



CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION



2023 YEAR-END REPORT

PUBLISHED DATE June 27, 2024






TABLE OF CONTENTS

7	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
11	YEAR-END EVALUATION
20	FORCE OPTIONS MODEL
25	INCIDENT DEBRIEFING REPORT
27	IDR CREATION
28	TRED REVIEW
29	IDR TOTALS
31	TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT TOTALS
34	FORCE REVIEW BOARD INCIDENTS
36	FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT
38	FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT TOTALS
42	FOOT PURSUIT REPORT TOTALS
47	IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS
51	INVOLVED MEMBER RECOMMENDATIONS
52	IDRs WITH BWC RECOMMENDATIONS
54	DE-ESCALATION AND FORCE MITIGATION
55	SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY
57	REVIEWING SUPERVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS
59	INVESTIGATING SUPERVISOR RECOMMENDATIONS



60	OC DISCHARGE INCIDENTS
61	TASER DISCHARGE INCIDENTS
64	INCIDENTS WITH FORCE AGAINST HANDCUFFED SUBJECT
66	TRRs AND PURSUITS
67	FPIRs AND PURSUITS
68	FPIRs AND TRRs
69	FPIRs AND WEAPON RECOVERIES
70	SEARCH WARRANT REVIEW
71	FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP REVIEW UNIT
72	PRE-STIPULATION PERIOD
78	POST-STIPULATION PERIOD
84	RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS
101	ACRONYMS AND TERMS



MISSION

TO SERVE OUR
AND PROTECT
RIGHTS, AND
OF ALL PEOPLE



STATEMENT

COMMUNITIES
THE LIVES,
PROPERTY
IN CHICAGO.



G01-01, Vision, Mission Statement, and Core Values



OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

The Department is led by the Superintendent of Police, who is appointed by the Mayor.

In addition to overall Department management, the Office of the Superintendent is responsible for critical functions such as planning and implementing the Community Policing Strategy, facilitating and coordinating law enforcement services, planning police coverage at public gatherings, addressing legal and legislative matters, administering labor agreements, and providing a liaison to the news media.



Superintendent of Police

Larry Snelling

OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING AND REFORM

The Office of Constitutional Policing & Reform is commanded by a Bureau Chief who reports directly to the Superintendent of Police. The office consists of the following division and groups: Administrative Support, Reform Management, and Training & Support.

The office is responsible for administrative operations, including the management of records, compliance, reform, and training.



Chief

Angel L. Novalez




Deputy Chief

Stephen Chung

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is overseen by a Commander and Lieutenant who report directly to a Bureau Chief.

The mission of the Chicago Police Department's Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is to review and analyze information that arises from Use of Force incidents in order to enhance Department Members' skills and ultimately make the City of Chicago safer for its Officers and citizens. The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is non-disciplinary in nature.



Commander

Sean G. Joyce



Lieutenant

Richard B. DeFelice



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

¶ 153,154

BACKGROUND

The Chicago Police Department established the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (formerly the Force Review Division), in 2017 with the mission of reviewing and analyzing information that arises from use of force incidents. After establishing review procedures and an electronic use of force reporting application, the Force Review Division began conducting use of force reviews on May 29, 2018.

On November 1, 2019, the Department issued its first-ever Firearm Pointing Incident (FPI) policy which requires a Department member to make a notification any time that a member points a firearm at a person while performing their duties. In conjunction with this policy, TRED created a new team to review and analyze FPIs.

Beginning January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all reported Foot Pursuits involving Department members. Additionally, as of this same date, TRED commenced utilizing the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) for reviews of Use of Force, Foot Pursuit, and Firearm Pointing Incidents.

TRED's review process involves examining Department reports and any associated video, including body-worn camera and in-car camera video. The reviews compare the facts of each incident with protocols which have been established by Department policy and training standards in order to identify opportunities for improvement. These reviews are designed to be non-disciplinary in nature. TRED utilizes these reviews to make both individual and Department-wide recommendations related to training, policy, and equipment.

In 2023, the 4th Amendment Stop Review Unit expanded its operations as part of TRED. These two units comprise the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the TRED 2023 Year-End Report is to provide an overview of findings and recommendations related to Use of Force, Firearm Pointing Incidents, and Foot Pursuits. An analysis of these findings is critical to enhancing both community and officer safety and reducing the risk of civil liability to Department members.

Note on information reported:

The information and data contained in this document is indicative of IDRs generated from January 1 through December 31,

2023. The primary source of data for this report was drawn from Department tables as of April 30, 2024. Notably, data and information in this report is subject to change based upon any subsequent reporting or processing of the relevant information. TRED produces its Year-End and Midyear reports based on the date of occurrence rather than date of TRED review. Accordingly, TRED reports should closely align with published data dashboards as well as other reports produced by other Department bureaus.

There are references to Consent Decree paragraphs throughout this report. The text of specific paragraphs is included in the appendix at the end of this report.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) was fully implemented in 2023. The IDR collects all reports that TRED reviews within one computer application. This streamlines TRED reviews by implementing a holistic approach to incident review. See page 25 for a full description of the Incident Debriefing Report.

In response to a substantial number of BWC debriefing points related to body-worn camera (BWC) operation, TRED began utilizing a new debriefing matrix to ensure accountability and consistency. When addressing BWC issues (No Activation, Late Activation, Early Deactivation, etc.), TRED utilizes the following debriefing progression: **1st Debriefing** - review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" with a supervisor; **2nd Debriefing** - review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" and BWC Training Bulletin ETB 17-03 "Body Worn Camera" with a supervisor and view Streaming Video V423 "Officer Worn Body Camera Act 2022"; **3rd Debriefing** - review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" and BWC Training Bulletin ETB 17-03 "Body Worn Camera" with a supervisor and view Streaming Video V423 "Officer Worn Body Camera Act 2022 Updates." Additionally, the member will be re-enrolled in BWC E-Learning; **4th Debriefing** - the member will be required to attend BWC training with the Training and Support Group; and **5th Debriefing** - the following information will be forwarded to the unit's Commander and Captain: *The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division has progressively increased recommended training options for each incident requiring a debrief. TRED has exhausted all available training options at this time. This incident requires further corrective action to be determined by the affected member's unit/district, which should be documented in the Incident Debriefing Report upon completion.* It is expected that this new BWC matrix, along with increased training and



district-level supervisory accountability will reduce the number of BWC issues moving forward. In addition, TRED sees a need to provide more training to officers who have multiple debriefings for BWC violations. Accordingly, TRED continues to work with the Training Support Group to create and conduct classes on the use and requirements of the BWC system. Further, TRED is working collaboratively with the Strategic Initiatives Division to develop and rollout an IDR Supervisory Debriefing Point Dashboard that will provide all supervisors with access to a member's IDR debriefing history. This will equip unit level supervisors with the information needed to better address training concerns, including BWC activation issues, at the unit level.

In preparing presentations related to Level 3 use of force incidents under review by the Force Review Board, TRED noted multiple instances of supervisors conducting public safety questioning of members before ensuring that BWCs were deactivated as required by Department policy. In response, TRED assisted the Training and Support Group with the development of a streaming video designed to provide instruction to all Department supervisors about conducting Public Safety questions following an officer-involved shooting. This streaming video was shown at roll calls to inform Department members on proper procedures related to the Public Safety inquiry. In addition, members of TRED and the Incident Response Team (IRT), a team of investigators that respond to Level 3 use of force incidents, presented training to the Department command staff on multiple topics including response to officer-involved shooting incidents and conducting public safety questioning.

TRED implemented several measures to address challenges with an increasing number of IDRs requiring review. TRED trained an additional **20** review officers in February, 2023. The on-boarding of additional officers assists TRED in conducting reviews in a timely manner. Following the detail of **20** additional officers in February 2023, TRED created a new Notice of Job Opportunity to replenish and increase TRED personnel. Additionally, TRED established the hiring criteria for the first civilian use of force reviewers. **Four** civilian Tactical Review Specialists began training with the Training and Support Group in December of 2023. Further, TRED continues to grant overtime to officers who volunteer to work on their day off and extend their tours of duty. TRED has also requested that members of the unit no longer be deployed to the field when days off are cancelled.

In the event days off are cancelled, TRED recommends that members remain at their unit and conduct reviews.

TRED has observed continued success in reducing the number of "*Other*" debriefing points in 2023. TRED attributes this to the increased training of unit members and heightened supervisory review.

TRAINING

TRED staff completed **16** hours of additional in-service training during 2023. This training was in addition to the annual 40-hour required minimum for Department members. Topics included Taser training and tactical room entry.

As previously mentioned, TRED supervisors also on-boarded **20** new TRED members. Training consisted of **24** hours of TRR review training (specific to the TRR review process). These new members also spent 2-4 weeks shadowing veteran reviewers to familiarize themselves with the incident review process.

New members also received **7-10** hours of FPIR training (specific to the FPI review process). These new members also spent **6** hours shadowing veteran reviewers to familiarize themselves with the FPI review process.

In 2023, TRED staff also developed a lesson plan for the Foot Pursuit review process. TRED now reviews all Foot Pursuits. This lesson plan was developed in conjunction with Department policy that was implemented in August of 2022. This will aid current and future TRED reviewers with the review process that incorporates Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports.

IDR OBSERVATIONS - PATTERNS AND TRENDS

After reviewing a use of force incident, firearm pointing incident, or foot pursuit, TRED may issue a recommendation or an advisement. A recommendation is more formal in nature and requires that either the member's immediate supervisor or the Department's Training and Support Group conduct a debriefing and/or training session.

In comparison to a recommendation, an advisement is more informal in nature. Advisements are written debriefing points that provide involved members and supervisors with information that could potentially benefit them when engaged in or



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

documenting a future use of force, firearm pointing, or foot pursuit incident. Unlike recommendations, advisements do not require a formally documented debriefing or training session.

TRED issues recommendations and advisements for involved members, reviewing supervisors (generally the rank of sergeant), and investigating/approving supervisors (generally the rank of lieutenant).

TRED conducted **22,270** IDR reviews in 2023. There were **2,450 (11%)** of the IDR reviews completed in 2023 that led to advisements for involved members. There were a total of **4,366** training recommendations made representing **20%** of all IDR reviews. **16,795 (75%)** of the reviews resulted in no recommendations.

The most commonly debriefed issue for Department members is body-worn camera compliance. The four most common body-worn camera compliance issues comprised a total of **2,771** debriefing points, which accounted for **17%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed. The four most common body-worn camera compliance issues include late camera activation, no activation, early deactivation, and no buffering. In addition to implementing the previously-described BWC debriefing matrix, TRED, in 2023, began assisting the Training and Support Group in administering BWC refresher training for referred members.

Incidents requiring TRED review increased significantly in 2023. TRED reviewed **3,375** TRRs in 2023. This is a **31%** increase over the **2,575** TRRs reviewed in 2022. Total TRRs in 2023 increased by approximately **36%** over the 2022 total. Similarly, TRED reviewed **4,465** FPIRs in 2023. During 2022, TRED reviewed **3,540** FPIRs. This results in a **26%** increase in FPIRs reviewed in 2023. Overall, total FPIRs in 2023 increased by approximately **26%** compared to the 2022 total. Despite these year-over-year increases in reported uses of force and firearm pointing incidents, COPA noted in its 2023 Annual Report that it received **11%** fewer allegations of excessive force in 2023 compared to 2022. This 2023 decrease in excessive force allegations co-occurring with significant increases in reported uses of force and firearm pointing incidents supports the conclusion that, concomitantly, Training and Support Group trainings and TRED advisements and recommendations are enhancing Department member awareness of, practices consistent with, and adherence to de-escalation and use of force policies.

The 2023 increases in reported uses of force and FPIs are at-

tributable, at least in part, to increases in the number of contacts police made with citizens as measured by arrests and investigatory stops. In its Midyear Report, TRED presented an analysis showing significant year-over-year increases in the first seven months of 2023 versus 2022 in the total number of arrests and investigatory stops. These two metrics continued to increase through 2023 yearend in comparison to 2022 totals. In 2023 versus 2022, total arrests increased by approximately **14.7%** while investigatory stops increased by **14.2%**. In 2024, TRED will continue to monitor and analyze this trend of increasing TRRs and FPIRs.

TRED reviewed **5,120** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports in 2023. Department members submitted a total of **5,361** Foot Pursuit reports. This was the first full year that TRED began reviewing all Foot/Pursuit Bicycle Pursuit reports. Overall, TRED reviewed **96%** of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports. The remaining percentage consists of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports for which TRED has completed a review and the report is now pending recommended actions at the district level in order to enter final status for the report to finalize. In addition, due to a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit application issue there were reports submitted that did not have an OEMC event number and, consequently, an IDR was not created. TRED staff is working with the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit application developer to resolve this issue.

TRRs indicating a foot pursuit increased by **53 (10%)** in 2023. There were **583** TRRs associated with a foot pursuit in 2023 versus **530** in 2022. The number of TRRs associated with a foot pursuit and involving a Level 1 use of force increased by **88 (28%)** in 2023 over the previous year. However, a downward trend has developed since 2021 regarding TRRs associated with a foot pursuit and reporting a Level 2 use of force. The number of TRRs associated with foot pursuit and reporting a Level 2 use of force have decreased since 2021: **206** in 2021, **201** in 2022, and **173** in 2023.

Though total TRRs indicating a pursuit (foot, foot and vehicle, other, or vehicle) increased in 2023, when viewed as a percentage of annual total TRRs submitted, TRRs associated with a pursuit have decreased each year since 2021. TRRs indicating a pursuit (foot, foot and vehicle, other, or vehicle) increased by **53 (10%)** in 2023 compared to 2022. However, there has been a steady downward trend since 2021 of TRRs indicating a pursuit as a percentage of annual total TRRs. In 2021, **18%** of total TRRs submitted indicate a pursuit. In 2022, the percentage of TRRs



associated with a pursuit fell to **16%** of total TRRs submitted. Again in 2023, the percentage of TRRs associated with a pursuit decreased to **13%** of total TRRs submitted.

There are multiple positive monthly trends regarding TRED issuance of debriefing points. Throughout 2023, there has been a downward monthly trend in the following categories: percent of IDRs reviewed with debriefing points (page 48), IDRs with involved member debriefing points (page 49), IDRs with reviewing supervisor debriefing points (page 50), and IDRs with investigating supervisor debriefing points (page 50). In each of these categories, the cumulative monthly average number of debriefing points issued has decreased each month as has the cumulative monthly average of IDRs with a debriefing point as a percentage of IDRs reviewed. These positive trends are attributable, at least in part, to in-service training courses developed and administered by the Training and Support Group. Due to the close working relationship between TRED and the Training and Support Group, the curricula for these courses have taken into account the most commonly issued debriefing points by TRED.

In 2023, TRED continued to see a decrease in the debriefing point *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*. At year-end, **3%** of all IDR's reviewed received this debriefing point compared to **12%** of TRR's reviewed in 2022.

TRED will continue to monitor these trends in 2024.

2024 TRED RECOMMENDATIONS

TRED anticipates a need for more training of the Department's exempt staff related to Level 3 Use of Force investigations. In most instances, a Street Deputy with the rank of Deputy Chief responds to Level 3 Use of Force incidents. However, there may be times that other exempt members will be required to respond to these incidents. TRED intends to work with the Training Support Group on updating a lesson plan for all exempt members on Level 3 Use of Force investigation.

To enhance accountability at the unit level and further address the backlog of pending IDR reviews, TRED is exploring the benefits and challenges with introducing the concept of unit-level firearm pointing incident reviews. Developing procedures that facilitate the review of select firearm pointing incidents at the unit level will serve dual objectives of strengthening accountability and reducing the backlog of IDRs awaiting review. This effort

will require both policy changes and the development of training curriculum for conducting unit-level reviews.

In November 2023, TRED discussed with members of the Independent Monitoring Team and Office of the Illinois Attorney General operational issues related to its review of TRRs reporting a Level 1 use of force. Consent Decree ¶574 requires the review of "a representative sample of level 1 reportable use of force" incidents. Accordingly, shortly after creating the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (formerly known as the Force Review Division), the decision was made to select for review a random **5%** of Level 1 TRRs. TRED's current wholistic approach to incident review, however, now includes the review of all Level 1 uses of force that occur during incidents involving a Level 2 use of force, a firearm pointing, and/or a foot pursuit. Consequently, in 2021, 2022, and 2023, TRED reviewed over **50%** of all TRRs reporting a Level 1 use of force. In 2024, TRED will continue to work with members of the of the Independent Monitoring Team and Office of the Illinois Attorney General to explore review practices that better balance the requirements of ¶574 with TRED's operational efficiency concerns regarding the review of TRRs reporting a Level 1 use of force.

Finally, Chicago is hosting the 2024 Democratic National Convention (DNC). As a result, Department planning is underway to ensure that any reportable uses of force related to DNC events are properly documented. TRED is involved in this planning effort and anticipates conducting a post-DNC evaluation of Department response and reporting with respect to use of force incidents.

FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP REVIEW UNIT (4ASRU)

INTRODUCTION AND EARLY REFORMS

In March 2015, the City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department (CPD), and American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) agreed that CPD would follow policies and practices consistent with the Fourth Amendment for investigatory stops. Former U.S. Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys was retained to review CPD's policies and practices related to investigatory stops and protective pat downs. In April 2015, a class action lawsuit, Darnell Smith et al. vs. City of Chicago, was filed, highlighting unconstitutional stops by CPD and prompting further reforms.

In October 2015, CPD established the Integrity Section (Unit 115), later re-established as the Fourth Amendment Stop Review



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Unit (4ASRU), to review Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) and train officers on new ISR policies. The ACLU's 2016 Annual Report confirmed CPD's substantial compliance with the Fourth Amendment regarding street stops. In 2016, Public Act 99-352 expanded the Illinois Traffic Stop Statistical Study Act to include pedestrian stops and mandated receipts for pat-downs and searches, increasing transparency and accountability.

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND DEPARTMENT-LEVEL REVIEWS

The settlement of the Darnell Smith et al. vs. City of Chicago lawsuit in May 2023 led to significant improvements in training, supervision, accountability, and community engagement. Following the stipulations of the June 27, 2023 lawsuit settlement agreement, the 4ASRU began conducting Department-level reviews of ISRs in August 2023. Per the stipulation, 4ASRU reviewed **5% (1,396 ISRs)** of the **15% (26,506 ISRs)** of all ISRs approved at the unit level (**176,708**) between January 1, 2021 and June 27, 2023. Upon completing the backlog review in December 2023, 4ASRU notified Department members of identified deficiencies and enrolled them in an e-Learning ISR policy review module. For the post-stipulation period of June 28, 2023 to December 31, 2023, 4ASRU reviewed approximately **15%** of all ISRs approved at the unit level during that timeframe.

STAFFING AND EXPANSION OF 4ASRU

In May 2023, CPD increased 4ASRU staffing by adding **11** officers and **2** supervisors to address expanded review responsibilities under the Consent Decree. This expansion enhances compliance and accountability within the Department.

4ASRU 2023 ACHIEVEMENTS

In 2023, 4ASRU achieved significant milestones. In staffing the unit, 4ASRU trained and completed onboarding for **11** officers to conduct reviews of investigatory stops. Additionally, 4ASRU implemented a performance management process and collaborated with IT partners to enhance ISR-A, the application used for reviewing Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs). 4ASRU developed an efficient workflow for ISR reviews and introduced features to ISR

-A such as queueing ISRs for supervisory oversight and adding color-coding indicators for status tracking. To report the progress of reviews, 4ASRU worked closely with the Strategic Initiatives Division to design a dashboard that automatically updates totals and statuses of ISR reviews.

Most significantly, 4ASRU completed the review of the **1,396** ISRs that comprise **5%** of **15%** of all ISRs approved at the unit level between January 1, 2021 and June 27, 2023 as required by the consent decree. Moreover, 4ASRU provided feedback and guidance to **519** Department members who either authored or approved an ISR that was found to be deficient pursuant to 4ASRU's review. The **519** Department members were enrolled in an investigatory stop policy review e-Learning module.

PRE-STIPULATION BACKLOG REVIEWS (JANUARY 1, 2021 – JUNE 27, 2023)

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is actively leveraging technological advancements to enhance its investigatory practices, specifically through the development of an application designed to improve the accuracy and efficiency of inputting information into Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs). This initiative is a direct response to findings from the backlog review, which revealed varying degrees of compliance and deficiencies in ISRs, highlighting the need for more precise data capture and better training. The development of the new application focuses on minimizing human error and increasing the precision of data entry for ISRs. By making the application more user-friendly and integrating prompts that guide officers through the data entry process, the likelihood of administrative deficiencies and errors in articulating reasonable suspicion can be significantly reduced.

Enhanced oversight and accountability are achieved through the application's capability to track and audit ISR entries efficiently. With improved data integrity and accessibility, supervisors can more effectively review ISRs and provide timely feedback to officers. This not only facilitates ongoing training and development but also demonstrates to the community that CPD is committed to transparency and accountability.

The backlog review identified that **69.2%** of ISRs were compliant with Department policy, **17.8%** had administrative deficiencies, and **13%** had deficiencies in the articulation of reasonable suspicion. Deficiencies included insufficient reasonable articula-



ble suspicion (RAS) and improper justification for stops, pat-downs, and searches. Feedback was provided to **333** officers and **186** sergeants, with **99%** successfully completing the recommended e-learning policy review.

The demographic analysis of the pre-stipulation backlog ISR reviews showed that **67.8%** of the investigative stops involved Black subjects, **24.21%** involved White Hispanic subjects, **6.67%** involved White subjects, and **1.29%** involved Asian/Pacific Islander subjects. Geographically, the sample of reviewed ISRs represented all 22 police districts of the Department, indicating comprehensive coverage across different areas.

The backlog review identified that **69.2%** of ISRs were compliant with Department policy, **17.8%** had administrative deficiencies, and **13%** had deficiencies in the articulation of reasonable suspicion. Deficiencies included insufficient reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) and improper justification for stops, pat-downs, and searches. Feedback was provided to **333** officers and **186** sergeants, with **99%** successfully completing the recommended e-learning policy review.

