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CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION



2023 MIDYEAR REPORT

PUBLISHED DECEMBER 28, 2023





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OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

The Department is led by the Superintendent of Police, who is appointed by the Mayor.

In addition to overall Department management, the Office of the Superintendent is responsible for critical functions such as planning and implementing the Community Policing Strategy, facilitating and coordinating law enforcement services, planning police coverage at public gatherings, addressing legal and legislative matters, administering labor agreements, and providing a liaison to the news media.



Superintendent of Police

Larry Snelling

OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING AND REFORM

The Office of Constitutional Policing & Reform is commanded by an Executive Director who reports directly to the Superintendent of Police. The office consists of the following division and groups: Administrative Support, Reform Management, and Training & Support.

The office is responsible for administrative operations, including the management of records, compliance, reform, and training.



Chief

Angel L. Novalez



Deputy Chief

Stephen Chung

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is overseen by a Commander and Lieutenant who report directly to a Bureau Chief.

The mission of the Chicago Police Department's Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is to review and analyze information that arises from Use of Force incidents in order to enhance Department Members' skills and ultimately make the City of Chicago safer for its Officers and citizens. The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is non-disciplinary in nature.



Commander

Sean G. Joyce



Lieutenant

Richard B.

DeFelice



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The Chicago Police Department established the Department's Force Review Division (later renamed the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division or TRED) in 2017 with the mission of reviewing and analyzing information that arises from use of force incidents. After establishing review procedures and an electronic use of force reporting application, the Force Review Division began conducting reviews on May 29, 2018.

On November 1, 2019, the Department issued its first-ever Firearm Pointing Incident (FPI) policy which requires a Department member to make a notification any time that a member points a firearm at a person while performing their duties. In conjunction with this policy, TRED created a new team that began to specifically review and analyze FPIs.

Beginning January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all Foot Pursuits involving Department members. Additionally, as of this same date, TRED commenced utilizing the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) for reviews of all Use of Force, Foot Pursuits, and Firearm Pointing Incidents.

TRED's review process involves examining Department reports and any associated video, including body-worn camera and in-car camera video. The reviews compare the facts of each incident with protocols which have been established by Department policy and training standards in order to identify opportunities for improvement. These reviews are designed to be non-disciplinary in nature. TRED utilizes these reviews to make both individual and Department-wide recommendations related to training, policy, and equipment.

Beginning in 2022, the 4th Amendment Stop Review Unit merged with TRED. These two units together make up the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the TRED 2023 Mid-Year Report is to provide an overview of findings and recommendations related to Use of Force, Firearm Pointing Incidents, and Foot Pursuits. An analysis of these findings is critical to enhancing both community member safety and officer safety and reducing the risk of civil liability to Department members.

Note on information reported:

The information and data contained in this document is indicative of IDRs generated from January 1 through June 30, 2023.

Data for this report was drawn from Department tables and is accurate as of October 10, 2023. Information in this report is subject to change based upon any subsequent reporting or processing of the relevant information. Also, please note that beginning with the 2021 Q4 report, TRED started producing reports based on the date of occurrence rather than date of TRED review. This change aligns TRED reports with published data dashboards as well as reports produced by other Department bureaus.

There are references to Consent Decree paragraphs throughout this report. These specific paragraphs are included in the appendix at the end of the report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) was fully implemented in 2023. The IDR collects all reports that TRED reviews within one computer application. This streamlines TRED reviews by implementing a holistic approach to incident review. See page 12 for a full description of the Incident Debriefing Report.

In response to a substantial number of BWC debriefing points, TRED began utilizing a new debriefing matrix to ensure accountability and consistency. When addressing BWC issues (No Activation, Late Activation, Early Deactivation, etc.), TRED utilizes the following debriefing progression: **1st Debriefing** - Review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" with Supervisor; **2nd Debriefing** - Review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" AND Review BWC Training Bulletin ETB 17-03 "Body Worn Camera" with a Supervisor AND view Streaming Video V423 "Officer Worn Body Camera Act 2022"; **3rd Debriefing** - Review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" AND Review BWC Training Bulletin ETB 17-03 "Body Worn Camera" with a Supervisor AND view Streaming Video V423 "Officer Worn Body Camera Act 2022 Updates." Additionally, the member will be re-enrolled in BWC E-Learning; **4th Debriefing** - The member will be required to attend BWC training with the Training and Support Group; and **5th Debriefing** - The following information will be forwarded to the unit's Commander and Captain: *The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division has progressively increased recommended training options for each incident requiring a debrief. TRED has exhausted all available training options at this time. This incident requires further corrective action to be determined by the affected member's unit/district, which should be documented in the Incident Debriefing Report upon completion.* It is expected that this new BWC matrix, along with increased training and district-level supervi-



sory accountability will reduce the number of BWC issues moving forward.

TRED also succeeded in training an additional 20 review officers in February, 2023. The on-boarding of these additional officers will help TRED conduct more reviews in a timely manner. Additionally, TRED began establishing the hiring criteria for the first civilian use of force reviewers. It is anticipated the first civilian reviewers will begin training before the end of 2023.

TRED continues to note a decrease in the debriefing point *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*. At the mid-year point of 2023, **3%** of all IDR's reviewed received this debriefing point compared to **12%** of TRR's reviewed in 2022.

Working with the Training and Support Group, TRED helped develop an eLearning module designed to provide instruction to all Department supervisors about conducting Public Safety questioning following an officer-involved shooting. All Department supervisors will be enrolled in this eLearning training module before the end of 2023.

TRAINING

TRED staff completed **16** hours of additional in-service training during 2023. This training is in addition to the annual 40-hour required minimum for Department members. Topics included, but were not limited to, Taser training and tactical room entry.

As previously mentioned, TRED supervisors also on-boarded **20** new TRED members. Training consisted of 24 hours of TRR review training (specific to the TRR review process). These new members also spent 2-4 weeks shadowing veteran reviewers to familiarize themselves with the TRR review process.

New members also received **7-10** hours of FPIR training (specific to the FPI review process). These new members also spent **6** hours shadowing veteran reviewers to familiarize themselves with the FPI review process.

TRED staff developed a lesson plan for the Foot Pursuit review process. TRED will now review all Foot Pursuits. This lesson plan was developed in conjunction with Department policy that was implemented in August of 2022. This will aid current and future TRED reviewers with the review process that comes along with Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports.

IDR OBSERVATIONS

After reviewing a use of force incident, firearm pointing incident or foot pursuit, TRED may issue a recommendation or an advisement. A recommendation is more formal in nature and requires that either the member's immediate supervisor or the Department's Training and Support Group conduct a debriefing and/or training session.

In comparison to a recommendation, an advisement is more informal in nature. These advisements are written debriefing points that provide involved members and supervisors with information that could potentially benefit them when engaged in or documenting a future use of force incident. Unlike recommendations, advisements do not require a formally documented debriefing or training session.

TRED issues recommendations and advisements for involved members, reviewing supervisors (generally the rank of sergeant), and investigating/approving supervisors (generally the rank of lieutenant).

TRED conducted **9,456** IDR reviews in the first half of 2023. A total of **1,087 (11.5%)** of the IDR reviews completed in the first half of 2023 led to advisements for involved members. There were a total of **2,175** training recommendations made representing **23%** of all IDR reviews.

The most commonly debriefed issue for Department members is body-worn camera compliance. The four most common body-worn camera compliance issues comprised a total of **1,456** debriefing points, which accounted for **20%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed. The four most common body-worn camera compliance issues include late camera activation, no activation, early deactivation, and no buffering.

The **1,473** TRRs reviewed in the first half of 2023 is an increase over the **1,268** TRRs reviewed in the second half of 2022. This was a **16%** increase in TRRs that TRED reviewed over the first half of 2023.

TRED reviewed **2,221** FPIRs in the first half of 2023. During the second half of 2022, TRED reviewed **1,873** FPIRs. This was an increase in **19%** of FPIRs reviewed by TRED at the mid-year point.

Beginning on January 1, 2023, TRED was required to review all Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports. In the first half of 2023, Department members submitted a total of **2,439** Foot Pursuit reports.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PATTERNS & TRENDS

Overall in 2023, body-worn camera compliance issues continue to be the main debriefing points issued by TRED. BWC-Late Activation has now become the most frequent debriefing point issued by TRED. This accounts for 15.6% of all IDR debriefing points for the involved member. The new BWC debriefing matrix was established to help address this issue.

In the first half of 2023, TRED noted an increase in the number of TRRs and FPIRs generated by Department members. A midyear analysis of the first seven months was conducted and, although there was an increase in the number of TRRs and FPIRs generated, the rise was comparable to an increase in the number of contacts police made with citizens as measured by arrests, Investigatory Stops, Traffic Stops, and Administrative Notice of Violations (ANOVs) during the same time period. As a percentage of each of these contact activity categories, the difference in the number of TRRs and FPIRs in the first seven months of 2022 versus the first seven months of 2023 is negligible. See the charts below for details. Additionally, increased training of and awareness among members regarding the proper documentation of use of force and firearm pointing incidents may also have contributed to an increase in reporting.

	2022	2023
TRRs	2,236	2,630 +18%
FPIRs	2,023	2,639 +30%
Arrests	24,802	27,552 +11%
ISRs	44,340	46,925 +6%
ANOVs	12,222	17,646 +44%
Traffic Stops	289,760	334,907 +16%

Year to Year Total Number of Reports per Incident: January - July (2022 - 2023)

	2022	2023
TRRs as % of Arrests	9.0%	9.5% +0.5%
TRRs as % of ISRs	5.0%	5.6% +0.6%
FPIRs as % of Arrests	8.2%	9.6% +0.5%
FPIRs as % of ISRs	4.6%	5.6% +1.0%
TRRs as % of Traffic Stops	0.8%	0.8% no change
FPIRs as % of Traffic Stops	0.7%	0.8% no change
TRRs as % of ANOVs	18.2%	14.9% -3.3%
FPIRs as % of ANOVs	16.5%	14.9% -1.6%

Year to Year Percent Increase/Decrease per Incident: January - July (2022 - 2023)

2023 GOALS & RECOMMENDATIONS

TRED continues to face IDR backlogs. Following the detail of 20 additional officers in February 2023, TRED created a new Notice of Job Opportunity to replenish and increase TRED personnel. TRED also began the process of creating a position for hiring civilian employees to conduct IDR reviews. TRED continues to grant overtime to officers who volunteer to work on their day off and extend their tours of duty. TRED has also requested that members of the unit no longer be deployed to the field when days off are cancelled. In the event days off are cancelled, TRED recommends that members remain at their unit and conduct reviews.

TRED has observed continued success in reducing the number of "Other" debriefing points in 2023. TRED attributes this to the increased training of unit members and heightened supervisory review.

TRED sees a need to provide more training to officers who have multiple debriefings for BWC violations. Accordingly, TRED's year-end goal is to continue working with the Training Support Group to create and conduct classes on the use and requirements of the BWC system.

TRED anticipates a need for more training of the Department's exempt staff related to Level 3 Use of Force investigations. In most instances, a Street Deputy with the rank of Deputy Chief responds to Level 3 Use of Force incidents. However, there may be times that other exempt members will be required to respond to these incidents. TRED intends to work with the Training Support Group on updating a lesson plan for all exempt members on Level 3 Use of Force investigation.

In 2023, TRED launched the Incident Debriefing Report. TRED's goal is to work with developers, supervisors, and officers to increase the use and functionality of this new application. Working with the Training Support Group, TRED will review feedback from all stakeholders to help evolve this application into a better tool for all users.

In the final 2023 Year-End Report, TRED anticipates reporting data related to the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU). For further reference, see Consent Decree paragraphs 800-877 related to stipulation regarding Investigatory Stops, Protective Pat Downs, and Enforcement of Loitering Ordinances, located in the Relevant Consent Decree Paragraphs section of this report.



MIDYEAR EVALUATION

574.575

January 1– June 30, 2023

A. *Foot Pursuit Pattern*

Beginning in 2023, TRED began reviewing all Foot Pursuits initiated by Department members. Through June 30, 2023, 2,439 Foot Pursuit reports were created. The most common debriefing point related to Foot Pursuits was Foot Pursuit-Documentation; the second most common debriefing point was Foot Pursuit-Partner Splitting. The Department's new Foot Pursuit policy became effective in August, 2022, likely accounting for the high number of debriefings for not properly documenting a member's Foot Pursuit. It is expected that with new training and greater supervisory review, the percentage of undocumented foot pursuits will decrease. TRED will monitor this pattern and make recommendations as needed.

B. *Body-Worn Camera Pattern*

TRED continues to see BWC issues as the top IDR debriefing point with Body-Worn Camera-Late Activation being the most common issue. To address this BWC pattern, TRED enrolls officers with three or more debriefings in the BWC eLearning module. Additionally, TRED worked with the Training Support Group to begin teaching a new BWC class for members with four or more BWC debriefings. TRED members conduct the in-person training of other unit members with the aim of reducing the number of BWC violations. TRED also created a new debriefing point, District/Unit Correction Action Required. This debriefing is issued when TRED has exhausted all its training recommendations and informs the member's unit that further action must be taken at the unit level to address the issue.

TRED will continue working with the Training and Support Group, Research and Development, and other Department bureaus to find ways to address this training issue.

