



CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION



2025 YEAR-END REPORT

PUBLISHED DATE June 30, 2026






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MISSION

TO SERVE OUR
AND PROTECT
RIGHTS, AND
OF ALL PEOPLE



STATEMENT

COMMUNITIES
THE LIVES,
PROPERTY
IN CHICAGO.



G01-01, Vision, Mission Statement, and Core Values



OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

The Department is led by the Superintendent of Police, who is appointed by the Mayor.

In addition to overall Department management, the Office of the Superintendent is responsible for critical functions such as planning and implementing the Community Policing Strategy, facilitating and coordinating law enforcement services, planning police coverage at public gatherings, addressing legal and legislative matters, administering labor agreements, and providing a liaison to the news media.



Superintendent of Police

Larry Snelling

OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING AND REFORM

The Office of Constitutional Policing & Reform is commanded by an Executive Director who reports directly to the Superintendent of Police. The office consists of the following division and groups: Wellness and Support Group, Training and Support Group, Administrative Support and Reform Management.

The office is responsible for administrative operations, including the management of records, compliance, reform, and training.



Executive Director

Allyson

Clark-Henson



Commander

James J. Berlage

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is overseen by a Lieutenant who reports directly to a Commander.

The mission of the Chicago Police Department's Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is to review and analyze information that arises from Use of Force incidents in order to enhance Department members' skills and ultimately make the City of Chicago safer for its Officers and citizens. The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is non-disciplinary in nature.



Lieutenant

Richard B. DeFelice



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1574,575

BACKGROUND

The Chicago Police Department established the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (TRED; formerly the Force Review Division), in 2017 with the mission of reviewing and analyzing information that arises from use of force incidents. After establishing review procedures and an electronic use of force reporting application, the Force Review Division began conducting use of force reviews on May 29, 2018.

On November 1, 2019, the Department issued its first-ever Firearm Pointing Incident (FPI) policy which requires a Department member to make a notification any time that a member points a firearm at a person while performing their duties. In conjunction with this policy, TRED created a new team to review and analyze FPIs.

Beginning January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all reported Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports involving Department members. Additionally, as of this same date, TRED commenced utilizing the Incident Debriefing Report for reviews of Use of Force, Foot Pursuit, and Firearm Pointing Incidents. Although reviews are incident based, feedback is provided individually on separate Incident Debriefing Reports. For example, for a use of force incident, the involved members, reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor will each receive their own individual Incident Debriefing Report.

TRED's review process involves examining Department reports and any associated video, including body-worn camera and in-car camera video. The reviews compare the facts of each incident with protocols which have been established by Department policy and training standards in order to identify opportunities for improvement. These reviews are designed to be non-disciplinary in nature. TRED utilizes these reviews to make both individual and Department-wide recommendations related to training, policy, and equipment.

In 2023, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit expanded its operations to become part of TRED. The Tacti-

cal Review and Evaluation Division now comprised of the Force Review Division and the 4th Amendment Stop Review Unit.

PURPOSE

The purpose of the TRED 2025 Year-End Report is to provide an overview of findings and recommendations related to Use of Force, Firearm Pointing Incidents, and Foot Pursuits.

Note on information reported:

The information and data contained in this document are indicative of Tactical Response reports (TRRs), Firearm Pointing Incident reports (FPIRs), Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports (FPRs), and Incident Debriefing reports (IDRs) generated from January 1 through September 30, 2025. The primary source of data for this report was drawn from Department tables as of May 6, 2026. Data in this report may differ slightly from other reports, or even internally, depending on the data pull date, the specific data point being analyzed, or a system issue. CPD remains committed to transparency and continual improvement. The Department regularly reviews its data maintenance processes and databases to identify and resolve inconsistencies. When discrepancies arise, both internal and external data can be traced back to their original sources to help clarify relationships. CPD continuously evaluates opportunities to improve efficiency and accuracy in its data collection and analysis practices (for example, see Patterns and Trends section). Finally, in reviewing this report, please keep in mind that behind all of the work and data are real people, including many members of our community and CPD. Many of these people work tirelessly every day to make Chicago a better place to live, work, learn, and play.

Data Through September 2025

The data presented in this report reflect incidents reviewed that occurred between January 1, 2025, and September 30, 2025. Unless otherwise noted, review information for incidents occurring from October 1, 2025,



through December 31, 2025, is not included. On January 1, 2025, the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division began the year with about **9,100** Incident Debriefing Reports awaiting review, and more than **25,000** additional reports were generated during 2025. At the same time, TRED was implementing significant staffing and process improvements. These conditions affected the pace at which reviews from the final quarter of 2025 could be completed.

During this period, TRED focused on processing newly generated reviews and assigned personnel to support and monitor the District Level Review Program. As a result, some reviews for incidents from the last quarter of 2025 remain in progress. The data in this report therefore cover only those incidents for which reviews were fully completed between January and September.

One exception is Force Review Board (FRB) cases. These incidents involve the most serious categories of force, and all cases from 2025 were reviewed for the entire year and are fully represented in this report. Information for remaining incidents occurring between October 1, 2025, and December 31, 2025 will be incorporated into future TRED reports as those reviews are completed.

Additional System and Data Considerations

All incident reports (TRR, FPIR, and FP) are automatically flagged for TRED review by the IDR application after an incident occurs. In some cases, these reports may still reflect a “*Preliminary*” status when the corresponding IDRs are generated. Not all preliminary reports are ultimately approved; some are later cancelled, rejected, or identified as duplicates. When this occurs after the IDR has already been created, the report remains in the IDR data but no longer exists in the respective source applications (TRR, FPIR, or FP). As a result, slight discrepancies arise when comparing approved application-level reports to the reports recorded as reviewed by TRED in the IDR system.

In addition, due to a system issue during development, some Foot Pursuit reports that were cancelled or rejected

(i.e., reports created in error) were mistakenly removed from the system instead of being placed into a final status such as “Cancelled.” Work is underway to correct this issue and return the affected records to the appropriate final status. It is important to note that the removal of these reports did *not* affect the creation of any foot pursuit-related Incident Debriefing Reports. As a result, until the issue is fully resolved, the number of Foot Pursuit reports reported as having been *reviewed* by TRED may temporarily appear higher than the total number of actual Foot Pursuits.

TRED produces its Year-End and Mid-year reports based on the date of incident rather than date of TRED review. Accordingly, TRED reports should closely align with published data dashboards as well as other reports produced by other Department bureaus.

There are references to Consent Decree paragraphs throughout this report. The text of specific paragraphs is included in the appendix at the end of this report.

Training and Program Implementation

During the summer and fall of 2024 TRED, along with its partners at Research and Development, Unit 127, participated in the development of a pilot program for qualifying Firearm Pointing Incidents to be reviewed at the district level. This effort bore fruit in the late fall of 2024 as directive “D24-06, Firearm Pointing Incidents District-Level Review - Pilot Program.”

D24-06 was developed for multiple purposes including a streamlined review process for qualifying FPIRs— resulting in a more manageable backlog of reviews— and in an effort to improve the identification of patterns and trends.

A 16-hour Firearm Pointing review training program was developed by TRED and delivered to all district Captains. Additionally, a program of sustained mentoring by veteran TRED reviewers was made available to each district Captain on a personalized basis. Full deployment of the Pilot to all Chicago Police Districts was accomplished in



December of 2025. Group 1 and Group 2 have a year or more of data each and, while preliminary, the results are positive and justified an expansion of the Pilot into a full program, "S03-22-01, District Level Review Program" (DLRP).

DLRP, which includes Firearm Pointing Incidents and Foot Pursuits and also expands the scope of reviewers to include district Lieutenants, was submitted to the Independent Monitoring Team and the Office of the Attorney General for review and received No Objection Letters from each. DLRP will be fully implemented on January 1, 2027.

In 2025, TRED continued to train all Bureau of Patrol (BOP) Captains in the Firearm Pointing Incident Review (FPIR) Pilot Program. The TRED FRIR training program is now a regular part of Captain's pre-service training. According to Chicago Police Department Notice D24-06 titled District-Level Reviews of Firearm Pointing Incidents: Pilot Program, the program has been implemented in all Chicago Police Districts. TRED has trained all district patrol Captains.

TRED's training team has continued to develop and facilitate Department training in 2026. Besides TRED commitment to the FPIR, the team continues to provide instructors for both pre-service training and in-service training. In-service training includes the Department's supportive Body-Worn Camera (BWC) course, where Department members needing additional training are enrolled. Members assigned or detailed to the Bureau of Patrol (BOP) are enrolled after receiving two BWC-related debriefings within a year. TRED continues to instruct, develop, and maintain several pre-service courses. They include but are not limited to: several rank-specific TRED-related courses for specific supervisor ranks and a separate firearm pointing course for supervisors. Topics in the courses include sustainment and refresher training on foot pursuits, reportable use of force, firearms pointing incidents, related Department forms, relevant Department policies, supervisor specific job duties differentiated by rank and role, su-

pervisor specific duties, an overview of the Force Review Board, TRED-related data sources, the process of debriefing members, supervisor specific reports, debriefing members (including all available statuses within the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) system), and other topics. All TRED training in-service and pre-service, reflects current Department policy, law, a commitment to de-escalation, and the principles of force mitigation.

The TRED training team has continued to work on developing and implementing an expansion to the District-Level Reviews of Firearm Pointing Incidents. The expansion focuses on District supervisors reviewing foot pursuits and firearm pointing incidents.

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division continues to operate as the designated unit at the headquarters level for reviewing Tactical Response reports, Firearm Pointing Incident reports, and Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports. TRED conducted **19,746** Incident Debriefing Report reviews through September 30, 2025. These reviews help ensure that officer performance, documentation, and supervisory oversight meet Department policy and standards.

TRED's review system remains non-disciplinary in nature, focused on supporting officer performance, reinforcing constitutional policing principles, and identifying trends in order to improve Department supervision, policy, and training.

Jurisdiction and Review Outcomes

COPA retains jurisdiction over allegations of excessive force, regardless of whether the incident comes into TRED with an allegation already attached or whether TRED identifies possible excessive force (or other misconduct within COPA's jurisdiction) during the course of TRED's review. Once an allegation is forwarded to COPA, COPA has final authority over the disposition of that allegation, and TRED will not review or debrief on that incident. However, the data collected from the CPD reports completed by the involved members and their supervisors immediately after the incident are still collected and ana-



lyzed by CPD via both this report and the CPD's Annual Use of Force Report. The disposition of COPA investigations into excessive force and other misconduct within their jurisdiction is reported in COPA's Annual Report. For more information on COPA's jurisdiction and COPA's investigative process, please visit chicagocopa.org.

After TRED review of a use of force incident, firearm pointing incident, or foot pursuit (which does not fall under COPA jurisdiction), TRED may issue either a recommendation or an advisement. A recommendation typically requires the involved member's immediate supervisor or the Department's Training and Support Group to conduct a debriefing and/or training session.

In contrast, an advisement is informal and consists of written debriefing points intended to offer guidance that may assist Department members and supervisors in future incidents or documentation. Unlike recommendations, advisements do not require a formally recorded debriefing or training.

TRED may issue recommendations or advisements to involved members, reviewing supervisors (generally rank of sergeant and above), and investigating or approving supervisors (generally rank of lieutenant and above).