The demographic analysis of the pre-stipulation backlog ISR reviews showed that 67.8% of the investigative stops involved Black subjects, 24.21% involved White Hispanic subjects, 6.67% involved White subjects, and 1.29% involved Asian/Pacific Islander subjects. Geographically, the sample of reviewed ISRs represented all 22 police districts of the Department, indicating comprehensive coverage across different areas.

POST-STIPULATION REVIEWS (JUNE 28, 2023 – DECEMBER 31, 2023)

Of the **39,634** ISRs approved at the unit level during the post-stipulation period of June 28, 2023 to December 31, 2023, 4ASRU reviewed approximately **15%** or **6,033** ISRs. 4ASRU addressed deficiencies by advising on proper procedures and recommending policy reviews, enrollments in e-Learning modules, and debriefings with unit supervisors that include the review of investigatory stop Body-Worn Camera (BWC) footage.

4ASRU RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 2024

In the 2024 TRED Midyear Report, 4ASRU anticipates providing updates concerning new developments. Regarding selection methodology, 4ASRU currently reviews **15%** of all ISRs approved during the relevant reporting period. 4ASRU is devising changes to its ISR selection methodology that will ensure that a representative sample of ISRs is selected for review while more efficiently balancing workloads with staffing demands.

The Chicago Police Department is in the process of reviewing its policies related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the loitering ordinances. Revisions to these policies may involve changes to the 4ASRU's operations. Information related to these changes will also be discussed in the 2024 TRED Midyear Report.

Finally, Consent Decree ¶835 requires that a needs assessment be conducted of the Department's reporting and data collection systems related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of Loitering Ordinances. Given the likelihood of policy changes in 2024 that will impact these areas, 4ASRU will work collaboratively with relevant stakeholders to provide a thorough needs assessment report and, thereafter, a plan to address the identified needs.



YEAR END EVALUATION

¶ 574.575

January 1– December 31, 2023

A. De-Escalation/Force Mitigation

Articulation Pattern

Over the past four years, there has been a remarkable and positive decline in the amount of debriefing points related to De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated. In 2020, there were **585** debriefing points recorded for this issue. However, concerted efforts and improvements in training and Department-wide awareness in report writing have led to a significant reduction in these debriefings. By 2021, the number of debriefing points had decreased to **464**, and this downward trend continued in 2022, with only **305** debriefing points. Most impressively, by 2023, the number of debriefing points had plummeted to just **110**. This continuous decline demonstrates the effectiveness of the in-service trainings implemented to address and improve de-escalation and force mitigation efforts, reflecting a commitment to better practices and enhanced safety for all involved.

B. Body-Worn Camera Pattern

In 2023, the most frequent debriefing point issued by TRED spanning across all incidents continued to be BWC-Late Activation. In an attempt to address this BWC pattern, TRED enrolls officers with three or more debriefings in the BWC eLearning module for refresher training. TRED personnel has also collaborated with the Training Support Group to begin instruction of a new BWC in-service training for Department members with four or more BWC debriefings. This in-person training of Department members highlights the BWC related Department directives in order to reduce the amount of BWC debriefings.

TRED will continue working with the Training and Support Group, Research and Development, and other Department bureaus to develop solutions to reduce this issue.

C. Foot Pursuit Pattern

In 2023, there were **5,361** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports submitted. The most frequent debriefing was for Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Event Log-Not Completed. The Department introduced a new Foot Pursuit policy in August 2022. A lack of familiarity with the new Department policy may have contributed to the improper documentation after Department members engaged in a foot pursuit. With additional training and increased supervisory oversight, it is anticipated that the overall total of undocumented foot pursuits will decrease. TRED will continue to monitor this trend and provide recommendations as necessary.

D. Public Safety Investigations

TRED continued to see a pattern of responding supervisors not following proper procedure when conducting the Public Safety Investigations throughout 2023. Working with the Training & Support Group, TRED helped develop a streaming video designed to provide instruction to all Department supervisors about Public Safety questions following an officer-involved shooting. This roll call training video informs Department members on proper procedures related to the Public Safety inquiry. TRED also recommended re-enrolling all supervisors in the Public Safety Investigation eLearning module. Further, TRED worked with Bureau of Patrol to emphasize the need for Public Safety Investigations training at district roll calls. TRED will continue to monitor this pattern.



TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

193.574.575

Staff Requirements

TRED staff is selected through a Notice of Job Opportunity (NOJO) process. Department members are encouraged to apply to the unit using a process delineated by the Human Resources Division.

TRED members are required to have a minimum of five years of experience. Officers must demonstrate a thorough working knowledge of Department policy and directives related to foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, search warrants, and use of force incidents.

Additionally, members must have an established working knowledge of Department computer applications and informational databases. Applicants must also have an acceptable disciplinary record, no outstanding debt to the City of Chicago, and an acceptable history of medical roll use and attendance.

Once applicants are detailed to the TRED, they are trained by TRED staff to perform the functions of a TRED review officer. This training includes Department policy refresher sessions regarding how policy and Department training materials relate and apply to the TRED review process.

Reviewers are then trained on using Department resources to gather and review all the information that is associated with an incident. This includes systems used to view body-worn camera and in-car camera video, and Clearnet.

New TRED reviewers shadow veteran TRED reviewers to gain familiarity with the review process and complete their training.

Tactical Review and Evaluation Division Staff

At the beginning of 2023, TRED was staffed with one Commander, one Lieutenant, seven Sergeants, and **34** Review Officers.

At the conclusion of 2023, the staffing levels were at one Commander, one Lieutenant, nine Sergeants, **45** Review Officers, and four civilian Tactical Review Specialists. During the year, the Department detailed **20** Review Officers to TRED along with two sergeants.

The addition of **20** officers detailed to TRED gave the unit an overall increase of **59%** in review officers. TRED supervisory staff then conducted training to onboard the new review officers. These detailed officers have been critical within the daily operations needed to address the current Incident Debriefing Report backlog.

TRED staff also began preparation of another Notice of Job Opportunity (NOJO). This NOJO process has been finalized and a current list is active in order to have qualified applicants readily available in the event any current personnel are lost due to promotions, transfers, retirements, etc.

There was also a separate hiring process initiated by TRED staff. This hiring process was opened up to civilians with previous law enforcement experience who have recently retired. At the conclusion of this hiring process, TRED received **four** candidates who received extensive onboarding training from the Training and Support Group. This new position is titled Tactical Review Specialist.



¶ 193,574,575

TRED Training

All sworn Department members were required to attend **40** hours of in-service training during 2023. TRED makes recommendations based on tactics, equipment, and training after reviewing different types of incidents. To ensure that TRED reviewers have the foundation necessary for critical review, they are required to attend additional in-service training.

In 2023, TRED reviewers attended an additional **16** hours of training with the Training and Support Group. This training consisted of:



8 hours Taser Training



8 hours Tactical Room Entry Training

Continuous Training

TRED conducts weekly staff meetings on Wednesdays where Department-required training is presented. TRED also uses this as an opportunity to analyze and discuss policy changes that may impact the TRED review process and any recent trends observed while conducting reviews. Incidents that have training value are also presented. These incidents allow TRED staff to ensure that there is consistency in both the review process and training recommendations that are being made to Department members.




GUIDING PRINCIPLES

To serve members of this organization and the community through objective and consistent review and analysis of use of force incidents, foot pursuit incidents and firearm pointing incidents.

To remain proactive and forward thinking and to continuously develop the use of force review process and communicate changes to all Department members.

To identify patterns that suggest a need for policy or enhanced training.

To ensure individual and Department-wide professional development through debriefing, training, and fostering a genuine culture of learning and improvement.





DEPARTMENT POLICY

SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE

The Department's highest priority is the sanctity of human life. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity, regardless of race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military status, immigration status, homeless status, source of income, credit history, criminal record, criminal history, or incarceration status. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life

DE-ESCALATION

Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time.

WHEN FORCE IS AUTHORIZED

Department members may only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, under the totality of the circumstances, in order to provide for the safety of any person or Department member, stop an attack, make an arrest, bring a person or situation safely under control, or prevent escape.

Source: G03-02 De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force

Effective Date: June 28, 2023



PRINCIPLES OF FORCE MITIGATION

CONTINUAL COMMUNICATION

When it is safe and feasible, members will use continual communication, including exercising **PERSUASION**, **ADVICE**, and **INSTRUCTION** prior to the use of physical force.

- When practical, establish and maintain one-on-one communication where only one member speaks at a time.

TACTICAL POSITIONING

When it is safe and reasonable to do so, members should make advantageous use of **POSITIONING**, **DISTANCE**, and **COVER** by isolating and containing a person, creating distance between the member and a potential threat, or utilizing barriers or cover.

- Members should attempt to establish a *zone of safety* for the security of the responding members and the public.

TIME AS A TACTIC

When it is safe and reasonable to do so, members should use time as a tactic by **SLOWING DOWN THE PACE OF THE INCIDENT**.

Using time as a tactic may:

- Permit the de-escalation of the person's emotions and allow the person an opportunity to comply with the lawful verbal direction;
- Allow for continued communication with the person and the adjustment of verbal techniques employed by the members; and
- Allow for the arrival of additional members, special units and equipment, and other tactical resources.

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*

Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*



LEVELS OF RESISTANCE

COOPERATIVE SUBJECT

A person who is **COMPLIANT** without the need for physical force.

RESISTER

A person who is **UNCOOPERATIVE**. Resisters are further divided into two categories:

1. **PASSIVE RESISTER** - A person who fails to comply (non-movement) with verbal or other direction.
2. **ACTIVE RESISTER** - A person who attempts to create distance between himself or herself and the member's reach with the intent to avoid physical control and/or defeat the arrest.

ASSAILANT

A person who is **USING OR THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE** against another person or himself/ herself which is likely to cause physical injury. Assailants are further subdivided into two categories:

1. The person's actions are **AGGRESIVELY OFFENSIVE WITH OR WITHOUT WEAPONS**. This category may include an assailant who is armed with a deadly weapon but whose actions do not constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.
2. The person's actions constitute an **IMMINENT THREAT OF DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM** to a Department member or to another person.

Source: G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options

Effective Date: June 28, 2023




FORCE OPTIONS MODEL

§ 153.163.164.176



Force Options Model CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT



CPD-11.960 (11/17)



CONTROL DEVICES & INSTRUMENTS

O.C. SPRAY

The prescribed personal OC device is a hand-held, canister type device containing a non-lethal, active ingredient of oleoresin capsicum solution. The personal OC device will use a nonflammable propellant and contain a ten percent solution of oleoresin capsicum (pepper agent) only. The rating will not exceed 500,000 Scoville Heat Units.

A Personal OC device is an authorized force option against passive resisters only under the following conditions:

- A. Occupants of a motor vehicle who are passively resisting arrest only after obtaining authorization from an on-scene supervisor the rank of sergeant or above.
- B. Noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd and only after obtaining authorization from the Superintendent or his or her designee.

A Personal OC device is an authorized force option against active resisters. If an active resister is part of a group or crowd, a Personal OC device is authorized only after obtaining approval from the Superintendent or his or her designee.



Source: U06-01-25 OC Chemical-Spray and Holder

Effective Date: August 26th, 2019

Source: G03-02-05 Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Devices and Other Chemical Agent Use Incidents

Effective Date: June 28, 2023

BATONS

Batons are authorized force options against passive and active resisters only as a control instrument placed mainly on the sensors of the skin covering bone or applied to joints and pressure sensitive areas of the body with non-impact pressure.

Batons are authorized force options against an assailant as an impact weapon.



Source: G03-02-07 Baton Use Incidents

Effective Date: June 28-2023



TASER X2

The Taser is a device used to control and subdue an active resister through the application of electrical impulses that override the central nervous system and cause uncontrollable muscle contractions.

Two probes attached by thin wires are fired from a cartridge attached to the handheld device. When both probes attach to the subject, a timed energy cycle is applied to the subject at the control of the operator. The Taser contains a computerized function which retains data of all discharges of the device.

Department members are authorized to use a Taser only for the purpose of gaining control of and restraining the following subjects:*

ACTIVE RESISTERS

The use of a Taser is an authorized force response option against an active resister, when:

- There is objectively reasonable belief at the time that the person is armed, the person presents a risk of serious injury to the Department member or others, and other reasonable force options are not readily available or would otherwise be ineffective under the circumstances at the time, or
- The person is exhibiting violent and aggressive behavior and there is objectively reasonable belief at the time that the person has committed a felony offense or any other offense against a person (e.g. battery, aggravated assault) or that disregards or endangers the bodily safety of other (e.g. reckless discharge of a firearm).

ASSAILANTS

- The use of a Taser is an authorized force option against an assailant, when the person is using or threatening to use force which is likely to cause physical injury.

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*
G03-02-04 Taser Use Incidents

Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*



DEPARTMENT TECHNOLOGY

Body Worn Cameras

When activated to event mode, the camera begins a permanent recording of digital data (audio and video media).

When the camera is powered on, the BWC is continually capturing video without audio. The camera is activated to event mode by a double press of the large button on the front of the camera. Activating the BWC also retains a buffering period (120 seconds prior to activation without audio and video recording). It is deactivated by pressing and holding the same button.

Recordings made on BWCs must be retained for a period of 90 days unless any incident captured on the recording has been flagged for extended retention.




Source: *S03-14 Body Worn Cameras*

Effective Date: *December 29, 2023*

In-Car Video Systems

The COBAN in-car video system records high definition video through a windshield mounted camera as well as a rear-camera lens directed at the prisoner compartment of the police vehicle.

The in-car video system will automatically engage audio and video recording when the vehicle's emergency-roof lights are activated. However, Department members may manually activate the in-car video system without the activation of the emergency equipment. At the conclusion of the incident, Department members must manually deactivate all recording processes, regardless of what method activated n in-car video system, and select the appropriate event type on the post-event pop-up menu.



Source: *S03-05 In-Car Video Systems*

Effective Date: *November 27, 2018*



Body Worn Camera Video Access

Once the AXON Body Worn Camera is docked in its cradle, video stored on the camera is automatically uploaded and stored in a cloud based server.

This video is then immediately available for viewing. The server can be searched using a variety of criteria including: date, time, and officer involved. If multiple videos of an incident exist, they are automatically linked together.

TRED reviewers are able to view multiple videos simultaneously that are synchronized. This provides TRED with multiple viewing angles and better clarity when analyzing most incidents.

The screenshot displays the AXON Evidence web application. The top navigation bar includes links for EVIDENCE, CASES, INVENTORY, REPORTS, ADMIN, and HELP. Below this, a secondary bar shows filters for ALL EVIDENCE, MY EVIDENCE, SHARED EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE MAP, and CITIZEN EVIDENCE. The main content area shows details for a specific video titled "AXON Body 2 Video 2019-09-21 1628". The video player is active, showing a street scene with a fire truck and a building. The video player includes a progress bar, a timestamp of 01:18 / 05:28, and a 1X playback speed. Below the video player, there are buttons for "CLIPS & MARKERS" and "OVERLAYS", and "ADD MARKER" and "ADD CLIP" buttons. To the right of the video player, a "METADATA" section provides details about the video, including "ASSIGNED TO:", "RECORDED ON:", "UPLOADED ON:", "UPLOADED BY:", "DELETION SCHEDULED FOR:", "FILE FORMAT:", "FILE SIZE:", and "EVIDENCE GROUP:". The "SOURCE" section shows the "Serial:" and "Model: Axon Body 2".



INCIDENT DEBRIEFING REPORT

The Incident Debriefing Report Origin

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is tasked with reviewing use-of-force incidents, firearm pointing incidents, and foot pursuits. These incidents are documented in the Tactical Response Report (TRR), Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR), and the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report (FP). The TRR and the FP reports are completed by the Department member involved in the incident. A FPIR is automatically created after the Department member makes the required notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communication (OEMC). Prior to 2023, TRED reviewed TRRs and documented their findings in the Tactical Response Report Review (TRR-R) located in the TRR application within Clearnet. TRED also reviewed FPIRs and documented their findings in the FPIR review section within the Firearm Pointing application within Clearnet. With the additional task of reviewing foot pursuits, TRED would be required to document their reviews in a Foot Pursuit Review report within the Foot Pursuit application located in Clearnet. Under this method, it was conceivable that if a Department member was involved in a foot pursuit that involved a firearm pointing and also involved a use-of-force, TRED would review and document its findings in three separate reports located in three separate applications in Clearnet. The involved Department member could then potentially be debriefed on three separate occasions for what was essentially one incident. TRED also debriefed reviewing and investigating supervisors within these same documents. This made it difficult for Department members to understand and separate the individual training which may be required.

Prior to 2023, in anticipation of reviewing foot pursuits, the decision was made to create the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR). The IDR facilitates a comprehensive review of an incident. Each member that is involved in the incident—the involved member, reviewing and

investigating supervisors—receive their own report. One TRED reviewer analyzes the entire incident and any combination of TRRs, FPIRs, and FPs that it may involve. This allows the reviewer to understand the totality of the circumstances around the incident and make an informed debriefing when it comes to recommending training.

This method also allows TRED to target training specific to each Department member as well as recommend training that corresponds with a particular debriefing point. Frontline supervisors are required to document the specific training that members receive. Frontline supervisors also have the ability to document instances when they do not concur with TRED's assessment. This provides valuable feedback when a supervisor's firsthand knowledge of the member's performance is needed to add context that TRED did not have during its review.

The IDR also creates efficiency in TRED's process. The total number of IDRs is significantly higher than the total number of TRRs and FPIRs reviewed in previous reporting periods. This is because the system automatically generates an IDR not only for the involved member(s), but also for the reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In practice, it does not take a TRED reviewer any longer to process three IDRs than a TRR-R from the same involved member, reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. The efficiency surfaces when there are multiple involved members with the same reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In these cases, TRED reviewers do not need to repeat the information in every report for the same two supervisors.

The IDR also eliminates the separate data silos that contained TRED debriefing data. Instead of having separate TRR debriefing data and FPIR debriefing data, all the data is now contained in one IDR data set. As a result, this report will present some data differently than



previous reports. For example, previously, if an involved member did not activate their body-worn camera in accordance with policy during an incident in which a foot pursuit, firearm pointing, and use-of-force all occurred, TRED would report on this data point in both the TRR and FPIR review sections. Now, using the IDR data, TRED can report this as one body-worn camera debriefing, for one member, in one incident. In addition, TRED has received feedback from field personnel and its own reviewers that the IDR is easier to understand and use.



IDR CREATION

¶ 228, 229, 234

TRR #1

Involved Member A
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

TRR #2

Involved Member B
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FP #1

Involved Member A
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FP #1

Involved Member C
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FPIR #1

Involved Beat Member
Involved Beat Member

Each member in an incident, whether they are an involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor, only receives one IDR for an incident.

In the diagram below, three separate involved members, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor were involved in these five reports. Previously, each member or supervisor would have required documentation in every report that they authored, reviewed, or approved.

The IDR generates only one report for each member.

When the IDR has been reviewed, debriefed, and approved, it is attached electronically to every associated TRR, FPIR, or FP.

ROOT IDR

IDR Involved Member A

IDR Involved Member B

IDR Involved Member C

IDR Reviewing Supervisor

IDR Investigating Supervisor



TRED REVIEW

IDRs Reviewed by TRED

The Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) is used by TRED to document reviews of foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, and use-of-force incidents.

On January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports submitted. TRED reviewed **5,120** foot pursuit reports that occurred in 2023.

TRED also reviews all Firearm Pointing Incident reports. TRED reviewed **4,465** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports that occurred in 2023.

TRED reviews use-of-force incidents documented in Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) based on the TRR level.


The level of a TRR is determined by a combination of different factors including the force options used by the Department member and injuries to a person.

TRED reviews a randomly selected **5%** of all Level 1 TRRs. TRED also reviews all Level 1 TRRs associated with a foot pursuit or firearm pointing incident. In addition, TRED reviews any Level 1 TRR that is associated with another TRR that TRED is required to review. TRED reviewed **1,685** Level 1 TRRs that occurred in 2023.

TRED reviews all Level 2 TRRs. TRED reviewed **1,646** Level 2 TRRs that occurred in 2023.

TRED does not review Level 3 TRRs. These are reviewed by the Force Review Board.

22,270 individual Incident Debriefing Reports were created and used by TRED to document these reviews.






IDR TOTALS


TRRs and IDRs January 1, 2023 – December 31, 2023

Every TRR generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor. Multiple TRRs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor and will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.




FPIRs and IDRs January 1, 2023 – December 31, 2023

Every FPIR generates an IDR for the involved beat which may have one involved member or, in many cases, two involved members. In some cases, the FPIR generates IDRs for more than two members involved in the same incident (e.g., when two units each staffed with two officers are involved in an incident and at least one officer from each unit points their firearm).



FPs and IDRs January 1, 2023 – December 31, 2023

Every FP generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and, in some cases, one investigating supervisor. Multiple FPs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor and will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.






IDRs Generated and Reviewed by TRED

TRED began using the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) to review and debrief incidents beginning on March 17, 2023. TRED reviewed **3,375** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs), **4,465** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **5,120** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports, which in turn generated **22,270** Incident Debriefing Reports (IDRs) for TRED to review in 2023.

The below chart displays the amount of IDRs generated by month of incident. Consequently, TRED reviewed these **22,270** IDRs generated for individual members in their role as either the involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor within an incident. These incidents include a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination thereof.