C. *Public Safety Investigations*

TRED continued to see a pattern of supervisors not conducting proper Public Safety Investigations in the first half of 2023. Working with the Training & Support Group, TRED has recommended re-enrolling all supervisors in the Public Safety Investigation eLearning module. In addition, TRED worked with Bureau of Patrol to emphasize the need for Public Safety Investigations training at district roll calls. TRED will continue to monitor this pattern.

D. *De-Escalation/Force Mitigation Articulation Pattern*

Historically, De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated has been one of the most common debriefing points issued by TRED. The first half of 2023 has seen significant improvement in this area. TRED debriefed De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated in only 3% of the TRRs reviewed as of midyear 2023 compared to 2022 when this debriefing point was issued in 12% of TRRs reviewed.



TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

1 574,575

Tactical Review and Evaluation Division Staff

At the beginning of 2023, TRED was staffed with one Commander, one Lieutenant, seven Sergeants, and **34** Review Officers. In February of 2023, one additional Sergeant and **20** Review Officers were detailed to TRED, bringing the unit total up to **54** Review officers and eight Sergeants. By June 30th, 2023, the staffing level had fallen to **46** review officers and seven Sergeants.

The addition of **20** officers detailed to TRED gave the unit a 59% increase in review officers. TRED supervisory staff then conducted training to onboard the new review officers. These newly detailed officers proved instrumental in addressing the Incident Debriefing Report backlog.

TRED staff also began preparation of another Notice of Job Opportunity (NOJO) process so that the position can be posted in the second half of 2023. This NOJO process was initiated in order to have qualified applicants readily available in the event any current personnel are lost due to promotions, transfers, retirements, etc.

Staff Requirements

TRED staff is selected through a Notice of Job Opportunity (NOJO) process. Department members are encouraged to apply to the unit using a process delineated by the Human Resources Division.

TRED members are required to have a minimum of five years of experience. Officers must demonstrate a thorough working knowledge of Department policy and directives related to foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, search warrants, and use of force incidents.

Additionally, members must have an established working knowledge of Department computer applications and informational databases. Applicants must also have an acceptable disciplinary record, no outstanding debt to the City of Chicago, and an acceptable history of medical roll use and attendance.

Once applicants are detailed to the TRED they are trained by TRED staff to perform the functions of a TRED review officer. This training includes Department policy refresher sessions regarding how policy and Department training materials relate and apply to the TRED review process.

Reviewers are then trained on using Department resources to gather and review all the information that is associated with an incident. This includes systems used to view body-worn camera and in-car camera video.

New TRED reviewers shadow veteran TRED reviewers to gain familiarity with the review process and complete their training.



TRED Training

All sworn Department members were required to attend **40** hours of in-service training during 2023. TRED makes recommendations based on tactics, equipment, and training after reviewing different types of incidents. To ensure that TRED reviewers have the foundation necessary for critical review, they are required to attend additional in-service training.

As of midyear 2023, TRED reviewers attended an additional **16** hours of training with the Training and Support Group. This training consisted of:



8 hours Taser Training



8 hours Tactical Room Entry Training

Continuous Training

TRED conducts weekly staff meetings on Wednesdays where Department-required training is presented. TRED also uses this as an opportunity to analyze and discuss policy changes that may impact the TRED review process and any trends observed while conducting reviews. Incidents that have training value are also presented. These incidents allow TRED staff to ensure that there is consistency in both the review process and training recommendations that are being made to Department members.



INCIDENT DEBRIEFING REPORT

The Incident Debriefing Report Origin

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is tasked with reviewing use-of-force incidents, firearm pointing incidents, and foot pursuits. These incidents are documented in the Tactical Response Report (TRR), Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR), and the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report (FP). The TRR and the FP reports are completed by the Department member involved in the incident. A FPIR is automatically created after the Department member makes the required notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communication (OEMC). Prior to 2023, TRED reviewed TRRs and documented their findings in the Tactical Response Report Review (TRR-R). TRED also reviewed FPIRs and documented their findings in the FPIR review section. With the additional task of reviewing foot pursuits, TRED would be required to document their reviews in a Foot Pursuit Review Report. Under this method, it was conceivable that if a Department member was involved in a foot pursuit that involved a firearm pointing and ended in a use-of-force, TRED would review and document its findings in three separate reports. The involved Department member would then be debriefed on three separate occasions for what was essentially one incident. TRED also debriefed reviewing and investigating supervisors in the same document. This made it difficult for Department members to understand and separate the individual training that was required.

In 2022, in anticipation of reviewing foot pursuits, the decision was made to create the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR). The IDR facilitates a comprehensive review of an incident. Each member that is involved in the incident—the involved member and the reviewing and investigating supervisors—receive their own report. One TRED reviewer analyzes the entire incident and any combination of TRRs, FPIRs, and FPs that it may involve. This allows the reviewer to understand the totality of the circumstances around the incident and make an informed

decision when it comes to recommending training.

This method also allows TRED to target training specific to each Department member as well as recommend training that corresponds with a particular debriefing point. Frontline supervisors are required to document the specific training that members receive. Frontline supervisors are also allowed to document instances when they do not concur with TRED's assessment. This provides valuable feedback when a supervisor's firsthand knowledge of the member's performance is needed to add context that TRED did not have during its review.

The IDR also creates efficiency in TRED's process. The total number of IDRs is significantly higher than the total number of TRRs and FPIRs reviewed in previous reporting periods. This is because the system automatically generates an IDR not only for the involved member(s), but also for the reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In practice, it does not take a TRED reviewer any longer to process three IDRs than a TRR-R from the same involved member, reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. The efficiency surfaces when there are multiple involved members with the same reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In these cases, TRED reviewers do not need to repeat the information in every report for the same two supervisors.

The IDR also eliminates the separate data silos that contained TRED debriefing data. Instead of having separate TRR debriefing data and FPIR debriefing data, all the data is now contained in one IDR data set. As a result, this report will present some data differently than previous reports. For example, previously, if an involved member did not activate their body-worn camera in accordance with policy during an incident in which a foot pursuit, firearm pointing, and use-of-force all occurred, TRED would report on this data point in both the TRR



and FPIR review sections. Now, using the IDR data, TRED can report this as one body-worn camera debriefing, for one member, in one incident. In addition, TRED has received feedback from field personnel and its own reviewers that the IDR is easier to understand and use.



IDR CREATION

¶ 228, 229, 234

TRR #1
Involved Member A
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

TRR #2
Involved Member B
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FP #1
Involved Member A
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FP #1
Involved Member C
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor


FPIR #1
Involved Beat Member
Involved Beat Member

Each member in an incident, whether they are an involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor, only receives one IDR for an incident.

In the diagram below, three separate involved members, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor were involved in these five reports. Previously, each member or supervisor would have required documentation in every report that they authored, reviewed, or approved.

The IDR generates only one report for each member.

When the IDR has been reviewed, debriefed, and approved, it is attached electronically to every associated TRR, FPIR, or FP.





TRED REVIEW

IDRs Reviewed by TRED

The Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) is used by TRED to document reviews of foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, and use-of-force incidents.

TRED now reviews all foot pursuit incidents. TRED reviewed **2,439** foot pursuits that occurred from January 1, 2023 through June 30, 2023.

TRED reviews all firearm pointing incidents. TRED reviewed **2,221** firearm pointing incidents that occurred from January 1, 2023 through June 30, 2023.

TRED reviews use-of-force incidents documented in Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) based on the TRR level.


The level of a TRR is determined by a combination of different factors including the force options used by the Department member or injuries to a person.

TRED reviews a randomly selected **5%** of all Level 1 TRRs. TRED also reviews all Level 1 TRRs associated with a foot pursuit or firearm pointing incident. TRED also reviews any Level 1 TRR that is associated with another TRR that TRED is required to review. TRED reviewed **706** Level 1 TRRs that occurred from January 1, 2023 through June 30, 2023.

TRED reviews all Level 2 TRRs. TRED reviewed **734** Level 2 TRRs that occurred from January 1, 2023 through June 30, 2023.

TRED does not review Level 3 TRRs. These are reviewed by the Force Review Board.

9,456 individual Incident Debriefing Reports were created and used by TRED to document these reviews.






IDR TOTALS


TRRs and IDRs January 1, 2023- June 30, 2023

Every TRR generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor. Multiple TRRs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor and will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.




FPIRs and IDRs January 1, 2023- June 30, 2023

Every FPIR generates an IDR for the involved beat which may have one involved member or, in many cases, two involved members. In some cases, the FPIR generates IDRs for more than two members involved in the same incident (e.g., when two units each staffed with two officers are involved in an incident and at least one officer from each unit points their firearm).



FPs and IDRs January 1, 2023- June 30, 2023

Every FP generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and, in some cases, one investigating supervisor. Multiple FPs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor and will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.






IDRs Generated and Reviewed by TRED

TRED began using the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) to review and debrief incidents beginning on March 17, 2023. TRED reviewed **1,473** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs), **2,221** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **2,439** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports, which in turn generated **9,456** Incident Debriefing Reports (IDRs) in the first half of 2023.

This means that TRED evaluated **9,456** individual members in their role as either the involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor in an incident. These incidents include a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit or any combination thereof.

Total IDRs Generated January 1, 2023 - June 30, 2023





TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT TOTALS

¶ 153,156,157, 161,162,220


Tactical Response Report Totals



TOTAL TRRs
JAN 1, 2023 -
JUN 30, 2023



TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED



% OF TOTAL
TRRs
REVIEWED



(6 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL TRRs




(6 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
% OF TRRs
REVIEWED



TOTAL TRRs
JUL 1, 2022 -
DEC 31, 2022



TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED



% OF TOTAL
TRRs
REVIEWED


In the first six months of 2023, there were **2,133** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) created due to use of force incidents. TRED reviewed **1,473** or **69%** of all TRRs because they were either a random sample, flagged for review based on level classification, or associated with an incident that was flagged for review. In comparison to the second half of 2022, there were **1,839** TRRs generated, with TRED reviewing **1,268 (69%)**.

The first six months of 2023 saw a **16%** increase in the number of TRRs created compared to the last six months of 2022. As a result, TRED reviewed **16%** more TRRs overall than in the previous six months.



¶ 153,156,157, 161, 162, 220

Tactical Response Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023– June 30, 2023



In the first six months of 2023, an average of **355** TRRs were generated each month. In the second half of 2022, the average monthly number of TRRs was **306**. At the midyear point of 2023, there were **3,589** IDRs created involving a use of force incident. This resulted in an average of **598** IDRs created each month. Overall, the number of TRRs documenting use of force by Department members is trending upward over a one-year span beginning July 1, 2022. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.



TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORTS

¶ 153,156,157, 161

% of TRRs Reviewed Sorted by District

Unit	Total TRRs	TRRs Reviewed	% of TRRs Reviewed
001	82	61	74%
002	75	44	59%
003	103	76	74%
004	79	52	66%
005	90	64	71%
006	154	115	75%
007	122	86	70%
008	58	42	72%
009	57	47	82%
010	131	91	69%
011	168	126	75%
012	96	76	79%
014	38	24	63%
015	91	61	67%
016	35	16	46%
017	38	23	61%
018	91	61	67%
019	81	56	69%
020	28	20	71%
022	71	22	31%
024	74	47	64%
025	94	67	71%

On average, TRED reviewed **67%** of TRRs generated by each district in 2023. The 022nd District had the lowest percentage of TRRs reviewed (**31%**), while the 009th District had the highest percentage of TRRs reviewed (**82%**). Overall, TRED reviewed **67%** of all TRRs generated by the Department's 22 police districts.

TRR Reviews by Force Level




The use of force level classifications were reduced from a four-level system to a three-level system in 2020. After this modification, a higher proportion of instances started to be categorized as Level 2 uses of force.

The overall total number of TRR reviews has increased in the first half of 2023. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.



Force Options Reported by TRRs Submitted



A

A Level 1 use of force is any reportable use of force by a Department member to overcome the active resistance of a subject that does not rise to a Level 2 or Level 3 reportable use of force. This would include force that is reasonably expected to cause pain or injury, but does not result in injury or complaint of injury. The following techniques are Level 1 reportable uses of force when applied in response to active resistance and do not result in injury or complaint of injury: wristlocks, arm bars, leg sweeps, weaponless defense techniques, or takedowns. It is not a reportable use of force when a member escorts, touches, or handcuffs a person who offers no or minimal resistance and the encounter does not result in injury or complaint of injury.

65% of the TRRs that were reviewed indicated a Level 1 use of force. The majority of these (85%) indicated a physical force option and/or control tactics that did not result in injury or complaint of injury.

A Level 2 use of force by a Department member includes use of a less lethal weapon that causes injury or results in a complaint of injury, but does not rise to a Level 3 reportable use of force. Force options in this level include: discharge of an OC device, discharge of a Taser, impact weapon strikes to any part of the body other than the head or neck, use of impact munitions, any physical apprehension by canine, any reportable use of force against a handcuffed subject, and any Level 1 reportable use of force that results in injury or complaint of injury.

35% of the TRRs reviewed indicated a Level 2 use of force by the involved member. The majority of these (36%) indicated a physical force option and/or control tactics that resulted in an injury or complaint of injury.

50 TRRs documented the discharge of a Taser. Taser discharges represent 2% of TRRs submitted at the mid-year point of 2023.