Through September 30, 2025, TRED conducted **19,746** Incident Debriefing Report reviews. **16%** of these reviews led to training recommendations and **14%** led to advisements. The majority of IDR reviews (**66%**) required no recommendations at all. It can be noted that an involved member may receive both an advisement and a recommendation from the TRED review of the incident.

Trends Through September 2025

Overall, incidents requiring TRED review decreased slightly through September 30, 2025. TRED reviewed **3,353** TRRs in the first three quarters of 2025 which was a **6%** decrease from the first three quarters of 2024, when TRED reviewed **3,551** TRRs. The total amount of TRRs in the first three quarters of 2025 increased by approximately **9%** from the same time period of the previous year. There was also an increase in FPIRs that TRED reviewed in the first three quarters of 2025. TRED reviewed **3,979** FPIRs through the first three quarters of 2025. During that same time period in 2024, TRED reviewed **3,715** FPIRs. This resulted in a **7%** increase in FPIRs reviewed by TRED in the first three quarters of 2025.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit

From July 1 - December 31, 2025, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) served as the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) designated Department-level review unit responsible for reviewing investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and gang- and narcotics-related loitering enforcement activity. This work was conducted pursuant to the Amended Stipulation to the Consent Decree governing investigatory stop practices, supervisory oversight, Department-level review, data collection, training, accountability, and related reporting requirements (**Amended Stipulation ¶¶800, 812-814, 828-833, 852-860**).

Throughout this reporting period, 4ASRU evaluated whether Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) were complete, consistent with Department policy, and sufficiently articulated to establish reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) for investigatory stops and protective pat-downs. The unit also evaluated supervisory approval practices, identified recurring trends, and supported after-action reviews, accountability, and policy-compliance efforts. These functions align with **Paragraph 857**, which requires 4ASRU to assess whether officers completely and thoroughly documented the factors supporting RAS, whether reports were complete and policy-compliant, and whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy.

Consistent with the Department-level review methodology in effect during this reporting period, CPD routed 100% of gang- and narcotics-related loitering ISRs and a 3% representative sample of the remaining approved ISR population to 4ASRU for review. This methodology remained in place throughout the reporting period, although the Department temporarily adjusted ISR sampling practices while questions regarding the review of court-related ISRs were being evaluated. This review structure is consistent with the Amended Stipulation's requirement that 4ASRU conduct regular Department-level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including reports

completed for enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and that the reviewed subset be demographically and geographically representative (**Amended Stipulation ¶¶852, 857-858**).

During the review period of January 1 - June 30, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed **2,033** reports. Review outcomes consisted of approximately **69.45%** Concur findings, **15.49%** Administrative Deficiency findings, and **15.05%** Deficiency findings.

During the review period of July 1 - December 31, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed **1,706** reports. Review outcomes consisted of **69.11%** Concur findings, **11.43%** Administrative Deficiency findings, and **19.46%** Deficiency findings.

A Concur classification indicated that the review did not identify articulation, reporting, or policy-related concerns requiring corrective action. Administrative Deficiency findings generally involved clerical, receipt-related, or report-completeness issues, while Deficiency findings generally involved more substantive concerns, including insufficient articulation of RAS, improper justification for enforcement activity, or reports requiring corrective follow-up. These classifications support review obligations related to report completeness, RAS, supervisory review, and after-action support (**Amended Stipulation ¶¶813-819, 828-833, 857-860**).

This reporting period reflects investigatory stop activity, supervisory review, and Department-level review processes conducted under Special Order S04-13-09, Investigatory Stop System, which remained in effect throughout the January 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period. Accordingly, the findings presented in this report reflect only activity occurring during the January 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period.

Throughout the reporting period, 4ASRU supported Department-wide preparation for the scheduled February 3, 2026 implementation of the revised Police Encounters and Fourth Amendment policy suite, including the Temporary Detention STOP Application (STOP Application), Stop Re-



port process, Loitering Dispersal Report (LDR), and Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) review application. Activities supporting implementation are discussed throughout this report; however, the review outcomes presented herein are limited to Department-level review activities conducted between January 1 and December 31, 2025.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU also reviewed 98 ISRs originating from the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period that had remained pending Department-level review due to their association with active court proceedings or internal and external administrative investigations. These 98 carried-forward ISRs were reviewed separately and are not included in the 1,706 reports reviewed during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period. To ensure that Department-level review activities would not supersede or interfere with ongoing legal, prosecutorial, or investigative processes, 4ASRU coordinated with Department leadership, the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT), the Office of the Illinois Attorney General (OAG), the Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform, and the Office of Prosecutorial Strategies. A resolution was subsequently developed whereby all ISRs would continue to undergo Department-level review.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, Concur findings accounted for 69.11% of Department-level Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) reviews, Administrative Deficiency findings accounted for 11.43%, and Deficiency findings accounted for 19.46% of reviewed ISRs. These review outcomes reflect 4ASRU's Department-level assessment of report quality, supervisory review, policy compliance, and documentation standards during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period.

Throughout the reporting period, while supporting Department preparation for the scheduled February 3, 2026 implementation of the revised Police Encounters and Fourth Amendment policy suite, 4ASRU continued to conduct Department-level reviews of representative Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) samples and all gang- and narcot-

ics-loitering enforcement ISRs, while simultaneously supporting CPD's preparation for the revised reporting and review applications. Working with Department stakeholders and technology partners, the Unit participated in the planning, design, testing, validation, and refinement of the STOP application and the IDR review application, helping develop the Department's electronic reporting and review infrastructure for the revised Police Encounters and Fourth Amendment policy suite. These efforts enhanced reporting consistency, supervisory accountability, data collection, and Department-level review capabilities in preparation for implementation, consistent with the objectives of **Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 837, 840, and 841**. Detailed comparisons of review outcomes and trends between reporting periods are presented in the body of this report.



TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

‡ 193.574.575

Staff Requirements

TRED staff assigned to the use of force, foot pursuit, and firearm pointing reviews are selected through a Notice of Job Opportunity (NOJO) process. Department members are encouraged to apply to the unit using a process delineated by the Human Resources Division.

TRED members are required to have a minimum of five years of experience. Officers must demonstrate a thorough working knowledge of Department policy and directives related to foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, search warrants, and use of force incidents.

Additionally, members must have an established working knowledge of Department computer applications and informational databases. Applicants must also have an acceptable disciplinary record, no outstanding debt to the City of Chicago, and an acceptable history of medical roll use and attendance.

Once applicants are detailed to TRED, they are trained by TRED supervisory staff to perform the functions of a TRED review officer. This training includes Department policy refresher sessions regarding how policy and Department training materials relate and apply to the TRED review process.

Reviewers are then trained on using Department resources to gather and review all the information associated with an incident. This includes systems used to view body-worn camera and in-car camera video, and Clearnet.

New TRED reviewers shadow veteran TRED reviewers to gain familiarity with the review process and complete their training.

Tactical Review and Evaluation Division Staff

Through the first three quarters of 2025, TRED was staffed with **1** Lieutenant, **10** Sergeants, and **55** sworn review officers and **2** Tactical Review Specialists.



TRED Training

Through September 30, 2025, newly detailed TRED staff were given a two week onboarding class comprised of classroom instruction and shadowing of an experienced TRED reviewer in order to learn the daily reviewer process. The onboarding course includes Department policy related to the core functions of TRED, such as Firearms Pointing review, Tactical Response report reviews, law and policy related to Body-Worn Cameras, TRED data sources, the use and function of the Body-Worn Camera management system, and other related Department policies and laws.

Certain members of TRED also attended specialized training with the Effective Fitness Combatives program. This training was designed to equip members with knowledge and skills necessary to train peers in an effort to raise a standard of training as it pertains to combatives, defensive tactics, and use of force situations.

In addition, there were TRED personnel selected to attend the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) "Use of Force Training Program" 40 hour course.

Continuous Training

TRED conducts weekly staff meetings on Wednesdays where Department-required training is presented. TRED also uses this as an opportunity to discuss policy changes that may impact the TRED review process and any recent trends observed while conducting reviews. Incidents that have training value are also presented. These incidents allow TRED staff to ensure that there is consistency in both the review process and training recommendations that are being made to Department members.



PATTERNS AND TRENDS

193,574,575

BWC-Late Activation Compliance (10.8%)

Late activation of body-worn cameras accounted for 10.8% of all debriefing points and remained the most frequently identified issue in the first three quarters of 2025. TRED has continued to advance its debriefing process while increasing collaboration with the Training Division in an effort to improve body-worn camera compliance among Department members.

TRED personnel continue to conduct in-person training for Department members who receive four or more body-worn camera debriefings within a 12-month period from the date of the original incident. Additionally, TRED now provides training to Department members upon request from a Department supervisor. This in-service training emphasizes Illinois law, Department directives, Department streaming video policy, and the proper use of body-worn cameras.

TRED continues to meet with various sections throughout the Department to address body-worn camera compliance, identify recurring issues, and support corrective action through training, education, and ongoing collaboration.

TRED will continue monitoring this trend and coordinating with TSG to reinforce policy compliance.

De-Escalation / Force Mitigation-Communication (6.9%)

The Department trains its members to utilize de-escalation techniques to potentially avoid or reduce the amount of force needed to gain control of a person or incident. Effective communication is one of the most important de-escalation tools available to Department members. As TRED continues to identify patterns and trends, it also continues to add and refine debriefing points. One such debriefing point that was created from past patterns and trends is "*De-escalation / Force Mitigation - Communication*." This debriefing point indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of communication as a de-escalation tactic. In many cases, TRED uses this debriefing point to address and improve the effectiveness of Department members' communication and professionalism during critical incidents.

TRED noted that this debriefing point has increased significantly since 2024. From January 1, 2025 through September 30, 2025, this deficiency was identified 958 times. By comparison, there were 579 debriefings on this issue in 2024. TRED has been working collaboratively with the Training Division and Research and Development to identify strategies to address this emerging concern. Furthermore, TRED is considering additional de-escalation debriefing points in order to better understand more specific opportunities for improvement. For example, TRED is working to develop ways to distinguish between *absence* of de-escalation and *ineffective* de-escalation. This type of information is vital as the Department continues to enhance policy and training around de-escalation.



PATTERNS AND TRENDS

193,574,575

Notification – Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) (3.3%)

"Notification -ISR" was the third most frequently identified debriefing issue. TRED members use this debriefing point when an Investigatory Stop Report, which documents an investigatory stop, should have been completed and submitted with the associated reports but could not be located.

In these incidents, TRED members were unable to locate ISRs submitted by the involved members. This deficiency highlights the importance of proper documentation and the need for members to properly investigate stops. TRED continues to provide guidance and support to Department members regarding the importance of timely, complete, and accurate documentation of investigatory stops. TRED is also utilizing in-person training of district captains and lieutenants in 2026 to reinforce the importance of accurate documentation.

Tactical Response Report and Tactical Response Report-Investigation Enhancements

During their reviews, TRED reviewers evaluate the consistency between reports, video, and the overall investigation. Through this work, TRED has identified opportunities to improve the reports that Department members are required to complete. These improvements are intended to provide clarity and ensure accurate documentation of incidents.