Total IDRs Generated for Review in 2023





TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT TOTALS

¶ 153,156,157, 161,162,163,164,220

Tactical Response Report Totals

4,975

TOTAL TRRs
JAN 1, 2023 -
DEC 31, 2023

3,375

TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED

68%

% OF TOTAL
TRRs
REVIEWED

+36%

(12 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL TRRs

+31%

(12 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
% OF TRRs
REVIEWED

3,646

TOTAL TRRs
JAN 1, 2022 -
DEC 31, 2022

2,575

TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED

71%

% OF TOTAL
TRRs
REVIEWED


In 2023 , there were **4,975** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) submitted due to use of force incidents. TRED reviewed **3,375** or **68%** of all TRRs because they were either a random sample, flagged for review based on level classification, or associated with an incident that was flagged for review. In comparison to the previous year of 2022, there were **3,646** TRRs submitted, with TRED reviewing **2,575 (71%)** of all TRRs that year.

This year saw a **36%** increase in the number of TRRs submitted compared to 2022. As a result of this increase in TRRs submitted, TRED reviewed **31%** more TRRs overall than in the previous year. On average, TRED reviewed **68%** of all TRRs submitted in 2023. In 2022, TRED reviewed **71%** of all TRRs submitted.



¶ 153,156,157, 161, 162, 220

Tactical Response Reports Generated 2022– 2023



There were a total of **2,543** use of force incidents in 2023. The average monthly number of TRRs was **304**. At the end of 2023, there were **7,971** IDRs created involving a use of force incident. This resulted in an average of **664** IDRs created each month. There were **4,975** TRRs submitted in 2023, which led to an average of **415** TRRs that were generated each month. These numbers are elevated from the previous year. In 2022, there were **3,646** TRRs submitted. Overall, when comparing January to December of 2022 and 2023, there is a noticeable increase in the total number of TRRs in 2023.




TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORTS

% of TRRs Reviewed Sorted by District

Unit	Total TRRs	TRRs Reviewed	% of TRRs Reviewed
001	186	123	66%
002	153	102	67%
003	252	177	70%
004	164	114	70%
005	230	149	65%
006	288	191	66%
007	265	181	68%
008	153	101	66%
009	165	129	78%
010	357	252	71%
011	568	395	70%
012	194	140	72%
014	82	52	63%
015	284	208	73%
016	79	39	49%
017	82	53	65%
018	168	101	60%
019	125	82	66%
020	72	54	75%
022	167	125	75%
024	170	111	65%
025	242	159	66%

Over the course of 2023, TRED reviewed on average **68%** of all TRRs that were submitted by members of each district.

TRR Reviews by Force Level



The total number of Level 1 and Level 2 use of force reviews that TRED has been conducting has increased each year from 2021 to 2023.

There was a significant rise of reviews by TRED in 2023 from the previous year of 2022.

Even with the overall increase of use of force incidents since 2021, the amount of Level 1 and Level 2 reviews by TRED has remained proportionately consistent.



FRB INCIDENTS

¶ 165,166,173,178,184,185,186,187,213,216,575,577,578,589

FORCE REVIEW BOARD INCIDENTS 2023																					
LEVEL 3 INCIDENT TYPE									TRR-I SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION												
TRR	Deadly Force, Firearms Discharge	Deadly Force, Chokehold	Deadly Force, Impact Weapon Strike to Head or Neck	Deadly Force, Other	Hospital Admission	Force Caused Death to a Person	Chokehold Used	Carotid Artery Restraint Used	Intentional Baton Strike to Head or Neck	Member Discharged Firearm	Warning Shot Fired	Firearm Discharge at a Person Who Was a Threat Only to Self	Firearm Discharge Solely in Defense or Protection of Property	Firearm Discharged Into a Crowd	Firearm Discharged at or into a Building	Firearm Discharged at or into a Moving Motor Vehicle	Firearm Discharged From a Moving Motor Vehicle	Member Was On-Duty	Involved a Mental Health Component	Medical Aid Provided	Subject Fled Scene
2023-00031																					
2023-00046	✓									✓							✓	✓			
2023-00127																					
2023-00128																					
2023-00188	✓				✓					✓									✓	UNK	UNK
2023-00360	✓			✓						✓									✓		
2023-00361	✓				✓					✓									✓		
2023-00402	✓					✓				✓											
2023-00536	✓		✓						✓										✓		
2023-00582	✓									✓									✓		
2023-00583	✓									✓									✓		
2023-00584	✓									✓									✓		
2023-00585	✓									✓						✓			✓		
2023-00586	✓									✓									✓		
2023-00587	✓									✓									✓		
2023-00590																			✓		
2023-00591																			✓		
2023-00597																			✓		
2023-00598																			✓		
2023-00622	✓				✓														✓		
2023-00623										✓									✓		
2023-00799																			✓		
2023-00800																			✓		
2023-00801																			✓		
2023-00802	✓									✓						UNK				✓	
2023-00806																					
2023-00914																			✓		
2023-00916	✓									✓									✓		
2023-00917																			✓		
2023-00918																			✓		
2023-00970																			✓		
2023-00971																			✓		
2023-00973																			✓		
2023-01046																			✓		
2023-01171																			✓		
2023-01169																			✓		
2023-01170																			✓		
2023-01178	✓				✓	✓				✓									✓		✓
2023-01179																			✓		
2023-01429	✓			✓	UNK														✓		
2023-01433			✓						✓										✓		
2023-01435					UNK														✓		
2023-01436			UNK		UNK				UNK										✓	✓	
2023-01726	✓										UNK								✓	✓	
2023-01742																			✓		
2023-01743																			✓		
2023-01745	✓				UNK					✓									✓		
2023-01883	✓									✓									✓		
2023-02580	✓																		✓		
2023-02581	✓									✓									✓		
2023-02582	✓									✓									✓		
2023-02587	✓									✓						✓			✓		
2023-02788	✓									✓									✓		
2023-02789	✓			✓	✓					✓									✓	✓	
2023-02901	✓			✓	✓	✓				✓									✓		
2023-02902					✓					✓									✓	✓	
2023-03084																			✓		
2023-03200	✓									✓									✓		
2023-03201	✓									✓									✓		
2023-03202				✓						✓									✓		
2023-03203				✓															✓		
2023-03492	✓				✓					✓									✓		
2023-03494																			✓		
2023-02952		✓					✓												UNK	✓	
2023-02953			✓																	✓	
2023-03698							✓												✓		
2023-03699																			✓		
2023-03701																			✓		
2023-03704																			✓		
2023-03918																			✓		
2023-02650																			✓		
2023-02658																			✓		
2023-02659																			✓		
2023-02660																			✓		
2023-02661																			✓		
2023-02662		✓					✓												UNK	✓	
2023-03491		✓					✓												UNK		
2023-03493																				✓	
2023-04259	✓	✓								✓									✓	✓	
2023-04260										✓									✓	✓	
2023-04263		✓			✓					✓									✓	✓	
2023-04265										✓									✓	✓	
2023-04608	✓									✓									✓		
2023-04897	✓									✓									✓		



FRB INCIDENTS

¶ 166,185,213,216,575,577

Force Review Board Incidents

The Force Review Board is responsible for reviewing incidents when a Department member uses deadly force, also referred to as a Level 3 reportable use of force . These include discharging a firearm, (FRB will not be responsible for reviewing unintentional firearm discharges or discharges solely to destroy/deter an animal that did not involve a firearm discharged at a person and did not result in an injury to any person) using an impact weapon to intentionally strike a person's head or neck, the application of a chokehold, the application of a carotid artery restraint, and the application of other restraints above the shoulders with risk of positional asphyxiation.

The Force Review Board is also responsible for reviewing any force by a Department member that causes injury to any person resulting in admission to a hospital, any force that causes the death of any person, all use of force incidents by an exempt member that results in the completion of a TRR, and other incidents as determined by the Superintendent.

There were **35** Force Review Board incidents in 2023. Page 34 displays these **35** incidents and their associated TRRs.

Level 3 Baton / Impact Weapon Use

Department members will not use batons to intentionally strike a person in the head or neck except when deadly force is justified.

There were **35** total Force Review Board incidents in 2023. From these **35**, there were **two** Level 3 incidents in which a Department member used an impact weapon on the head or neck area of a person.

In one of these incidents, the involved member used an improvised impact weapon to strike a person in the head or neck area. During the course of the supervisory review and investigation, the reviewing and investigating supervisors made the determination that the member's use of force response did not appear to be in compliance with Department policy and directives. A complaint log number was then obtained at the district level.

In the second incident, the investigating supervisor determined that the member's use of force response appeared to be in compliance with Department policy and directives.

Warning Shots

In 2023, there were no incidents in which a Department member used their firearm to fire warning shots.

Deadly Force Against Fleeing Persons

Department members are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing persons who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.

In 2023 there were no incidents in which a Department member used deadly force against a fleeing person who did not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188,189,190, 191,192,193,195,196

1

FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT OCCURS

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while in the performance of his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

2

OEMC IS NOTIFIED

OEMC takes the notification of the involved member's beat. OEMC generates an event for Firearm Pointing (PNT) which is tied to the original incident that the member responded to.

3

OEMC NOTIFIES THE BEAT'S SUPERVISOR

The member's supervisor is notified of the beat number that was involved in a Firearm Pointing Incident. The supervisor will document the incident on their Supervisor's Management Log and ensure that appropriate documentation of the incident is completed. They will also ensure that ICC and BWC video is appropriately retained.

4

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION REVIEWS THE FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

A Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR) is automatically generated in Clearnet. TRED gathers documentation related to the incident. If no Arrest Report or Investigatory Stop Report was completed for the incident, TRED does not continue reviewing the incident. TRED then reviews available video of the incident in conjunction with written documentation. TRED identifies any tactical, equipment, or training concerns. TRED also identifies whether the pointing of a firearm at a person allegedly violated department policy. TRED will ensure that appropriate complaint and disciplinary procedures are followed involving obvious policy violations. FPIRs that do not result in a training recommendation are closed.

5

TRED SENDS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

TRED issues written notifications of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to address any tactical, equipment, or training concerns to the notifying beat's executive officer and unit commanding officer.

6

FOLLOW-UP ACTION

The notifying beat's unit commanding officer ensures that the written communication (FPIR) has been received by the notifying beat's immediate supervisor and informs the notifying beat's chain of command of the written notification of recommendations. They ensure that recommendations are appropriately implemented and documented in the debriefing section of the FPIR. Debriefings are approved by the notifying beat's chain of command and the FPIR is closed.



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 196





FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT TOTALS

¶ 190, 191, 192, 193

Firearm Pointing Incident Report Totals

4,513

TOTAL FPIRs
JAN 1, 2023 -
DEC 31, 2023

3,584

TOTAL FPIRs
JAN 1, 2022 -
DEC 31, 2022

+26%

(12 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL FPIRs

3,719

TOTAL FPI
INCIDENTS
IN 2023

2,925

TOTAL FPI
INCIDENTS
IN 2022

+27%

(12 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
% OF TOTAL
INCIDENTS

In 2023, there were **3,719** total firearm pointing incidents. When compared to 2022, there are **794** more total firearm pointing incidents in 2023 from the previous year.


There were **4,513** total FPIRs generated for review by TRED in 2023. This is an increase of **929** total FPIRs when compared to 2022. Please note that differences in the FPI and FPIR totals are attributable to occurrences of officers assigned to different beats engaging in firearm pointings during the course of the same incident.

The overall FPI numbers in 2023 show a substantial rise in both firearm pointing incidents and FPIRs. Despite the increase in the number of firearm pointing incidents, the ratio of FPI to FPIRs has remained consistent. This suggests that members are routinely complying with the Department's firearm pointing notification requirements.



¶ 190, 191, 192, 193

Firearm Pointing Incident Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023 – June 30, 2023



There were a total of **3,719** firearm pointing incidents in 2023. In 2023, there were a total of **4,513** total FPIRs generated. TRED reviewed **4,465** FPIRs in 2023. The average number of FPIRs generated per month in 2023 was **372**. There were a total of **12,503** IDRs generated which involved a FPIR for an average of **1,041** IDRs created monthly.

There is a noticeable increase in FPIRs generated this year from the previous year. Each month in 2023 had a higher total of FPIRs generated compared to the corresponding month in 2022. Overall there were a total of **3,719** total firearm pointing incidents in 2023 compare to **2,925** total firearm pointing incidents in 2022 which was a **27%** increase. Correspondingly, there was a **26%** increase in FPIRs generated in 2023 from the previous year.



FPIRs Generated by Unit Involved

001	134	3.0%
002	312	6.9%
003	375	8.3%
004	188	4.2%
005	225	5.0%
006	337	7.5%
007	338	7.5%
008	232	5.1%
009	180	4.0%
010	230	5.1%
011	292	6.5%
012	121	2.7%
014	107	2.4%
015	194	4.3%
016	62	1.4%
017	50	1.1%
018	161	3.6%
019	86	1.9%
020	36	0.8%
022	162	3.6%
024	77	1.7%
025	234	5.2%
057	1	0.0%
140	1	0.0%
145	1	0.0%
189	12	0.3%
193	16	0.4%
211	66	1.5%
212	25	0.6%
213	6	0.1%
214	25	0.6%
215	12	0.3%
216	6	0.1%
218	1	0.0%
277	1	0.0%
341	1	0.0%
353	1	0.0%
411	1	0.0%
606	55	1.2%
610	17	0.4%
620	8	0.2%
630	6	0.1%
640	8	0.2%
650	9	0.2%
701	17	0.4%
702	1	0.0%
704	9	0.2%
712	1	0.0%
715	6	0.1%
716	22	0.5%

In 2023, District units within the Bureau of Patrol accounted for the large majority of FPIRs generated. Generally, these units are responding to calls for service and actively patrolling Chicago streets and neighborhoods.

001-1st District	193-Gang Investigations Division
002-2nd District	211-Bureau of Patrol, Area 1
003-3rd District	212- Bureau of Patrol, Area 2
003-3rd District	213- Bureau of Patrol, Area 3
004-4th District	214- Bureau of Patrol, Area 4
005-5th District	215- Bureau of Patrol, Area 5
006-6th District	216-Central Control Group
007-7th District	218-Centralized Gang Investigation
008-8th District	277-Crime Scene Investigations Unit
009-9th District	341-Canine Unit
010-10th District	353-SWAT Unit
011-11th District	411-Criminal Network Team, Area 1
012-12th District	606-Investigative Field Group
014-14th District	610-Detectives, Area 1
015-15th District	620- Detectives, Area 2
016-16th District	630- Detectives, Area 3
017-17th District	640- Detectives, Area 4
018-18th District	650- Detectives, Area 5
019-19th District	701-Public Transportation Section
020-20th District	702-CTA Security Unit
022-22nd District	704-Transit Security Unit
024-24th District	712-Violence Reduction Initiative
025-25th District	715-Critical Incident Response Team
057-Detail Unit	716-Community Safety Team
140-First Deputy Supt. Office	
145-Traffic Section	
189-Narcotics Division	



FPI REPORTING

¶ 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195

FPIs Reported in Error

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while performing his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

The exceptions to this notification requirement includes:

Department members assigned as a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team members, who point a firearm at a person during the course of a designated SWAT incident.

Department members assigned to a federal task force, who point a firearm at a person during the execution of the federal task force duties.

Department members un-holstering or displaying their firearm or having the firearm in a “ready” position (e.g. low ready, position “SUL”) or any other position during the course of an incident , unless the firearm is pointed at a person.

OEMC Dispatcher Notifications

A firearm pointing occurs when a Department member points his firearm at a person while in the performance of his or her duties. The Department member is then required to notify OEMC promptly after the incident has concluded.

The notified OEMC dispatcher is then required to acknowledge the notification from the Department member who pointed a firearm at a person. Then the OEMC dispatcher must create a Police Computer-Aided Dispatch (PCAD) event recording the firearm pointing incident and the Beat Number of the notifying Department member. After the PCAD event number is created, the OEMC dispatcher is required to notify the firearm pointing beat’s immediate supervisor of the event and record the notification in the appropriate PCAD event.

In the Fourth Quarter of 2023, TRED staff created the debriefing point OEMC Notification Deficiency. This debriefing point will allow TRED personnel to capture instances of when an OEMC dispatcher fails to notify an immediate supervisor of a firearm pointing incident.

This issue generated **three** debriefings for this in 2023.

TRED will continue to monitor this moving forward into 2024.



FOOT PURSUIT REPORTS

168,169,172

Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report Totals

2,549

TOTAL FP
INCIDENTS
JAN 1, 2023 -
DEC 31, 2023

5,361

TOTAL FP
REPORTS
JAN 1, 2023 -
DEC 31, 2023

5,120

TOTAL FP
REVIEWED
JAN 1, 2023 -
DEC 31, 2023


The Department policy on Foot Pursuits was implemented on August 29, 2022. As of January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports created by Department members. After a foot pursuit incident occurs, the involved member is required to create a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. A unit-level reviewing supervisor then routes the reviewed Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report to the district of occurrence Watch Operations Lieutenant if the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is associated with a reportable use of force or an arrest. In an instance where a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is not associated with an reportable use or force or an arrest, the unit-level reviewing supervisor is required to correctly route the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report directly to TRED after their supervisory review.

As previously noted, TRED reviewed **96%** of the 2023 Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports. The remaining percentage consists of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports for which TRED has completed a review and the report is now pending recommended actions at the district level in order to enter final status for the report to finalize. In addition, due to a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit application issue there were reports submitted that did not have an OEMC event number and, consequently, an IDR was not created. TRED staff is working with the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit application developer to resolve this issue.



168,169,172

Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023– Dec 31, 2023




The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division began its first full year of reviewing Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports in 2023. Consequently, 2023 would be the first full year of data from those foot pursuits. In 2023, there were a total of **2,549** foot pursuit incidents. As a result of this, there were **5,361** total Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports that were submitted in 2023. On average, there were **449** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports submitted every month. This equates to an average of approximately **15** reports submitted every day by Department members throughout the city in 2023.

There were **11,954** IDRs generated that involve a foot pursuit. In 2023, on average, there were **996** IDRs generated each month that involve a foot pursuit.



After-Action Support Recommendations



After a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is submitted, it is reviewed by a reviewing supervisor. When a foot pursuit report is associated with a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor should correctly route the report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for their review.


The majority of reports forwarded to the WOL for review resulted in no further need for corrective actions or further guidance (**61%**).

13% involve a recommendation for review of department directives. This ensures emphasis on Department policy and procedure.

12% involve a recommendation for an individual debriefing with a supervisor. This ensures direct feedback from front line supervisor in a timely manner.

There were **four** reports that indicate that the WOL recommended a Stress Reduction Seminar.

Foot Pursuits and Injuries



When completing the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report, Department members will indicate if there is a known injury or a claim of injury that has resulted from the pursuit.

In 2023, **89%** of foot pursuit reports indicate no injury, showing evidence that the majority of foot pursuits did not lead to physical harm for any involved person.

10% of foot pursuit reports indicate that the Pursued Person was injured.

6% of foot pursuit reports indicate an injury to the pursuing Department member.

There was only **one** reported instance that a Department member indicate a third party community member was injured or claimed injury.



¶ 168,169,172

Foot Pursuit and In Compliance

BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH DEPARTMENT POLICY AND DIRECTIVES	3544
REQUIRE A NOTIFICATION TO COPA	21
BE ASSOCIATED WITH A DEADLY FORCE INCIDENT	8

In the instances when the reviewing supervisor forwarded the report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant, there were **3,544** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports in which the WOL determined that the foot pursuit appeared to be in compliance with Department policy and directives.

There were **21** reports where the WOL determined the foot pursuit appeared to require a notification to COPA.


The WOL indicated that a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report was associated with a deadly force incident on **8** reports.



IDRs FOOT PURSUIT RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 168, 169, 170

Foot /Bicycle Pursuit Debriefing Points



In 2023, TRED reviewed **22,270** total IDRs. There were **11,954** IDRs created that involved a foot pursuit and **5,964** total incidents reviewed by TRED.

In 2023, the most common debriefing point from IDRs which involve a foot pursuit is *Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Event Log-Report Not Completed*. TRED recommends this debriefing point when an involved member is involved in a foot pursuit and there is no Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report submitted by an involved member that engaged in a foot pursuit.

The second most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Partner Splitting*. Given the inherent risk of a foot pursuit and absent exigent circumstances, partner splitting may compromise safety, hinder effective communication between partners, prevent the ability to provide assistance during a foot pursuit, or create a situation that places the Department member at a tactical disadvantage.

The third most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Radio Communications*. TRED typically will use this debriefing point when an involved member does not give a location of their foot pursuit, or if the involved member is unable to make a reasonable effort to provide OEMC with an accurate location of their foot pursuit.


Foot Pursuit-Supervisor Other was also frequently debriefed by TRED. TRED recommends this debriefing point when a reviewing supervisor incorrectly routes the report (either to TRED or the WOL) and/or other approval deficiencies occur. This debriefing point may also be used for instances in which the reviewing supervisor does not complete their review in a timely manner.



IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS

153,162,168,169,170,177,178, 192,196,199,183,202,203,205,207,208,210, 220,233,234,235,236,238,239

IDR Recommendations Jan 1– Dec 31, 2023




In 2023, Department members submitted a total of **4,975** Tactical Response Reports, **4,513** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **5,361** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports. The sum of these submitted reports created **22,270** Incident Debriefing Reports that were flagged for review for TRED. Overall, TRED reviewed a total of **5,964** incidents from 2023. These **5,964** incidents included a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination of the three incidents. Of the **22,270** IDR reports reviewed by TRED, **16,795 (75%)** had no debriefing points. This means that TRED did not recommend any additional training.

When TRED reviews a TRR and a training opportunity presents itself, an “Advisement” or a “Recommendation” is made to the involved member(s), reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. An Advisement is recommended training that is detailed in the TRED review and issued directly to the involved Department member. These are issued for minor policy and procedure infractions. A Recommendation is recommended training that is conducted by the involved member’s immediate supervisor or the Training and Support Group (training academy). Also, on occasion, TRED can make a recommendation to re-enroll involved members in e-learning modules for refresher training. A recommendation typically is made for involved members that have repeated debriefings for the same policy issue or debriefings that have officer safety implications. In **2,450** reviews, TRED made an Advisement for training. This represents **11%** of all IDRs reviewed. Overall, a Recommendation for training was made on **4,366** instances, which represents **20%** of all total IDRs reviewed.