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188,189,190,192,193,195,196

1

FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT OCCURS

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while in the performance of his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

2

OEMC IS NOTIFIED

OEMC takes the notification of the involved member's beat. OEMC generates an event for Firearm Pointing (PNT) which is tied to the original incident that the member responded to.

3

OEMC NOTIFIES THE BEAT'S SUPERVISOR

The member's supervisor is notified of the beat number that was involved in a Firearm Pointing Incident. The supervisor will document the incident on their Supervisor's Management Log and ensure that appropriate documentation of the incident is completed. They will also ensure that ICC and BWC video is appropriately retained.

4

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION REVIEWS THE FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

A Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR) is automatically generated in Clearnet. TRED gathers documentation related to the incident. If no Arrest Report or Investigatory Stop Report was completed for the incident, TRED does not continue reviewing the incident. TRED then reviews available video of the incident in conjunction with written documentation. TRED identifies any tactical, equipment, or training concerns. TRED also identifies whether the pointing of a firearm at a person allegedly violated department policy. TRED will ensure that appropriate complaint and disciplinary procedures are followed involving obvious policy violations. FPIRs that do not result in a training recommendation are closed.

5

TRED SENDS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

TRED issues written notifications of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to address any tactical, equipment, or training concerns to the notifying beat's executive officer and unit commanding officer.

6

FOLLOW-UP ACTION

The notifying beat's unit commanding officer ensures that the written communication (FPIR) has been received by the notifying beat's immediate supervisor and informs the notifying beat's chain of command of the written notification of recommendations. They ensure that recommendations are appropriately implemented and documented in the debriefing section of the FPIR. Debriefings are approved by the notifying beat's chain of command and the FPIR is closed.



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 196





FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT TOTALS

¶ 190, 191, 192, 193

Firearm Pointing Incident Report Totals




TOTAL FPIRs
JAN 1, 2023 -
JUN 30, 2023



FPIRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED



% OF TOTAL
FPIRs
REVIEWED



(6 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL FPIRs



(6 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
% OF FPIRs
REVIEWED



TOTAL FPIRs
JUL 1, 2022 -
DEC 31, 2022



FPIRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED




% OF TOTAL
FPIRs
REVIEWED

At the midyear point of 2023, there were **2,221** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports created due to firearm pointing incidents. TRED is now required to review all Firearm Pointing Incident Reports. There were **15** FPIRs created that were not reviewed by TRED. These **15** FPIRs were duplicates, and the incident was reviewed under an associated FPIR number.

The first six months of 2023 saw a **19%** increase in the number of FPIRs created compared to the last six months of 2022. As a result, TRED reviewed **19%** more FPIRs overall than in the previous six months.



Firearm Pointing Incident Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023 – June 30, 2023



In the first six months of 2023, an average of **370** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports were generated each month. In the second half of 2022, the average monthly number of FPIRs generated was **298**. This is a **19%** increase in FPIRs in the first six months of 2023 compared to the last six months of 2022. As of midyear 2023, there are **6,023** total IDRs involving a firearm pointing incident. In other words, an average of **1,008** IDRs involving a firearm pointing incident were created each month. Overall, FPIRs have been trending upward since the beginning of 2022. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.



FPI REPORTING ERROR

¶ 190, 191, 192, 193, 194

FPIs Reported in Error


Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while performing his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

The exceptions to this notification requirement included:

Department members assigned as a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team members, who point a firearm at a person during the course of a designated SWAT incident.

Department members assigned to a federal task force, who point a firearm at a person during the execution of the federal task force duties.

Department members un-holstering or displaying their firearm or having the firearm in a “ready” position (e.g. low ready, position “SUL”) or any other position during the course of an incident , unless the firearm is pointed at a person.





FOOT PURSUIT REPORT

168,169

Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report Totals




TOTAL FPs
JAN 1, 2023 -
JUN 30, 2023




FPs
REVIEWED
BY TRED



% OF TOTAL
FPs
REVIEWED



(6 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL FPs




(6 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
% OF FPs
REVIEWED



TOTAL FPs
AUG 29, 2022 -
DEC 31, 2022



FPs
REVIEWED
BY TRED




% OF TOTAL
FPs
REVIEWED

Beginning January 1, 2023, TRED was tasked with reviewing every Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report created by Department members. After a foot pursuit incident occurs, the involved member creates a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report. A unit-level reviewing supervisor then routes the reviewed Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report to the District Watch Operations Lieutenant if it is associated with a reportable use of force or an arrest. If a reportable use of force or an arrest is not associated with the foot pursuit, the unit-level reviewing supervisor routes the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report directly to TRED.

The Department policy on Foot Pursuits was implemented on August 29, 2022. Consequently, data related to foot pursuits was limited for most of 2022.



Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023- June 30, 2023




In the first six months of 2023, **2,439** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports were created. This is an average of **407** Foot Pursuit Reports generated monthly by Department members in the first six months of 2023. As of midyear, **5,396** IDRs involving a foot pursuit were generated. This resulted in an average of **899** IDRs each month.



IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS

IDR Recommendations Jan 1- Jun 30, 2023




As of midyear 2023, Department members submitted a total of **2,133** Tactical Response Reports, **2,221** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **2,439** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports. The sum of these submitted reports created **10,571** Incident Debriefing Reports that were flagged for review for TRED. Overall, at the midyear point of 2023, TRED reviewed a total of **1,914** incidents. Of the **9,456** IDR reports reviewed by TRED, **7,536 (79.7%)** had no debriefing points. This means that TRED did not recommend any additional training.

When TRED reviews a TRR and a training opportunity presents itself, an “Advisement” or a “Recommendation” is made to the involved members, reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. An Advisement is recommended training that is detailed in the TRED review and issued directly to the involved Department member. These are issued for minor policy and procedure infractions. A Recommendation is recommended training that is conducted by the involved member’s immediate supervisor or the Training and Support Group (training academy). These are made for involved members who have repeated debriefings for the same policy issue or debriefings that have officer safety implications. In **1,087** reviews, TRED made an Advisement for training. This represents **11.5%** of all IDRs reviewed. Overall, a Recommendation for training was made on **2,175** instances, which represents **23%** of all total IDRs reviewed.



% of IDRs Reviewed with Debriefing Points



Implementation of TRED reviews using the IDR platform in Clearnet began in March. As of June 30, 2023, the percentage of IDRs reviewed by TRED that contain debriefing points has remained consistent.

In 2022, the Department implemented an 8-hour De-escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force in-service training course for every Department member. Also, the Department implemented an 8-hour Annual Supervisor Training in-service course. These trainings were created by the Training and Support Group in collaboration with TRED. These trainings highlight many of the most common debriefing points that are issued by TRED as a way to address these debriefing point issues.



IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS


IDR Roles

“Involved member” refers to the Department member who reports a use of force, firearm pointing, or a foot pursuit. Every incident has at least one involved member. Many incidents are comprised of more than one involved member.

The “reviewing supervisor”¹ is the Department member responsible for reviewing a report submitted by an involved member. Most incidents only have one reviewing supervisor regardless of the number of involved members. For an incident that only involves a firearm pointing, there is no reviewing supervisor. The firearm pointing incident report is not generated by the involved member and thus does not require a supervisory review.


The “investigating supervisor” is the Department member responsible for authorizing final approval of submitted reports. In most incidents, the investigating supervisor is the Watch Operations Lieutenant in the district of occurrence.

IDRs with Involved Member Debriefing Point (IDMPs)



Involved member refers to the member who was involved in a use of force incident, firearm pointing incident, foot pursuit, or any combination thereof.

IDRs With IDMPs as % of IDRs Reviewed




In 2023, IDRs with Involved Member (IM) debriefing points are trending downward.

¹Language in the consent decree refers to “Responding Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Reviewing Supervisor.” The data included on these pages is for the “Responding Supervisor” as defined in the consent decree.




IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Debriefing Points (RSDPs)




Reviewing Supervisor refers to the supervisor who is responsible for completing the reviewing supervisor section of the Tactical Response Report or Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report.

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor² Debriefing Point (ISDPs)




Investigating Supervisor refers to the supervisor who is responsible for investigating the use of force incident, approving the TRR, and completing the Tactical Response Report-Investigation (TRR-I) and the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review Section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report.

IDRs with RS DPs as % of IDRs Reviewed



In the first six months of 2023, IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor debriefing points trend consistently on a monthly basis.

IDRs with IS DPs as % of IDRs Reviewed



In the first six months of 2023, IDRs with Investigating Supervisor debriefing points trend consistently on a monthly basis.

² Language in the consent decree refers to "Reviewing Supervisor" whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as "Approving Supervisor." The data included on these pages is for the "Reviewing Supervisor" as defined in the consent decree.



INVOLVED MEMBER RECOMMENDATIONS


¶ 153,162,168,169,170, 177, 178, 199,183, 202,203,205,207,208,210, 220, 236, 238, 239

IDRs with Debriefing Points and Percentages for Involved Members

TRED began using the Incident Debriefing Report to review submitted reports on March 17, 2023. The IDR platform allows TRED to review the entire incident as a whole whether a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination of these occurs. When two or more of these occur in the same incident, the combination is compiled into one TRED review. In the past, TRED would review each occurrence individually. If an incident occurred involving a use of force, firearm pointing, and/or a foot pursuit, a TRED reviewer would have to perform up to three separate reviews.

TRED members review submitted reports to ensure the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident are thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with Department policy. When applicable, TRED recommends additional training or policy review for the involved members, reviewing supervisors, and/or investigating supervisors via the IDR Clearnet application.

As of midyear 2023, TRED reviewed **9,456** IDRs. The most common debriefing point for involved members is for *BWC-Late Activation*. This accounted for **15.6%** of all involved member debriefing points (**7,707**). Although most incidents are captured on BWC video, Department policy requires the BWC to be activated at the beginning of an incident. TRED stresses this issue because of the importance of memorializing words and actions of both Department members and citizens that occur prior to, during, and after the incident.





IDRs WITH BWC RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 236, 237, 238, 239

IDRs with Involved Member Body-Worn Camera Recommendations

1,199

BWC - LATE
ACTIVATION

124

BWC - NO
ACTIVATION

95

BWC -
EARLY
DEACTIVATION

38

BWC -
NO
BUFFERING

As of midyear 2023, TRED reviewed **7,113** IDRs created by involved members. There were **1,199** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-Late Activation* and this represents **17%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed. There were **124** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-No Activation*, which represents **1.7%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed.

BWC-Late Activation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the Department member is late in activating the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident to record all law-enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

BWC-No Activation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when there is no BWC activation found for the involved member. As required by policy, the Department member will activate the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident and record the entire incident for all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

BWC-Early Deactivation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the involved member

deactivates their BWC prior to the conclusion of the incident in its entirety. The Department member will not deactivate event mode unless the entire incident has been recorded and the member is no longer engaged in a law enforcement-related activity.

BWC-No Buffering is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when a TRED reviewer observes that there is two minutes or less of buffering period when the BWC is activated. According to policy, Department members will at the beginning of the tour of duty ensure the BWC is on buffering mode prior to leaving the station.



IDRs with Involved Member BWC Late Activation and BWC No Activation Debriefing Points by Unit

Unit	IDRs With 'BWC Late Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC Late Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed	IDRs With BWC No Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC No Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed
001	15.5%	47	304	1.6%	5	304
002	16.3%	88	540	1.3%	7	540
003	11.5%	114	989	0.7%	7	989
004	16.5%	22	293	0.7%	2	293
005	14.4%	58	403	1.7%	7	403
006	11.2%	90	804	1.2%	10	804
007	8.3%	55	664	0.5%	3	664
008	16.9%	62	366	1.1%	4	366
009	11.5%	33	287	0.7%	2	287
010	11.5%	75	652	1.1%	7	652
011	16.9%	142	838	1.1%	9	838
012	9.6%	32	333	1.2%	4	333
014	11.6%	19	164	2.4%	4	164
015	6.3%	39	619	1.8%	11	619
016	5.3%	5	95	0.0%	0	95
017	5.8%	7	121	1.7%	2	121
018	10.5%	33	313	2.6%	8	313
019	10.3%	23	223	0.4%	1	223
020	4.5%	3	66	1.5%	1	66
022	14.6%	44	302	0.7%	2	302
024	9.8%	19	194	0.5%	1	194
025	7.9%	38	480	0.4%	2	480
044	9.0%	7	78	2.6%	2	78
189	6.9%	2	29	3.4%	1	29
193	13.9%	5	36	0.0%	0	36
211	19.9%	29	146	1.4%	2	146
212	24.1%	14	58	1.7%	1	58
213	15.8%	3	19	0.0%	0	19
214	28.9%	22	76	0.0%	0	76
215	11.1%	3	27	11.1%	3	27
222	100.0%	1	1	0.0%	0	1
353	9.1%	1	11	9.1%	1	11
606	13.4%	18	134	2.2%	3	134
608	100.0%	1	1	100.0%	1	1
610	17.4%	4	23	8.7%	2	23
620	7.7%	2	26	0.0%	0	26
640	15.0%	3	20	10.0%	2	20
701	11.6%	13	112	1.8%	2	112
704	12.5%	6	48	4.2%	2	48
715	7.7%	1	13	0.0%	0	13
716	12.6%	17	135	3.7%	5	135

The most concerning debriefing points for TRED are *BWC-No Activation* and *BWC-Late Activation*. BWC video is crucial for the review of a use of force incident. It is also vital for the involved member and the Department to memorialize the events leading up to and including the use of force incident.