For example, TRED identified an issue in which some members were mistakenly recorded as having used deadly force when it was actually their partner who used deadly force. Because they were present during a deadly force incident, their involvement was sometimes misinterpreted in reports as having personally used deadly force. TRED has also observed similar reporting issues in which the display of a weapon was reported as a weapon discharge (e.g., taser discharge) or weapon strike (e.g., baton strike).

TRED continues to compile patterns and trends related to reporting accuracy and is working with the Research and Development Division to implement report enhancements in 2026. These efforts represent another important way in which TRED's reviews support organizational improvement across the Department, and TRED looks forward to providing updates on this project in 2026.



PATTERNS AND TRENDS

193,574,575

Firearm Pointing Incidents Analysis


The Chicago Police Department continues to analyze firearm pointing incidents to better understand trends, improve reporting accuracy, and strengthen accountability. While the number of documented firearm pointing incidents has increased over the last several years, this rise may reflect several factors including improved reporting practices, clearer policy guidance, enhanced tracking systems, and directed training on documentation requirements. CPD adopted its firearm pointing policy in 2019, with full data collection beginning in 2020. Because this period overlaps with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department has not yet established a stable long-term baseline for comparison.

The data shown in the accompanying graph illustrate that firearm pointing incidents increased in the years following full implementation of the policy. This pattern aligns with the Department’s understanding that increased reporting accuracy and improved compliance with documentation requirements can cause these numbers to rise. The data also reflects broader operational patterns, including increased police activity as the city returned to more typical levels of service following the pandemic.

To strengthen oversight and improve understanding of these incidents, CPD launched a District-Level Review Pilot Program in 2025. Under this program, district Captains review firearm pointing incidents that occur in their districts. These reviews allow Captains to assess whether pointing a firearm was reasonable and necessary under Department policy, identify training needs, and address any emerging concerns at the district level.

Districts that piloted the program for the entirety of 2025 experienced a meaningful reduction in firearm pointing incidents. During the second half of 2025, these districts saw approximately a 16% decrease in firearm pointing incidents.

Based on positive initial indications from this pilot, CPD is expanding the initiative. This effort reflects the Department’s broader commitment to balancing the potential trauma associated with pointing a firearm at a person with the reality that officers routinely respond to violent situations and recover more than 12,000 firearms each year. Through continued review, monitoring, and training, CPD aims to ensure that firearm pointing occurs only when objectively reasonable and consistent with Department policy.






GUIDING PRINCIPLES

To serve members of this organization and the community through objective and consistent review and analysis of use of force incidents, foot pursuit incidents, and firearm pointing incidents.

To remain proactive and forward thinking, and to continuously develop the use of force review process and communicate changes to all Department members.

To identify patterns that suggest a need for policy or enhanced training.

To ensure individual and Department-wide professional development through debriefing, training, and fostering a genuine culture of learning and improvement.





DEPARTMENT POLICY

SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE

The Department's highest priority is the sanctity of human life. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity, regardless of race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military status, immigration status, homeless status, source of income, credit history, criminal record, criminal history, or incarceration status. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life.

DE-ESCALATION

Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time.

WHEN FORCE IS AUTHORIZED

Department members may only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, under the totality of the circumstances, in order to provide for the safety of any person or Department member, stop an attack, make an arrest, bring a person or situation safely under control, or prevent escape.

Source: *G03-02 De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force*
Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*



PRINCIPLES OF FORCE MITIGATION

CONTINUAL COMMUNICATION

When it is safe and feasible, members will use continual communication, including exercising **PERSUASION, ADVICE,** and **INSTRUCTION** prior to the use of physical force.

- When practical, establish and maintain one-on-one communication where only one member speaks at a time.

TACTICAL POSITIONING

When it is safe and reasonable to do so, members should make advantageous use of **POSITIONING, DISTANCE,** and **COVER** by isolating and containing a person, creating distance between the member and a potential threat, or utilizing barriers or cover.

- Members should attempt to establish a *zone of safety* for the security of the responding members and the public.

TIME AS A TACTIC

When it is safe and reasonable to do so, members should use time as a tactic by **SLOWING DOWN THE PACE OF THE INCIDENT.**

Using time as a tactic may:

- Permit the de-escalation of the person's emotions and allow the person an opportunity to comply with the lawful verbal direction;
- Allow for continued communication with the person and the adjustment of verbal techniques employed by the members; and
- Allow for the arrival of additional members, special units and equipment, and other tactical resources.

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*

Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*



LEVELS OF RESISTANCE

COOPERATIVE PERSON

A person who is **COMPLIANT** without the need for physical force.

RESISTER

A person who is **UNCOOPERATIVE**. Resisters are further divided into two categories:

1. **PASSIVE RESISTER** - A person who fails to comply (non-movement) with verbal or other direction.
2. **ACTIVE RESISTER** - A person who attempts to create distance between himself or herself and the member's reach with the intent to avoid physical control and/or defeat the arrest.

ASSAILANT

A person who is **USING OR THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE** against another person or himself/ herself which is likely to cause physical injury. Assailants are further subdivided into two categories:

1. The person's actions are **AGGRESIVELY OFFENSIVE WITH OR WITHOUT WEAPONS**. This category may include an assailant who is armed with a deadly weapon but whose actions do not constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.
2. The person's actions constitute an **IMMINENT THREAT OF DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM** to a Department member or to another person.

Source: G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options

Effective Date: June 28, 2023



CONTROL DEVICES & INSTRUMENTS

O.C. SPRAY

The prescribed personal OC device is a hand-held, canister type device containing a non-lethal, active ingredient of oleoresin capsicum solution. The personal OC device will use a nonflammable propellant and contain a ten percent solution of oleoresin capsicum (pepper agent) only. The rating will not exceed 500,000 Scoville Heat Units.

A Personal OC device is an authorized force option against passive resisters only under the following conditions:

- A. Occupant(s) of a motor vehicle who is passively resisting arrest only by the approving on-scene supervisor, consistent with G03-02-05.
- B. Noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd and only after obtaining authorization from the Superintendent or his or her designee.

A Personal OC device is an authorized force option against active resisters. If an active resister is part of a group or crowd, a Personal OC device is authorized only after obtaining approval from the Superintendent or his or her designee.



Source: *U48-02-02 Control Devices and Instruments*

Effective Date: February 29, 2020

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*

Effective Date: June 28, 2023

BATONS

Batons are authorized force options against passive and active resisters only as a control instrument placed mainly on the sensors of the skin covering bone or applied to joints and pressure sensitive areas of the body with non-impact pressure.

Batons are authorized force options against an assailant as an impact weapon.



Source: *G03-02-07 Baton Use Incidents*

Effective Date: June 28-2023



TASER X2

The Taser is a device used to control and subdue an active resister through the application of electrical impulses that override the central nervous system and cause uncontrollable muscle contractions.

Two probes attached by thin wires are fired from a cartridge attached to the handheld device. When both probes attach to the subject, a timed energy cycle is applied to the subject at the control of the operator. The Taser contains a computerized function which retains data of all discharges of the device.

Department members are authorized to use a Taser only for the purpose of gaining control of and restraining the following subjects:

ACTIVE RESISTERS

The use of a Taser is an authorized force response option against an active resister when:

- There is objectively reasonable belief at the time that the person is armed, the person presents a risk of serious injury to the Department member or others, and other reasonable force options are not readily available or would otherwise be ineffective under the circumstances at the time; or
- The person is exhibiting violent and aggressive behavior and there is objectively reasonable belief at the time that the person has committed a felony offense or any other offense against a person (e.g., battery, aggravated assault) or that disregards or endangers the bodily safety of others (e.g., reckless discharge of a firearm).

ASSAILANTS

- The use of a Taser is an authorized force option against an assailant, when the person is using or threatening to use force which is likely to cause physical injury.

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*
G03-02-04 Taser Use Incidents

Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*



DEPARTMENT TECHNOLOGY

‡ 236.237.238.239

Body-Worn Cameras

When activated to event mode, the camera begins a permanent recording of digital data (i.e., audio and video media).

When the camera is powered on, the BWC is continually capturing video without audio. The camera is activated to event mode by a double press of the large button on the front of the camera. Activating the BWC also retains a buffering period (120 seconds prior to activation without audio and video recording). It is deactivated by pressing and holding the same button.

Recordings made on BWCs must be retained for a period of 90 days unless any incident captured on the recording has been flagged for extended retention.




Source: *S03-14 Body Worn Cameras*
Effective Date: *December 29, 2023*

In-Car Video Systems

The COBAN in-car video system records high definition video through a windshield-mounted camera as well as a rear-camera lens directed at the prisoner compartment of the police vehicle.

The in-car video system will automatically engage audio and video recording when the vehicle's emergency-roof lights are activated. However, Department members may manually activate the in-car video system without the activation of the emergency equipment. At the conclusion of the incident, Department members must manually deactivate all recording processes, regardless of what method activated an in-car video system, and select the appropriate event type on the post-event pop-up menu.



Source: *S03-05 In-Car Video Systems*
Effective Date: *November 27, 2018*



Body-Worn Camera Video Access

Once the AXON Body-Worn Camera is docked in its cradle, video stored on the camera is automatically uploaded and stored in a cloud based server.

This video is then immediately available for viewing. The server can be searched using a variety of criteria including: date, time, and officer involved. If multiple videos of an incident exist, they are automatically linked together.

TRED reviewers are able to view multiple videos simultaneously that are synchronized. This provides TRED with multiple viewing angles and better clarity when analyzing most incidents.

The screenshot displays the AXON Evidence Management System interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with tabs for EVIDENCE, CASES, INVENTORY, REPORTS, ADMIN, and HELP. Below this is a sub-navigation bar with options: ALL EVIDENCE, MY EVIDENCE, SHARED EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE MAP, and CITIZEN EVIDENCE. The main content area shows the details for a specific video titled "AXON Body 2 Video 2019-09-21 1628". The video player is currently at 01:18 / 05:28. To the right of the video player is a metadata panel with the following information:

- ASSIGNED TO: [Redacted]
- RECORDED ON: Sep 21, 2019 4:28 PM -05:00
- UPLOADED ON: Sep 21, 2019 10:05 PM -05:00
- UPLOADED BY: [Redacted]
- DELETION SCHEDULED FOR: Unscheduled
- FILE FORMAT: video/mp4
- FILE SIZE: 114.7 MB
- EVIDENCE GROUP: [Redacted]
- CUSTOM METADATA: [Redacted]
- SOURCE: [Redacted]
- Serial: [Redacted]
- Model: Axon Body 2

At the bottom of the interface, there are buttons for "ADD MARKER" and "ADD CLIP".



INCIDENT DEBRIEFING REPORT

569.574.575

The Incident Debriefing Report Origin

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is tasked with reviewing use of force incidents, firearm pointing incidents, and foot pursuits. These incidents are documented in the Tactical Response Report (TRR), Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR), and the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report (FP). The TRR and the FP reports are completed by the Department member involved in the incident. A FPIR is automatically created after the Department member makes the required notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communication (OEMC). Prior to 2023, TRED reviewed TRRs and documented their findings in the Tactical Response Report Review (TRR-R) located in the TRR application within CPD's Clearnet application suite. TRED also reviewed FPIRs and documented their findings in the FPIR review section within the Firearm Pointing application within Clearnet. With the additional task of reviewing foot pursuits, TRED would have been required to document their reviews in a Foot Pursuit Review report within the Foot Pursuit application located in Clearnet. Under this method, it was conceivable that if a Department member was involved in a foot pursuit that involved a firearm pointing and also involved a use of force, TRED would review and document its findings in three separate reports located in three separate applications in Clearnet. The involved Department member could then potentially be debriefed on three separate occasions for what would have been essentially one incident. TRED also debriefed reviewing and investigating supervisors within these same documents. This made it difficult for Department members to understand and separate the individual training which may be required.