% of IDRs Reviewed with Debriefing Points



TRED began utilizing the IDR application within Clearnet in March of 2023. During the course of 2023, the percentage of IDRs reviewed by TRED that contain a debriefing point has been trending downward. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.

Over the past couple of years, the Department has been utilizing the in-service training programs to address some of the more common debriefing points that have been observed by TRED personnel. Some of these in-service trainings have been an 8-hour De-escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force in-service training course for every Department member. Also, the Department implemented an 8-hour Annual Supervisor Training in-service course. These trainings were created by the Training and Support Group in collaboration with TRED. These trainings highlight many of the most common debriefing points that are issued by TRED. Learning objectives are taught to Department members and supervisors in a manner to correct these debriefing point issues observed by TRED personnel.



IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS


IDR Roles

“Involved member” typically refers to the Department member who reports a use of force, firearm pointing, or a foot pursuit. This can also refer to a Department member on the scene of an incident. Every incident has at least one involved member. Most incidents are comprised of more than one involved member.

The “reviewing supervisor”¹ is the Department member responsible for reviewing a report submitted by an involved member. Most incidents only have one reviewing supervisor regardless of the number of involved members. For an incident that only involves a firearm pointing, there is no reviewing supervisor. The firearm pointing incident report is not generated by the involved member and thus does not require supervisory review.


The “investigating supervisor” is the Department member responsible for authorizing final approval of submitted reports. In most incidents, the investigating supervisor is the Watch Operations Lieutenant in the district of occurrence.

IDRs with Involved Member Debriefing Point (IMDP)



Involved member refers to the member who was involved in a use of force incident, firearm pointing incident, foot pursuit, or any combination thereof. The above chart displays IDRs with at least one debriefing point for the involved member.

IDRs With IMDP as % of IDRs Reviewed




In 2023, IDRs with at least one debriefing point for the Involved Member (IM) role is trending downward.

¹Language in the consent decree refers to “Responding Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Reviewing Supervisor.” The data included on these pages is for the “Responding Supervisor” as defined in the consent decree.




IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Debriefing Point (RSDP)




Reviewing Supervisor refers to the supervisor who is responsible for completing the reviewing supervisor section of the Tactical Response Report or Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report. Above displays IDRs with at least one debriefing point for the reviewing supervisor.

IDRs with a RSDP as % of IDRs Reviewed




In 2023, IDRs with at least one debriefing point for the Reviewing Supervisor have been trending down.

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor² Debriefing Point (ISDP)



Investigating Supervisor refers to the supervisor who is responsible for investigating the use of force incident, approving the TRR, and completing the Tactical Response Report-Investigation (TRR-I). Investigating Supervisor also completes the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review Section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report.

IDRs with an ISDP as % of IDRs Reviewed



In 2023, IDRs with at least one debriefing point for Investigating Supervisor have also been trending down.

² Language in the consent decree refers to "Reviewing Supervisor" whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as "Approving Supervisor." The data included on these pages is for the "Reviewing Supervisor" as defined in the consent decree.



INVOLVED MEMBER RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 153,162,168,169,170, 177, 178, 192,196,199,183, 202,203,205,207,208,210, 220, 236, 238, 239

IDRs with Debriefing Points and Percentages for Involved Members

On March 17, 2023, TRED began using the Incident Debriefing Report to review submitted reports. The IDR platform allows TRED to review the entire incident as a whole whether a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination thereof. When two or more of these occur in the same incident, the combination is compiled into one TRED review. In the past, TRED would review each occurrence individually. If an incident occurred involving a use of force, firearm pointing, and/or a foot pursuit, a TRED reviewer would have to perform up to three separate reviews.

TRED members review submitted reports to ensure the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident are thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with Department policy. When applicable, TRED recommends additional training or policy review for the involved members, reviewing supervisors, and/or investigating supervisors via the IDR Clearnet application.

In 2023, there were **15,291** IDRs generated for involved members. There were **5,849** total debriefing points for involved members. The most common debriefing point for involved members is for *BWC-Late Activation* (**13.8%**). Although most incidents are captured on BWC video, Department policy requires the BWC to be activated at the beginning of an incident. TRED stresses this issue because of the importance of memorializing words and actions of both Department members and citizens that occur prior to, during, and after the incident.

The second most debriefed issue was for *Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Event Log-Not Completed* (**314**). TRED will debrief this issue when an involved member engages in a foot pursuit but does not complete a report as required by Department policy.

10,671 IDRs for involved members had no debriefing point.





IDRs WITH BWC RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 236, 237, 238, 239

IDRs with Involved Member Body-Worn Camera Recommendations

2,273

BWC - LATE
ACTIVATION

228

BWC - NO
ACTIVATION

166

BWC - NO
EARLY
DEACTIVATION

104

BWC -
NO
BUFFERING

In 2023, TRED reviewed **16,521** IDRs created by involved members. There were **2,273** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-Late Activation* and this represents **13.8%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed. There were **228** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-No Activation*, which represents **1.4%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed.

BWC- Late Activation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the Department member is late in activating the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident to record all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

BWC-No Activation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when there is no BWC activation found for the involved member. As required by policy, the Department member will activate the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident and record the entire incident for all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

BWC-Early Deactivation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the involved member deactivates their BWC prior to the conclusion of the incident in its entirety. The Department member will not deactivate event mode unless the entire incident has been recorded and the member is no longer engaged in a law

enforcement-related activity.

BWC-No Buffering is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when a TRED reviewer observes that there is less than the appropriate amount of buffering time when the BWC is activated. According to policy, Department members will at the beginning of the tour of duty ensure the BWC is on buffering mode prior to leaving the station.



IDRs with Involved Member BWC Late Activation and BWC No Activation Debriefing Points by Unit

Unit	IDRs With 'BWC Late Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC Late Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed	IDRs With BWC No Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC No Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed
001	14.8%	88	593	0.8%	5	593
002	12.4%	137	1104	1.4%	16	1104
003	10.4%	205	1968	0.8%	15	1968
004	16.5%	44	725	0.4%	3	725
005	9.9%	88	887	1.4%	12	887
006	10.4%	155	1491	0.9%	14	1491
007	7.6%	102	1344	0.5%	7	1344
008	13.5%	107	795	0.8%	6	795
009	10.4%	74	714	1.1%	8	714
010	9.0%	148	1648	0.6%	10	1648
011	14.3%	300	2101	1.0%	22	2101
012	8.5%	54	637	1.3%	8	637
014	11.5%	42	365	1.6%	6	365
015	5.7%	75	1310	1.1%	14	1310
016	6.3%	14	223	0.0%	0	223
017	7.0%	18	257	1.2%	3	257
018	9.3%	61	654	2.3%	15	654
019	7.6%	30	395	0.5%	2	395
020	6.3%	13	205	0.5%	1	205
022	12.1%	83	685	1.0%	7	685
024	11.1%	47	425	0.2%	1	425
025	7.0%	70	1006	0.5%	5	1006
044	8.2%	20	243	2.1%	5	243
045	2.4%	1	41	2.4%	1	41
051	11.1%	1	9	0.0%	0	9
057	7.7%	2	26	7.7%	2	26
124	4.5%	1	22	4.5%	1	22
145	16.7%	1	6	0.0%	0	6
189	17.0%	9	53	1.9%	1	53
193	10.3%	6	58	3.4%	2	58
211	16.6%	55	331	1.8%	6	331
212	15.5%	17	110	0.9%	1	110
213	8.8%	3	34	0.0%	0	34
214	25.6%	55	215	0.0%	0	215
215	9.4%	3	32	0.0%	0	32
222	33.3%	1	3	0.0%	0	3
240	5.9%	1	17	5.9%	1	17
277	50.0%	1	2	0.0%	0	2
353	4.8%	1	21	4.8%	1	21
376	2.6%	1	39	0.0%	0	39
543	33.3%	1	3	0.0%	0	3
606	13.2%	36	273	1.8%	5	273
608	16.7%	1	6	0.0%	0	6
610	20.4%	11	54	7.4%	4	54
620	6.2%	4	65	0.0%	0	65
630	7.1%	3	42	0.0%	0	42
640	16.7%	11	66	3.0%	2	66
650	6.7%	3	45	0.0%	0	45
701	9.5%	18	190	2.1%	4	190
704	9.9%	8	81	3.7%	3	81
715	2.9%	1	35	0.0%	0	35
716	13.0%	42	322	2.2%	7	322

The most concerning debriefing points for TRED are *BWC-No Activation* and *BWC-Late Activation*. BWC video is crucial for the review of a use of force incident. It is also vital for the involved member and the Department to memorialize the events leading up to and including the use of force incident.

In some cases of *BWC-Late Activation*, the words and actions of both the involved member and the citizen leading up to the use of force incident are not recorded on audio, video, or both.

The corresponding chart displays the total number of IDRs which TRED reviewed for each district and the total number of IDRs with debriefing points for *BWC-Late Activation* and *BWC-No Activation*.



DE-ESCALATION AND FORCE MITIGATION

¶ 153, 156, 157, 161, 162, 183, 220

IDRs with Involved Member De-Escalation Force Mitigation Articulation Debriefing Points

3,375

TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED

110

IDR
RECOMMENDATIONS

3%

% OF IDRs WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS

The debriefing point for *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* was added to the Tactical Response Report Review (TRR-R) after TRED identified a common issue in which a member checks force mitigation boxes on the TRR but neglects to describe these efforts with specificity in the narrative of their report. Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need to use force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time. The details that the involved member describes serves to articulate the totality of the circumstances, including why force was necessary despite the involved member's de-escalation and force mitigation efforts.

TRED reviewers recommend this debriefing point when involved members fail to fully articulate with specificity their force mitigation effort(s). Department policy requires members to describe force mitigation efforts in detail, not simply provide a list of force mitigation efforts when writing a report narrative. In 2023, **3%** of TRRs reviewed received a debriefing point for *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*. This is a **9%** decrease from 2022 when **12%** of the TRRs reviewed received this debriefing point.

Overall, there has been a downward trend in the number of *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* debriefing points issued by TRED since 2021 when **20%** of TRRs received this debriefing.


This encouraging trend continued throughout 2023. TRED will continue to monitor this trend throughout 2024. This trend may be a result from the impact of TRED debriefing efforts in conjunction with Department training that occurred in 2022. The Training and Support Group developed Department-wide in-service training for Department members to attend in 2022 comprised of an 8-hour Force Communications class and an 8-hour Use of Force Procedures class. These courses emphasized the need to articulate de-escalation/force mitigation efforts in the TRR narrative. TRED will continue to monitor this positive trend.



SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

¶ 156,192,217,232

IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers




When misconduct is observed or an allegation of misconduct is made, a Complaint Log (CL) number is obtained from the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA). This initiates the investigatory process.

As a matter of policy, TRED does not review incidents that are associated with a CL investigation. Thus, when notified of an incident becoming subject to a complaint investigation, TRED does not complete a review of the associated incident. Furthermore, during the course of an incident review or investigation, reviewing and investigating supervisors are required to enter a complaint log number into the TRR-I or the Watch Operations Lieutenants Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report whenever they obtain a complaint log number for an allegation of misconduct.

During 2023, **1,055 (5%)** of IDRs were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation and not subject to review by TRED. These **1,055** IDRs derived from **207** total incidents.

IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers in 2023



1,055 IDRs that were flagged for review had an associated complaint log number due to an allegation of misconduct. On average, there were **88** IDRs generated each month that were associated with a complaint log number.

Complaint Log Numbers continued

TRED reviewed **5,964** total incidents from 2023. TRED obtained complaint log numbers in **4** of those incidents.

One of those incidents involved an allegation of excessive force.


One complaint log number was obtained due to alleged misconduct involving a foot pursuit incident.

The remaining **two** complaint log numbers were obtained due to improper notification procedures by investigating supervisors in connection with a Level 3 use of force incident.

There were no complaint log numbers obtained involving a firearm pointing incident.



Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred at Time of Incident




Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred is the data point TRED uses to capture how often an involved member's unit supervisor identifies, addresses, and documents corrective action at the time (or briefly after) an incident occurs.

In 2023, unit supervisors documented corrective action on **539** IDRs. This means that during the course of the supervisory investigation, the investigating supervisor identified and addressed a potential training opportunity for the involved member. The investigatory supervisor then documented their corrective actions taken within the TRR-I or Watch Operations Lieutenant Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. As a reminder, supervisors are not required to review Firearm Pointing Incidents and their investigatory review of Foot Pursuits is limited to when a use of force or an arrest is associated with the pursuit.

During pre-service promotional classes for Sergeants and Lieutenants, TRED instructors emphasize to front-line supervisors when and how to identify training opportunities. Identifying, addressing, and documenting training opportunities is emphasized.

Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred at Time of Incident Jan 1 - Dec 31 as % of Reviewed IDRs




Data to track information on the amount of instances of when a reviewing supervisor or investigating supervisor documents unit corrective action taking place at the time of the incident is now kept in the IDR application within the IDR data tables. TRED will continue to collect and monitor this data.



REVIEWING SUPERVISOR¹ RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 232, 233

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the reviewing supervisor (Sergeant or above) complete the responsibilities outlined in General Orders *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if reviewing supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or a foot pursuit.

In 2023, there were **3,797** IDRs generated for reviewing supervisors. TRED issued **366** debriefing points for reviewing supervisors from those IDRs. The most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Foot Pursuit-Supervisor Other* (**85 - 23.2%**). TRED typically makes a recommendation for this debriefing point if a reviewing supervisor did not submit his supervisory review of a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant in a timely manner or the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routes the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to TRED or the Watch Operations Lieutenant.

The second most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Notification Deficiency-E.T.* (**47 - 12.8%**). TRED will debrief this issue when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of people and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured, allege injury, or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a person or Department member who have been involved in a use of force incident are injured or allege injury.

Debriefing point *Review Deficiency-Rev Sup* was also issued on **18 (4.9%)** occasions. TRED commonly debriefs this issue when a reviewing supervisor does not address minor errors within the review process.

3,489 reviewing supervisor IDRs had no debriefing points issued from TRED reviews.

¹Language in the consent decree refers to “Responding Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Reviewing Supervisor.” The data included on these pages is for the “Responding Supervisor” as defined in the consent decree.



Foot Pursuit-Supv Other Debriefing Points Jan 1 - Dec 31, 2023

The debriefing point for *Foot Pursuit-Supv Other* was manually subcategorized in preparation for this report. On **33** occasions, TRED used this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routed the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant or TRED for their review. When there is a use of force or an arrest associated with a foot pursuit, it is the responsibility of the reviewing supervisor to route the reports to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for review. For foot pursuits that do not involve a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor is required to route the report to TRED for review.

This debriefing point was also used by TRED **30** times when the reviewing supervisor did not submit their review of a foot pursuit to the Watch Operations Lieutenant in a timely manner. When the report is not correctly reviewed in a timely manner, it can hinder the Watch Operations Lieutenant's review of the foot pursuit incident and prolong the incident review beyond the 48 hour review period.

The remainder of these debriefing points were for miscellaneous documentation and/or review deficiencies during the review process of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports.

The relative frequency of these two issues can be attributed to the general lack of familiarity with the implementation of the foot pursuit review policy which began at the start of 2023. TRED will continue to monitor this trend in 2024.

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Notification Deficiency-E.T. Debriefing Points Jan 1 - Dec 31, 2023

TRED issues this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of persons and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured, allege injury, or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a person is injured during a use of force incident.

In 2023, TRED issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **47** IDR reviews.

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Response to Scene Debriefing Points Jan 1- Dec 31, 2023

To ensure that front line supervisors respond to the scene of use of force incidents, the Department revised its directives to require supervisors to respond to scenes of any Level 2 or Level 3 use of force incident. During 2023, TRED issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **7** IDR reviews. TRED issues this debriefing point when a reviewing supervisor does not respond to a Level 2 or Level 3 use of force or does not fully articulate the circumstances when they could not respond to the scene as required by Department policy.


The Department has made this issue a learning objective during in-service supervisor training. TRED personnel also emphasize this topic in the pre-service supervisor training.



INVESTIGATING SUPERVISOR¹ RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 225.226.228.229.230.231.232.233.234.235.236.238.239

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor² Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the investigating supervisor (Lieutenant or above) complete responsibilities outlined in General Order *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if investigating supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or an incident involving a foot pursuit.

The most common debriefing point for investigating supervisors is *Investigating Supervisor-BWC Issue Not Addressed (202)*. This debriefing point was created in late 2022. This issue is typically debriefed when TRED issues a recommendation to an involved member for *BWC-Late Activation* and the investigating supervisor reviewed the incident but did not identify and address this issue with the member during the course of their TRR investigation or Watch Operations Lieutenant incident review of a foot pursuit.

The second most common debriefing point is for “*Foot Pursuit-Over 48 hours.*” This debriefing is issued by TRED when the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review is not completed within 48 hours of the pursuit and there is no indication that an extension request has been approved.

The third most common debriefing point is for “*Foot Pursuit-Supv Other.*” When the IDR application launched, TRED used this as a catch-all debriefing point for deficiencies related to policies and procedures contained in the *Foot Pursuits* directive. TRED staff recognized the generality of this debriefing point and added specific debriefing points in order to reduce the amount of times that this debriefing point was issued. These debriefing points are described below.

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor² Foot Pursuit - Supervisor Other Debriefing Points

The debriefing point for *Foot Pursuit-Supv Other* was manually subcategorized in preparation for this report. Accordingly, TRED added the most common debriefing issues for which this debriefing point was being used to the IDR in order to more accurately capture that data. Two debriefing points added to the IDR are *Foot Pursuit-Approval Over 48 hours W/O Extension Request (20)* and *Foot Pursuit Initiation (3)*.

This “*Foot Pursuit-Supv Other*” debriefing point is also used by TRED in **18** instances when the WOL did not review BWC of a foot pursuit as required by Department policy. This debriefing point was used in **8** instances in which an involved member was involved in a foot pursuit and did not create a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. In these **8** instances, the WOL did not address the requirement of the involved member to create a report. There are also **5** instances in which the Watch Operations Lieutenant did not check the compliance box located within the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. The remainder were for miscellaneous advisements and recommendations related to policy and procedure requirements of the Watch Operations Lieutenant outlined in *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*.

TRED will continue to monitor issues within this debriefing point.


²Language in the consent decree refers to “Reviewing Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Investigating Supervisor,” The data included on these pages is for the “Reviewing Supervisor” as defined in the consent decree.



OC DISCHARGE INCIDENTS

¶ 173, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 235

TRRs with Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Discharge



IDRs (OC) Discharge Summary

There were **23** incidents in 2023 when the involved member indicated an OC discharge. This represents **0.5%** of all the TRRs generated. TRED reviews all instances where an OC device is discharged.

SWAT incidents accounted for **7** of the TRRs which indicated an OC discharge.

16 TRRs indicating an OC discharge were submitted by members of the Bureau of Patrol further suggesting the relatively low usage of OC spray.

The **23** OC discharge TRRs produced two IDR debriefing points. **One** debriefing point is for *Radio Communications* and the other is for *TRR Entry-Involved Member*.

There were **5** OC discharge incidents in which the involved member indicated multiple applications of an OC device. **Four** of these TRRs were determined to be in compliance with Department policy by the investigating supervisor.

There was **1** incident indicating multiple applications of an OC device where the investigating supervisor determined that the member's use of force response appeared to not be in compliance with Department policy and directives. A complaint log number was obtained.

In **2** instances of OC discharge, the subject fled the scene after the OC discharge and, as a result, medical aid could not be provided.

In every other instance where an involved person was sprayed with an OC device, the person was given medical aid by CFD EMS and/or taken to the hospital for decontamination.



TASER DISCHARGE INCIDENTS


¶ 173,198,200,202,203,205,235

TRRs with Taser CEW Discharge

In 2023, Department members submitted **109** TRRs indicating a Taser Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW) discharge. This represents **2.2%** of all the TRRs submitted. TRED reviews all incidents of a Taser discharge.

There were **9** TRRs where a member indicated that a Taser was deployed but TRED's review determined that there was no Taser deployment. Furthermore, there were **6** TRRs that indicated a Taser was deployed in an attempt to deter a vicious animal.

In 2022, there were **3,643** total TRRs submitted and **98** TRRs submitted indicating a Taser CEW was discharged. Taser discharge incidents accounted for **2.6%** of all TRRs submitted in 2022.




Taser Discharge-Related Debriefing Points

The involved member role had **80** debriefing points from Taser discharge-related IDRs. The most common debriefing point issued by TRED was for *Taser-Accidental Discharge* (**22**). Within these accidental discharges, there were **20** instances of a Taser being accidentally discharged at the start of a member's tour. These accidental discharges are occurring within the first hour of the tour of duty while the member is conducting a weapon function test. When TRED reviews a TRR indicating an accidental Taser discharge, the involved member is referred to the Training and Support Group for additional Taser refresher training with the Tactical Training Unit.


The second most debriefed issue by TRED is for *Taser-Other*. In **3** of these incidents, a Taser was discharged at a person while they were running, which may increase the risk of injury. In **2** of these incidents, there were multiple Tasers discharged at the involved person. In both of these incidents, a unit-level supervisor administered individualized training on the date of occurrence.

TRED added the debriefing point *Taser-Verbal Commands and Warnings* in December of 2023. This was added to accurately capture data pertaining to Department members use of verbal commands and warnings issued when safe and feasible to do prior to, during, and after the deployment of a Taser. TRED will continue to monitor this debriefing point moving forward.






Taser Energy Cycles Discharged



There were **109** Taser discharge incidents in 2023. **31 (28%)** of those Taser incidents had multiple energy cycles deployed. These multiple energy cycles can indicate a deployment of one or two cartridges and/or a combination of using the Arc button to re-energize an already-deployed cartridge.