In some cases of *BWC-Late Activation*, the words and actions of both the involved member and the citizen leading up to the use of force incident are not recorded on audio, video, or both.

Debriefing points for *BWC-No Activation* remains low. IDRs with debriefing point *BWC-No Activation* as a percentage of a unit's IDRs reviewed had a median value of **1.3%**.



IDRs FOOT PURSUIT RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

168,169,170

IDRs with Foot Pursuit Associated Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2023



9,456

IDRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED




2,439

FOOT
PURSUIT
INDICATED



26%

% OF IDRs
WITH FP
INDICATED




74%

% OF IDRs
WITH NO FP
INDICATED

In the first six months of 2023, TRED reviewed 9,456 total IDRs. TRED reviewed 2,439 IDRs associated with a foot pursuit. When a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is created, TRED reviews the IDRs generated for the involved member, reviewing supervisor, and, when applicable, the investigating supervisor. At of midyear 2023, 26% of all IDRs created are due to foot pursuits.

Debriefing Points of IDRs Associated with FPs



For the first six months of 2023, the most common debriefing point from IDRs which involve a foot pursuit is *Foot Pursuit-Documentation*. TRED recommends this debriefing point when an involved member is involved in a foot pursuit and there is no Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report submitted by that member.

The second most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Partner Splitting*. Given the inherent risk of a foot pursuit and absent exigent circumstances, partner splitting may compromise safety, hinder effective communication between partners, prevent the ability to provide assistance during a foot pursuit, or create a situation that places the Department member at a tactical disadvantage.

Foot Pursuit-Supervisor Other, is the third most common debriefing point. TRED recommends this debriefing point when a reviewing supervisor incorrectly routes the report (either to TRED or the WOL) and/or other approval deficiencies occur.



DE-ESCALATION AND FORCE MITIGATION

¶ 153, 156, 157, 161, 162, 183, 220

IDRs with Involved Member De-Escalation Force Mitigation Articulation Debriefing Points

1,473

TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED

45

IDR
RECOMMENDATIONS

3%

% OF IDRs WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS

The debriefing point for *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* was added to the Tactical Response Report Review (TRR-R) after TRED identified a common issue in which a member checks force mitigation boxes on the TRR but neglects to describe these efforts with specificity in the narrative of their report. Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need to use force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time. The details that the involved member describes serves to articulate the totality of the circumstances, including why force was necessary despite the involved member's de-escalation and force mitigation efforts.

TRED reviewers recommend this debriefing point when involved members fail to fully articulate with specificity their force mitigation effort(s). Department policy requires members to describe force mitigation efforts in detail, not simply provide a list of force mitigation efforts when writing a report narrative. In the first six months of 2023, **3%** of TRRs reviewed received a debriefing point for *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*. This is a **9%** decrease from 2022 when **12%** of the TRRs reviewed received this debriefing point.

Overall, there has been a downward trend in the number of *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* debriefing points issued by TRED since 2021 when **20%** of TRRs received this debriefing.


This encouraging trend for the first half of 2023 may result from the impact of TRED debriefing efforts in conjunction with Department training that occurred in 2022. The Training and Support Group developed Department-wide in-service training for Department members to attend in 2022 comprised of an 8-hour Force Communications class and an 8-hour Use of Force Procedures class. These courses emphasized the need to articulate de-escalation/force mitigation efforts in the TRR narrative. TRED will continue to monitor this positive trend.



SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

¶ 156.217

IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers




When misconduct is observed or an allegation of misconduct is made, a Complaint Log (CL) number is obtained from the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA). This initiates the investigatory process.

Although TRED does not have access to COPA's records regarding the total of CL numbers initiated regarding use of force incidents, reviewing and investigating supervisors are required to enter a CL number into the TRR-I or the Watch Operations Lieutenants Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report whenever they are obtained for an allegation of misconduct.

In the first six months of 2023, **469 (5%)** of IDRs that were flagged for review were associated with a CL number. These **469** IDRs derived from **94** total incidents.


IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers Jan - Jun 2023



469 IDRs that were flagged for review had an associated CL number due to alleged misconduct. On average, there were **78** IDRs generated each month that were associated with a CL number.



Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred at Time of Incident




Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred is the data point TRED uses to track how often an involved member’s unit supervisor undertakes and documents corrective action at the time (or shortly after) an incident occurs.

Through June 30, 2023, unit supervisors documented corrective action on **295** IDRs. This means that during the course of the supervisory investigation, the investigating supervisor documented a CL number in the TRR-I or the Watch Operations Lieutenants Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. As a reminder, supervisors are not required to review the Firearm Pointing Incident report and there an investigatory review of Foot Pursuits only when a use of force or an arrest is associated with the pursuit.

During pre-service promotional classes for Sergeants and Lieutenants, TRED instructors emphasize to front-line supervisors when and how to identify training opportunities. Identifying, addressing, and documenting training opportunities is stressed.

Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred at Time of Incident Jan 1 - Jun 30 as % of Reviewed IDRs




In 2020, the Department began collecting information on unit corrective action taken at the time of occurrence. This data is stored in the TRR data table.

With the 2023 implementation of the IDR system, this data is now kept in IDR data tables. TRED will continue to collect and monitor this data.



REVIEWING SUPERVISOR¹ RECOMMENDATIONS

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the reviewing supervisor (Sergeant or above) complete the responsibilities outlined in General Orders *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if reviewing supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident.

In the first half of 2023, there were **1,685** IDRs generated for reviewing supervisors. TRED issued **162** debriefing points for reviewing supervisors. The most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Foot Pursuit-Supervisor Other* (**50 - 30.9%**). TRED makes a recommendation for this issue if a reviewing supervisor does not submit his supervisory review of a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant in a timely manner or the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routes the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to TRED or the Watch Operations Lieutenant.

The second most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Notification Deficiency-E.T.* (**12 - 0.7%**). TRED will debrief this issue when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of citizens and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured or allege injury or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a citizen is injured or alleges injury during a use of force incident.

Debriefing point *Narrative Deficiency-RS* was also issued on **12 (.7%)** occasions. TRED commonly debriefs this issue when a reviewing supervisor fails to fully articulate and document any injury and the location of the injury to the person against whom force was used.

92%, or **1,545** of the **1,685** IDRs, had no Recommendations issued from TRED reviews.

¹Language in the consent decree refers to “Responding Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Reviewing Supervisor.” The data included on these pages is for the “Responding Supervisor” as defined in the consent decree.



Foot Pursuit-Supv Other Debriefing Points Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2023

During the first half of 2023, TRED issued the *Foot Pursuit-Supv Other* debriefing point in **50** IDRs. In **20** of these instances, the reviewing supervisor did not submit their review of a foot pursuit to the Watch Operations Lieutenant in a timely manner. This, in turn, prolongs the Watch Operations Lieutenant's review of the foot pursuit incident beyond the 48 hour review period.

Further, there are **19** instances in which the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routed the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. When there is a use of force or an arrest associated with a foot pursuit, it is the responsibility of the reviewing supervisor to route the reports to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for review. For foot pursuits that do not involve a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor is required to route the report to TRED for review. The remainder of these debriefing points are attributable to miscellaneous documentation and/or review deficiencies.

The relative frequency of these two issues can be attributed to the recent implementation of the foot pursuit review policy. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Notification Deficiency-E.T. Debriefing Points Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2023

TRED issues this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of citizens and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured or allege injury or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a citizen is injured during a use of force incident.

As of midyear 2023, TRED has issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **12** IDR reviews.

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Response to Scene Debriefing Points Jan 1- Jun 30, 2023

This debriefing point was added to the TRR-R in 2020. To ensure that front line supervisors respond to the scene of use of force incidents, the Department revised its directives to require supervisors to respond to scenes of any Level 2 or Level 3 use of force incident. As of midyear 2023, TRED has issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **3** IDR reviews. TRED issues this debriefing point when a reviewing supervisor does not respond to a Level 2 or Level 3 use of force or does not fully articulate the circumstances when they could not respond to the scene as required by Department policy.


The low occurrence frequency of this issue may be attributable to both the Department's efforts to cover this point during in-service training as well as TRED stressing this topic in the pre-service supervisor training.



INVESTIGATING SUPERVISOR¹ RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 225, 230, 231, 234, 235, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor¹ Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the investigating supervisor (Lieutenant or above) complete responsibilities outlined in General Order *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if investigating supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or an incident involving a foot pursuit.

The most common debriefing point for investigating supervisors is “*Investigating Supervisor-BWC Issue Not Addressed.*” TRED began using this debriefing point in 2022. This issue is typically debriefed when TRED issues a recommendation to an involved member for *BWC-Late Activation* and the investigating supervisor did not address this issue with the member during the course of their TRR investigation.

The second most common debriefing point is for “*Foot Pursuit-Over 48 hours.*” These debriefings are issued by TRED when the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review is not completed within 48 hours of the pursuit and there is no indication that an extension request has been approved.

The third most common debriefing point is for “*Foot Pursuit-Supv Other.*” In the beginning of 2023, TRED used a catch-all debriefing point for deficiencies related to policies and procedures contained in *G69-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED staff recognized the generality of this debriefing point shortly after the new IDR was implemented and added specific debriefing points in order to reduce the amount of times that this debriefing point was issued. These debriefing points are described below.

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor¹ Foot Pursuit - Supervisor Other Debriefing Points

The “*Foot Pursuit-Supv Other*” debriefing point was manually sub-categorized in preparation of this report. Accordingly, TRED added the most common debriefing issues for which this debriefing point was being used to the IDR in order to more accurately capture that data. Two debriefing points added to the IDR are *Foot Pursuit-Approval Over 48 hours W/O Extension Request (19)* and *Foot Pursuit Initiation (3)*.

This “*Foot Pursuit-Supv Other*” debriefing point is also used by TRED in **five** instances in which the Watch Operations Lieutenant did not review BWC of the foot pursuit incident. There are also **four** instances in which the Watch Operations Lieutenant did not check the compliance box located within the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. These issues may be attributable to the recent adoption of the foot pursuit policy. TRED will continue to monitor these debriefing issues.

The remainder were for miscellaneous advisements and recommendations related to policy and procedure requirements of the Watch Operations Lieutenant outlined in *G69-07 Foot Pursuits*.


¹Language in the consent decree refers to “*Reviewing Supervisor*” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “*Investigating Supervisor,*” The data included on these pages is for the “*Reviewing Supervisor*” as defined in the consent decree.



OC DISCHARGE INCIDENTS

¶ 173, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 235

TRRs with Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Discharge



There were **four** total OC discharge incidents in the first six months of 2023.

There were **10** TRRs created at the mid-year of 2023 where the involved member indicated an OC discharge. This represents **0.5%** of all the TRRs generated. TRED reviews all instances where an OC device is discharged.

As a result of the **10** TRRs, there were **10** IDRs created. TRED had no advisements or recommendations related to the OC discharge incidents.

IDRs (OC) Discharge Summary

In **two** of the OC discharge incidents, the involved member indicated multiple applications of an OC device. Both were determined to be in compliance with Department policy by the investigating supervisor.

There was **one** instance of OC discharge that was reviewed by an investigating supervisor (the rank of Lieutenant or above) to determine if the involved member's actions were in compliance with Department policy, and the investigating supervisor determined that the involved member's actions were not in compliance with Department policy.

In **one** instance of OC discharge, the subject fled the scene after the OC discharge and, as a result, medical aid could not be provided.


In every other instance, the involved subject was given medical aid by CFD EMS and/or taken to the hospital for decontamination.



TASER DISCHARGE INCIDENTS

¶ 198,200,202,203,205,207


TRRs with Taser CEW Discharge



In the first half of 2023, Department members submitted **50** TRRs indicating a Taser Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW) was discharged. This represents **2.3%** of all the TRRs generated. TRED reviews all incidents of a Taser discharge. Of these **50** TRRs submitted, there were **125** IDRs generated.

In 2022, there were **98** TRRs submitted indicating a Taser CEW was discharged. During the same time frame last year, Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2022, there were **47** TRRs submitted indicating a Taser discharge.

Taser-Related Discharge Debriefing Points



As of midyear 2023, there are **125** IDRs generated from incidents in which a Taser was discharged.


The most common debriefing point issued by TRED is for *Taser-Accidental Discharge* (**15**). The large majority of these accidental discharges occurred at the start of the member's tour of duty while the member conducted a weapons system check (**13**). When TRED observes a TRR indicating an accidental Taser discharge, the involved member is referred to the Training and Support Group for additional training with the Tactical Training Unit.

The second most debriefed issue by TRED is for *Taser-Other*. In **two** of these incidents, there were multiple Tasers discharged at the involved person. In both of these incidents, a unit-level supervisor administered individualized training on the date of occurrence.

77 (61%) Taser-related IDRs were reviewed by TRED with no recommendations.




Taser Energy Cycles Discharged



In the first half of 2023, of the **50** TRRs where the involved member indicate a discharge of a Taser, **14** (**28%**) indicate that multiple energy cycles were discharged. This can indicate a deployment of one or two cartridges and/or a combination of using the Arc button to re-energize an already-deployed cartridge.

Taser Discharge and Medical Aid



Of the **50** TRRs where the involved member indicated a Taser discharge, medical aid was rendered in all but **five** incidents. In **one** incident, the Taser was deployed at a dog. In another **two** incidents, the Taser discharge was accidental. In **one** other instance, the Taser did not make contact with the subject. Finally, in **one** incident, the person involved fled the scene and made good on their escape. Furthermore, there are **four** incidents in which the subject refused medical aid. In most instances, medical aid was requested, performed by CFD on scene, and then also at a hospital.