Prior to 2023, in anticipation of reviewing foot pursuits, the decision was made to create the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR). The IDR facilitates a comprehensive review of an incident. Each member that is involved in the

incident—the involved member, reviewing and investigating supervisors—receives their own report. One TRED reviewer analyzes the entire incident and any combination of TRRs, FPIRs, and FPs that it may involve. This allows the reviewer to understand the totality of the circumstances around the incident and make an informed decision when it comes to recommending training.

This method also allows TRED to target training specific to each Department member as well as recommend training that corresponds to a particular debriefing point. Frontline supervisors are required to document the specific training that members receive. Frontline supervisors also have the ability to document instances when they do not concur with TRED's assessment. This provides valuable feedback when a supervisor's firsthand knowledge of the member's performance is needed to add context that TRED did not have during its review.

The IDR also creates efficiency in TRED's process. The total number of IDRs is significantly higher than the total number of TRRs and FPIRs reviewed in previous reporting periods. This is because the system automatically generates an IDR not only for the involved member(s), but also for the reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In practice, it does not take a TRED reviewer any longer to process three IDRs than the old TRR-R from the same involved member, reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. The efficiency surfaces when there are multiple involved members with the same reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In these cases, TRED reviewers do not need to repeat the information in every report for the same two supervisors.

The IDR also eliminates the separate data silos that contained TRED debriefing data. Instead of having separate TRR debriefing data and FPIR debriefing data, all the data are now contained in one IDR dataset.



Previously, if an involved member did not activate their body-worn camera in accordance with policy during an incident in which a foot pursuit, firearm pointing, and use of force all occurred, TRED would report on this data point in both the TRR and FPIR review sections. Now, using the IDR data, TRED can report this as one body-worn camera debriefing for one member in one incident. In addition, TRED has received feedback from field personnel and its own reviewers that the IDR is easier to understand and use.

In conclusion, the IDR process allows TRED to identify trends, communicate debriefing points, and provide feedback to involved members and supervisors.



IDR CREATION

¶ 228, 234

TRR #1
Involved Member A
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

TRR #2
Involved Member B
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FP #1
Involved Member A
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor

FP #1
Involved Member C
Reviewing Supervisor
Investigating Supervisor


FPIR #1
Involved Beat Member
Involved Beat Member

Each member in an incident, whether they are an involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor, only receives one IDR for an incident.

In the diagram below, three separate involved members, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor were involved in these five reports. Previously, each member or supervisor would have required documentation in every report that they authored, reviewed, or approved.

The IDR generates only one report for each member.

When the IDR has been reviewed, debriefed, and approved, it is attached electronically to every associated TRR, FPIR, or FP.





IMPORTANT NOTES ABOUT 2025 REVIEW DATA

BACKGROUND

On January 1, 2025, the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (TRED) began the year with about 9,100 Incident Debriefing Reports awaiting review. **Throughout 2025, over 25,000 additional IDRs were generated for TRED review.** With the staffing and processes in place at that time, it was clear that the backlog could not be cleared while also keeping up with new incidents. Without major changes, the backlog would have continued to grow, limiting the Department's ability to analyze use of force incidents, identify trends, and make timely recommendations for improvements in training, policy, and operations.

To address this, TRED partnered with the Training Division and the Research and Development Division to launch a comprehensive plan. These efforts were designed to increase efficiency, strengthen analysis, and ensure the Department can effectively review incidents and identify opportunities for corrective action and organizational learning.

Staffing and Training Improvements

A key part of this plan was increasing staff. In early 2025, TRED had 42 Police Officer Reviewers, 9 Sergeants, and 2 civilian review specialists. By January 2026, staffing increased to 55 Police Officer Reviewers and 11 Sergeants. This expansion allowed TRED to conduct timely and in-depth reviews while dedicating resources to reducing the backlog. TRED also created a standardized training program to ensure all reviewers have the necessary experience and analytical skills. This formal curriculum was approved by the Independent Monitoring Team and the Office of the Attorney General.

Scope of 2025 Review Data

Unless otherwise noted, this 2025 report includes data from reviews completed for incidents that occurred between January and September of 2025 (first three quarters). TRED was not able to finish reviewing all 2025 incidents in time for the remaining months to be included. As a result, the report reflects only the portion of the year for which reviews were fully completed, from January through September.

There is one exception. All Force Review Board cases, which involve the Department's most serious incidents, including the use of deadly force, were reviewed for the entire year and are fully represented in this report.



Backlog Reduction and Future Reporting Plans

TRED continues to make significant progress in reducing the backlog of pending reviews and improving the timeliness of current year assessments. Based on current progress, TRED expects to complete all remaining 2025 reviews during 2026. Once these reviews are finalized, TRED will provide a full year comparison in the first TRED Mid-Year report that follows completion of the 2025 review cycle.

In addition, TRED restructured its operations to improve trend analysis. Previously, cases were assigned in the order they were received, which limited the ability to identify patterns across districts or specific areas. Beginning January 1, 2026, TRED reorganized into five Area-based teams, each responsible for incidents within a specific geographic area. This structure allows TRED to more quickly identify tactical, training, equipment, or policy concerns and share those findings with supervisors so that corrective action can be taken promptly.

To ensure timely reviews, TRED also created a dedicated backlog reduction team. **By June 2026, the total number of pending reviews had been reduced by about 48 percent.** After TRED began tracking pending cases by incident year, the 2025 backlog dropped by 36% in just over a month. As of June 19, 2026, the total number of pending reports had been reduced to 2,929, representing significant progress at a time when CPD typically experiences its highest activity levels.

Summary

These improvements demonstrate that TRED now has sufficient personnel with the appropriate experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise to carry out thorough and timely after-action reviews. TRED has significantly reduced the historical backlog while also maintaining timely review of current incidents. This progress strengthens supervisory oversight and supports continuous improvement across the Department.



TRED REVIEW

169,569

Reports Reviewed by TRED

The Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) is used by TRED to document reviews of foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, and use of force incidents.

In the first three quarters of 2025, TRED reviewed **4,685** foot pursuit reports.

TRED also reviews Firearm Pointing Incident reports. TRED reviewed **3,979** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports.

TRED reviews use of force incidents documented in Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) based on the TRR level.


The level of a TRR is determined by a combination of different factors including the force options used by the Department member and any injuries or claims of injury to a person.

TRED reviews all Level 1 TRRs associated with a foot pursuit or firearm pointing incident. In addition, TRED reviews any Level 1 TRR that is associated with another TRR that TRED is required to review. TRED reviewed **1,463** Level 1 TRRs in the first three quarters of 2025.

TRED reviews all Level 2 TRRs. TRED reviewed **1,769** Level 2 TRRs through September 30, 2025.

TRED does not review Level 3 TRRs. These are reviewed by the Force Review Board.

Overall, **19,746** individual Incident Debriefing Reports were created during the first three quarters of 2025 and used by TRED to document these reviews.






REPORTS REVIEWED

¶ 169,569

TRRs, FPIRs, and FPs Reviewed



The total reports reviewed by TRED has declined slightly in the first three quarters of 2025. There is a decrease in **81** total reports reviewed (**-0.7%**). TRR reviews decreased by **198** TRRs (**-6%**) through September 30, 2025 when compared to the same time period of the 2024. Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports have also decreased by **147** reports (**-3%**). FPIR reviews have slightly increased **264** reports (**7%**) in the first three quarters of 2025.




IDR TOTALS

Every TRR generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor. Multiple TRRs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor, and they will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.


Every Firearm Pointing Incident report (FPIR) generates an IDR for the involved beat which may have one involved member or, in many cases, two involved members. In some cases, the FPIR generates IDRs for more than two members involved in the same incident (e.g., when two units each staffed with two officers are involved in an incident and at least one officer from each unit points their firearm).

Every Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report (FP) generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and, in some cases, one investigating supervisor. Multiple FPs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor and will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.


TRRs and IDRs January 1- September 30, 2025



FPIRs and IDRs January 1-September 30, 2025



FPs and IDRs January 1-September 30, 2025






IDRs Generated and Reviewed by TRED

Through September 30, 2025, TRED reviewed **3,353** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs), **3,979** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **4,687** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports, which in turn generated **19,746** Incident Debriefing Reports (IDRs) which TRED reviewed.

The below chart displays the amount of IDRs TRED reviewed in the first three quarters of 2024 compared to the first three quarters of 2025. TRED reviewed **19,746** IDRs generated for individual members in their role as either the involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor within an incident. These incidents include a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination thereof.

Overall, there was a decrease of **144 (-0.7%)** IDRs in the first three quarters of 2025 vs 2024.

Total IDRs Generated






TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT TOTALS

¶ 153,156,157,161,162,163,164,219,220,569

Tactical Response Report Totals



Through September 30, 2025, there were **5,383** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) submitted due to use of force incidents. This would represent a **9%** increase in submitted TRRs. TRED reviewed **3,353 (62%)** of all TRRs because they were flagged for review based on Level 2 use of force classification. In addition, a Level 1 use of force TRR would be flagged for review if it was involved in the same incident as a Level 2 use of force and/or associated with a firearm pointing incident or foot pursuit incident. Through the first three quarters of 2025, there was a decrease of **6%** in TRRs reviewed when compared to the first three quarters of 2024.

The decrease in the number of TRRs reviewed is likely attributable to the agreement between the City and the OAG to temporarily pause the random review of a representative sample of Level 1 TRRs during the period from January 1 through June 30, 2025. As reported to the District Court overseeing the Consent Decree, the City and OAG agreed with the support of the IMT to the following:


For TRRs completed on or after January 1, 2025, for a period of six months, TRED will pause its review of a representative sample of Level 1 TRRs (“the moratorium”). The Level 1 TRRs generated during this six-month period will not be subject to random review by TRED. CPD has agreed that, during the moratorium, the Superintendent will hire additional TRED reviewers, or detail existing personnel to TRED, in order to address TRED’s overall backlog, which consists of firearm pointing incidents, foot pursuits, and uses of force.

(Status Report to the Court, dated February 7, 2025, Court Docket No. 1259, page 7)

This moratorium agreement has been extended through the end of 2025. In the first three quarters of 2025, TRED reviewed **62%** of all TRRs submitted by Department members.



Tactical Response Reports Generated in the First Three Quarters



Through the first three quarters of 2025, there has been a **9%** increase of TRRs. In 2024, the first three quarters had a total of **4,942** TRRs. In the first three quarters of 2025, there were a total of **5,383** TRRs. The month of April had a significant increase of **211** TRRs in 2025 (**49%**). The month of June had an increase of **104** TRRs in 2025 (**17%**). The month of September had an increase of **81** TRRs in 2025 (**15%**).