Taser Discharge and Medical Aid



After a Taser discharge, once the Department member(s) gain control and restrain the person, the discharging member is required to request the appropriate medical aid, including contacting emergency medical services from the Chicago Fire Department, if the person was exposed to electricity, probes penetrated the person's skin, or the person appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury . Of the **109** TRRs where the involved member indicated a Taser discharge, no medical aid was indicated on **14** TRRs. In **6** incidents, the Taser was deployed at a dog. In another **4** incidents, the Taser discharge was accidental and no person was struck. In **2** other instances, the person involved fled the scene and made good on their escape before medical aid could be provided. In the remaining **2** incidents where no medical aid was provided, the involved member indicated on the TRR that a Taser was used but TRED's review revealed that the Taser was never actually discharged. Typically when medical aid is requested, it is performed by CFD on scene and also at a hospital.



Taser Applied More Than Once

There are **31** Taser incidents in which the Taser was applied more than once. In **13** of those incidents, the Taser probes from the first cartridge discharge did not make contact or the probe contact was ineffective. There was no neuromuscular incapacitation observed to gain compliance after the first cartridge therefore a second and/or third cartridge was discharged. There were **3** incidents of multiple Taser application that resulted in a CL number alleging misconduct. As a result, the incident was not subject to review by TRED.

Multiple applications of Taser discharge were applied to a vicious animal in **3** other incidents.

Another **2** incidents of multiple applications involved accidental Taser discharges. On occasion, due to the infrequent Taser use and highly stressful nature of use of force incidents involving a Taser discharge, the involved member may inadvertently double tap the Taser trigger causing two Taser cartridges to discharge. This occurred on **2** occasions during 2023.

On **1** occasion of multiple Taser applications, TRED debriefed a member for *De-Escalation/Force Mitigation-Time*. There was an incident in which multiple applications of a Taser were used during a Level 3 use of force incident. This was not subject to review by TRED. Appropriately, this incident was reviewed by the Force Review Board.

There were **2** unusual incidents which involved multiple Department members applying multiple applications of a Taser. In one incident, neuromuscular incapacitation was never obtained. TRED debriefed the members and a referral to the Training and Support Group was made for additional training. In the other incident, multiple Tasers were simultaneously discharged at the involved person. Following this incident, the investigating supervisor conducted individualized training with the involved members on the date of occurrence.

In 2023, there were **3** incidents that involved a Taser discharge with more than three arc cycles applied. **One** of these incidents involved a Taser discharge at a vicious dog that was attacking another dog and pedestrians. The **2** other incidents had complaint log numbers obtained at the district level during supervisory review/investigation for improper Taser use.

Taser Use Incidents referred to COPA

There were **109** TRRs indicating a Taser discharge during 2023. **14** of these TRRs were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation and were not subject to review by TRED. **9** of these were a result of TRED being notified by COPA of the complaint investigation. The other **5** were a result of the complaint log number being obtained at the district level during the course of supervisory review and investigation.

Taser Use in Schools


In 2023, there was no reported Taser discharges that occurred inside of a school. This was also the case in 2022, when there were no reported Taser discharges that occurred inside of a school.



INCIDENTS WITH FORCE AGAINST A HANDCUFFED SUBJECT

177

Reviewed TRRs with Force Used Against a Subject Who Was Handcuffed or Otherwise Physically Restrained




TRED reviews all TRRs that indicate a reportable use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. In most instances, the involved member indicates more than one force option being used on a subject. The involved member is responsible for justifying each use of force in the narrative portion of the TRR.

In 2023, there were **468** TRRs where the involved member indicated that there was a use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. This represents **9.4%** of the TRRs submitted.

CPD policy states that officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained, absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.

Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject IDR Recommendations



In 2023, there were **208** debriefing points issued by TRED that resulted in a training advisement or recommendation for a reportable use of force against a handcuffed person.

Training advisements were made in **108** IDRs and recommendations were made in **42** of these IDRs.

There were **25** instances when individual training was completed on the date of the incident.


Three debriefing points are for additional training with the Training and Support Group.

There were **277** IDRs in which TRED issued no recommendations or debriefing points.

There were **17** IDRs generated from **10** total incidents in which there was a current COPA complaint investigation. Consequently, TRED did not review these incidents.



Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject Debriefing Points



TRED issued a total of **208** debriefing points related to these IDRs indicating force used against a person who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints.

TRR Entry-Handcuffed Subject is one of most common debriefing points (**27**) issued by TRED in these IDRs. TRED debriefs this in instances when the involved member incorrectly made a data entry error and marked “No” instead of “Yes” when documenting “Was any reportable force used against the subject while handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints?”

BWC- Late Activation (**27**) is also a common debriefing point in these IDRs. This debriefing point is recommended by TRED when the Department member is late in activating the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident to record all law-enforcement-related activities.


The third most common debriefing point is for *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*. TRED typically debriefs this issue when an involved member checks force mitigation boxes on the TRR but neglects to describe these efforts with specificity in the narrative of their report.



TRRs AND PURSUITS

168,169

TRRs with Pursuits over 3 years




In 2023, **629** of submitted TRRs indicate a pursuit (foot, foot and vehicle, other, and vehicle.) This amounts to **13%** of all submitted TRRs.

In 2022, **589** of submitted TRRs indicated a pursuit. This amounts to **16%** of all TRRs.

In 2021, there were **599** TRRs indicating a pursuit, which amounted to **18%** of all submitted TRRs.


TRRs with Pursuits Jan 1 - Dec 31, 2023



Of the **4,975** TRRs that were submitted in 2023, **4,346 (87.4%)** did not indicate any type of pursuit. There are **571** TRRs where the involved member indicated a foot pursuit, **24** vehicle pursuit, **22** other pursuit, and **12** foot and vehicle pursuits.

Incidents that involve a foot pursuit comprise the majority of pursuit incidents. Combined foot pursuit and foot and vehicle pursuits (**583**) are **12%** of all the TRRs submitted.

TRR with Foot Pursuits and Force Levels



When completing a TRR, the involved member will indicate if there was a foot pursuit involved.

Looking at a 3 year period. It appears that there is a noticeable trend in total foot pursuits. In 2023, there was a total of **82** more TRRs documenting a foot pursuit and a Level 1 use of force from the previous year.


TRRs that document a foot pursuit and a Level 2 use of force have trended downward since 2021.



FPIRs AND PURSUITS


168,169,192,196

FPIRs and Pursuits Jan 1 - Dec 31, 2023




In 2023, there were **3,188** FPIRs reviewed that were not associated with any form of pursuit. TRED reviewers identified **1,256 (28%)** FPIRs that involve a foot pursuit or a foot and vehicle pursuit in 2023.

FPIRs and Pursuits over 3 years




Over the past three years, the percentages of FPIRs that involved a pursuit has remained consistent.

FPIs, Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery



TRED determined that **1,121 (30%)** of the **3,719** incidents in which a FPI (or multiple FPIs) are reported involve some type of pursuit. Out of the **1,121** incidents involving a pursuit, **569 (51%)** of these resulted in the recovery of a weapon. **527** of the **569** recovered weapons from pursuits were semi-automatic handguns.

FPIs, Foot Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery




In 2023, a weapon was recovered in **52%** of the firearm pointing incidents that also involved a foot pursuit.



FPIRs AND TRRs


192,196

FPIRs and Tactical Response Reports




Of the FPIRs that were reviewed by TRED in 2023, **10%** involve a use of force incident. **90%** of FPIRs have no association to a TRR and did not involve a use of force.

FPIRs and TRRs Over 3 Years




While the total number of FPIRs has significantly increased, the number of FPIRs which involve a TRR has remained consistent since the beginning of 2021.

FPIRs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery



In 2023 there were **4,465** FPIR reviewed where a firearm pointing incident (or more than one FPI) occurred, **10%** involved a use of force. When a FPIR and a TRR were reported together, **39%** involved the recovery of a weapon.

FPIs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery



Over the past three years, **56%** of FPI incidents which involved a use of force also indicated a weapon recovered.




FPIRs AND WEAPON RECOVERIES


FPIs and Weapon Recoveries

In 2023, there are **4,513** Firearm Pointing Incident reports generated from **3,719** firearm pointing incidents. Data reflecting weapon recoveries is based on each individual firearm pointing incident, rather than the total number of officers who reported a FPI.

In comparison with 2022, there is a **27%** increase in total firearm pointing incidents. Due to this increase of total firearm pointing incidents, there was also a **15%** increase in occurrences when at least one weapon was recovered from these incidents.



FPIs and Weapon Recoveries by Month



There have been **2,330** firearm pointing incidents in which at least one weapon was recovered over the past two years.



SEARCH WARRANT REVIEW

Search Warrant Review

Department policy requires the Department to conduct a critical incident after-action review for search warrants identified as wrong raids or in other circumstances identified by the Superintendent.

Department policy defines a wrong raid as a search warrant that is served at a location that is different than the location listed or an incident in which a Department member serving a search warrant encounters, identifies, or should reasonably have become aware of circumstances or facts that are inconsistent with the factual basis for the probable cause used to obtain the search warrant.

The Search Warrant Review Board (SWRB) is tasked with conducting this review of wrong raids and other search warrants identified by the Superintendent.

In 2023, Department members serviced approximately **201** residential search warrants. Of those search warrants, **none** were identified as being a wrong raid and no other search warrants were referred to the SWRB.



4ASRU

ISR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In August 2015, the City of Chicago, the Chicago Police Department (CPD), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) entered an agreement to implement best practices for investigatory stops under the oversight of Judge Arlander Keys. The ACLU's March 2015 report "Stop and Frisk in Chicago," which was critical of CPD's investigatory stop and pat down practices, influenced this agreement.

In April 2015, a class action lawsuit, *Smith v. City of Chicago*, was filed. This lawsuit relied upon the ACLU report and accused CPD officers of unconstitutional stops and pat downs, including in the enforcement of the City's gang and narcotics loitering ordinances.

The Integrity Section, Unit 115, was established in October 2015 to manage changes in policy and practices involving Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs), train officers on new ISR policies, and ensure CPD's compliance with revised practices and accountability measures related to the ACLU agreement. In 2016, Public Act 99-352 was introduced, expanding the Illinois Traffic Stop Statistical Study Act to cover pedestrian stops, require receipts for pat downs and searches, and improve transparency and accountability. During this time, the Integrity Section conducted audits and corrective actions, supported by comprehensive training, to ensure compliance with the new standards.

When the Consent Decree was entered on January 31, 2019, it specifically excluded reforms related to investigatory stops due to the existing City-ACLU agreement. However, following a May 2023 settlement of the *Smith* lawsuit and an agreement with the Independent Monitoring Team and Office of the Illinois Attorney General, the Consent Decree was expanded in June 2023 to include CPD's investigatory stops, pat downs, and gang and narcotic loitering ordinance enforcement practices. In turn, CPD established Unit 131, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU), and increased staffing by adding **11** officers and **2** supervisors to expand investigatory stop review capability. Pursuant to the June 27, 2023 stipulation adding paragraphs 800 through 877 to the Consent decree, 4ASRU began conducting Department-level reviews of ISRs.

The initial City-ACLU agreement and the expansion of the Consent Decree in June 2023 to include investigatory stops and related procedures reflects CPD's ongoing commitment to ensure its practices are constitutional and meet community expectations. Through these reforms, CPD continues to provide services to all people in a manner that complies with the Constitution and state and federal law, respects the rights of all, builds trust between officers and the communities they serve, and promotes community and officer safety.



4ASRU

1854.855

PRE-STIPULATION PERIOD

PRE-STIPULATION BACKLOG ISR REVIEWS, January 1, 2021 – June 27, 2023

4TH AMENDMENT STREET STOP REVIEW UNIT | ISR Weekly Totals - Stipulation Period

Data Updated as of 6/18/2024 7:51:20 AM

This is an update on the Fourth Amendment Street Stop Review Unit's Investigative Stop Reports (ISR). As of June 18, 2024, the following are in the Clearnet System:

Total ISRs from 01/01/2021 through 06/27/2023 as of JUNE 18, 2024

Approved ISRs

176,708


15% of Approved ISRs

26,506

4ASRU Review Completed

1,396 (5.3%)

PRELIMINARY
0 (0.0%)



* 15% Subject to change based on approval of drafted 4th Amendment Standard Operating Procedures.

NOTE: There is a seven day period of time in which the difference between approved ISRs and Total ISRs is reconciled. You are subscribed to this report every Monday with the most accurate numbers.

Created and maintained by the Strategic Initiatives Division
Version Control: 1.0 6/6/2024, updated by Kenia Godinez Noguera

Upon the entry of the stipulations resulting from the lawsuit on June 27, 2023 the 4th Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) began conducting Department-level reviews in August 2023 as required. The unit reviewed **5% (1,396 ISRs)** of the **15% of approved ISRs (26,506)** from the backlog of Investigatory Stop Reports, which had been conducted by the Department between January 1, 2021, and June 27, 2023, totaling **176,708** ISRs.

The backlog, representing **5%** of all ISRs completed from January 1, 2021 to June 27, 2023 (the entry of the stipulation), was selected through a random process generated by the review application used by 4ASRU. Upon completing the review of the backlog in December 2023, 4ASRU notified Department members if their ISRs contained deficiencies and enrolled them in e-learning for an ISR policy review.



4ASRU

CATEGORIZING ISRS

ISR TYPE			
GANG / NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT	INVESTIGATORY STOP	PROSTITUTION ENFORCEMENT	Grand Total
38	1,357	1	1,396

Within a drop-down menu in the ISR application, officers have the ability to classify an ISR into one of three categories. The most frequently selected category is "investigatory stops." Officers also have the option to categorize the stop as "gang and narcotics enforcement-related" or "prostitution enforcement-related," based on the facts of the stop.

In the review of the **1,396** ISRs associated with the pre-stipulation backlog, **97.2% (1,357)** were classified as Investigatory Stops, **2.72% (38)** as Gang and Narcotics Enforcement-Related, and **0.07% (1)** as Prostitution-Related.

BACKLOG DEFICIENCY FINDINGS

The Chicago Police Department's Investigatory Stop System policy outlines specific supervisory responsibilities to ensure compliance and accuracy in documentation. To ensure that reports are properly completed and consistent with Department policy, reviewing supervisors are required to review ISRs submitted by officers and either approve or reject the ISR by the end of their tour of duty.

Backlog January 1st, 2021 - June 27th, 2023										
Same Day Approval Total	1 Day Approval Total	Total 0 - 1 Day Approval Total	0 - 1 Day Approval %	2 - 7 Days Approval Total	2 - 7 Days Approval %	8 -14 Days Approval Total	8-14 Days Approval %	15 - 364 Days Approval Total	15 - 364 Days Approval %	Grand Total
162	647	809	57.95%	468	33.52%	70	5.01%	49	3.51%	1396

During the review of pre-stipulation backlog ISRs, 4ASRU gauged the timeframe in which district supervisors conducted ISR reviews. 4ASRU found that **57.95%** of all ISRs were approved within the first 24 hours of their creation, **33.52%** were approved between 2 and 7 days, **5.01%** were approved between 8 and 14 days, and **3.51%** were approved between 15 and 364 days.

4ASRU is actively collaborating with IT partners and the Department's Research and Development Unit to develop solutions that will reduce the time required for ISR approvals. By targeting and addressing specific inefficiencies in the application used for the approval process, the Department aims to streamline the time supervisors need to approve ISRs and provide timely feedback to officers upon their completion.



4ASRU

4ASRU REVIEW STATUSES

Investigative Stop Report (ISR) review findings are divided into three statuses: Concurs, Administrative Deficiency, and Deficiency. The “Concurs” status indicates that no administrative or procedural errors were found during 4ASRU's review of the ISR. An ISR is placed in administrative deficiency status when 4ASRU's review identifies typographical errors, incomplete fields, or occurrences when an officer fails to issue an ISR receipt pursuant to a pat-down or search as required by Department policy. An ISR is placed in a deficiency status when 4ASRU's review indicates that important factors supporting reasonable articulable suspicion are omitted, there is improper justification for an Investigatory Stop or a search, there are discrepancies between a submitted hard copy and an electronic copy of the ISR, or an Investigatory Stop Report is not required and submitted in error.

Completed Reviews ISRs by Status

CONCURS - REVIEW PROCESS COMPLETED 966 (69.2%)	ADMIN DEFICIENCY - AWAITING DISTRICT/UNIT NOTIFICATION 249 (17.8%)	DEFICIENCY - AWAITING DISTRICT/UNIT NOTIFICATION 181 (13.0%)
---	--	---

Between January 2021 and June 2023, 4ASRU reviewed **5% (1,396 ISRs)** out of a **15% (26,504)** backlog. The 4ASRU review results identified that **966 ISRs (69.2%)** were compliant with Department policy, **249 ISRs (17.8%)** had Administrative Deficiencies, and **181 ISRs (13%)** had deficiencies in the articulation of reasonable suspicion.



4ASRU

DEFICIENT STATUS ISRS

Insufficient RAS			Improper Justification			Not required	Admin	Total AD/DR (completed)
Stop	Pat Down	Search	Stop	Pat Down	Search			
25 1.8% 25	77 5.5%	8 0.6%	7 0.5%	9 0.6%	3 0.2%	65 4.7%	249 17.8%	430 30.8%

Insufficient reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) refers to when an officer's documentation related to an investigatory stop or a protective pat down lacks enough specific, articulable facts to reasonably believe that an individual is, has been, or is about to be involved in criminal activity. In the context of Fourth Amendment stops, this means that the officer documented some facts but not enough RAS to support a stop an individual and/or perform a protective pat down for weapons. Unlike investigatory stops and pat downs that are each subject to sufficient RAS requirements, the standard for a search is probable cause. Generally, probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer provide a reasonable basis to believe that the individual committed a crime and that evidence of the crime can be found in the place or location to be searched. Accordingly, when searches are mentioned under the "Insufficient RAS" heading, it means that the officer documented some factors to establish probable cause but did not articulate sufficient facts to establish probable cause in support a search of the individual and/or their personal property.

Improper justification, with respect to investigatory stops and protective pat downs, refers to when an officer documents few or no specific, articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that an individual is, has been, or is about to be involved in criminal activity. Therefore, the officer's ISR contains little or no RAS for either an investigatory stop and/or a protective pat down. Similarly, "Improper Justification" for a search means the officer conducted a search but did not articulate probable cause for the search in their ISR.

Regarding the pre-stipulation backlog review of **1,396** ISRs, **110** ISRs were classified as having insufficient RAS. Specifically, **25** ISRs (**1.8%**) had insufficient RAS for the stop, **77** ISRs (**5.5%**) had insufficient RAS for the protective pat-down, and **8** ISRs (**0.6%**) had insufficient probable cause for the search(es). Additionally, **19** ISRs were classified as having improper justification (or no justification): **7** ISRs (**0.5%**) had improper justification for the stop, **9** ISRs (**0.6%**) had improper justification for the pat-down, and **3** ISRs (**0.2%**) had improper justification for the search(es).

It's important to note that Deficiency status ISRs may include more than one deficiency (e.g., insufficient RAS for both a stop and a protective pat down). Among those reviewed from the pre-stipulation backlog period, **13** ISRs had multiple deficiencies, resulting in a total of **194** deficiencies identified across **181** Deficiency status ISRs.

These findings highlight areas for improvement in police practices and training to ensure compliance with constitutional standards.



4ASRU

1856

PRE-STIPULATION BACKLOG REVIEW - DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

Race Demographics & Geography 1/1/2021 - 6/27/23 Backlog						
AREA 1						
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
2		1	44	2	3	50
3			39		3	42
7			86	2	6	94
8		1	42	3	31	77
9	1	1	29	2	30	63
Subtotal	1	3	240	9	73	326
AREA 2						
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
4			49	1	9	59
5			70		1	71
6			81	3	2	86
22			39	3	1	43
Subtotal			239	7	13	259
AREA 3						
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
1			44	6	21	71
12			40	6	23	69
18		1	51	13	11	76
19		2	23	9	14	48
20		1	5	8	7	21
24		5	34	2	11	52
Subtotal		9	197	44	87	337
AREA 4						
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
10			33		40	73
11			137	9	25	171
15			49		3	52
Subtotal			219	9	68	296
AREA 5						
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
14		1	9	1	20	31
16		2	5	11	19	37
17		2	8	9	18	37
25		1	27	3	40	71
Subtotal		6	49	24	97	176
OTHER						
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
31			2			2
Subtotal			2			2
Grand Total	1	18	946	93	338	1396

The above graph illustrates the demographic and geographic breakdown of the pre-stipulation backlog ISRs reviewed by 4ASRU. Of the **1,396** ISRs reviewed, the majority involved Black subjects (**946**), followed by White Hispanic (**338**), White (**93**), Asian/Pacific Islander (**18**), and American Indian/Alaskan Native (**1**) subjects.

The backlog consists of Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) from all 22 Chicago Police Department (CPD) districts. Although these stops took place within the geographic boundaries of the districts, not all were conducted by officers assigned to those districts. Some stops were carried out by officers from other units who were assigned to work within those district boundaries. Regarding "District 31," when officers stop subjects outside of the city, the beat is automatically recorded as 3100, which then places the ISR in District 31 by default. In this review, District 31 (ISRs documenting stops conducted outside city limits) recorded **2** ISRs, both involving White Hispanic subjects.



4ASRU

FEEDBACK TO DEPARTMENT MEMBERS

The completion of the review of the backlog was a significant milestone. 4ASRU conducted **1,396** reviews of ISRs approved between January 1, 2021 and June 27, 2023. Feedback was provided to **333** authoring police officers and **186** approving sergeants of ISRs that were categorized in Administrative Deficiency status or Deficiency status. These officers and supervisors were enrolled in a policy review e-learning module. While there were **430** combined deficiencies, each deficiency involved two Department members, the authoring officer, and the approving supervisor. In several instances, the same officer authored multiple deficient ISRs and the same supervisor approved multiple deficient ISRs. Accordingly, the total number of officer and supervisor eLearning enrollments related to pre-stipulation ISR reviews is **519**. Notably, **99%** of the Department members enrolled in the e-Learning module successfully completed the training.