Taser Applied More Than Once

There are **14** Taser incidents in which the Taser was applied more than once. In **four** of those incidents, the Taser probes from the first cartridge discharged did not make contact or the probe contact was ineffective, therefore a second cartridge was discharged. In **three** of those incidents, a CL number was obtained and, as a result, the incident was not subject to review by TRED. Another **two** incidents involved accidental Taser discharges. **One** incident was a part of a Level 3 use of force incident and was not subject to review by TRED. On occasion, due to the infrequent Taser use and highly stressful nature of use of force incidents involving a Taser discharge, the involved member may inadvertently double tap the Taser trigger causing two Taser cartridges to discharge. This occurred on **one** occasion. TRED debriefed **one** incident for *De-Escalation/Force Mitigation-Time*. There was another incident in which multiple Tasers were simultaneously discharged at the involved person. Following this incident, the investigating supervisor conducted individualized training with the involved members on the date of occurrence.

During the first half of 2023, there is only **one** incident that involved a Taser discharge with more than three arc cycles applied. In this unique incident, the involved members discharged the Taser at a vicious dog that was attacking another dog and pedestrians.


Finally, TRED made no recommendations for the involved members in only **one** of these incidents,



INCIDENTS WITH FORCE AGAINST A HANDCUFFED SUBJECT

177

Reviewed TRRs with Force Used Against a Subject Who Was Handcuffed or Otherwise Physically Restrained




■ TRRs No Force Used Against a Subject While Handcuffed or Otherwise in Physical Restraints
■ TRRs Indicating Force Used Against a Subject While Handcuffed or Otherwise in Physical Restraints

TRED reviews all TRRs that indicate a reportable use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. In most instances, the involved member indicates more than one force option being used on a subject. The involved member is responsible for justifying each use of force in the narrative portion of the TRR.

In the first half of 2023, there were **184** TRRs where the involved member indicated that there was a use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. This represents **8.6%** of the TRRs generated.

CPD policy states that officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained, absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.

Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject IDR Recommendations




In the first six months of 2023, **240** IDRs were reviewed by TRED in which a reportable use of force against a handcuffed person was indicated. These **240** IDRs were generated from **72** total incidents. TRED made training advisements in **24% (34)** of IDRs and training recommendations in **13% (18)** of these incidents. **Two** incidents were referred to the Training and Support Group for additional training.

There were **166** IDRs in which TRED issued no recommendations.

All **72** incidents were reviewed by an investigating supervisor (the rank of Lieutenant or above) to determine if the involved member's actions were in compliance with Department policy. There were **7** IDRs (**0.03%**) generated from three total incidents in which the investigating supervisor determined that the involved member's actions were not in compliance with Department policy and a complaint log number was obtained.



Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject Debriefing Points



There are **240** IDRs that TRED reviewed as of midyear 2023 where the involved member indicated that there was a use of force against a person who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. TRED issued a total of **114** debriefing points related to these IDRs.

TRR Entry-Handcuffed Subject is the most common debriefing point (**16**) issued by TRED in these incidents. TRED debriefs this in instances when the involved member incorrectly made a data entry error and marked “No” instead of “Yes” when documenting “Was any reportable force used against the subject while handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints?”

The second most common debriefing point is for “*TRR Not Completed.*” In these debriefings, the involved member used a low-level reportable use of force (e.g., control holds, firm grip, or push/physical redirection) against a handcuffed person who was actively resisting the involved members’ attempts to place the person into a police vehicle or facility. TRED was unable to locate a TRR in these incidents.


These instances may be attributable to a training issue in which the involved member is unaware that a TRR should be completed. This is likely due to the relatively low amount of force that requires reporting in such instances, general infrequency of these occurrences, and/or a lack of familiarity with such use of force incidents.




TRRs AND FOOT PURSUITS

168,169

TRRs with Pursuits by Six-Month Periods



TRRs with Pursuits Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2023



TRED reviews every Tactical Response Report that is associated with a foot pursuit. As of midyear 2023, 245 TRRs indicate a pursuit (foot, foot and vehicle, other, and vehicle.) This amounts to 17% of reviewed TRRs. In 2022, TRED reviewed 565 TRRs that indicate a pursuit, or 22% of reviewed TRRs.

Of the 2,133 TRRs that were submitted in the first six months of 2023, 1,229 (58%) did not indicate any type of pursuit. There are 245 TRRs where the involved member indicated a foot pursuit, four foot and vehicle pursuits, seven other pursuit, and nine vehicle pursuit.


Incidents that involve a foot pursuit comprise the majority of pursuit incidents. Combined foot pursuit and foot and vehicle pursuits (229) are 11% of all the TRRs generated.



FPIRs AND FOOT PURSUITS


168, 169, 196

FPIRs and Pursuits Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2023




In the first six months of 2023, there are **1,595** reported FPIRs that are not associated with any form of pursuit. TRED reviewers identified **573 (26%)** FPIRs that involve a foot pursuit.

FPIs and Pursuits by Six-Month Periods




In the first six months of 2023, an average of **26%** of reported FPIs involve a foot pursuit. This is consistent over the past three six month periods.

FPIs, Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery



TRED determined that **609 (34%)** of the **1,814** incidents in which a FPI (or multiple FPIs) are reported involve some type of pursuit. Out of the **609** instances involving a pursuit, **279 (46%)** of these resulted in the recovery of a weapon. **260** of the **497** recovered weapons were semi-automatic handguns.


FPIs, Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery



Since the beginning of 2022, an average of **56%** of FPIs with a pursuit involve the recovery of a weapon.




FPIRs and Tactical Response Reports




2,221 FPIRs were generated in the first six months of 2023. 8% of the FPIRs involve a use of force incident. 92% of FPIRs have no association to a TRR and do not involve a use of force.

FPIRs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery




There were 2,221 FPIR generated where a firearm pointing incident (or more than one FPI) occurred, 8% involved a use of force incident. When a FPIR and a TRR were reported together, 39% involved the recovery of a weapon.

FPIRs and TRRs by Six-Month Periods



In the first six months of 2023, 8% of FPIRs are associated with a TRR. This average has remained consistent since the beginning of 2022.

FPIRs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery



In the first six months of 2023, 51% of FPIRs associated with a TRR are also associated with a weapon recovery.




FPIRs AND WEAPON RECOVERIES


FPIs and Weapon Recoveries

As of midyear 2023, there are **2,221** Firearm Pointing Reports created from **1,814** firearm pointing incidents. Data reflecting weapon recoveries is based on each individual firearm pointing incident, rather than the total number of officers who reported a FPI.

In comparison with Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2022, there is a **30%** increase in total firearm pointing incidents. As a result, there is an **11%** increase in occurrences when at least one weapon was recovered from these incidents.



FPIs and Weapon Recoveries by Month



Since the beginning of January 2022, there were **1,687** incidents involving a firearm pointing in which at least one weapon was recovered.



SEARCH WARRANT REVIEW

Search Warrant Review

Department policy requires the Department to conduct a critical incident after-action review for search warrants identified as wrong raids or in other circumstances identified by the Superintendent.

Department policy defines a wrong raid as a search warrant that is served at a location that is different than the location listed or an incident in which a Department member serving a search warrant encounters, identifies, or should reasonably have become aware of circumstances or facts that are inconsistent with the factual basis for the probable cause used to obtain the search warrant.

The Search Warrant Review Board (SWRB) is tasked with conducting this review of wrong raids and other search warrants identified by the Superintendent.

As of midyear 2023, Department members have executed approximately **101** residential search warrants. Of those search warrants, **none** were identified as being a wrong raid and no other search warrants were referred to the SWRB.





RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

Relevant Consent Decree Paragraphs

The following consent decree paragraphs are referenced at the top of some pages by the symbol ¶.

- ¶153 CPD’s use of force policies, as well as its training, supervision, and accountability systems, must ensure that: CPD officers use force in accordance with federal law, state law, and the requirements of this Agreement; CPD officers apply de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible; when using force, CPD officers only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances; and any use of unreasonable or unnecessary force is promptly identified and responded to appropriately.
- ¶156 CPD’s use of force policies and training, supervision, and accountability systems will be designed, implemented, and maintained so that CPD members:
- a. act at all times in a manner consistent with the sanctity of human life;
 - b. act at all times with a high degree of ethics, professionalism, and respect for the public;
 - c. use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible;
 - d. use sound tactics to eliminate the need to use force or reduce the amount of force that is needed;
 - e. only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances;
 - f. only use force for a lawful purpose and not to punish or retaliate;
 - g. continually assess the situation and modify the use of force as circumstances change and in ways that are consistent with officer safety, including stopping the use of force when it is no longer necessary;
 - h. truthfully and completely report all reportable instances of force used;
 - i. promptly report any use of force that is excessive or otherwise in violation of policy;
 - j. are held accountable, consistent with complaint and disciplinary policies, for use of force that is not objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, or that otherwise violates law or policy; and
 - k. act in a manner that promotes trust between CPD and the communities it serves.
- ¶157 CPD will collect and analyze information on the use of force by CPD members, including whether and to what extent CPD members use de-escalation techniques in connection with use of force incidents. CPD will use this information to assess whether its policies, training, tactics, and practices meet the goals of this Agreement, reflect best practices, and prevent or reduce the need to use force.
- ¶161 CPD recently adopted de-escalation as a core principle. CPD officers must use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible. CPD officers are required to de-escalate potential and ongoing use of force incidents whenever safe and feasible through the use of techniques that may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- a. using time as a tactic by slowing down the pace of an incident;
 - b. employing tactical positioning and re-positioning to isolate and contain a subject, to create distance between an officer and a potential threat, or to utilize barriers or cover;
 - c. continual communication, including exercising persuasion and advice, and providing a warning prior to the use of force;
 - d. requesting assistance from other officers, mental health personnel, or specialized units, as necessary and appropriate; and
 - e. where appropriate, use trauma-informed communication techniques, including acknowledging confusion or mistrust, or using a respectful tone.



- ¶165 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force except in circumstances where there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person. CPD officers are not permitted to use deadly force against a person who is a threat only to himself or herself or to property. CPD officers may only use deadly force as a last resort.
- ¶166 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing subjects who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.
- ¶167 CPD officers will operate their vehicles in a manner that is consistent with CPD policy and training and with the foremost regard for the safety of all persons involved. CPD will periodically include instruction regarding sound vehicle maneuvers in its in-service training regarding use of force. As appropriate, CPD will provide supplemental training guidance regarding dangerous vehicle maneuvers that should be avoided.
- ¶169 For foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents, by January 1, 2020, CPD will review all associated foot pursuits at the headquarters level to identify any tactical, equipment, or training concerns.
- ¶173 Following a use of force, once the scene is safe and as soon as practicable, CPD officers must immediately request appropriate medical aid for injured persons or persons who claim they are injured.
- ¶177 Consistent with CPD policy that force must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, CPD officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.
- ¶178 CPD officers are prohibited from using carotid artery restraints or chokeholds (or other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway, i.e., the front of the neck, with the intention of reducing the intake of air) unless deadly force is authorized. CPD officers must not use chokeholds or other maneuvers for intentionally putting pressure on a person's airway or carotid artery restraints as take-down techniques.
- ¶182 CPD will require officers to consider their surroundings before discharging their firearms and take reasonable precautions to ensure that people other than the target will not be struck.
- ¶184 When CPD officers discharge firearms, they must continually assess the circumstances that necessitated the discharge and modify their use of force accordingly, including ceasing to use their firearm when the circumstances no longer require it (e.g., when a subject is no longer a threat).
- ¶185 CPD will continue to prohibit officers from firing warning shots.
- ¶186 CPD officers must not fire at moving vehicles when the vehicle is the only force used against the officer or another person, except in extreme circumstances when it is a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily harm to a person, such as when a vehicle is intentionally being used to attack a person or group of people. CPD will continue to instruct officers to avoid positioning themselves or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, and will provide officers with adequate training to ensure compliance with this instruction.
- ¶187 CPD will prohibit officers from firing from a moving vehicle unless such force is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life or to prevent great bodily harm to the officer or another person.
- ¶188 By January 1, 2019, CPD will develop a training bulletin that provides guidance on weapons discipline, including circumstances in which officers should and should not point a firearm at a person. CPD will incorporate training regarding pointing of a firearm in the annual use of force training required by this Agreement in 2019.
- ¶189 CPD will clarify in policy that when a CPD officer points a firearm at a person to detain the person, an investigatory stop or an arrest has occurred, which must be documented. CPD will also clarify in policy that officers will only point a firearm at a person when objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶190 Beginning July 1, 2019, CPD officers will, at a minimum, promptly after the incident is concluded, notify OEMC of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer points a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The notification will identify which CPD beat(s) pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The City will ensure that OEMC data recording each such notification is electronically linked with CPD reports and body-



RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

worn camera recordings associated with the incident, and all are retained and readily accessible to the supervisor of each CPD beat(s) identified in the notification.