The months of May and August were the only months that had a slight decrease in TRRs compared to 2024. May had a decrease of **46** TRRs in 2025 (**-7%**). August had a slight decrease of **17** TRRs in 2025 (**-3%**).

There were a total of **2,583** use of force incidents in the first three quarters of 2025 compared to **2,364** use of force incidents in the first three quarters of 2024 (**8% increase**). In the first three quarters of 2025, there were **5,984** IDRs created involving a use of force incident. This resulted in an average of **665** IDRs created each month involving a use of force. Use of force incidents and the total amount of TRRs documenting use of force Department-wide continues to trend upward.




TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORTS

% of TRRs Reviewed Sorted by District

Unit	Total TRRs	TRRs Reviewed	% of TRRs Reviewed
001	210	100	48%
002	265	173	65%
003	327	190	58%
004	237	133	56%
005	209	130	62%
006	348	242	70%
007	235	129	55%
008	167	88	53%
009	210	119	57%
010	360	229	64%
011	626	413	66%
012	215	134	62%
014	72	44	61%
015	291	184	63%
016	150	96	64%
017	142	92	65%
018	197	115	58%
019	136	54	40%
020	59	38	64%
022	124	78	63%
024	99	56	57%
025	191	108	57%

Reviewed TRRs by Force Level



Level 1 TRED TRR reviews dropped from **1,884 (54%)** in the first three quarters of 2024 to **1,464 (45%)** in the first three quarters of 2025, a decrease of **420** Level 1 TRRs or about **22%**. Level 1 TRR reviews displayed a **9%** decline in overall proportion.

Level 2 TRED TRR reviews increased from **1,537 (44%)** in the first three quarters of 2024 to **1,767 (54%)** in the first three quarters of 2025, an increase of **230** Level 2 TRR reviews or nearly **15%**. Level 2 incidents now continue to make up the majority of TRR reviews in 2025.

In the first three quarters of 2025, TRED reviewed on average **60%** of all TRRs that were submitted by members of each district in patrol (excluding units outside district law enforcement).



FRB INCIDENTS

¶ 577,578,579,580

Force Review Board Incidents

The Force Review Board (FRB) is responsible for reviewing incidents when a Department member uses deadly force, or any other Level 3 reportable use of force (e.g., hospital admission). These include discharging a firearm (FRB is not responsible for reviewing unintentional firearm discharges or discharges solely to destroy/deter an animal that did not involve a firearm discharged at a person and did not result in an injury to any person); using an impact weapon to intentionally strike a person's head or neck; the application of a chokehold; the application of a carotid artery restraint; and the application of other restraints above the shoulders with risk of positional asphyxiation.

The Force Review Board is also responsible for reviewing any force by a Department member that causes injury to any person resulting in admission to a hospital, any force that causes the death of any person, all use of force incidents by an exempt member that results in the completion of a TRR, and other incidents as determined by the Superintendent.

There were **43** Force Review Board incidents in all of 2025. Page 40 and 41 display these **43** incidents and their associated TRRs.

Force Review Board

The Force Review Board consists of the following members:

1. Superintendent, or an authorized designee, who will serve as the chairperson;
2. First Deputy Superintendent, or an authorized designee the rank of the deputy chief;
3. Executive Director, Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform, or an authorized designee the rank of deputy chief;
4. Chief, Bureau of Patrol, or an authorized designee the rank of deputy chief;
5. Chief, Bureau of Internal Affairs, or an authorized designee the rank of deputy chief;
6. Chief, Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform, or an authorized designee;
7. Deputy Chief, Training and Support Group, or an authorized designee;
8. General Counsel to the Superintendent, or an authorized designee; and
9. Other members designated by the Superintendent at the rank of deputy chief or above.



FRB INCIDENTS

‡ 165,166,173,178,184,185,186,187,213,216,575,578

FORCE REVIEW BOARD INCIDENTS 2025

LEVEL 3 INCIDENT TYPE		TRR-I SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION																						
TRR	DATE OF INCIDENT	Deadly Force, Firearms Discharge	Deadly Force, Chokehold	Deadly Force, Impact Weapon Strike to Head or Neck	Deadly Force, Other	Hospital Admission	Force Caused Death to a Person	Chokehold Used	Carotid Artery Restraint Used	Intentional Baton Strike to Head or Neck	Member Discharged Firearm	Warning Shot Fired	Firearm Discharge at a Person Who Was a Threat Only to Self	Firearm Discharge Solely in Defense or Protection of Property	Firearm Discharged into a Crowd	Firearm Discharged at or into a Building	Firearm Discharged at or into a Moving Motor Vehicle	Firearm Discharged From a Moving Motor Vehicle	Member Was On-Duty	Involved a Mental Health Component	Medical Aid Provided			
2025-00045	1/3/25																					✓		✓
2025-00046	1/3/25	✓				✓	✓				✓											✓		✓
2025-00047	1/3/25																					✓		✓
2025-00048	1/3/25	✓				✓	✓				✓											✓		✓
2025-00355	1/23/25	✓				✓					✓											✓	UNK	✓
2025-00495	2/1/25	✓					✓				✓											✓	UNK	✓
2025-00496	2/1/25																					✓		✓
2025-00497	2/1/25	✓					✓				✓											✓	UNK	✓
2025-00498	2/1/25	✓					✓				✓											✓	UNK	✓
2025-00499	2/1/25	✓					✓				✓											✓	UNK	✓
2025-00500	2/1/25																					✓		✓
2025-00501	2/1/25	✓					✓				✓											✓		✓
2025-00503	2/1/25																					✓		✓
2025-00504	2/1/25																					✓		✓
2025-00976	2/28/25	✓				✓					✓											✓		✓
2025-01363	3/18/25																					✓		✓
2025-01364	3/18/25																					✓		✓
2025-01365	3/18/25		✓					✓														✓		✓
2025-01390	3/20/25	✓					✓				✓											✓	UNK	✓
2025-01730	4/7/25	✓				✓					✓											✓		✓
2025-01731	4/7/25																					✓		✓
2025-01734	4/7/25																					✓		✓
2025-01736	4/7/25	✓				✓					✓											✓		✓
2025-01737	4/7/25																					✓		✓
2025-01741	4/7/25																					✓		✓
2025-01742	4/7/25																					✓		✓
2025-02001	4/19/25																					✓		✓
2025-02002	4/19/25		✓					✓														✓		✓
2025-02003	4/19/25																					✓		✓
2025-02183	4/28/25	✓									✓											✓		✓
2025-02297	5/5/25																					✓		✓
2025-02300	5/5/25	✓									✓											✓		✓
2025-02301	5/5/25	✓									✓											✓		✓
2025-02302	5/5/25																					✓		✓
2025-02303	5/5/25	✓				✓					✓											✓		✓
2025-02374	5/8/25	✓					✓				✓											✓		✓
2025-02375	5/8/25	✓					✓				✓											✓		✓
2025-02426	5/10/25	✓				✓					✓											✓		✓
2025-02635	5/18/25																					✓		✓
2025-02636	5/18/25																					✓		✓
2025-02637	5/18/25		✓					✓														✓		✓
2025-02869	5/29/25	✓					✓				✓											✓		✓
2025-02870	5/29/25																					✓		✓
2025-02895	5/31/25	✓				✓					✓						✓					✓		✓
2025-02896	5/31/25	✓				✓					✓						✓					✓		✓
2025-02908	5/31/25		✓					✓														✓		✓
2025-03017	6/5/25						✓																	✓
2025-03021	6/5/25																							✓
2025-03557	6/26/25	✓									✓											✓		✓
2025-03559	6/26/25																					✓		✓
2025-03165	6/10/25																					✓		✓
2025-03142	6/9/25																					✓		✓



FRB INCIDENTS

‡ 165,166,173,178,184,186,187,213,216,575,578

THR	DATE OF INCIDENT	Deadly Force, Firearms Discharge	Deadly Force, Chokehold	Deadly Force, Impact Weapon Strike to Head or Neck	Deadly Force, Other	Hospital Admission	Force Caused Death to a Person	Chokehold Used	Carotid Artery Restraint Used	Intentional Baton Strike to Head or Neck	Member Discharged Firearm	Warning Shot Fired	Firearm Discharge at a Person Who Was a Threat Only to Self	Firearm Discharge Solely in Defense or Protection of Property	Firearm Discharged into a Crowd	Firearm Discharged at or into a Building	Firearm Discharged at or into a Moving Motor Vehicle	Firearm Discharged From a Moving Motor Vehicle	Member Was On-Duty	Involved a Mental Health Component	Medical Aid Provided
2025-03737	7/2/25		✓																✓		
2025-03738	7/2/25		✓																✓		
2025-03995	7/13/25																		✓		
2025-03996	7/13/25		✓																✓		
2025-04462	8/3/25	✓									✓										
2025-04703	8/15/25	✓									✓										
2025-04705	8/15/25		✓																✓		
2025-04706	8/15/25																		✓		
2025-04931	8/27/25																		✓		
2025-04932	8/27/25																		✓		
2025-04933	8/27/25																		✓		
2025-04934	8/27/25	✓									✓								✓		
2025-04935	8/27/25	✓									✓						✓		✓		
2025-04936	8/27/25										✓						✓		✓		
2025-04937	8/27/25	✓									✓						✓		✓		
2025-04967	8/29/25																		✓		
2025-05016	9/1/25																		✓		
2025-05032	9/2/25																		✓		
2025-05034	9/2/25		✓					✓	✓										✓		
2025-05113	9/6/25						✓												✓		
2025-05114	9/6/25	✓									✓						✓		✓		
2025-05116	9/6/25										✓								✓		
2025-05258	9/14/25																		✓		
2025-05262	9/14/25																		✓		
2025-05331	9/17/25																		✓		
2025-05332	9/17/25																		✓		
2025-05333	9/17/25																		✓		
2025-05334	9/17/25																		✓		
2025-05335	9/17/25																		✓		
2025-05336	9/17/25																		✓		
2025-05337	9/17/25	✓									✓								✓		
2025-05808	10/9/25	✓				✓					✓								✓		
2025-05810	10/9/25										✓								✓		
2025-03145	6/10/25																		✓		
2025-03147	6/10/25		✓					✓											✓		
2025-06321	11/7/25																		✓		
2025-06322	11/7/25	✓									✓						✓		✓	UNK	✓
2025-06323	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06324	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06325	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06326	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06327	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06328	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06331	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06333	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06334	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06335	11/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06365	11/8/25																		✓		✓
2025-06561	11/18/25	✓				✓					✓								✓		✓
2025-06591	11/19/25	✓									✓								✓		✓
2025-06605	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06606	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06611	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06612	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06613	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06618	11/21/25					✓													✓		✓
2025-06620	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06621	11/21/25																		✓		✓
2025-06965	12/7/25																		✓		✓
2025-06966	12/7/25	✓				✓					✓								✓		✓
2025-07004	12/9/25																		✓		✓
2025-07005	12/9/25	✓					✓				✓						✓		✓		✓
2025-07054	12/14/25																✓		✓		✓
2025-07055	12/14/25			✓															✓		✓
2025-07056	12/14/25																		✓		✓



FRB INCIDENTS

¶ 166,185,213,216,578

Level 3 Baton / Impact Weapon Use

Department members will not use batons to intentionally strike a person in the head or neck except when deadly force is justified.