4ASRU

§ 857 (a,b,c)

POST-STIPULATION PERIOD

POST-STIPULATION PERIOD REVIEWS JUNE 28 TO DECEMBER 31, 2023

4ASRU conducted reviews of approximately **15%** of ISRs, including those completed for the enforcement of Loitering Ordinances, approved at the unit level during the post-stipulation period of June 28 to December 31, 2023 . These reviews assess whether officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) supporting investigatory stops and, if applicable, protective pat downs. Further, 4ASRU reviews determine whether the ISRs are thoroughly completed, in compliance with Department policy, and reviewed by unit-level supervisors in a timely, thorough, complete, and objective manner consistent with Department policies .

4ASRU REVIEW STATUSES

Completed Reviews - Total: **6,033**

Concurs (finalized by reviewer)
3,971 (65.8%)

Concurs
606
(10.0%)

Admin deficiency
744 (12.3%)

Deficiency
712 (11.8%)

Concurs Status: This status indicates 4ASRU's review of an ISR found that no administrative or procedural errors were identified. In addition, all factors that established RAS for the investigative stop, RAS for a protective pat down, and/or probable cause for any search(es) conducted are completely and thoroughly reported.

Concurs "finalized by reviewers" are ISR reviews conducted by 4ASRU reviewers that yield no administrative or deficiency findings. To ensure quality control and review accuracy, 4ASRU Supervisors review approximately **10%** of the total concurs "finalized by reviewer" ISRs. These reviews are then categorized as "Review Process Completed." Please note that all ISRs categorized in administrative deficiency status and deficiency status were reviewed by 4ASRU Supervisors to ensure accuracy.

Administrative Deficiency Status: This status indicates that 4ASRU's review of an ISR found one or more administrative issues including typographical errors, incomplete fields, or instances when an officer fails to issue an ISR receipt when required by Department policy. Administrative deficiencies impact the accuracy and completeness of the ISR documentation.

Deficiency Status: This status indicates that 4ASRU's review of an ISR found that important factors supporting reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop and/or a protective pat down are omitted, there is improper justification for an investigatory Stop and/or a protective pat down, there is insufficient documentation of probable cause supporting a search, there are discrepancies between a submitted hard copy and an electronic copy of the ISR. Additionally, it includes cases where an ISR is not required and submitted in error.

4ASRU reviews and assesses if CPD officers completely and thoroughly report all factors establishing reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) to justify investigatory stops and pat downs and if the reports were completely and accurately filled out in accordance with CPD policy. The review of the **6,033** post-stipulation period ISRs resulted in **4,577** Concurs, representing **75.9%**, **744** Administrative Deficiencies representing **12.3%**, and **712** Deficiencies representing **11.8%**.



4ASRU

§ 860 (b,c,d)

DEFICIENCY STATUS ISRS

Insufficient RAS			Improper Justification			Not required	Admin	Total
Stop	Pat Down	Search	Stop	Pat Down	Search			
72 1.2%	365 6.1%	52 0.9%	25 0.4%	12 0.2%	5 0.1%	222 3.7%	744 12.3%	1,456 24.1%

Insufficient reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) refers to when an officer's documentation related to an investigatory stop or a protective pat down lacks enough specific, articulable facts to reasonably believe that an individual is, has been, or is about to be involved in criminal activity. In the context of Fourth Amendment stops, this means that the officer documented some facts but not enough RAS to support a stop an individual and/or perform a protective pat down for weapons. Unlike investigatory stops and pat downs that are each subject to sufficient RAS requirements, the standard for a search is probable cause. Generally, probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to the officer provide a reasonable basis to believe that the individual committed a crime and that evidence of the crime can be found in the place or location to be searched. Accordingly, when searches are mentioned under the "Insufficient RAS" heading, it means that the officer documented some factors to establish probable cause but did not articulate sufficient facts to establish probable cause in support a search of the individual and/or their personal property.

Improper justification, with respect to investigatory stops and protective pat downs, refers to when an officer documents few or no specific, articulable facts to support a reasonable belief that an individual is, has been, or is about to be involved in criminal activity. Therefore, the officer's ISR contains little or no RAS for either an investigatory stop and/or a protective pat down. Similarly, "Improper Justification" for a search means the officer conducted a search but did not articulate probable cause for the search in their ISR.

Of the 6,033 post-stipulation ISRs reviewed, 489 ISRs were classified as having insufficient RAS. Specifically, 72 ISRs (1.2%) have insufficient RAS for the stops, 365 ISRs (6.1%) have insufficient RAS for the pat-downs, and 52 ISRs (0.8%) have insufficient probable cause for the searches. Additionally, 42 ISRs were classified as having improper justification (no justification): 25 ISRs (0.4%) have no justification for the stops, 12 ISRs (0.2%) have no justification for the pat-downs, and 5 ISRs (0.1%) have no probable cause for the searches.

It's important to note that deficiency status ISRs may include more than one deficiency (e.g., insufficient RAS for both a stop and a protective pat down). Among those reviewed in the post-stipulation period, 41 ISRs had multiple deficiencies, resulting in a total of 1,497 deficiencies identified across 1,456 reviewed ISRs.



4ASRU

858

UNIT-LEVEL SUPERVISOR REVIEWS

Paragraph 860 (d) June 28th, 2023 - December 31st, 2023												
Same Day Approval Total	1 Day Approval Total	Total 0 - 1 Day Approval Total	0 - 1 Day Approval %	2 - 7 Days Approval Total	2 - 7 Days Approval %	8 -14 Days Approval Total	8-14 Days Approval %	15 - 364 Days Approval Total	15 - 364 Days Approval %	365 Days + Approval Total	365 Days + Approval %	Grand Total
2120	1806	3926	65.08%	1659	27.50%	257	4.26%	188	3.12%	3	0.05%	6033

A total of **6,033** reviews were conducted by the 4ASRU. Unit-level supervisors approved approximately **65.08%** of ISRs within 24 hours of submission, which aligns with Department policy. Additionally, **27.5%** of ISRs were approved between two and seven days after submission. Another **4.26%** received approval between 8 and 14 days, while **3.12%** were approved between 15 and 364 days after submission. Lastly, only **0.05%** of ISRs were approved after 365 days of submission.


REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLING

4TH AMENDMENT STREET STOP REVIEW UNIT | ISR Weekly Totals - Post Stipulation Period

Data Updated as of 6/19/2024 7:33:16 AM

This is an update on the Fourth Amendment Street Stop Review Unit's Investigative Stop Reports (ISR). As of June 20, 2024, the following are in the Cleartnet System:

Total ISRs from 06/28/2023 through 12/31/2023 as of JUNE 20, 2024



* 15% Subject to change based on approval of drafted 4th Amendment Standard Operating Procedures.

NOTE: There is a seven day period of time in which the difference between approved ISRs and Total ISRs is reconciled. You are subscribed to this report every Monday with the most accurate numbers.

Created and maintained by the Strategic Initiatives Division
Version Control: 1.0 6/6/2024, updated by Kenia Godínez Noguera

From June 28 to December 31, 2023, the Department members completed **39,634** ISRs. The 4ASRU reviewed **6,033** ISRs, approximately **15.21%** of the total, exceeding the **15%** by **0.21%**. The ISR-A application rounded up whenever a decimal point in the **15%** daily calculation was **.5** or higher. This rounding resulted in 4ASRU reviewing **88** more ISRs than the **15% (5,945 reviews)**.



4ASRU

858

DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF POST-STIPULATION REVIEWS

Race Demographics & Geography 6/28/23 - 12/31/23 Post Stipulations							
AREA 1							
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	BLACK HISPANIC	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
2			223		3	5	231
3		1	191		1	5	198
7		1	401		5	39	446
8			134		27	156	317
9		2	127		23	159	311
Subtotal		4	1076		59	364	1503
AREA 2							
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	BLACK HISPANIC	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
4			150		2	31	183
5		1	312		7	3	323
6		4	312		2	5	323
22			159		9	7	175
Subtotal		5	933		20	46	1004
AREA 3							
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	BLACK HISPANIC	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
1	1	7	239		38	93	378
12		5	105		12	90	212
18	1	2	186		22	42	253
19	1	15	93		25	62	196
20	2	19	94		56	82	253
24		7	118		30	55	210
Subtotal	5	55	835		183	424	1502
AREA 4							
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	BLACK HISPANIC	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
10			135		13	127	275
11		1	414		44	74	533
15		1	227		5	19	252
Subtotal		2	776		62	220	1060
AREA 5							
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	BLACK HISPANIC	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
14	1		80		20	116	217
16		8	41		55	70	174
17	1	8	36		27	136	208
25	1	1	102		20	215	339
Subtotal	3	17	259		122	537	938
OTHER							
DISTRICT	AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	BLACK	BLACK HISPANIC	WHITE	WHITE HISPANIC	Grand Total
31		1	10	1	3	10	25
41			1				1
Subtotal		1	11	1	3	10	26
Grand Total	8	84	3890	1	449	1601	6033

The above graph illustrates the demographic and geographic breakdown of the pre-stipulation backlog ISRs reviewed by 4ASRU. Of the **6,033** ISRs reviewed, the majority involved Black subjects (**3,890**), followed by White Hispanic (**1,601**), White (**449**), Asian/Pacific Islander (**84**), American Indian/Alaskan Native (**8**), and Black Hispanic (**1**) subjects. The review sample includes ISRs documenting investigatory stops from all 22 Chicago Police Department districts. Although these stops took place within the geographic boundaries of the districts, not all were conducted by officers assigned to those districts. Some stops were carried out by officers from other units who were assigned to work within those district boundaries. ISRs documenting investigatory stops from all 22 Chicago Police Department districts are represented in the review sample. The "Other" category includes District 31 (from the 3100 location code indicating ISRs documenting investigatory stops conducted outside of city limits) and District 41 (from the 4100 location code indicating ISRs documenting investigatory stops conducted outside of the State of Illinois), with a total of **26** ISRs. District 31 lists **25** ISRs involving **1** Asian/Pacific Islander subject in addition to **10** Black, **1** Black Hispanic, **3** White, and **10** White Hispanic subjects. District 41 lists **1** ISR involving an Asian/Pacific Islander subject.



4ASRU

¶ 859

ISR TYPES

ISR TYPE			
GANG / NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT	INVESTIGATORY STOP	PROSTITUTION ENFORCEMENT	Grand Total
140	5,889	4	6,033

Of the **6,033** ISRs reviewed by 4ASRU, **140** were related to Gang and Narcotics Loitering Enforcement, comprising about **2.32%** of the reviewed ISRs. The majority, approximately **97.61%**, were general ISRs totaling **5,889**. Additionally, **4** ISRs, or roughly **0.07%**, were related to Prostitution Enforcement.

OFFICERS DEFICIENT 5 TIMES IN A 90-DAY PERIOD

Paragraph 859 states, "CPD will recommend an involved officer(s) and their supervisor review the BWC footage for the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down conducted by the involved officer(s), after the involved officer has submitted five ISRs or Stop Reports within a 90-day period that have resulted in a recommendation for after-action support to resolve a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion."

Of 4ASRU's **6,033** ISR reviews, the number of officers who authored five or more ISRs within a 90-day period that lack sufficient articulation of RAS is **7**. This 90-day period is calculated from the approval date of the first ISR reviewed by 4ASRU to the approval date of the **fifth** ISR reviewed by 4ASRU. Accordingly, to address the deficiencies stemming from insufficient articulation of reasonable suspicion, 4ASRU is recommending that these **7** officers review with their supervisor the BWC footage of the investigatory stop that resulted in their **fifth** deficiency status ISR.



4ASRU

§ 860(b,c,d,f)

TRENDS OR PATTERNS

Jane and John Doe ISRs: 4ASRU reviewers noted that a **3.08%** population of Jane and John Doe ISRs existed in the post-stipulation reviews. Failure to provide identification during an Investigatory Stop, in and of itself, is not grounds for arrest or further detention. If, after an investigatory stop, the individual is unable or refuses to provide identification and there is no probable cause to arrest, the sworn member will enter "John Doe" or "Jane Doe," as appropriate, in the name field. The officer will provide as much of the stop information as possible, indicate the refusal in the narrative field, and describe the reason for the stop and/or the circumstances of the stop in as much detail as possible, including a description of any unusual clothing, manner, or behavior.

Jane or John Doe Reviewed ISRs June 28 - December 31, 2023				
	Total Jane or John Doe	Total Statuses	% Over Statuses	% Over Total Reviewed ISRs
Concur	112	4577	2.45%	1.86%
Admin	34	744	4.57%	0.56%
Deficiency	40	712	5.62%	0.66%
Grand Total	186	6033		3.08%

From June 28, 2023, to December 31, 2023, 4ASRU reviewed **6,033** Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs). Of these, **186** ISRs were marked with "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" in the name field, representing **3.08%** of the total reviewed ISRs. The reviews were categorized as follows: **4,577** ISRs were concurred, with **112** containing "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" (**2.45%** of concurred ISRs, **1.86%** of total reviewed ISRs); **744** ISRs were marked as administrative, with **34** containing "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" (**4.57%** of administrative ISRs, **0.56%** of total reviewed ISRs); and **712** ISRs were found to have deficiencies, with **40** containing "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" (**5.62%** of deficient ISRs, **0.66%** of total reviewed ISRs). For the same period, **39,635** ISRs were created, including **1,226** ISRs marked as "John Doe" or "Jane Doe," representing **3.09%** of the created ISRs. Accordingly, 4ASRU recommends field validation to ensure Department members provide as much information as possible, even when the identity of the person is not known.

Protective Pat Downs: There are **377** deficiency status ISRs associated with Insufficient RAS or Improper Justification for a protective pat down brings attention to a pattern that should be addressed to improve Department members' knowledge on conducting stops consistent with policy and accuracy in completing ISRs. An Investigatory Stop and a protective pat down are two distinct actions. Both require independent RAS. This address this pattern, 4ASRU is referring it to the Training and Support Group for future trainings.

Officers with Multiple Rejected ISRs

4ASRU reviews resulted in **314** officers having multiple ISRs rejected specifically due to insufficient description of RAS. Another **129** officers had multiple Deficiency status ISRs rejected.

Recommendations

4ASRU recognizes the importance of collecting and maintaining accurate data and records related to the enforcement of Loitering Ordinances Dispersal Reports (LDRs), as specified in Consent Decree paragraph 839. This data is critical for evaluating the CPD's practices regarding LDRs. To achieve this, 4ASRU recommends developing an application to document the reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the enforcement of LDRs. An electronic application is required to record and review these reports. Additionally, 4ASRU must identify and address deficiencies in conducting LDRs. The LDR review process should be integrated with the ISR review process. Determining the necessary data and processes for an effective LDR review is essential. 4ASRU will continue to identify patterns and trends in CPD's investigatory stops, pat-downs, and enforcement of gang and narcotic loitering ordinances to ensure ongoing compliance with constitutional standards.



RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

Relevant Consent Decree Paragraphs

The following consent decree paragraphs are referenced at the top of some pages by the symbol ¶.

- ¶153 CPD's use of force policies, as well as its training, supervision, and accountability systems, must ensure that: CPD officers use force in accordance with federal law, state law, and the requirements of this Agreement; CPD officers apply de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible; when using force, CPD officers only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances; and any use of unreasonable or unnecessary force is promptly identified and responded to appropriately.
- ¶154 CPD adopted revised use of force policies on October 16, 2017 ("October 2017 Policies"). The October 2017 Policies incorporated multiple best practices that were not reflected in CPD's prior use of force policies. Building on these improvements, CPD will maintain the best practices reflected in the October 2017 Policies and make additional improvements to its policies consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
- ¶156 CPD's use of force policies and training, supervision, and accountability systems will be designed, implemented, and maintained so that CPD members:
- a. act at all times in a manner consistent with the sanctity of human life;
 - b. act at all times with a high degree of ethics, professionalism, and respect for the public;
 - c. use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible;
 - d. use sound tactics to eliminate the need to use force or reduce the amount of force that is needed;
 - e. only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances;
 - f. only use force for a lawful purpose and not to punish or retaliate;
 - g. continually assess the situation and modify the use of force as circumstances change and in ways that are consistent with officer safety, including stopping the use of force when it is no longer necessary;
 - h. truthfully and completely report all reportable instances of force used;
 - i. promptly report any use of force that is excessive or otherwise in violation of policy;
 - j. are held accountable, consistent with complaint and disciplinary policies, for use of force that is not objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, or that otherwise violates law or policy; and
 - k. act in a manner that promotes trust between CPD and the communities it serves.
- ¶157 CPD will collect and analyze information on the use of force by CPD members, including whether and to what extent CPD members use de-escalation techniques in connection with use of force incidents. CPD will use this information to assess whether its policies, training, tactics, and practices meet the goals of this Agreement, reflect best practices, and prevent or reduce the need to use force.
- ¶161 CPD recently adopted de-escalation as a core principle. CPD officers must use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible. CPD officers are required to de-escalate potential and ongoing use of force incidents whenever safe and feasible through the use of techniques that may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- a. using time as a tactic by slowing down the pace of an incident;
 - b. employing tactical positioning and re-positioning to isolate and contain a subject, to create distance between an officer and a potential threat, or to utilize barriers or cover;
 - c. continual communication, including exercising persuasion and advice, and providing a warning prior to the use of force;
 - d. requesting assistance from other officers, mental health personnel, or specialized units, as necessary and appropriate; and
 - e. where appropriate, use trauma-informed communication techniques, including acknowledging confusion or mistrust, or using a respectful tone.
- ¶162 Consistent with CPD's commitment to preventing and reducing the need for force, CPD officers will allow individuals to voluntarily comply with lawful orders whenever safe and feasible (e.g., allowing individuals the opportunity to submit to arrest before force is used).



- ¶163 CPD officers may only use force for a lawful purpose. CPD officers are prohibited from using force as punishment or retaliation, such as using force to punish or retaliate against a person for fleeing, resisting arrest, insulting an officer, or engaging in protected First Amendment activity (e.g., lawful demonstrations, protected speech, observing or filming police activity, or criticizing an officer or the officer's conduct).
- ¶164 CPD officers must only use force when it is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶165 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force except in circumstances where there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person. CPD officers are not permitted to use deadly force against a person who is a threat only to himself or herself or to property. CPD officers may only use deadly force as a last resort.
- ¶166 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing subjects who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.
- ¶168 Starting no later than January 1, 2019, CPD will track and analyze the frequency with which CPD officers engage in foot pursuits of persons attempting to evade arrest or detention by fleeing on foot, regardless of whether the foot pursuit is associated with a reportable use of force incident. CPD will track foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents through TRRs or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement.
- ¶169 For foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents, by January 1, 2020, CPD will review all associated foot pursuits at the headquarters level to identify any tactical, equipment, or training concerns.
- ¶170 CPD recently issued a foot pursuit training bulletin. By July 1, 2019, CPD will develop and issue a supplemental foot pursuit training bulletin that reflects best practices from foot pursuit policies in other jurisdictions. The supplemental training bulletin will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and OAG. The supplemental training bulletin will:
- identify risks and tactical factors officers should consider prior to initiating and during the course of a foot pursuit;
 - provide guidance to officers regarding radio communications during a foot pursuit;
 - instruct officers to avoid, to the extent practical, separating from other officers in the course of a foot pursuit;
 - provide guidance on circumstances when alternatives to a foot pursuit may be appropriate; and
 - inform officers that they must follow supervisors' instructions in the course of a foot pursuit, including instructions to alter tactics or discontinue the pursuit.
- ¶172 By no later than January 1, 2021, the Monitor will complete an assessment of CPD data and information to determine whether CPD should adopt a foot pursuit policy. If the Monitor recommends that CPD should adopt a foot pursuit policy, CPD will adopt a foot pursuit policy no later than July 1, 2021. Any foot pursuit policy adopted by CPD will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and OAG.
- ¶173 Following a use of force, once the scene is safe and as soon as practicable, CPD officers must immediately request appropriate medical aid for injured persons or persons who claim they are injured.
- ¶176 CPD officers must recognize and act upon the duty to intervene on the subject's behalf when another officer is using excessive force.
- ¶177 Consistent with CPD policy that force must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, CPD officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.
- ¶178 CPD officers are prohibited from using carotid artery restraints or chokeholds (or other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway, i.e., the front of the neck, with the intention of reducing the intake of air) unless deadly force is authorized. CPD officers must not use chokeholds or other maneuvers for intentionally putting pressure on a person's airway or carotid artery restraints as take-down techniques.
- ¶183 CPD will require officers to issue a verbal warning prior to the use of any reportable force, including the use of firearms, when it is safe and feasible to do so.
- ¶184 When CPD officers discharge firearms, they must continually assess the circumstances that necessitated the discharge and modify their use of force accordingly, including ceasing to use their firearm when the circumstances no longer require it



RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

(e.g., when a subject is no longer a threat).