- ¶191 OEMC will notify an immediate supervisor of the identified beat(s) each time the pointing of a firearm is reported. Notified CPD supervisors will ensure that the investigatory stop or arrest documentation and the OEMC recordation of the pointing of a firearm are promptly reviewed in accordance with CPD policy. CPD supervisors will effectively supervise the CPD members under their command consistent with their obligations set forth in the Supervision section of this Agreement.
- ¶192 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected from all investigatory stop and arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting a seizure. The review and audit will be completed within 30 days of each such occurrence. This review and audit will:
- identify whether the pointing of the firearm at a person allegedly violated CPD policy;
 - identify any patterns in such occurrences and, to the extent necessary, ensure that any concerns are addressed; and
 - identify any tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns and, to the extent necessary, ensure that the concerns are addressed.
- The designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will, where applicable, make appropriate referrals for misconduct investigations or other corrective actions for alleged violations of CPD policy. At the completion of each review and audit, the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will issue a written notification of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to an immediate supervisor as described above.
- ¶193 CPD will ensure that the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level responsible for performing the duties required by this Part has sufficient resources to perform them, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶194 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of the pointing of a firearm at a person when the CPD officer is a SWAT Team Officer responding to a designated SWAT incident, as defined in CPD Special Order S05-05, or an officer assigned to a federal task force during the execution of federal task force duties.
- ¶195 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of any unholstering or display of a firearm or having a firearm in a “low ready” position during the course of an investigation, unless the firearm is pointed at a person
- ¶196 The City will ensure that all documentation and recordation of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD member points a firearm at a person, including OEMC data, is maintained in a manner that allows the Monitor, CPD, and OAG to review and analyze such occurrences. Beginning January 1, 2020, the Monitor will analyze these occurrences on an annual basis to assess whether changes to CPD policy, training, practice, or supervision are necessary, and to recommend any changes to the process of documenting, reviewing, and analyzing these occurrences. CPD will either adopt the Monitor’s recommendations or respond in writing within 30 days. Any dispute regarding the whether the Monitor’s recommendations should be implemented will be resolved by the Court.
- ¶200 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must give verbal commands and warnings prior to, during, and after deployment of a Taser. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers will allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use a Taser, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶202 CPD officers will treat each application or standard cycle (five seconds) of a Taser as a separate use of force that officers must separately justify as objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional. CPD will continue to require officers to, when possible, use only one five-second energy cycle and reassess the situation before any additional cycles are given or cartridges are discharged. In determining whether any additional application is necessary, CPD officers will consider whether the individual has the ability and has been given a reasonable opportunity to comply prior to applying another cycle.
- ¶203 CPD will require that if the subject has been exposed to three, five-second energy cycles (or has been exposed to a cumulative 15 total seconds of energy) and the officer has not gained control, officers switch to other force options unless



the officer can reasonably justify that continued Taser use was necessary to ensure the safety of the officer or another person, recognizing that prolonged Taser exposure may increase the risk of death or serious injury.

- ¶207 CPD officers may use OC devices only when such force is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.
- ¶209 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must issue verbal commands and warnings to the subject prior to, during, and after the discharge of an OC device. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD will require officers to allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use an OC device, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶210 Each individual application of an OC device (e.g., each spray of an officer's personal OC device) by a CPD officer must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.
- ¶211 CPD officers must assist subjects exposed to application of an OC device with decontamination and flushing when it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must request the appropriate medical aid for a subject after the discharge of an OC device if the subject appears to be in any physical distress, or complains of injury or aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition (e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or a heart ailment).
- ¶213 CPD officers must not use impact weapons (e.g., baton, asp, improvised impact weapons) to intentionally strike a subject in the head or neck, except when deadly force is justified
- ¶216 CPD officers must request appropriate medical aid for a subject who experiences an impact weapon strike when the subject appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury, or when the subject sustained a strike to the head from an impact weapon or a hard, fixed object. CPD officers must render life-saving aid to the subject consistent with the officers' training until medical professionals arrive on scene.
- ¶219 Whenever a CPD member engages in a reportable use of force, the member must complete a TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. In addition to completing the TRR, officers must also document the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action per CPD policy. CPD may allow members requiring medical attention a reasonable amount of additional time to complete the required documentation. CPD may allow supervisors to complete the TRR for members who are unable to complete the report due to injury or in other extraordinary circumstances.
- ¶220 In completing the TRR, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, CPD members must include a narrative that describes with specificity the use of force incident, the subject's actions, or other circumstances necessitating the level of force used; and the involved member's response, including de-escalation efforts attempted and the specific types and amounts of force used. The narrative requirement does not apply to CPD members who discharged a firearm in the performance of duty or participated in an officer-involved death in the performance of duty. Any CPD member who observes or is present when another CPD member discharges a firearm or uses other deadly force must complete a written witness statement prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. CPD members will note in their TRRs the existence of any body-worn camera or in-car camera audio or video footage, and whether any such footage was viewed in advance of completing the TRR or any other incident reports. CPD members must complete TRRs, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, and other reports related to the incident, truthfully and thoroughly.
- ¶224 In addition, for level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents involving an injury or complaint of injury for which COPA does not have jurisdiction, the responding supervisor will undertake reasonable efforts to identify and interview additional witnesses beyond those that are known and available.
- ¶225 A supervisor who used force or ordered force to be used during a reportable use of force incident will not perform the duties assigned to the responding supervisor for that incident
- ¶226 CPD will continue to require the responding supervisor to document information collected and actions taken in performing his or her investigatory duties in the supervisor's portion of the TRR, or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement.



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- ¶227 Any CPD member who becomes aware of information indicating that a reportable use of force occurred but was not reported must immediately notify his or her supervisor.
- ¶228 Supervisors play a critical role in ensuring that force is used legally, consistent with CPD policy, and in a manner that will promote community confidence in the Department. Supervisor reviews and investigations of uses of force are essential to identify necessary individual and departmental corrective action.
- ¶230 After a reportable use of force has occurred, required TRRs have been completed, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 incidents, a responding supervisor has documented any investigatory information collected, the incident will be reviewed and evaluated by a CPD supervisor at least the rank of Lieutenant, and in all instances at least one rank level above that of the highest-ranking member who engaged in the reportable use of force, or by a command staff member, when designated (“reviewing supervisor”).
- ¶231 The reviewing supervisor will conduct an investigation into the reportable use of force incident by reviewing all information reasonably available regarding the incident, including written reports, video or audio recordings, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, witness statements, photographs (if available), and other evidence or information collected by the responding supervisor. After advising the subject of his or her right not to answer questions and other applicable rights, and only if the subject voluntarily consents to an interview, the reviewing supervisor will interview the subject solely about the reportable use of force. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will visually inspect the subject and document any injuries observed.
- ¶232 For all reportable uses of force, the reviewing supervisor will determine, based on the information reviewed, if the use of force requires a notification to COPA and will assess whether the use of force was in compliance with CPD policy (except for incidents involving deadly force or an officer-involved death). The reviewing supervisor will also review the TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, for sufficiency and completeness.
- ¶233 For all reportable use of force incidents, the reviewing supervisor will: provide timely, constructive feedback, where appropriate, to the officer who engaged in the reportable use of force, the officer’s supervisor, or both; recommend additional training and/or support as Case: 1:17-cv-06260 Document #: 703-1 Filed: 01/31/19 Page 73 of 236 PageID #:5066 67 necessary based on the incident; take appropriate action, including referring uses of force that may violate law or CPD policy to COPA.
- ¶234 CPD will continue to require the reviewing supervisor to document in a Tactical Response Report – Investigation (“TRR-I”), or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, his or her detailed assessment of compliance with CPD policy, any constructive feedback, and any required or recommended action. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will include in the TRR-I or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, the identities of CPD members on scene during the incident who are reasonably believed to have relevant knowledge or information regarding the reportable use of force
- ¶235 All district-level supervisory review documentation regarding a reportable use of force incident must be completed within 48 hours of the incident, unless an extension is approved by a command staff member.
- ¶236 CPD will continue to develop, implement, and maintain a system of video recording officers’ encounters with the public with body-worn cameras. The use of body-worn cameras will be designed to increase officer accountability, improve trust and CPD legitimacy in the community, and augment CPD’s records of law enforcement-related activities.
- ¶237 CPD will continue to require all officers assigned to patrol field duties to wear body-worn cameras and microphones with which to record law-enforcement related activities as outlined in the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq.), with limited exceptions, including, but not limited to, when requested by a victim or witness of a crime, or interacting with a confidential informant. CPD will develop and implement a written policy delineating the circumstances when officers will not be equipped with body worn cameras.
- ¶238 CPD will continue to maintain a policy regarding body-worn camera video and audio recording that will require officers to record their law-enforcement related activities, and that will ensure the recordings are retained in compliance with the Department’s Forms Retention Schedule (CPD-11.717) and the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act. At a minimum, CPD’s body-worn camera policy will:



- a. clearly state which officers are required to use body-worn cameras and under which circumstances;
- b. require officers, subject to limited exceptions specified in writing, to activate their cameras when responding to calls for service and during all law enforcement-related activities that occur while on duty, and to continue recording until the conclusion of the incident(s);
- c. require officers to articulate in writing or on camera their reason(s) for failing to record an activity that CPD policy otherwise requires to be recorded;
- d. require officers to inform subjects that they are being recorded unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible;
- e. address relevant privacy considerations, including restrictions on recording inside a home, and the need to protect witnesses, victims, and children;
- f. establish a download and retention protocol;
- g. require periodic random review of officers' videos for compliance with CPD policy and training purposes;
- h. require that the reviewing supervisor review videos of incidents involving reportable uses of force by a subordinate; and Case: 1:17-cv-06260 Document #: 703-1 Filed: 01/31/19 Page 75 of 236 PageID #:5068 69
- i. specify that officers who knowingly fail to comply with the policy may be subject to progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action.

¶239 CPD officers must comply with the body-worn camera policy. CPD will impose progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action on officers who do not comply with the body-worn camera policy, as permitted by applicable law.

¶574 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected regarding each level 2 reportable use of force incident, a representative sample of level 1 reportable use of force, and incidents involving accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries to ensure:

- a. CPD members completely and thoroughly reported the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action, the type and amount of force used, the subject's actions or other circumstances necessitating the level of force used, and all efforts to de-escalate the situation;
- b. the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident were thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy;
- c. any tactical, equipment, or policy concerns are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed; and
- d. any patterns related to use of force incidents are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed.

¶575 CPD recently established a Force Review Unit ("FRU") and tasked the FRU with certain responsibilities described in the preceding paragraph. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities has sufficient resources to perform them. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities is staffed with CPD members, whether sworn or civilian, with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise to: effectively analyze and assess CPD's use of force practices and related reporting and review procedures; conduct trend analysis based on use of force data; identify tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns based on analysis of use of force incidents and data; and develop recommendations regarding modifications to tactics, equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address identified practices or trends relating to the use of force.



- ¶800 The Parties agree that the Consent Decree will be expanded to include obligations by CPD to monitor, report, review, train, and implement accountability measures with respect to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. Enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances will include initial dispersal orders and, where appropriate, may include investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and arrests. These measures will ensure that CPD's investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances are conducted in a manner that comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois and are in accordance with best practices, as defined in Paragraph 730 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶801 In conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs and enforcing the Loitering Ordinances, CPD will interact with all members of the public without bias and will treat all persons with the courtesy and dignity which is inherently due every person as a human being without reference to stereotypes based on race, color, ethnicity, religion, homeless status, national origin, immigration status, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, socio-economic class, age, disability, incarceration status, or criminal history.
- ¶802 The Parties agree that in achieving the goals of this Stipulation, CPD will encourage officers, through training and supervision, to employ a less intrusive response when enforcing the Loitering Ordinances when appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances.
- B. Investigatory Stops, Protective Pat Downs, and Enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances
- ¶803 CPD will review and, to the extent necessary, revise the policies and procedures for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances consistent with the law, the Consent Decree, and this Stipulation and in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A], including that:
- a. Upon initial contact with person(s) engaged in loitering prohibited by the Loitering Ordinances, CPD officers will issue a dispersal order without conducting an investigatory stop, unless: i. A previous dispersal order has been given and documented for that person(s) at that location within eight hours of such contact, in which case CPD officers may undertake enforcement action under the Loitering Ordinances; or ii. They have separate and distinct reasonable articulable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime;
 - b. CPD officers will document the initial contact with person(s) engaged in loitering prohibited by the Loitering Ordinances and any dispersal orders on a Loitering Dispersal Report ("LDR"); and
 - c. If a dispersed person fails to promptly obey the dispersal order or violates the dispersal order by returning within sight or hearing of the location where loitering is prohibited within eight hours of the dispersal, CPD officers may undertake enforcement action as provided for under the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶804 CPD will review and, to the extent necessary, revise the policies and procedures for conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs consistent with the law, the Consent Decree, and this Stipulation.
- ¶805 CPD will require officers to:
- a. Conduct investigatory stops and protective pat downs, and undertake enforcement action under the Loitering Ordinances in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois, the Consent Decree, this Stipulation, and best practices;
 - b. Communicate with individuals regarding the specific basis for an investigatory stop, consistent with principles of procedural justice, by:



- i. Identifying themselves by name and rank as soon as it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so;
 - ii. Stating the reason for the investigatory stop as soon as it is safe, reasonable, and practicable to do so;
 - iii. If it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so, notifying the person(s) encountered that they are being lawfully detained temporarily, indicating that they will be free to leave at the conclusion of the investigatory stop, and if asking the individual questions, informing the individual they are not required to answer; and
 - iv. If it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so, notifying the person(s) encountered that they are being lawfully detained temporarily, indicating that they will be free to leave at the conclusion of the investigatory stop, and if asking the individual questions, informing the individual they are not required to answer; and;
- c. Ensure that the duration of an investigatory stop is no longer than reasonably necessary to confirm or dispel reasonable articulable suspicion and to take the appropriate enforcement actions, if any; and d. Act with professionalism and courtesy throughout the duration of the investigatory stop interaction.