There were **43** total Force Review Board incidents in 2025. From these **43**, there was **one** Level 3 incident in which a Department member used an impact weapon on the head or neck area of a person.

Warning Shots

In 2025, there were no incidents in which a Department member used their firearm to fire warning shots.

Deadly Force Against Fleeing Persons

Department members are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing persons who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.

In 2025, there were no incidents in which a Department member used deadly force against a fleeing person who did not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188,189,190,191,192,193,195,196

1

FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT OCCURS

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while in the performance of his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

2

OEMC IS NOTIFIED

OEMC takes the notification of the involved member's beat. OEMC generates an event for Firearm Pointing (PNT) which is tied to the original incident that the member responded to.

3

OEMC NOTIFIES THE BEAT'S SUPERVISOR

The member's supervisor is notified of the beat number that was involved in a Firearm Pointing Incident. The supervisor will document the incident on their Supervisor's Management Log and ensure that appropriate documentation of the incident is completed. They will also ensure that ICC and BWC video is appropriately retained.

4

TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION REVIEWS THE FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

A Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR) is automatically generated in Clearnet. TRED gathers documentation related to the incident. If no Arrest Report or Investigatory Stop Report was completed for the incident, TRED does not continue reviewing the incident. TRED then reviews available video of the incident in conjunction with written documentation. TRED identifies any tactical, equipment, or training concerns. TRED also identifies whether the pointing of a firearm at a person allegedly violated department policy. TRED will ensure that appropriate complaint and disciplinary procedures are followed involving obvious policy violations. FPIRs that do not result in a training recommendation are closed.

5

TRED SENDS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

TRED issues written notifications of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to address any tactical, equipment, or training concerns to the notifying beat's executive officer and unit commanding officer.

6

FOLLOW-UP ACTION

The notifying beat's unit commanding officer ensures that the written communication (FPIR) has been received by the notifying beat's immediate supervisor and informs the notifying beat's chain of command of the written notification of recommendations. They ensure that recommendations are appropriately implemented and documented in the Debriefing Points section of the IDR. Debriefings are approved by the notifying beat's chain of command and the FPIR is closed.



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶188,189,190,191,192,193,195,196

Officers are only required to make a notification when they point their firearm at an individual.

Notification IS NOT required:

UNHOLSTER-

LOW READY

SUL



FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT TOTALS

191,192,193

Firearm Pointing Incident Report Totals

4,059

TOTAL FPIRs
JAN 1, 2025 -
SEP 30, 2025

3,979

FPIRs
REVIEWED
JAN-SEP 25

3,255

TOTAL FPI
INCIDENTS
JAN-SEP 25

+4%

(9 MONTH)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL FPIRS

3,895

TOTAL FPIRs
JAN 1, 2024 -
SEP 30, 2024

3,715

FPIRs
REVIEWED
JAN-SEP 24

3,152

TOTAL FPI
INCIDENTS
JAN-SEP 24

+3%

(9 MONTH)
CHANGE IN
% OF TOTAL
INCIDENTS


Firearm Pointing Incident reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate officer decision-making, tactical considerations, reporting practices, and supervisory review in encounters involving the display of a firearm. Findings from FPIR reviews continue to inform training development, supervisory guidance, and Department-wide trend analysis.

There was an overall increase of firearm pointing incidents throughout the first three quarters of 2025. There was an increase of **103** total firearm pointing incidents from the first three quarters of 2024.

Due to the increase in firearm pointing incidents, there was an increase in FPIRs in the first three quarters of 2025. There was an increase of **164 FPIRs (4%)** in 2025 from the first three quarters of 2024. It can be noted that multiple FPIRs can be reported during an FPI (i.e., if multiple beats point their firearm during a single incident). The differences in these totals can be attributed to the total occurrences of officers assigned to different beats engaging in a firearm pointing during the same incident.



Firearm Pointing Incident Reports Generated



Overall, FPIRs increased in the first three quarters of 2025 by approximately **164 (4.2%)** compared to the same period in 2024. FPIRs increased in every month during the first half of the year. March 2025 recorded the largest monthly increase over the previous year (**23%**). July 2025 experienced a significant decline of **115 FPIRs (-21%)** compared to July 2024.

There were a total of **3,255** total firearm pointing incidents that occurred throughout September 30, 2025. During that same time period there were a total of **4,059** FPIRs generated. There were **3,979** FPIRs reviewed (**98%**) throughout the first three quarters of 2025.

In 2025, TRED personnel were made aware that, in some instances, involved members may have been creating firearm pointing incident notifications in error. However, TRED did not have a way to track how often this was happening. During the second half of 2025, TRED created the debriefing point *“Firearm Pointing Incident-Notification Not Required”* as a way to capture the data of when an involved member may unnecessarily or erroneously make a firearm pointing incident notification.

TRED continued to monitor this trend throughout the year.



¶ 191,192,193

FPIRs Generated by Unit Involved

District units within the Bureau of Patrol continue to account for the large majority of FPIRs reported. This continues to be consistent with data reported in the past.

001-1st District	182-Crime Gun Intelligence
002-2nd District	185-Major Crimes Division
003-3rd District	187-Criminal Registration Unit
004-4th District	189-Narcotics Division
005-5th District	191-Intelligence Section
006-6th District	192-Vice Section
007-7th District	193-Gang Investigations Division
008-8th District	191-Intelligence Section
009-9th District	192-Vice Section
010-10th District	193-Gang Investigations Division
011-11th District	211-Bureau of Patrol, Area 1
012-12th District	212- Bureau of Patrol, Area 2
014-14th District	213- Bureau of Patrol, Area 3
015-15th District	214- Bureau of Patrol, Area 4
016-16th District	215- Bureau of Patrol, Area 5
017-17th District	216-Central Control Group
018-18th District	277-Crime Scene Processing
019-19th District	341-Canine Unit
020-20th District	353-SWAT Unit
022-22nd District	606-Investigative Field Group
024-24th District	610-Detectives, Area 1
025-25th District	620- Detectives, Area 2
102-Communications	630- Detectives, Area 3
Division/News Affairs	640- Detectives, Area 4
132-Counterterrorism	650- Detectives, Area 5
Division	701-Public Transportation Section
141-Special Functions	702-CTA Security Unit
145-Traffic Section	704-Transit Security Unit
153-Specialty Vehicles	715-Critical Incident Response Team
180-Bureau of Detectives	

001	172	4.2%
002	230	5.7%
003	323	7.9%
004	202	5.0%
005	137	3.4%
006	225	5.5%
007	286	7.0%
008	173	4.3%
009	209	5.1%
010	209	5.1%
011	251	6.2%
012	122	3.0%
014	75	1.8%
015	184	4.5%
016	40	1.0%
017	79	1.9%
018	184	4.5%
019	69	1.7%
020	30	0.7%
022	125	3.1%
024	87	2.1%
025	158	3.9%
102	1	0.0%
132	1	0.0%
141	2	0.0%
145	1	0.0%
153	1	0.0%
180	32	0.8%
182	1	0.0%
185	11	0.3%
187	1	0.0%
189	19	0.5%
191	2	0.0%
192	1	0.0%
193	36	0.9%
211	76	1.9%
212	28	0.7%
213	4	0.1%
214	17	0.4%
215	5	0.1%
216	46	1.1%
277	1	0.0%
341	1	0.0%
353	2	0.0%
606	22	0.5%
610	21	0.5%
620	10	0.2%
630	4	0.1%
640	29	0.7%
650	8	0.2%
701	8	0.2%
702	1	0.0%
704	8	0.2%
715	8	0.2%



FPI REPORTING

¶ [191](#), [192](#), [193](#), [194](#), [195](#)

FPIs Reported in Error

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while performing his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

The exceptions to this notification requirement include:

Department members assigned as a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team members, who point a firearm at a person during the course of a designated SWAT incident.

Department members assigned to a federal task force, who point a firearm at a person during the execution of the federal task force duties.

Department members un-holstering or displaying their firearm or having the firearm in a “ready” position (i.e., low ready, position “SUL”) or any other position during the course of an incident, unless the firearm is pointed at a person.

Throughout the first three quarters of 2025, there were **13** debriefings issued by TRED for the debriefing point “*Firearm Pointing Incident-Notification Not Required.*”

OEMC Dispatcher Notifications

A firearm pointing occurs when a Department member points his or her firearm at a person during performance of duties. The Department member is then required to notify OEMC promptly after the incident has concluded.

The notified OEMC dispatcher is then required to acknowledge the notification from the Department member who pointed a firearm at a person. Then the OEMC dispatcher must create a Police Computer-Aided Dispatch (PCAD) event recording the firearm pointing incident and the Beat Number of the notifying Department member. After the PCAD event number is created, the OEMC dispatcher is required to notify the firearm pointing beat’s immediate supervisor of the event and record the notification in the appropriate PCAD event.

This debriefing point was created in order to capture data points from when an OEMC dispatcher does not inform the notifying beat’s immediate supervisor of the firearm pointing incident and record the notification on the appropriate PCAD event.

This issue generated **7** debriefings in the first three quarters of 2025.

When TRED issues a debriefing point for this issue, an OEMC supervisor is notified of the incident. The OEMC supervisor then conducts a debriefing with the OEMC dispatcher that handled the firearm pointing incident and did not make the appropriate notification.



DISTRICT LEVEL REVIEW PROGRAM-PILOT

During the summer and fall of 2024, TRED and Research and Development participated in the development of a pilot program for Firearm Pointing Incidents to be reviewed at the district level. This effort bore fruit in the late fall of 2024 as directive, "D24-06, Firearm Pointing Incidents District-Level Review - Pilot Program."

D24-06 was developed for multiple purposes including a streamlined review at the district level for qualifying FPIRS, making the current backlog of TRED reviews more manageable. Also, remediation at the involved member level was made quicker, more personal, and more meaningful while identifying patterns and trends at the district level.

The scope of D24-06 was intended to encompass all Chicago Police Patrol Districts. All the current Captains assigned to district patrol have been trained as of December 2025. The subject-matter of the D24-06 was, and remains, Firearm Pointing Incidents that have neither a Foot Pursuit nor a reportable use of force (i.e., TRR) associated with them.

TRED personnel developed a 16 hour in-service training curriculum to communicate to district Captains the TRED review process of a Firearm Pointing Incident. The TRED members that developed the new training curriculum were qualified instructors all having attended the Instructor Development Academy and receiving a qualification rating as recognized law enforcement instructors granted by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board (ILETSB).

The 16 hour in-service training program was developed with an eye towards imparting a level of expertise in each Captain that would ensure fidelity with the quality of reviews conducted by TRED personnel. Moreover, rather than a sterile training program which ended with 16 hours of instruction, the D24-06 is more comparable to an apprenticeship with TRED personnel remaining accessible as resources and guides throughout the life of the Pilot and the individual Captains' association with it. The D24-06 training curriculum was submitted for review by the Independent Monitoring Team and Office of the Attorney Gen-

eral and received a No Objection Letter from each. As of June 2026, TRED instructors have delivered three increments of the 16 hour in-service program and one increment of the 16 hour program within a pre-service format to impart the expertise on a recently promoted class of Captains.