- ¶185 CPD will continue to prohibit officers from firing warning shots.
- ¶186 CPD officers must not fire at moving vehicles when the vehicle is the only force used against the officer or another person, except in extreme circumstances when it is a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily harm to a person, such as when a vehicle is intentionally being used to attack a person or group of people. CPD will continue to instruct officers to avoid positioning themselves or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, and will provide officers with adequate training to ensure compliance with this instruction.
- ¶187 CPD will prohibit officers from firing from a moving vehicle unless such force is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life or to prevent great bodily harm to the officer or another person.
- ¶188 By January 1, 2019, CPD will develop a training bulletin that provides guidance on weapons discipline, including circumstances in which officers should and should not point a firearm at a person. CPD will incorporate training regarding pointing of a firearm in the annual use of force training required by this Agreement in 2019.
- ¶189 CPD will clarify in policy that when a CPD officer points a firearm at a person to detain the person, an investigatory stop or an arrest has occurred, which must be documented. CPD will also clarify in policy that officers will only point a firearm at a person when objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶190 Beginning July 1, 2019, CPD officers will, at a minimum, promptly after the incident is concluded, notify OEMC of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer points a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The notification will identify which CPD beat(s) pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The City will ensure that OEMC data recording each such notification is electronically linked with CPD reports and body-worn camera recordings associated with the incident, and all are retained and readily accessible to the supervisor of each CPD beat(s) identified in the notification.
- ¶191 OEMC will notify an immediate supervisor of the identified beat(s) each time the pointing of a firearm is reported. Notified CPD supervisors will ensure that the investigatory stop or arrest documentation and the OEMC recordation of the pointing of a firearm are promptly reviewed in accordance with CPD policy. CPD supervisors will effectively supervise the CPD members under their command consistent with their obligations set forth in the Supervision section of this Agreement.
- ¶192 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected from all investigatory stop and arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting a seizure. The review and audit will be completed within 30 days of each such occurrence. This review and audit will:
 - a. identify whether the pointing of the firearm at a person allegedly violated CPD policy;
 - b. identify any patterns in such occurrences and, to the extent necessary, ensure that any concerns are addressed; and
 - c. identify any tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns and, to the extent necessary, ensure that the concerns are addressed.The designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will, where applicable, make appropriate referrals for misconduct investigations or other corrective actions for alleged violations of CPD policy. At the completion of each review and audit, the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will issue a written notification of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to an immediate supervisor as described above.
- ¶193 CPD will ensure that the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level responsible for performing the duties required by this Part has sufficient resources to perform them, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶194 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of the pointing of a firearm at a person when the CPD officer is a SWAT Team Officer responding to a designated SWAT incident, as defined in CPD Special Order S05-05, or an officer assigned to a federal task force during the execution of federal task force duties.
- ¶195 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of any un-holstering or display of a firearm or having a firearm in a “low ready” position during the course of an investigation, unless the firearm is pointed at a person
- ¶196 The City will ensure that all documentation and recordation of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD member points a firearm at a person, including OEMC data, is maintained in a manner that allows the Monitor, CPD, and OAG to review and analyze such occurrences. Beginning January 1, 2020, the Monitor will analyze these occurrences on an annual basis to assess whether changes to CPD policy, training, practice, or supervision are necessary, and to recommend



any changes to the process of documenting, reviewing, and analyzing these occurrences. CPD will either adopt the Monitor's recommendations or respond in writing within 30 days. Any dispute regarding the whether the Monitor's recommendations should be implemented will be resolved by the Court.

- ¶198 CPD will instruct officers that Tasers can cause serious injury or death and, as a result, officers should use Tasers only after balancing relevant factors including the threat presented by the subject, the risk of injury if a Taser is used, and the seriousness of the suspected offense. Consistent with this standard, CPD officers should not use Tasers against persons who are reasonably perceived to be non-violent, unarmed, and suspected of low-level offenses, such as property-related misdemeanors, quality of life offenses, moving or traffic violations, or municipal code violations.
- ¶199 CPD will clarify in policy that flight alone, without any other basis for reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause, does not justify use of a Taser against a subject.
- ¶200 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must give verbal commands and warnings prior to, during, and after deployment of a Taser. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers will allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use a Taser, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶201 CPD will strongly discourage the use of Tasers in schools and on students. CPD will require officers to consider the totality of the circumstances, including a subject's apparent age, size, and the threat presented, in assessing the reasonableness and necessity of using a Taser in a school.
- ¶202 CPD officers will treat each application or standard cycle (five seconds) of a Taser as a separate use of force that officers must separately justify as objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional. CPD will continue to require officers to, when possible, use only one five-second energy cycle and reassess the situation before any additional cycles are given or cartridges are discharged. In determining whether any additional application is necessary, CPD officers will consider whether the individual has the ability and has been given a reasonable opportunity to comply prior to applying another cycle.
- ¶203 CPD will require that if the subject has been exposed to three, five-second energy cycles (or has been exposed to a cumulative 15 total seconds of energy) and the officer has not gained control, officers switch to other force options unless the officer can reasonably justify that continued Taser use was necessary to ensure the safety of the officer or another person, recognizing that prolonged Taser exposure may increase the risk of death or serious injury.
- ¶205 CPD officers must request medical aid for a person subjected to a Taser application. CPD officers must place any person subjected to a Taser application in a position that does not impair respiration, as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must render life-saving aid to injured persons consistent with their training until medical professionals arrive on scene. Only trained medical personnel may remove Taser probes from a subject.
- ¶207 CPD officers may use OC devices only when such force is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.
- ¶208 CPD officers may only use OC devices for crowd dispersal when such force is necessary, objectively reasonable, and proportional to the threat presented to public safety. CPD will continue to require that the Superintendent or his or her designee provides authorization before OC devices are used for noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd.
- ¶209 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must issue verbal commands and warnings to the subject prior to, during, and after the discharge of an OC device. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD will require officers to allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use an OC device, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶210 Each individual application of an OC device (e.g., each spray of an officer's personal OC device) by a CPD officer must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.



RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

- ¶211 CPD officers must assist subjects exposed to application of an OC device with decontamination and flushing when it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must request the appropriate medical aid for a subject after the discharge of an OC device if the subject appears to be in any physical distress, or complains of injury or aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition (e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or a heart ailment).
- ¶213 CPD officers must not use impact weapons (e.g., baton, asp, improvised impact weapons) to intentionally strike a subject in the head or neck, except when deadly force is justified
- ¶216 CPD officers must request appropriate medical aid for a subject who experiences an impact weapon strike when the subject appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury, or when the subject sustained a strike to the head from an impact weapon or a hard, fixed object. CPD officers must render life-saving aid to the subject consistent with the officers' training until medical professionals arrive on scene.
- ¶217 To be effective, the foundation of CPD's accountability system must be CPD members. When CPD members use force, they must be able to demonstrate that the force used complies with the law and CPD policy. When a member's use of force does not comply with the law and CPD policy, the member's supervisors must be able to identify the non-compliance and take appropriate action to address it. To facilitate evaluation of how CPD members use force, CPD will ensure that members report incidents when they use force and that supervisors collect and review available information about the incidents.
- ¶220 In completing the TRR, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, CPD members must include a narrative that describes with specificity the use of force incident, the subject's actions, or other circumstances necessitating the level of force used; and the involved member's response, including de-escalation efforts attempted and the specific types and amounts of force used. The narrative requirement does not apply to CPD members who discharged a firearm in the performance of duty or participated in an officer-involved death in the performance of duty. Any CPD member who observes or is present when another CPD member discharges a firearm or uses other deadly force must complete a written witness statement prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. CPD members will note in their TRRs the existence of any body-worn camera or in-car camera audio or video footage, and whether any such footage was viewed in advance of completing the TRR or any other incident reports. CPD members must complete TRRs, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, and other reports related to the incident, truthfully and thoroughly.
- ¶222 A CPD supervisor will immediately respond to the scene when a level 2 or level 3 reportable use of force occurs ("responding supervisor"). CPD supervisors may, at their discretion, respond to the scene when a level 1 reportable use of force occurs, but they are not required to do so.
- ¶223 For level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, the duties of the responding supervisor will include, at a minimum:
- a. identifying known available witnesses to the use of force to the extent reasonably possible and documenting their identities and statements in a written report, except in incidents for which the Civilian Office of Police Accountability ("COPA") receives administrative notifications and responds to the scene;
 - b. coordinating with COPA, as appropriate;
 - c. gathering and preserving evidence related to the use of force;
 - d. requesting the assignment of an evidence technician to photograph persons involved in the incident, including any injuries sustained;
 - e. ensuring that members and subjects receive appropriate medical care;
 - f. making notifications as required by CPD policy;
 - and g. reviewing reports regarding the incident for legibility and completeness.
- ¶224 In addition, for level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents involving an injury or complaint of injury for which COPA does not have jurisdiction, the responding supervisor will undertake reasonable efforts to identify and interview additional witnesses beyond those that are known and available.
- ¶225 A supervisor who used force or ordered force to be used during a reportable use of force incident will not perform the duties assigned to the responding supervisor for that incident
- ¶226 CPD will continue to require the responding supervisor to document information collected and actions taken in performing his or her investigatory duties in the supervisor's portion of the TRR, or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement.



- ¶227 Any CPD member who becomes aware of information indicating that a reportable use of force occurred but was not reported must immediately notify his or her supervisor.
- ¶228 Supervisors play a critical role in ensuring that force is used legally, consistent with CPD policy, and in a manner that will promote community confidence in the Department. Supervisor reviews and investigations of uses of force are essential to identify necessary individual and departmental corrective action.
- ¶229 All reportable uses of force by CPD members must be reviewed by CPD supervisors.
- ¶230 After a reportable use of force has occurred, required TRRs have been completed, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 incidents, a responding supervisor has documented any investigatory information collected, the incident will be reviewed and evaluated by a CPD supervisor at least the rank of Lieutenant, and in all instances at least one rank level above that of the highest-ranking member who engaged in the reportable use of force, or by a command staff member, when designated (“reviewing supervisor”).
- ¶231 The reviewing supervisor will conduct an investigation into the reportable use of force incident by reviewing all information reasonably available regarding the incident, including written reports, video or audio recordings, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, witness statements, photographs (if available), and other evidence or information collected by the responding supervisor. After advising the subject of his or her right not to answer questions and other applicable rights, and only if the subject voluntarily consents to an interview, the reviewing supervisor will interview the subject solely about the reportable use of force. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will visually inspect the subject and document any injuries observed.
- ¶232 For all reportable uses of force, the reviewing supervisor will determine, based on the information reviewed, if the use of force requires a notification to COPA and will assess whether the use of force was in compliance with CPD policy (except for incidents involving deadly force or an officer-involved death). The reviewing supervisor will also review the TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, for sufficiency and completeness.
- ¶233 For all reportable use of force incidents, the reviewing supervisor will: provide timely, constructive feedback, where appropriate, to the officer who engaged in the reportable use of force, the officer’s supervisor, or both; recommend additional training and/or support as necessary based on the incident; take appropriate action, including referring uses of force that may violate law or CPD policy to COPA.
- ¶234 CPD will continue to require the reviewing supervisor to document in a Tactical Response Report – Investigation (“TRR-I”), or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, his or her detailed assessment of compliance with CPD policy, any constructive feedback, and any required or recommended action. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will include in the TRR-I or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, the identities of CPD members on scene during the incident who are reasonably believed to have relevant knowledge or information regarding the reportable use of force
- ¶235 All district-level supervisory review documentation regarding a reportable use of force incident must be completed within 48 hours of the incident, unless an extension is approved by a command staff member.
- ¶236 CPD will continue to develop, implement, and maintain a system of video recording officers’ encounters with the public with body-worn cameras. The use of body-worn cameras will be designed to increase officer accountability, improve trust and CPD legitimacy in the community, and augment CPD’s records of law enforcement-related activities.
- ¶237 CPD will continue to require all officers assigned to patrol field duties to wear body-worn cameras and microphones with which to record law-enforcement related activities as outlined in the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq.), with limited exceptions, including, but not limited to, when requested by a victim or witness of a crime, or interacting with a confidential informant. CPD will develop and implement a written policy delineating the circumstances when officers will not be equipped with body worn cameras.



- ¶238 CPD will continue to maintain a policy regarding body-worn camera video and audio recording that will require officers to record their law-enforcement related activities, and that will ensure the recordings are retained in compliance with the Department's Forms Retention Schedule (CPD-11.717) and the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act. At a minimum, CPD's body-worn camera policy will:
- a. clearly state which officers are required to use body-worn cameras and under which circumstances;
 - b. require officers, subject to limited exceptions specified in writing, to activate their cameras when responding to calls for service and during all law enforcement-related activities that occur while on duty, and to continue recording until the conclusion of the incident(s);
 - c. require officers to articulate in writing or on camera their reason(s) for failing to record an activity that CPD policy otherwise requires to be recorded;
 - d. require officers to inform subjects that they are being recorded unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible;
 - e. address relevant privacy considerations, including restrictions on recording inside a home, and the need to protect witnesses, victims, and children;
 - f. establish a download and retention protocol;
 - g. require periodic random review of officers' videos for compliance with CPD policy and training purposes;
 - h. require that the reviewing supervisor review videos of incidents involving reportable uses of force by a subordinate; and
 - i. specify that officers who knowingly fail to comply with the policy may be subject to progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action.
- ¶239 CPD officers must comply with the body-worn camera policy. CPD will impose progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action on officers who do not comply with the body-worn camera policy, as permitted by applicable law.
- ¶574 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected regarding each level 2 reportable use of force incident, a representative sample of level 1 reportable use of force, and incidents involving accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries to ensure:
- a. CPD members completely and thoroughly reported the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action, the type and amount of force used, the subject's actions or other circumstances necessitating the level of force, and all efforts to de-escalate the situation;
 - b. the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident were thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy;
 - c. any tactical, equipment, or policy concerns are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed; and
 - d. any patterns related to use of force incidents are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed.
- ¶575 CPD recently established a Force Review Unit ("FRU") and tasked the FRU with certain responsibilities described in the preceding paragraph. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities has sufficient resources to perform them. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities is staffed with CPD members, whether sworn or civilian, with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise to: effectively analyze and assess CPD's use of force practices and related reporting and review procedures; conduct trend analysis based on use of force data; identify tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns based on analysis of use of force incidents and data; and develop recommendations regarding modifications to tactics, equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address identified practices or trends relating to the use of force.
- ¶577 CPD will create a Force Review Board ("FRB") to review, from a Department improvement perspective:
- (a) any level 3 reportable use of force incident, except for accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries, and
 - (b) any reportable uses of force by a CPD command staff member.



- ¶578 For any reportable use of force incident subject to an ongoing investigation by COPA, COPA will be exclusively responsible for recommending disciplinary action relating to the incident. The purpose of FRB's review will be to:
- evaluate if actions by CPD members during the incident were tactically sound and consistent with CPD training; and
 - if applicable, identify specific modifications to existing policy, training, tactics, or equipment that could minimize the risk of deadly force incidents occurring and the risk of harm to officers and the public.
- ¶579 The FRB will be chaired by the Superintendent, or his or her designee, and will include, at a minimum, the Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, or his or her designee, and CPD members at the rank of Deputy Chief, or above, who are responsible for overseeing policy development, policy implementation, training, and misconduct investigations. CPD's General Counsel, or his or her designee, will also serve on the FRB.
- ¶800 The Parties agree that the Consent Decree will be expanded to include obligations by CPD to monitor, report, review, train, and implement accountability measures with respect to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. Enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances will include initial dispersal orders and, where appropriate, may include investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and arrests. These measures will ensure that CPD's investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances are conducted in a manner that comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois and are in accordance with best practices, as defined in Paragraph 730 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶801 In conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs and enforcing the Loitering Ordinances, CPD will interact with all members of the public without bias and will treat all persons with the courtesy and dignity which is inherently due every person as a human being without reference to stereotypes based on race, color, ethnicity, religion, homeless status, national origin, immigration status, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, socio-economic class, age, disability, incarceration status, or criminal history.
- ¶802 The Parties agree that in achieving the goals of this Stipulation, CPD will encourage officers, through training and supervision, to employ a less intrusive response when enforcing the Loitering Ordinances when appropriate and reasonable under the circumstances.
- B. Investigatory Stops, Protective Pat Downs, and Enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances
- ¶803 CPD will review and, to the extent necessary, revise the policies and procedures for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances consistent with the law, the Consent Decree, and this Stipulation and in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A], including that:
- Upon initial contact with person(s) engaged in loitering prohibited by the Loitering Ordinances, CPD officers will issue a dispersal order without conducting an investigatory stop, unless: i. A previous dispersal order has been given and documented for that person(s) at that location within eight hours of such contact, in which case CPD officers may undertake enforcement action under the Loitering Ordinances; or ii. They have separate and distinct reasonable articulable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime;
 - CPD officers will document the initial contact with person(s) engaged in loitering prohibited by the Loitering Ordinances and any dispersal orders on a Loitering Dispersal Report ("LDR"); and
 - If a dispersed person fails to promptly obey the dispersal order or violates the dispersal order by returning within sight or hearing of the location where loitering is prohibited within eight hours of the dispersal, CPD officers may undertake enforcement action as provided for under the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶804 CPD will review and, to the extent necessary, revise the policies and procedures for conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs consistent with the law, the Consent Decree, and this Stipulation.
- ¶805 CPD will require officers to:
- Conduct investigatory stops and protective pat downs, and undertake enforcement action under the Loitering Ordinances in a manner consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the State of Illinois, the Consent Decree, this



Stipulation, and best practices;

b. Communicate with individuals regarding the specific basis for an investigatory stop, consistent with principles of procedural justice, by:

- i. Identifying themselves by name and rank as soon as it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so;
- ii. Stating the reason for the investigatory stop as soon as it is safe, reasonable, and practicable to do so;
- iii. If it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so, notifying the person(s) encountered that they are being lawfully detained temporarily, indicating that they will be free to leave at the conclusion of the investigatory stop, and if asking the individual questions, informing the individual they are not required to answer; and
- iv. If it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so, notifying the person(s) encountered that they are being lawfully detained temporarily, indicating that they will be free to leave at the conclusion of the investigatory stop, and if asking the individual questions, informing the individual they are not required to answer; and;

c. Ensure that the duration of an investigatory stop is no longer than reasonably necessary to confirm or dispel reasonable articulable suspicion and to take the appropriate enforcement actions, if any; and d. Act with professionalism and courtesy throughout the duration of the investigatory stop interaction.

§ 806 CPD will prohibit officers from:

- a. Performing investigatory stops unless they have reasonable articulable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts that an individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime;
- b. Unreasonably extending a stop lawfully made based on reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause to conduct an investigation into other criminal activity unless they have reasonable articulable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit another crime;
- c. Relying on information known to the officer at the time to be materially false to establish reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigatory stop or protective pat down;
- d. Basing investigatory stops or protective pat downs solely on an individual's geographic location, such as presence in a high crime area or proximity to the scene of suspected or reported crimes, without any other reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity;
- e. Basing investigatory stops or protective pat downs solely on an individual's response to the presence of police officers, such as an individual's attempt to avoid contact with an officer (e.g., walking away, declining to talk, running away, or crossing the street to avoid contact), without any other reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity;
- f. Basing investigatory stops or protective pat downs solely on an individual's presence in the company of others suspected of criminal activity without any other reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is, has, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity;
- g. Conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs solely on the basis of an individual's race, ethnicity, color, national origin, religion, disability, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, immigration status, homeless status, marital status, parental status, military discharge status, financial status, or lawful source of income, except that officers may rely on the listed characteristics when part of a specific suspect description;
- h. Conducting a protective pat down, with or without consent, except where officers have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that a person is armed and dangerous;
- i. Conducting an investigatory stop or search of an individual based solely on an officer smelling cannabis/marijuana without any other specific and articulable facts of criminal activity; and
- j. Conducting an investigatory stop or search of an individual based solely on an officer smelling cannabis/marijuana without any other specific and articulable facts of criminal activity; and

§ 807 During an investigatory stop, CPD officers may conduct a search of a person upon consent if officers have reasonable articulable suspicion that the person is involved in a crime or possesses evidence of the crime.



- ¶808 CPD will require that when an officer requests consent for a search of a person during an investigatory stop, the officer will specifically ask the person for consent to search, and document on an Investigatory Stop Report (“ISR”) or whatever similar form of documentation CPD may implement (“Stop Report”) the request for consent, the person’s response, and whether a search was conducted by consent. If an individual gives consent to search, the officer must inform the individual that they may revoke consent at any time.
- ¶809 CPD will ensure that when officers request consent to conduct a search during an investigatory stop, officers will record the entire interaction on BWC.
- ¶810 An officer must establish and communicate the scope of the consensual search and end the search upon the person revoking consent.
- ¶811 Whenever CPD officers conduct a search by consent during an investigatory stop, the Investigatory Stop Receipt or whatever similar form of documentation CPD may implement (“Stop Receipt”) provided to the person will indicate that a consent search was conducted.
- ¶812 CPD will ensure that CPD officers report when they conduct investigatory stops, protective pat downs, or enforce the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶813 CPD will ensure that officers’ reasonable suspicion for their investigatory stops and protective pat downs, the facts on which the suspicion is based, and other information from an investigatory stop or protective pat down are documented in a written or electronic ISR or Stop Report using specific and clear language that does not rely solely on standardized or boilerplate terms.
- ¶814 When CPD officers conduct an investigatory stop, protective pat down, or engage in the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, their reports need to justify that the stop, pat down, or enforcement action complies with the law and CPD policy.
- ¶815 CPD officers will not justify an investigatory stop solely by describing an individual’s behavior as “suspicious,” without further articulating specific facts that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
- ¶816 CPD policy will continue to require that all of the factors that support reasonable articulable suspicion in order to temporarily detain an individual and, if applicable, all of the factors that support reasonable articulable suspicion in order to perform a protective pat down of an individual, will be documented on an ISR or Stop Report in CPD’s electronic reporting application.
- ¶817 CPD will require officers to document on the ISR or Stop Report any BWC footage viewed prior to the completion of the report.
- ¶818 CPD will permit officers to submit only one revised version of an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR from an investigatory stop, protective pat down, or Loitering Ordinance dispersal order, upon a supervisor’s review and rejection of the originally submitted ISR, Stop Report, or LDR. When a supervisor rejects an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR, the supervisor will document in writing the reason for the rejection, such as requesting that an officer amend an ISR or Stop Report for lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion. CPD will prohibit officers from submitting multiple revised versions of an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR, or further revising an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR once a revised version has been submitted.
- ¶819 CPD will require officers to provide an Investigatory Stop Receipt or Stop Receipt to a stopped individual at the conclusion of an investigatory stop, except an officer will not provide a receipt when an investigatory stop ends in an arrest and transport to a CPD facility or ends in the issuance of a citation and release from the scene under the Illinois Pre-Trial Fairness Act. In any circumstance in which an Investigatory Stop Receipt or Stop Receipt was required, but was not provided to or received by the individual, the CPD officer will articulate in the ISR or Stop Report the reasons why the receipt was not provided to or received by the individual stopped.