¶806 CPD will prohibit officers from:

- a. Performing investigatory stops unless they have reasonable articulable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime;
- b. Unreasonably extending a stop lawfully made based on reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause to conduct an investigation into other criminal activity unless they have reasonable articulable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit another crime;
- c. Relying on information known to the officer at the time to be materially false to establish reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop or protective pat down;
- d. Basing investigatory stops or protective pat downs solely on an individual's geographic location, such as presence in a high crime area or proximity to the scene of suspected or reported crimes, without any other reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity;
- e. Basing investigatory stops or protective pat downs solely on an individual's response to the presence of police officers, such as an individual's attempt to avoid contact with an officer (e.g., walking away, declining to talk, running away, or crossing the street to avoid contact), without any other reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity;
- f. Basing investigatory stops or protective pat downs solely on an individual's presence in the company of others suspected of criminal activity without any other reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity;
- g. Conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs solely on the basis of an individual's race, ethnicity, color, national origin, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, immigration status, homeless status, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, financial status, or lawful source of income, except that officers may rely on the listed characteristics when part of a specific suspect description;
- h. Conducting a protective pat down, with or without consent, except where officers have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that a person is armed and dangerous;
- i. Conducting an investigatory stop or search of an individual based solely on an officer smelling cannabis/marijuana without any other specific and articulable facts of criminal activity; and



j. Conducting an investigatory stop or search of an individual based solely on an officer smelling cannabis/marijuana without any other specific and articulable facts of criminal activity; and

- ¶807 During an investigatory stop, CPD officers may conduct a search of a person upon consent if officers have reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime or possesses evidence of the crime.
- ¶808 CPD will require that when an officer requests consent for a search of a person during an investigatory stop, the officer will specifically ask the person for consent to search, and document on an Investigatory Stop Report (“ISR”) or whatever similar form of documentation CPD may implement (“Stop Report”) the request for consent, the person’s response, and whether a search was conducted by consent. If an individual gives consent to search, the officer must inform the individual that they may revoke consent at any time.
- ¶809 CPD will ensure that when officers request consent to conduct a search during an investigatory stop, officers will record the entire interaction on BWC.
- ¶810 An officer must establish and communicate the scope of the consensual search and end the search upon the person revoking consent.
- ¶811 Whenever CPD officers conduct a search by consent during an investigatory stop, the Investigatory Stop Receipt or whatever similar form of documentation CPD may implement (“Stop Receipt”) provided to the person will indicate that a consent search was conducted.
- ¶812 CPD will ensure that CPD officers report when they conduct investigatory stops, protective pat downs, or enforce the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶813 CPD will ensure that officers’ reasonable suspicion for their investigatory stops and protective pat downs, the facts on which the suspicion is based, and other information from an investigatory stop or protective pat down are documented in a written or electronic ISR or Stop Report using specific and clear language that does not rely solely on standardized or boilerplate terms.
- ¶814 When CPD officers conduct an investigatory stop, protective pat down, or engage in the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, their reports need to justify that the stop, pat down, or enforcement action complies with the law and CPD policy.
- ¶815 CPD officers will not justify an investigatory stop solely by describing an individual’s behavior as “suspicious,” without further articulating specific facts that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
- ¶816 CPD policy will continue to require that all of the factors that support reasonable articulable suspicion in order to temporarily detain an individual and, if applicable, all of the factors that support reasonable articulable suspicion in order to perform a protective pat down of an individual, will be documented on an ISR or Stop Report in CPD’s electronic reporting application.
- ¶817 CPD will require officers to document on the ISR or Stop Report any BWC footage viewed prior to the completion of the report.



- ¶818 CPD will permit officers to submit only one revised version of an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR from an investigatory stop, protective pat down, or Loitering Ordinance dispersal order, upon a supervisor's review and rejection of the originally submitted ISR, Stop Report, or LDR. When a supervisor rejects an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR, the supervisor will document in writing the reason for the rejection, such as requesting that an officer amend an ISR or Stop Report for lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion. CPD will prohibit officers from submitting multiple revised versions of an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR, or further revising an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR once a revised version has been submitted.
- ¶819 CPD will require officers to provide an Investigatory Stop Receipt or Stop Receipt to a stopped individual at the conclusion of an investigatory stop, except an officer will not provide a receipt when an investigatory stop ends in an arrest and transport to a CPD facility or ends in the issuance of a citation and release from the scene under the Illinois Pre-Trial Fairness Act. In any circumstance in which an Investigatory Stop Receipt or Stop Receipt was required, but was not provided to or received by the individual, the CPD officer will articulate in the ISR or Stop Report the reasons why the receipt was not provided to or received by the individual stopped.
- ¶820 Investigatory Stop Receipts and Stop Receipts will indicate the Office of Emergency Management and Communications Police Computer Aided Dispatch event number of the stop, the reason for the stop, the CPD officer's name and star number, whether a consent search was conducted, and instructions on how to obtain a copy of the ISR or Stop Report from CPD through an Illinois Freedom of Information Act request.
- ¶821 CPD will ensure that the policies for conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs are consistent with the policies for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances in instances where both policies may be applicable.

C. Training

- ¶822 CPD will train officers how to perform investigatory stops and protective pat downs and to enforce the Loitering Ordinances consistent with CPD policies and all applicable laws. This training will be consistent with CPD's commitment to procedural justice, de-escalation, impartial policing, and community policing, and will incorporate scenario-based elements.
- ¶823 CPD will review and, to the extent necessary, revise its training specific to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances so that they are sufficient in quantity, quality, type, and scope to prepare officers to comply with CPD directives consistently, effectively, and in accordance with the law, CPD policy, best practices, and the Consent Decree.
- ¶824 CPD will provide training for officers and supervisors instructing that:
- a. Officers should consider reasonable alternatives to the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances based on the circumstances, including lesser actions such as a repeated dispersal;
 - b. Investigatory stops are conducted only where there is reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed;
 - c. If it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so, Officers will notify the person(s) encountered that they are being lawfully detained temporarily, indicate that they will be free to leave at the conclusion of the investigatory stop, and if asking the individual questions, inform the individual that they are not required to answer;
 - d. Protective pat downs are performed only where there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the person stopped is armed and dangerous;



e. An individual subject to an investigatory stop conducted by a CPD officer is not required to answer any questions asked by the CPD officer; and f. Consent to conduct a search of an individual must be voluntarily given based on the totality of the circumstances, including that consent cannot be obtained by using force, threats of force, promises, misrepresentation, intimidation, or exertion of authority, and the individual may revoke consent at any time.

- ¶825 CPD will train all officers with respect to ISRs, Stop Reports, Stop Receipts, and LDRs, the electronic applications for documenting of ISRs/Stop Reports, and their responsibilities to record the specific and articulable facts for each investigatory stop and protective pat down.
- ¶826 CPD will train supervisors on how to review ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs and how to discuss the results of the supervisory review of these reports and officers' practices with officers.
- ¶827 As part of CPD's 2024 Training Needs Assessment, and annually thereafter, under the supervision of the Training Oversight Committee, CPD will determine any additional development and administration of training related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. D. Supervisory Review
- ¶828 All submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, LDRs, and related arrest reports must be reviewed by a CPD supervisor.
- ¶829 CPD supervisors will approve or reject all submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs documenting investigatory stops, protective pat downs, or enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances by the end of their tours of duty.
- ¶830 CPD supervisors will review and ensure submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs are properly completed and conform to CPD policy (e.g., ensuring that CPD officers document in the narrative sections of the ISR or Stop Report the reasonable articulable suspicion that justifies the investigatory stop and, if performed, protective pat down).
- ¶831 CPD supervisors will inform the preparing CPD officer of the reason for any rejection of a submitted ISR, Stop Report, or LDR and comply with CPD policy on Department review of such reports.
- ¶832 With respect to the supervisory review of ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs, CPD supervisors will take the appropriate action, such as after-action support recommendations, to address any rejected reports and deviations from CPD policy related to the report or the conduct described in the report. The after-action support recommendations may include, but are not limited to, individual debriefing with a supervisor, reviewing CPD policy with the CPD officer, reviewing BWC footage from the stop with the CPD officer, mandatory re-training, formal counseling, enhanced supervision, or initiating progressive discipline. The appropriate after-action support will be documented within the report rejection.
- ¶833 When directed by a 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit after-action support recommendation, CPD supervisors will review the BWC footage from the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down with the involved officer(s). CPD supervisors will document the viewing of the BWC footage and the results of the after-action support in the appropriate supervisory reports. E. Data Collection
- ¶834 CPD will continue to post de-identified investigatory stop data derived from ISRs or Stop Reports on its website (currently, <https://home.chicagopolice.org/statistics-data/isr-data/>) on an annual basis, including fields for which information is collected on the ISR or Stop Report. CPD also will continue to post on its website the ISR data dictionary or an equivalent data dictionary for Stop Report data.



- ¶835 To evaluate and improve its data collection efforts with respect to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, CPD agrees that, within 180 days, or a reasonable extension of time approved by the Monitor, of entry of this Stipulation, it will conduct an assessment of the reporting and data collection mechanisms and system for investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶836 Within 180 days of completion of the needs assessment provided for in Paragraph 835 of this Stipulation, CPD will submit a plan to address areas of need to the Monitor and OAG for the review and approval process, as provided for in Paragraph 640 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶837 CPD's data plan for investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances will:
- a. Ensure that CPD maintains an electronic system such that every CPD officer will be able to electronically complete the documents related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, with the exception of Investigatory Stop Receipts or Stop Receipts;
 - b. Where feasible and practical, ensure every CPD officer in Patrol Field Units will have the equipment necessary while on patrol to electronically complete ISRs, Stop Reports (when implemented), and LDRs (when implemented); and
 - c. Ensure that all required fields of the ISR, Stop Report, and LDR are completed before the electronic document can be submitted.
- ¶838 CPD will maintain and preserve all electronic versions of any ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs submitted or re-submitted by CPD officers.
- ¶839 CPD will collect and maintain the data and records related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances necessary to:
- a. Accurately evaluate its practices concerning investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances; and
 - b. Post de-identified investigatory stop data derived from ISRs or Stop Reports on its website as provided for in Paragraph 834 of this Stipulation.
- ¶840 Upon approval and implementation of the data plan provided for in Paragraph 837 of this Stipulation, CPD will have an electronic reporting system that accurately and reliably maintains data and records related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and unit-level supervisory and 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit reviews, including all electronic versions of any ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs submitted or resubmitted. CPD will continue to maintain all data, records, and reports relevant to and associated with investigatory stops and protective pat downs, including BWC footage, consistent with legal requirements and the requirements of the Consent Decree.
- ¶841 Further, CPD will also continue to develop, implement, and maintain an electronic system to track and document which CPD officers have repeated rejected ISRs or Stop Reports consistent with the review process performed by the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit (or an equivalent internal CPD unit) described in Paragraph 857 of this Stipulation.

F. Data Analysis



- ¶842 The Parties acknowledge that the Consultant for the ACLU Agreement is preparing a report, in consultation with an independent statistical expert, which assesses data regarding investigatory stops completed by CPD officers for the period between 2018 and 2020 (“Report”). With respect to the disparate impact compliance methodology for this Report, the City has agreed that the Consultant may (1) assume that a prima facie showing under ICRA based on disparate impact on the basis of race has been satisfied, and (2) forego that analysis. The Parties recognize that the methodology for this Report includes, but is not limited to, an analysis of the following:
- a. Total CPD investigatory stops citywide and by police district, broken down by racial/ethnic identity;
 - b. Comparison of investigatory stop share to population share by race/ethnicity;
 - c. Protective pat downs, searches, and enforcement actions by race/ethnicity;
 - d. Hit-rate analysis for all contraband, firearms/weapons, drugs, and cannabis, including variations in hit rates between police districts; and e. Analysis of the boxes most often checked by officers to document reasonable articulable suspicion, including variations by race/ethnicity and by police district.
- ¶843 An independent subject matter expert (selected by the Monitor) will compile and assess data regarding investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersals completed by CPD officers through and including the period ending December 31, 2024. For the initial report, the Monitor will set a period for review and establish the date by which the report will be published. The preparation of the initial report will be under the direction of the Monitor. The methodology for this report will be consistent with the methodology for the report referenced in Paragraph 842 of this Stipulation, except that this report will also include (1) a Fourth Amendment analysis of a statistically representative sample of Stop Reports to assess whether the reports contain sufficient facts to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop and for any protective pat down, (2) an analysis of Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers and documented on LDRs, and (3) an analysis of the relative frequency of requests for consent to search and searches conducted based on consent. To the extent the report includes an analysis of the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity and gender within the reporting period, the report will clearly state that such analysis will be for information purposes only because the demographic classifications are based on the subjective observations of the CPD officer(s) who (1) pursuant to CPD policy, will not have stopped the individual to conduct the dispersal and (2) lacks the means to validate or confirm the demographic classifications. Any further changes in methodology will be submitted by the Monitor to the City and OAG in advance for review, comment, and approval.
- ¶844 After publication of the report as provided for in Paragraph 843 of this Stipulation, the City will submit to the Monitor and OAG for approval its plan for taking over the responsibility for obtaining and publishing periodic future independent subject matter reports from the Monitor. Once the plan has been approved, the Monitor will transfer the responsibility for obtaining periodic future independent subject matter reports to CPD.
- ¶845 After the Monitor transfers to CPD the responsibility for obtaining periodic independent subject matter reports on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will annually submit to the Monitor and OAG a copy of the annual independent subject matter expert report consistent with the methodology in Paragraph 843 of this Stipulation. The Monitor and OAG will review and approve the proposed independent subject matter expert and any proposed modifications to the methodology, including whether the use of an independent subject matter expert may be phased out in favor of an assessment methodology to be administered by CPD for future reports.