The December 2025 deployment of the Group 3 Captains saw the complete fielding of the D24-06 to all Chicago Police Districts within the Bureau of Patrol. Group 1 and Group 2 have a year or more of data each, and, while preliminary, the results are positive and justified an expansion of the Pilot into a full program, "S03-22-01, District Level Review Program" (DLRP).

As in the D24-06 Pilot, the DLRP will be fielded to all Police Districts within the Bureau of Patrol; however, the subject-matter and scope of reviewers have been expanded. The DLRP will incorporate qualifying Firearm Pointing Incidents, as well as Foot Pursuits, that do not have a reportable use of force associated with them. Moreover, the district reviewer will no longer be limited to the district Captain. District Lieutenants will have roles as alternate or supplementary reviewers and be trained in the same fashion as the district Captains. District Lieutenants will receive the legacy sixteen hour training curriculum and both district Captains and district Lieutenants will receive a newly developed eight hour increment of training to provide each with the processes for reviewing Foot Pursuits for a total of 24 hours of training. Captains and Lieutenants will both be the recipients of an expanded and improved training curriculum that has been re-worked to incorporate fact patterns and hypotheticals reflecting the core principles of the Chicago Police Department such as impartial policing, de-escalation and crisis intervention.

Great effort has been made to ensure that district reviewers within the DLRP maintain fidelity with reviews conducted by the reviewers organic to TRED. As before, the training program is highly individualized and resembles an apprenticeship with TRED structurally remaining as guide and sounding board to each reviewer as needed or sought.



An additional means of ensuring fidelity between TRED organic reviews and reviews undertaken by district level reviewers is the incorporation of a randomization algorithm within the application. Selected reviews will be prevented from being fully completed by the district reviewer and rendered back to TRED to be reviewed by a TRED reviewer as a review of first impression. The results of both reviews will be compared for content and conclusion. In matters of disagreement, the review conclusion will be determined by the Commanding Officer of TRED and commemorated as the final review result with consequent debriefing points, if any.

The expanded DLRP Policy was submitted to the Independent Monitoring Team and the Office of the Attorney General and received No Objection Letters from each, giving the Chicago Police Department authority to implement the program in its entirety on January 1, 2027. The expanded and enhanced DLRP training curriculum has been submitted to the Independent Monitoring Team and the Office of the Attorney General from which No Objection Letters are anticipated. Upon receipt of No Objection Letters and under the guidance of the Executive Director of Constitutional Policing and Reform and the Commanding Officer of TRED, delivery of the expanded and enhance DLRP training program will begin in early summer of 2026.



DISTRICT LEVEL REVIEW PROGRAM-PILOT

The table shows IDR's reviewed by the Captains, categorized by their status for all reviews conducted in 2025.

<u>Training Group</u>	#1	#2	#3
Trained in:	Nov-24	Jun-25	Sep-Oct 25
Began IDR reviews in:	Dec-24	Jun-Sep 25	Oct 25-Jan 26

		APPROVED/ REVIEWED	PENDING RECOMMENDED ACTION	GRAND TOTAL
TRAINING GROUP #1	006	279	0	279
	007	119	0	119
	011	229	2	231
	018	246	0	246
	025	214	0	214
	TOTAL	1087	2	1089
TRAINING GROUP #2	002	69	0	69
	005	40	0	40
	009	101	0	101
	012	71	0	71
	014	20	0	20
	017	156	0	156
	022	33	0	33
	024	39	0	39
	TOTAL	529	0	529
TRAINING GROUP #3	004	41	0	41
	008	25	0	25
	010	4	0	4
	015	2	0	2
	016	8	0	8
	019	4	0	4
TOTAL	84	0	84	
GRAND TOTAL		1544	2	1546



DISTRICT LEVEL REVIEW PROGRAM-PILOT

The below table displays the count of recommendations from Captains and TRED for all incidents that have occurred in 2025 during the pilot program period.

	CAPTAINS	TRED
No Actions Recommended	1,138 (74%)	20,092 (71%)
Advisement - No Further Action Necessary	164 (11%)	4,588 (16%)
Review Department directives	234 (15%)	2,788 (10%)
Individualized Training was Completed on Date of Incident	5 (0%)	1,286 (5%)
Review streaming video	75 (5%)	931 (3%)
Review legal/training bulletin	79 (5%)	655 (2%)
District/Unit Corrective Action Required	2 (0%)	295(1%)
Training and Support Group-Equipment/Weapon Training	3 (0%)	220 (1%)
Other (Describe)	7 (0%)	85 (0%)
Training and Support Group-Tactics Training	0	73 (0%)
Training and Support Group-Other (Describe)	5 (0%)	41 (0%)
Enrollment in E-Learning	19 (1%)	20 (0%)
Training and Support Group-Use of Force/Policy Review	0	17 (0%)
Training and Support Group-Force Mitigation Techniques	0	12(0%)
Grand Total	1,544 (100%)	28,318 (100%)



FOOT PURSUIT REPORTS

168,169,170,172

Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report Totals




4,678

TOTAL FP
REPORTS
JAN 1, 2025 -
SEP 30, 2025



2,232

TOTAL FP
INCIDENTS
JAN 1, 2025 -
SEP 30, 2025



-4%

(9 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN
NUMBER OF
TOTAL FPs




4,873

TOTAL FP
REPORTS
JAN 1, 2024 -
SEP 30, 2024



2,272

TOTAL FP
INCIDENTS
JAN 1, 2024 -
SEP 30, 2024



-2%


(9 MONTHS)
CHANGE IN %
OF FP
INCIDENTS

In January of 2018, the Department released a Foot Pursuits Training Bulletin. This training bulletin gave guidance to Department members in identifying the risks and tactical factors that involved members should consider prior to initiating and during the course of a foot pursuit.

On January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports created by Department members. After a foot pursuit incident occurs, the involved member is required to create a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. A unit-level reviewing supervisor then routes the reviewed Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report to the district of occurrence Watch Operations Lieutenant if the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is associated with a reportable use of force or an arrest. In an instance where a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is not associated with a reportable use of force or an arrest, the unit-level reviewing supervisor is required to correctly route the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report directly to TRED after their supervisory review.



Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports Generated January 1, 2024–Sept 30, 2025




Throughout the first three quarters of 2025, there were a total of **2,232** foot pursuit incidents. There were a total of **4,678** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports that were submitted by Department members through September 30, 2025 as a result of these foot pursuit incidents. On average, there were **520** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports submitted every month in 2025. In the first three quarters of 2024 there was an average of **541** total reports submitted each month. Overall, there was a **4%** decline of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports submitted in the first three quarters of 2025, indicating a downward trend.



After-Action Support Recommendations

Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025



After a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is submitted, it is reviewed by a reviewing supervisor. When a foot pursuit report is associated with a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor should correctly route the report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant (WOL) for their review.

The majority of reports forwarded to the WOL for review resulted in no further need for corrective actions or further guidance (**69%**).


13% involved a recommendation for review of department directives. This ensures an immediate emphasis on Department policy and procedure from frontline supervisors.

13% involved a recommendation for an individual debriefing with a supervisor. This ensures direct feedback from frontline supervisor in a timely manner.

There were **8** instances in which the involved member was referred to the Stress Reduction Seminar training.

Foot Pursuits and Injuries

Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025



When completing the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report, Department members indicate if there is a known injury or a claim of injury that has resulted from the pursuit.

86% of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports indicated no injury, showing evidence that the majority of foot pursuits did not lead to physical harm for any involved person.

10% of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports indicated that the Pursued Person was injured.

5% of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports indicated an injury to the pursuing Department member.

There were only **6** reported instances in which a Department member indicated a third-party community member was injured or claimed injury.

***Foot Pursuit and In Compliance******Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025***

BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH DEPARTMENT POLICY AND DIRECTIVES	3034
REQUIRE A NOTIFICATION TO COPA	39
BE ASSOCIATED WITH A DEADLY FORCE INCIDENT	28

In the instances when the reviewing supervisor forwarded the report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant, there were **3,034** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports in which the WOL determined that the foot pursuit appeared to be in compliance with Department policy and directives.

There were **39** reports in which the WOL determined the foot pursuit appeared to require a notification to COPA.


The WOL indicated that a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report was associated with a deadly force incident on **28** reports.



IDRs FOOT PURSUIT RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 168, 169, 172

Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Debriefing Points



In the first three quarters of 2025, there was an overall total of **7,118** debriefing points issued by TRED to all involved members and reviewing and investigating supervisors. Foot pursuit-related debriefing points accounted for **1,203** of the total debriefing points issued by TRED (**17%**).

The most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Radio Communications* (**266**). TRED typically uses this in order to debrief an involved member that does not give or make a reasonable effort to provide OEMC (i.e., Radio Dispatch) with an accurate location of their foot pursuit.

The second common debriefing point from IDRs which involve a foot pursuit is *Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Event Log-Report Not Completed* (**223**). TRED recommends this to debrief when an involved member is involved in a foot pursuit and there is no Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report submitted by an involved member that engaged in a foot pursuit.


The third most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Box Issue* (**163**). This is used by TRED to debrief involved members when minor errors are observed with the submitted Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report (e.g., incorrect original event number, incorrect time or date of incident, etc.)



IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS

153,162,168,169,170,177,178,183,192,196,199,207,208,220,233,234,235,236,238,239

IDR Recommendations Jan 1- Sep 30, 2025



In the first three quarters of 2025, TRED reviewed a total of **3,353** Tactical Response reports, **3,979** Firearm Pointing Incident reports, and **4,685** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports. The sum of these submitted reports created **19,746** Incident Debriefing Reports that were flagged for review. TRED reviewed a total of **5,265** incidents during this time. These **5,265** incidents included a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination of the three incidents. Of the **19,746** IDR reports reviewed by TRED, **14,249 (66.1%)** had no debriefing points. This means that TRED did not recommend any additional training.

When TRED reviews a TRR and a training opportunity presents itself, an “Advisement” or a “Recommendation” is made to the involved member(s), reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. An Advisement is recommended training that is detailed in the TRED review and issued directly to the involved Department member. These are issued for lack of adherence to minor policy, procedure, and training standards. A Recommendation is recommended training that is conducted by the involved member’s immediate supervisor or the Training and Support Group. Also, on occasion, TRED can make a recommendation to re-enroll involved members in e-learning modules for refresher trainings. A recommendation is typically made for involved members that have repeated debriefings for the same policy issue or debriefings that have officer safety implications. In **3,093** reviews, TRED made an Advisement. This represents **14.3%** of all IDRs reviewed. Overall, a Recommendation for training was made on **3,278** instances, which represents **16%** of all total IDRs reviewed.



INVOLVED MEMBER RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 153,162,168,170, 177,178,183,192,196,199,207,208,210,214,220,221,236,238,239


IDRs with Debriefing Points and Percentages for Involved Members

TRED members review submitted reports to ensure the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident are thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with Department policy. When applicable, TRED recommends additional training or policy review for the involved members, reviewing supervisors, and/or investigating supervisors via the IDR Clearnet application.

Through September 30, 2025, there were **13,861** IDRs generated for involved members. From these **13,861** IDRs, there were **6,357** total debriefing points for involved members. The most common debriefing point for involved members is for *BWC-Late Activation* (**10.8%**). Although most incidents are captured on BWC video, Department policy requires the BWC to be activated at the beginning of an incident and for all law-enforcement-related activities. The proper use of BWC can increase Department transparency and member accountability while building trust with the public and improving Department legitimacy in the community.