- ¶820 Investigative Stop Receipts and Stop Receipts will indicate the Office of Emergency Management and Communications Police Computer Aided Dispatch event number of the stop, the reason for the stop, the CPD officer's name and star number, whether a consent search was conducted, and instructions on how to obtain a copy of the ISR or Stop Report from CPD through an Illinois Freedom of Information Act request.
- ¶821 CPD will ensure that the policies for conducting investigatory stops and protective pat downs are consistent with the policies for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances in instances where both policies may be applicable.
- C. Training
- ¶822 CPD will train officers how to perform investigatory stops and protective pat downs and to enforce the Loitering Ordinances consistent with CPD policies and all applicable laws. This training will be consistent with CPD's commitment to procedural justice, de-escalation, impartial policing, and community policing, and will incorporate scenario-based elements.
- ¶823 CPD will review and, to the extent necessary, revise its training specific to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances so that they are sufficient in quantity, quality, type, and scope to prepare officers to comply with CPD directives consistently, effectively, and in accordance with the law, CPD policy, best practices, and the Consent Decree.
- ¶824 CPD will provide training for officers and supervisors instructing that:
- a. Officers should consider reasonable alternatives to the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances based on the circumstances, including lesser actions such as a repeated dispersal;
 - b. Investigatory stops are conducted only where there is reasonable articulable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed;
 - c. If it is safe, reasonable, and practical to do so, Officers will notify the person(s) encountered that they are being lawfully detained temporarily, indicate that they will be free to leave at the conclusion of the investigatory stop, and if asking the individual questions, inform the individual that they are not required to answer;
 - d. Protective pat downs are performed only where there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the person stopped is armed and dangerous; intimidation, or exertion of authority, and the individual may revoke consent at any time.
 - e. An individual subject to an investigatory stop conducted by a CPD officer is not required to answer any questions asked by the CPD officer; and f. Consent to conduct a search of an individual must be voluntarily given based on the totality of the circumstances, including that consent cannot be obtained by using force, threats of force, promises, misrepresentation, intimidation, or exertion of authority, and the individual may revoke consent at any time.
- ¶825 CPD will train all officers with respect to ISRs, Stop Reports, Stop Receipts, and LDRs, the electronic applications for documenting of ISRs/Stop Reports, and their responsibilities to record the specific and articulable facts for each investigatory stop and protective pat down.
- ¶826 CPD will train supervisors on how to review ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs and how to discuss the results of the supervisory review of these reports and officers' practices with officers.
- ¶827 As part of CPD's 2024 Training Needs Assessment, and annually thereafter, under the supervision of the Training Oversight Committee, CPD will determine any additional development and administration of training related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- D. Supervisory Review
- ¶828 All submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, LDRs, and related arrest reports must be reviewed by a CPD supervisor.
- ¶829 CPD supervisors will approve or reject all submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs documenting investigatory stops, protective pat downs, or enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances by the end of their tours of duty.
- ¶830 CPD supervisors will review and ensure submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs are properly completed and conform to CPD policy (e.g., ensuring that CPD officers document in the narrative sections of the ISR or Stop Report the reasonable articulable suspicion that justifies the investigatory stop and, if performed, protective pat down).
- ¶831 CPD supervisors will inform the preparing CPD officer of the reason for any rejection of a submitted ISR, Stop Report, or LDR and comply with CPD policy on Department review of such reports.



- ¶832 With respect to the supervisory review of ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs, CPD supervisors will take the appropriate action, such as after-action support recommendations, to address any rejected reports and deviations from CPD policy related to the report or the conduct described in the report. The after-action support recommendations may include, but are not limited to, individual debriefing with a supervisor, reviewing CPD policy with the CPD officer, reviewing BWC footage from the stop with the CPD officer, mandatory re-training, formal counseling, enhanced supervision, or initiating progressive discipline. The appropriate after-action support will be documented within the report rejection.
- ¶833 When directed by a 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit after-action support recommendation, CPD supervisors will review the BWC footage from the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down with the involved officer(s). CPD supervisors will document the viewing of the BWC footage and the results of the after-action support in the appropriate supervisory reports. E. Data Collection
- ¶834 CPD will continue to post de-identified investigatory stop data derived from ISRs or Stop Reports on its website (currently, <https://home.chicagopolice.org/statistics-data/isr-data/>) on an annual basis, including fields for which information is collected on the ISR or Stop Report. CPD also will continue to post on its website the ISR data dictionary or an equivalent data dictionary for Stop Report data.
- ¶835 To evaluate and improve its data collection efforts with respect to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, CPD agrees that, within 180 days, or a reasonable extension of time approved by the Monitor, of entry of this Stipulation, it will conduct an assessment of the reporting and data collection mechanisms and system for investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶836 Within 180 days of completion of the needs assessment provided for in Paragraph 835 of this Stipulation, CPD will submit a plan to address areas of need to the Monitor and OAG for the review and approval process, as provided for in Paragraph 640 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶837 CPD's data plan for investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances will:
- Ensure that CPD maintains an electronic system such that every CPD officer will be able to electronically complete the documents related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, with the exception of Investigatory Stop Receipts or Stop Receipts;
 - Where feasible and practical, ensure every CPD officer in Patrol Field Units will have the equipment necessary while on patrol to electronically complete ISRs, Stop Reports (when implemented), and LDRs (when implemented); and
 - Ensure that all required fields of the ISR, Stop Report, and LDR are completed before the electronic document can be submitted.
- ¶838 CPD will maintain and preserve all electronic versions of any ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs submitted or re-submitted by CPD officers.
- ¶839 CPD will collect and maintain the data and records related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances necessary to:
- Accurately evaluate its practices concerning investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances; and
 - Post de-identified investigatory stop data derived from ISRs or Stop Reports on its website as provided for in Paragraph 834 of this Stipulation.
- ¶840 Upon approval and implementation of the data plan provided for in Paragraph 837 of this Stipulation, CPD will have an electronic reporting system that accurately and reliably maintains data and records related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and unit-level supervisory and 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit reviews, including all electronic versions of any ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs submitted or resubmitted. CPD will continue to maintain all data, records, and reports relevant to and associated with investigatory stops and protective pat downs, including BWC footage, consistent with legal requirements and the requirements of the Consent Decree.



¶841 Further, CPD will also continue to develop, implement, and maintain an electronic system to track and document which CPD officers have repeated rejected ISRs or Stop Reports consistent with the review process performed by the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit (or an equivalent internal CPD unit) described in Paragraph 857 of this Stipulation.

F. Data Analysis

¶842 The Parties acknowledge that the Consultant for the ACLU Agreement is preparing a report, in consultation with an independent statistical expert, which assesses data regarding investigatory stops completed by CPD officers for the period between 2018 and 2020 ("Report"). With respect to the disparate impact compliance methodology for this Report, the City has agreed that the Consultant may (1) assume that a prima facie showing under ICRA based on disparate impact on the basis of race has been satisfied, and (2) forego that analysis. The Parties recognize that the methodology for this Report includes, but is not limited to, an analysis of the following:

- a. Total CPD investigatory stops citywide and by police district, broken down by racial/ethnic identity;
- b. Comparison of investigatory stop share to population share by race/ethnicity;
- c. Protective pat downs, searches, and enforcement actions by race/ethnicity;
- d. Hit-rate analysis for all contraband, firearms/weapons, drugs, and cannabis, including variations in hit rates between police districts; and e. Analysis of the boxes most often checked by officers to document reasonable articulable suspicion, including variations by race/ethnicity and by police district.

¶843 An independent subject matter expert (selected by the Monitor) will compile and assess data regarding investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersals completed by CPD officers through and including the period ending December 31, 2024. For the initial report, the Monitor will set a period for review and establish the date by which the report will be published. The preparation of the initial report will be under the direction of the Monitor. The methodology for this report will be consistent with the methodology for the report referenced in Paragraph 842 of this Stipulation, except that this report will also include (1) a Fourth Amendment analysis of a statistically representative sample of Stop Reports to assess whether the reports contain sufficient facts to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop and for any protective pat down, (2) an analysis of Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers and documented on LDRs, and (3) an analysis of the relative frequency of requests for consent to search and searches conducted based on consent. To the extent the report includes an analysis of the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity and gender within the reporting period, the report will clearly state that such analysis will be for information purposes only because the demographic classifications are based on the subjective observations of the CPD officer(s) who (1) pursuant to CPD policy, will not have stopped the individual to conduct the dispersal and (2) lacks the means to validate or confirm the demographic classifications. Any further changes in methodology will be submitted by the Monitor to the City and OAG in advance for review, comment, and approval.

¶844 After publication of the report as provided for in Paragraph 843 of this Stipulation, the City will submit to the Monitor and OAG for approval its plan for taking over the responsibility for obtaining and publishing periodic future independent subject matter reports from the Monitor. Once the plan has been approved, the Monitor will transfer the responsibility for obtaining periodic future independent subject matter reports to CPD.

¶845 After the Monitor transfers to CPD the responsibility for obtaining periodic independent subject matter reports on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will annually submit to the Monitor and OAG a copy of the annual independent subject matter expert report consistent with the methodology in Paragraph 843 of this Stipulation. The Monitor and OAG will review and approve the proposed independent subject matter expert and any proposed modifications to the methodology, including whether the use of an independent subject matter expert may be phased out in favor of an assessment methodology to be administered by CPD for future reports.



- ¶846 Prior to conducting this assessment, CPD will share its proposed methodology, including any proposed factors to be considered as part of the assessment, with the Monitor for review and approval. The Monitor will approve CPD's proposed methodology provided that the Monitor determines that CPD's methodology comports with published, peer-reviewed methodologies and the Consent Decree.
- ¶847 After the Monitor transfers to CPD the responsibility for obtaining periodic independent subject matter reports on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will annually submit to the Monitor and OAG a copy of the annual independent subject matter expert report consistent with the methodology in Paragraph 843 of this Stipulation.
- ¶848 As part of CPD's annual report on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will conduct an assessment of: (1) the relative frequency of all investigatory stops made by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including, race/ethnicity, gender, age, or perceived or known disability status for the prior calendar year, (2) the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers, and (3) an analysis of the relative frequency of requests for consent to search and searches conducted based on consent. For informational purposes only, CPD will identify the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity and gender. The report will clearly indicate that the assessment of Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders based on demographic categories is for informational purposes only because the demographic classifications are based on the subjective observations of the CPD officer(s) who (1) pursuant to CPD policy, will not have stopped the individual to conduct the dispersal and (2) lacks the means to validate or confirm the demographic classifications.
- ¶849 The assessment of all investigatory stops and protective pat downs conducted by CPD officers will be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in Paragraphs 79-82 of the Consent Decree. This assessment of all investigatory stops and protective pat downs effectuated by CPD will be in addition to and does not replace the requirements of Paragraph 79 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶850 Within 180 days after completion of each independent expert report, CPD will review the data and results of the analysis set forth in the report and assess whether to implement any revision to policies, procedures, or training to address any patterns of disparities, bias, or constitutional inadequacies in CPD's investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶851 If CPD's assessment determines there are any necessary revisions to policies, procedures, or training, CPD will develop a timeline for implementation of the modifications, subject to the processes provided for in Paragraph 627 of the Consent Decree for policies and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree for training.
- G. 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit Review
- ¶852 CPD's 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit (or an equivalent internal CPD unit), under the authority of the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (or an equivalent internal CPD unit), will serve as the designated unit within CPD tasked with conducting Department-level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including a representative sample of those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances.
- ¶853 CPD will ensure that the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit has sufficient resources to perform these review duties promptly, efficiently, and effectively, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶854 Beginning at the entry of this Stipulation, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform the Department-level reviews, consistent with the requirements of Paragraph 857(a) through (d) of this Stipulation, of 5% of the backlog of ISR reviews maintained in the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit for January 1, 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation.
- ¶855 The backlog of ISR reviews consists of 15% of all ISRs completed during 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation that have been randomly selected.



- ¶856 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will create and submit to the Monitor and OAG a summary to report the demographic and geographic distribution of the individuals subject to the investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed as prescribed in Paragraph 854 of this Stipulation.
- ¶857 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform regular Department level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including a representative sample of those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, submitted by CPD officers after the entry of this Stipulation, sufficient to reach relevant and reliable observations on:
- a. Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop;
 - b. Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the protective pat down;
 - c. Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly completed the report and complied with CPD policy; and
 - d. Whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policies.
- ¶858 For the representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports described in Paragraph 857 of this Stipulation, CPD must demonstrate that the subset of investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago.
- ¶859 CPD will recommend an involved officer(s) and their supervisor review the BWC footage for the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down conducted by the involved officer(s), after the involved officer has submitted five ISRs or Stop Reports within a 90-day period that have resulted in a recommendation for after-action support to resolve a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion.
- ¶860 On a semi-annual basis, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will report on the ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed beginning with the time period ending with December 31, 2023, including those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and identify:
- a. The total number of ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed by the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit;
 - b. Any trends or patterns relating to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances identified through the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit reviews;
 - c. The number of reports rejected by supervisors and categories of reason for rejection;
 - d. The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected;
 - e. The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected for a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion; and
 - f. Any equipment, training, or policy concerns, and to the extent necessary, recommendations regarding modifications to equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address those concerns.
- ¶861 CPD will develop a timeline for implementation of the recommendations provided for in Paragraph 860(f) of this Stipulation and consult at the earliest feasible time with the Monitor and OAG, with the goal of developing consensus on the substance and timetable for the implementation of recommendations, subject to the processes provided for in Paragraph 627 of the Consent Decree for policies and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree for training. H. Community Engagement
- ¶862 CPD will establish and maintain clear channels through which community and Department members can provide input regarding CPD's investigatory stop policies and forms and propose revisions or additions to those policies and forms.
- ¶863 In developing or revising policies and training referenced in this Stipulation, including those on investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, CPD will seek input from members of the community and community-based organizations with relevant knowledge and experience through community engagement efforts.



- ¶864 CPD will regularly conduct a community engagement process through which community members, reflecting a broad cross section of the Chicago community the Department serves, can provide feedback on CPD's policy for investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. At a minimum CPD will conduct this community engagement process every two years and will consider the recommendations, in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A], during the biennial policy review process. A summary of CPD's policy review and community engagement efforts will be shared with the community organizations and community members that participated in the community engagement process.
- ¶865 The Parties recognize that the City, ACLU-IL, and the ACLU Agreement Consultant have developed a promising model for thoughtful community engagement through the creation of a Request for Proposals which sought community organizations to co-design and lead a citywide process to engage individuals and stakeholders to develop recommendations regarding CPD's investigatory stop and protective pat down practices. Within 180 days of the release of these recommendations, the Monitor will publicly report on these recommendations and CPD's response, and will further make recommendations as to CPD's ability to adapt elements of this model for community engagement. CPD will consider the results of the Monitor's report in developing future community engagement processes.
- ¶866 Investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances will be included among the topics covered in the public awareness campaign provided for in Paragraph 28 of the Consent Decree.
- I. Policy, Training, and Plan Review
- ¶867 The Parties agree that the provisions in Paragraphs 627-633 of the Consent Decree apply to the policies and procedures, Paragraph 640 of the Consent Decree applies to the plans, and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree applies to the training described herein.
- ¶868 Within 60 days of the entry of this Stipulation, CPD will submit the most recently developed draft versions of the CPD policies and reports related to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A], to the Monitor and OAG for the review, comment, and, if necessary, objection process as provided for in Paragraphs 627-30 of the Consent Decree.
- ¶869 After the review, comment, and, if necessary, objection process provided for in Paragraphs 627-30 of the Consent Decree, CPD will adopt and utilize an LDR in accordance with the terms set forth in Exhibit [A].
- ¶870 After the review, comment, and, if necessary, objection process provided for in Paragraphs 627-30 of the Consent Decree, CPD will adopt and utilize a revised Stop Report and Stop Receipt, to replace the use of the ISR and the Investigatory Stop Receipt.
- ¶871 The Parties further agree that CPD will submit any new or revised policies, procedures, and trainings regarding investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances to the Monitor and OAG for review, comment, and, if necessary, objection, consistent with the requirements of the Consent Decree.
- ¶872 Every two years, CPD will conduct a comprehensive review of its investigatory stops policies to assess whether the policies meet the requirements of this Stipulation, incorporate best practices, address observed trends and practices, as necessary, and reflect developments in applicable law. CPD will regularly review and consider the community input received, including during this biennial policy review process. J. Miscellaneous
- ¶871 The Parties further agree that CPD will submit any new or revised policies, procedures, and trainings regarding investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances to the Monitor and OAG for review, comment, and, if necessary, objection, consistent with the requirements of the Consent Decree.
- ¶872 Every two years, CPD will conduct a comprehensive review of its investigatory stops policies to assess whether the policies meet the requirements of this Stipulation, incorporate best practices, address observed trends and practices, as necessary, and reflect developments in applicable law. CPD will regularly review and consider the community input received, including during this biennial policy review process. J. Miscellaneous



- ¶873 CPD will not permit the number of investigatory stops, protective pat downs, or enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances to be considered as part of any bonus, incentive, or promotional process for any CPD officer and will not implement any form of quota relating to the same.
- ¶874 The Parties agree that the Implementation, Enforcement, and Monitoring provisions in Part XII of the Consent Decree apply to the requirements described herein, including those of the Coalition described in Paragraph 709 of the Consent Decree.
- K. Community Input on this Stipulation
- ¶875 The Parties agree that they will make a joint request to the Court for a Community Input Session on this Stipulation, to be held within 90 days of the submission of this Stipulation by the parties and to include an opportunity for community input and public testimony by individuals affected by this Stipulation.
- L. Definitions
- ¶876 Loitering Ordinances – the City of Chicago’s Gang and Narcotics-Related Loitering Ordinances set forth in the Municipal Code of Chicago Section 8-4-015 “Gang Loitering” and Section 8-4-017 “Narcotics-Related Loitering.”
- ¶877 Patrol Field Units – the primary beat cars, rapid response cars, and watch specialty cars (squadrol, traffic car, and park car) assigned to watch field operations in District Law Enforcement; District tactical teams; and Community Safety Teams (or operationally equivalent units).



ACRONYMS AND TERMS

The following is a listing of acronyms and terms utilized by the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

4ASRU	Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit
Advisements and Recommendations	TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a TRR review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training which, once complete, must be documented by a supervisor in the TRR.
AXON	Company that provides the Body Worn Camera system utilized by CPD officers.
BWC	Body-Worn Camera
BWC Early Termination	Indicates that the involved member deactivated his BWC before the conclusion of an incident.
BWC Late Activation	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at the beginning of an incident.
BWC No Activation	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at any point during an incident.
BWC Other Issues	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue relating to BWC usage.
Control Tactics Not Articulated	The involved member indicated that they used control tactics by checking the action on their TRR but did not articulate how or when they were used.
DP	Debriefing Point
ET	Evidence Technician
Foot Pursuit Issue	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue related to a foot pursuit.
Foot Pursuit – Radio Communications	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified that the involved member did not follow the guidelines laid out in Training Bulletin 18-01.
Force Mit – Communication	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of communication as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Mit. – Not Articulated	The involved member indicated that they used the principles of Force Mitigation by checking it on the TRR but failed to articulate the actions in the narrative portion of their TRR.
Force Mit. – Positioning	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of positioning as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Mit. – Time	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of time as a Force Mitigation tactic.



Force Options	Indicates that the involved member incorrectly identified subject's actions or member's response in relation to the CPD Force Options Model.
FP	Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report
FPI	Firearm Pointing Incident
FPIR	Firearm Pointing Incident Report
IDR	Incident Debriefing Report
ISR	Investigatory Stop Report
Narrative Deficiency	Refers to various issues identified by TRED reviewers regarding an involved member's narrative or that of a reviewing or approving supervisor. Typically this involves the member failing to adequately articulate, in writing, a portion of the incident.
OEMC	Office of Emergency Management & Communications
Other – Policy Procedure	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous policy or procedure issue.
Other – Tactics	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified miscellaneous tactical issues.
Performance Recognition System	The Performance Recognition System is an assessment tool for assisting Department supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to the job performance of members under their command.
PERGUN	Person with a gun call for service
PERKNI	Person with a knife call for service
PERSTB	Person stabbed call for service
Pursuit Box Not Checked	Foot or vehicle pursuit box on the Tactical Response Report was either omitted or incorrectly checked.
PNT	Pointing notification
Radio Communications	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue relating to the involved member's use of radio to communicate with dispatchers or other officers.
Recommendations and Advisements	TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training.
Search Issue	Indicates an issue was identified by TRED reviewers relating to the involved member's search of a subject.
Taser – Accidental Discharge	The involved member reported accidentally discharging a Taser device.
Taser – Crossfire	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a crossfire situation involving a Taser.



ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Taser – Other	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding Taser handling, use, or reporting.
Taser – Over 5 Seconds	Involved member utilized a Taser cycle that exceeds five seconds.
TRR	Tactical Response Report
TRR-I	Tactical Response Report Investigation
TRED	Tactical Review and Evaluation Division
TRR Box Issue	One or more boxes on the Tactical Response Report were either omitted or incorrectly checked.
TRR Inconsistency – External	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency between the TRR or TRR-I and other reports (e.g. Arrest Report or Case Incident Report).
TRR Inconsistency – Internal	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency within the TRR or TRR-I.
Vehicle Extraction	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding the involved member's actions while extracting (removing) a subject from a motor vehicle.
VIRTRA	A 300-degree small arms judgmental use of force and decision-making simulator for law enforcement training. This intense, immersive training environment takes into account every detail from the smallest pre-attack indicators to the most cognitive overload stimuli situations imaginable.