- ¶846 Prior to conducting this assessment, CPD will share its proposed methodology, including any proposed factors to be considered as part of the assessment, with the Monitor for review and approval. The Monitor will approve CPD's proposed methodology provided that the Monitor determines that CPD's methodology comports with published, peer-reviewed methodologies and the Consent Decree.
- ¶847 After the Monitor transfers to CPD the responsibility for obtaining periodic independent subject matter reports on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will annually submit to the Monitor and OAG a copy of the annual independent subject matter expert report consistent with the methodology in Paragraph 843 of this Stipulation.
- ¶848 As part of CPD's annual report on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will conduct an assessment of: (1) the relative frequency of all investigatory stops made by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including, race/ethnicity, gender, age, or perceived or known disability status for the prior calendar year, (2) the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers, and (3) an analysis of the relative frequency of requests for consent to search and searches conducted based on consent. For informational purposes only, CPD will identify the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity and gender. The report will clearly indicate that the assessment of Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders based on demographic categories is for informational purposes only because the demographic classifications are based on the subjective observations of the CPD officer(s) who (1) pursuant to CPD policy, will not have stopped the individual to conduct the dispersal and (2) lacks the means to validate or confirm the demographic classifications.
- ¶849 The assessment of all investigatory stops and protective pat downs conducted by CPD officers will be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in Paragraphs 79-82 of the Consent Decree. This assessment of all investigatory stops and protective pat downs effectuated by CPD will be in addition to and does not replace the requirements of Paragraph 79 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶850 Within 180 days after completion of each independent expert report, CPD will review the data and results of the analysis set forth in the report and assess whether to implement any revision to policies, procedures, or training to address any patterns of disparities, bias, or constitutional inadequacies in CPD's investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶851 If CPD's assessment determines there are any necessary revisions to policies, procedures, or training, CPD will develop a timeline for implementation of the modifications, subject to the processes provided for in Paragraph 627 of the Consent Decree for policies and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree for training.

G. 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit Review

- ¶852 CPD's 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit (or an equivalent internal CPD unit), under the authority of the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (or an equivalent internal CPD unit), will serve as the designated unit within CPD tasked with conducting Department-level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including a representative sample of those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶853 CPD will ensure that the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit has sufficient resources to perform these review duties promptly, efficiently, and effectively, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶854 Beginning at the entry of this Stipulation, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform the Department-level reviews, consistent with the requirements of Paragraph 857(a) through (d) of this Stipulation, of 5% of the backlog of ISR reviews maintained in the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit for January 1, 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation.



- ¶855 The backlog of ISR reviews consists of 15% of all ISRs completed during 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation that have been randomly selected.
- ¶856 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will create and submit to the Monitor and OAG a summary to report the demographic and geographic distribution of the individuals subject to the investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed as prescribed in Paragraph 854 of this Stipulation.
- ¶857 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform regular Department level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including a representative sample of those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, submitted by CPD officers after the entry of this Stipulation, sufficient to reach relevant and reliable observations on:
- Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop;
 - Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the protective pat down;
 - Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly completed the report and complied with CPD policy; and
 - Whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policies.
- ¶858 For the representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports described in Paragraph 857 of this Stipulation, CPD must demonstrate that the subset of investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago.
- ¶859 CPD will recommend an involved officer(s) and their supervisor review the BWC footage for the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down conducted by the involved officer(s), after the involved officer has submitted five ISRs or Stop Reports within a 90-day period that have resulted in a recommendation for after-action support to resolve a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion.
- ¶860 On a semi-annual basis, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will report on the ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed beginning with the time period ending with December 31, 2023, including those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and identify:
- The total number of ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed by the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit;
 - Any trends or patterns relating to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances identified through the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit reviews;
 - The number of reports rejected by supervisors and categories of reason for rejection;
 - The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected;
 - The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected for a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion; and
 - Any equipment, training, or policy concerns, and to the extent necessary, recommendations regarding modifications to equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address those concerns.



- ¶861 CPD will develop a timeline for implementation of the recommendations provided for in Paragraph 860(f) of this Stipulation and consult at the earliest feasible time with the Monitor and OAG, with the goal of developing consensus on the substance and timetable for the implementation of recommendations, subject to the processes provided for in Paragraph 627 of the Consent Decree for policies and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree for training. H. Community Engagement
- ¶862 CPD will establish and maintain clear channels through which community and Department members can provide input regarding CPD's investigatory stop policies and forms and propose revisions or additions to those policies and forms.
- ¶863 In developing or revising policies and training referenced in this Stipulation, including those on investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, CPD will seek input from members of the community and community-based organizations with relevant knowledge and experience through community engagement efforts.
- ¶864 CPD will regularly conduct a community engagement process through which community members, reflecting a broad cross section of the Chicago community the Department serves, can provide feedback on CPD's policy for investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. At a minimum CPD will conduct this community engagement process every two years and will consider the recommendations, in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A], during the biennial policy review process. A summary of CPD's policy review and community engagement efforts will be shared with the community organizations and community members that participated in the community engagement process.
- ¶865 The Parties recognize that the City, ACLU-IL, and the ACLU Agreement Consultant have developed a promising model for thoughtful community engagement through the creation of a Request for Proposals which sought community organizations to co-design and lead a citywide process to engage individuals and stakeholders to develop recommendations regarding CPD's investigatory stop and protective pat down practices. Within 180 days of the release of these recommendations, the Monitor will publicly report on these recommendations and CPD's response, and will further make recommendations as to CPD's ability to adapt elements of this model for community engagement. CPD will consider the results of the Monitor's report in developing future community engagement processes.
- ¶866 Investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances will be included among the topics covered in the public awareness campaign provided for in Paragraph 28 of the Consent Decree.

I. Policy, Training, and Plan Review

- ¶867 The Parties agree that the provisions in Paragraphs 627-633 of the Consent Decree apply to the policies and procedures, Paragraph 640 of the Consent Decree applies to the plans, and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree applies to the training described herein.
- ¶868 Within 60 days of the entry of this Stipulation, CPD will submit the most recently developed draft versions of the CPD policies and reports related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A], to the Monitor and OAG for the review, comment, and, if necessary, objection process as provided for in Paragraphs 627-30 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶869 After the review, comment, and, if necessary, objection process provided for in Paragraphs 627-30 of the Consent Decree, CPD will adopt and utilize an LDR in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A].
- ¶870 After the review, comment, and, if necessary, objection process provided for in Paragraphs 627-30 of the Consent Decree, CPD will adopt and utilize a revised Stop Report and Stop Receipt, to replace the use of the ISR and the Investigatory Stop Receipt.



- ¶871 The Parties further agree that CPD will submit any new or revised policies, procedures, and trainings regarding investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances to the Monitor and OAG for review, comment, and, if necessary, objection, consistent with the requirements of the Consent Decree.
- ¶872 Every two years, CPD will conduct a comprehensive review of its investigatory stops policies to assess whether the policies meet the requirements of this Stipulation, incorporate best practices, address observed trends and practices, as necessary, and reflect developments in applicable law. CPD will regularly review and consider the community input received, including during this biennial policy review process. J. Miscellaneous
- ¶873 CPD will not permit the number of investigatory stops, protective pat downs, or enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances to be considered as part of any bonus, incentive, or promotional process for any CPD officer and will not implement any form of quota relating to the same.
- ¶874 The Parties agree that the Implementation, Enforcement, and Monitoring provisions in Part XII of the Consent Decree apply to the requirements described herein, including those of the Coalition described in Paragraph 709 of the Consent Decree.
- K. Community Input on this Stipulation
- ¶875 The Parties agree that they will make a joint request to the Court for a Community Input Session on this Stipulation, to be held within 90 days of the submission of this Stipulation by the parties and to include an opportunity for community input and public testimony by individuals affected by this Stipulation. L. Definitions
- ¶876 Loitering Ordinances – the City of Chicago’s Gang and Narcotics-Related Loitering Ordinances set forth in the Municipal Code of Chicago Section 8-4-015 “Gang Loitering” and Section 8-4-017 “Narcotics-Related Loitering.”
- ¶877 Patrol Field Units – the primary beat cars, rapid response cars, and watch specialty cars (squadrol, traffic car, and park car) assigned to watch field operations in District Law Enforcement; District tactical teams; and Community Safety Teams (or operationally equivalent units).



ACRONYMS AND TERMS

The following is a listing of acronyms and terms utilized by the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

Advisements and Recommendations

TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a TRR review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training which, once complete, must be documented by a supervisor in the TRR.

AXON	Company that provides the Body Worn Camera system utilize by CPD officers.
BATIP	Battery in progress call for service
BURGIP	Burglary in progress call for service
BWC	Body-Worn Camera
BWC Early Termination	Indicates that the involved member deactivated his BWC before the conclusion of an incident.
BWC Late Activation	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at the beginning of an incident.
BWC No Activation	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at any point during an incident.
BWC Other Issues	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue relating to BWC usage.
CHECKWB	Check the well-being call for service
Control Tactics Not Articulated	The involved member indicated that they used control tactics by checking the action on their TRR but did not articulate how or when they were used.
CRIMTI	Criminal trespass in-progress call
DD	Domestic disturbance call
DP	Debriefing Point
ET	Evidence Technician
Foot Pursuit Issue	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue related to a foot pursuit.
Foot Pursuit – Radio Communications	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified that the involved member did not follow the guidelines laid out in Training Bulletin 18-01.
Force Mit – Communication	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of communication as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Mit. – Not Articulated	The involved member indicated that they used the principles of Force Mitigation by checking it on the TRR but failed to articulate the actions in the narrative portion of their TRR.



Force Mit. – Positioning	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of positioning as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Mit. – Time	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of time as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Options	Indicates that the involved member incorrectly identified subject’s actions or member’s response in relation to the CPD Force Options Model.
FP	Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report
FPI	Firearm Pointing Incident
FPIR	Firearm Pointing Incident Report
IDR	Incident Debriefing Report
ISR	Investigatory Stop Report
MISSION	Mission (seat belt, narcotics, etc.)
Narrative Deficiency	Refers to various issues identified by TRED reviewers regarding an involved member’s narrative or that of a reviewing or approving supervisor. Typically this involves the member failing to adequately articulate, in writing, a portion of the incident.
OEMC	Office of Emergency Management & Communications
Other – Policy Procedure	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous policy or procedure issue.
Other – Tactics	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified miscellaneous tactical issues.
Performance Recognition System	The Performance Recognition System is an assessment tool for assisting Department supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to the job performance of members under their command.
PERGUN	Person with a gun call for service
PERKNI	Person with a knife call for service
PERSTB	Person stabbed call for service
Pursuit Box Not Checked	Foot or vehicle pursuit box on the Tactical Response Report was either omitted or incorrectly checked.
PNT	Pointing notification
Radio Communications	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue relating to the involved member’s use of radio to communicate with dispatchers or other officers.
Recommendations and Advisements	TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training.



ACRONYMS AND TERMS

ROBJO	Robbery just occurred call for service
SUSPER	Suspicious person call for service
Search Issue	Indicates an issue was identified by TRED reviewers relating to the involved member's search of a subject.
SHOTSF	Shots fired call for service
SS	Street Stop
SS(ov)	Street Stop (on-view)
Taser – Accidental Discharge	The involved member reported accidentally discharging a Taser device.
Taser – Crossfire	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a crossfire situation involving a Taser.
Taser – Other	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding Taser handling, use, or reporting.
Taser – Over 5 Seconds	Involved member utilized a Taser cycle that exceeds five seconds.
TRR	Tactical Response Report
TRR-I	Tactical Response Report Investigation
TRED	Tactical Review and Evaluation Division
TRR Box Issue	One or more boxes on the Tactical Response Report were either omitted or incorrectly checked.
TRR Inconsistency – External	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency between the TRR or TRR-I and other reports (e.g. Arrest Report or Case Incident Report).
TRR Inconsistency – Internal	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency within the TRR or TRR-I.
TS	Traffic Stop
Vehicle Extraction	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding the involved member's actions while extracting (removing) a subject from a motor vehicle.
VIRTRA	A 300-degree small arms judgmental use of force and decision-making simulator for law enforcement training. This intense, immersive training environment takes into account every detail from the smallest pre-attack indicators to the most cognitive overload stimuli situations imaginable.