The second most debriefed issue was for *De-escalation Force Mitigation-Communication* (**6.9%**). TRED use this debriefing point to address either the reporting or application of communication as a de-escalation tactic. In many cases, TRED uses this debriefing point to address and improve the effectiveness of Department members' communication and professionalism during critical incidents.

Notification-ISR (**3.3%**) was the third most debriefed issue. TRED members use this debriefing point on incidents where an Investigatory Stop Report, which documents the stop, should have been submitted with other associated reports. TRED members were unable to locate an ISR submitted by the involved member(s) in these incidents.





IDRs WITH BWC RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 236,237,238,239

IDRs with Involved Member Body-Worn Camera Recommendations

1,492

BWC - LATE
ACTIVATION

134

BWC - NO
ACTIVATION

172

BWC—EARLY
DEACTIVATION

80

BWC—NO
BUFFERING

Through September 30, 2025, TRED reviewed **13,861** IDRs generated for involved members. There were **1,492** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-Late Activation*, and this represents **10.8%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed. There were **134** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-No Activation*, which represents less than **1%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed.

BWC Debriefing Points

BWC-Late Activation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the Department member is late in activating the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident to record all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

BWC-No Activation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when there is no BWC activation found for the involved member. As required by policy, the Department member will activate the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident and record the entire incident for all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

BWC-Early Deactivation is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the involved member deactivates their BWC prior to the reasonable conclusion of the incident in its entirety. The Department member will not deactivate event mode unless the entire incident has been recorded and the member is no longer engaged in a law enforcement-related activity.

BWC-No Buffering is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when a TRED reviewer observes that there is less than the appropriate amount of buffering time when the BWC is activated. According to policy, Department members will at the beginning of the tour of duty ensure the BWC is on buffering mode prior to leaving the station.



IDRs with Involved Member BWC Late Activation and BWC Early Deactivation Debriefing Points by Unit

Unit	IDRs With 'BWC Late Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC Late Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed	IDRs With BWC No Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC Early Deactivation DPs	IDRs Reviewed
001	12.1%	90	746	0.0%	0	746
002	8.5%	92	1077	0.6%	7	1077
003	5.4%	78	1444	0.4%	6	1444
004	16.5%	51	897	1.0%	9	897
005	5.3%	43	807	1.7%	14	807
006	5.0%	57	1141	0.1%	1	1141
007	4.4%	52	1179	0.2%	2	1179
008	5.6%	42	745	0.3%	2	745
009	10.1%	89	883	1.7%	15	883
010	4.9%	59	1204	2.1%	25	1204
011	9.9%	186	1887	1.7%	32	1887
012	10.1%	63	625	0.3%	2	625
014	6.4%	23	358	0.0%	0	358
015	5.3%	56	1065	0.6%	6	1065
016	4.7%	14	298	0.0%	0	298
017	9.5%	36	380	1.6%	6	380
018	10.7%	80	749	0.8%	6	749
019	12.5%	36	287	0.3%	1	287
020	2.1%	4	195	0.0%	0	195
022	10.8%	60	557	0.5%	3	557
024	5.9%	22	374	0.5%	2	374
025	7.9%	66	834	0.5%	4	834
044	100.0%	2	2	0.0%	0	2
050	11.8%	2	17	0.0%	0	17
051	22.2%	4	18	0.0%	0	18
079	50.0%	1	2	0.0%	0	2
121	16.7%	1	6	16.7%	1	6
142	16.7%	1	6	0.0%	0	6
136	0.0%	0	1	100.0%	1	1
153	100.0%	1	1	0.0%	0	1
180	11.6%	13	112	2.7%	3	112
185	8.9%	7	79	0.0%	0	79
189	2.6%	1	39	0.0%	0	39
193	9.9%	9	91	0.0%	0	91
211	8.6%	39	452	0.2%	1	452
212	5.2%	8	154	4.5%	7	154
213	6.9%	2	29	0.0%	0	29
214	10.4%	17	163	1.2%	2	163
215	2.5%	2	81	0.0%	0	81
216	14.3%	18	126	2.4%	3	126
222	50.0%	1	2	0.0%	0	2
544	0.0%	0	4	25.0%	1	4
606	10.5%	17	162	3.1%	5	162
610	10.2%	5	49	0.0%	0	49
620	12.0%	3	25	0.0%	0	25
630	6.7%	1	15	0.0%	0	15
640	12.8%	6	47	0.0%	0	47
650	8.0%	2	25	0.0%	0	25
701	3.9%	5	129	0.8%	1	129
704	12.7%	9	71	2.8%	2	71
715	21.6%	16	74	0.0%	0	74

Department directive S03-14 states, in part, “the Department member will activate the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident and will record the entire incident for all law-enforcement related activities.” For the purposes of the activation of BWCs, the Department has identified the following circumstances as the beginnings of a law-enforcement-related activity:

- Dispatched calls for service, when acknowledging the call for service and en-route to the incident.
- Investigatory stops, when approaching the member of the public to initiate the stop.
- Traffic stops, when activating the Department vehicle’s emergency equipment to initiate the traffic stop.
- All other law-enforcement-related activities, when the member initiates and engages in the activity.

The most common debriefing points for TRED regarding Body-Worn Cameras are *BWC-Late Activation* and *BWC-Early Deactivation*. BWC video is essential in the review of a use of force incident. It is also vital for the involved member and the Department to memorialize the events leading up to and including the use of force incident.

In some cases of *BWC-Late Activation*, the words and actions of both the involved member and the involved person leading up to the use of force incident are not recorded on audio, video, or both.

The corresponding chart displays the total number of IDRs which TRED reviewed for each district/unit and the total number of IDRs with debriefing points for *BWC-Late Activation* and *BWC-Early Deactivation*.



DE-ESCALATION AND FORCE MITIGATION

¶ 153,156,157,161,162,183,220

IDRs with Involved Member De-Escalation Force Mitigation Articulation Debriefing Points

3,353

TRRs
REVIEWED
BY TRED

132

IDR
RECOMMENDATIONS

4%

% OF IDRs WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS

The debriefing point for *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* is used within the IDR by TRED personnel whenever TRED identifies the common issue in which a member checks force mitigation boxes on the TRR but neglects to describe these efforts with specificity in the narrative of their report. Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need to use force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or when de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time. The details that the involved member describes serves to articulate the totality of the circumstances, including why force was necessary despite the involved member's de-escalation and force mitigation efforts.


TRED reviewers recommend this debriefing point when involved members do not fully articulate with specificity their force mitigation effort(s). Department policy requires members to describe force mitigation efforts in full detail, not simply provide a list of force mitigation efforts when writing a report narrative. Through September 30, 2025, **4%** of TRRs reviewed received a debriefing point for *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*.



SUPERVISORY REVIEW

¶ 155,156,192,217,232

IDRs with COPA Log Numbers




When misconduct is observed or an allegation of misconduct is made, a Complaint Log (CL) number is obtained from the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA). This initiates the investigatory process.

As a matter of Department policy, TRED does not review incidents that are associated with a CL investigation because they are investigated by COPA. Thus, when notified of an incident becoming subject to a complaint investigation, TRED does not complete a review of the associated incident. Furthermore, during the course of an incident review or investigation, reviewing and investigating supervisors are required to enter a complaint log number into the TRR-I or the Watch Operations Lieutenants Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report whenever they obtain a complaint log number for an allegation of misconduct.

Throughout the first three quarters of 2025, **983 (5%)** of IDRs were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation and not subject to review by TRED. These **983** IDRs were a result of **184** total incidents that were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation.

IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers Jan 1- Sep 30, 2025



There were **983** IDRs that were flagged for review and had an associated complaint log number due to an allegation of misconduct. On average, there were **109** IDRs generated each month that were associated with a complaint log number.

Complaint Log Numbers continued

TRED reviewed **5,265** total incidents in the first three quarters of 2025. TRED obtained complaint log numbers in **six** of those incidents.

Two complaints involved the allegation of verbal abuse directed towards a member of the public that fell under COPA authority.

One complaint log number was obtained due to alleged excessive force.


One complaint log number was obtained for alleging disrespectful treatment directed towards another Department member.

One complaint log numbers was obtained due to improper notification procedures by investigating supervisors in connection with a Level 3 use of force incident.

One complaint log number was obtained due to a person in custody escaping.



Individualized Training Completed on Date of the Incident




Individualized Training Completed on Date of the Incident is a data point TRED uses to capture how often an involved member’s unit supervisor identifies, addresses, and documents corrective action at the time (or briefly after) an incident occurs.

Throughout the first three quarters, unit supervisors documented corrective action on **895** IDRs. This means that during the course of the supervisory investigation, the investigating supervisor identified and addressed a potential training opportunity for the involved member. The investigatory supervisor then documented their corrective actions taken within the TRR-I or Watch Operations Lieutenant Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. As a reminder, supervisors are not required to review Firearm Pointing Incidents and their investigatory review of Foot Pursuits is limited to when a use of force or an arrest is associated with the pursuit.

During pre-service promotional classes for Sergeants and Lieutenants, TRED instructors emphasize to the new front-line supervisors when and how to identify training opportunities. Supervisors are trained on how to appropriately recognize and document these instances to ensure effective front-line supervision.

Individualized Training Completed on Date of Incident Jan 1- Sep 30 as % of Reviewed IDRs



Data to track information on the amount of instances of when a reviewing supervisor or investigating supervisor documents unit corrective action taking place at the time of the incident is now kept in the IDR application within the IDR data tables.


The above displays the percentage of IDRs reviewed which indicated *Individualized Training Completed on Date of the Incident*.



REVIEWING SUPERVISOR¹ RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,232,233

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the reviewing supervisor (Sergeant or above) complete the responsibilities outlined in General Orders *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if reviewing supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or a foot pursuit.

Through September 30, 2025, there were **3,350** IDRs generated for reviewing supervisors. TRED issued **342** debriefing points for reviewing supervisors from those IDRs.

Notification Deficiency-E.T. (**75-2.2%**) continues to be the most debriefed issue for reviewing supervisors. TRED will debrief this issue when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of people and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured, allege injury, or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a person or Department member who have been involved in a use of force incident are injured or allege injury.

The second most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Foot Pursuit-Supervisor Other* (**71-2.1%**). TRED typically makes a recommendation for this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routes the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to TRED or the Watch Operations Lieutenant. This is also used to debrief minor supervisory review oversights of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report.

Review Deficiency-Rev Sup (**47-1.4%**) was the third most common debriefing point. TRED commonly debriefs this issue when a reviewing supervisor does not address minor errors within the review process.

There were **3,044 (91%)** reviewing supervisor IDRs which had no debriefing points issued from TRED reviews.

See graph for top 28 reviewing supervisor debriefing points.

Note: Percentages in this report now represent the percentage of TRED reviews in which TRED identified a particular debriefing point. In past reports, percentages were calculated instead as a percentage of all debriefing points. The updated method provides TRED and the public with a more accurate understanding of how frequently certain issues arise during reviews, independent of other debriefing points. Percentages in previous reports may appear higher because they were based on the older calculation method. Going forward, this revised approach will allow TRED to more effectively track patterns, trends, and emerging concerns.



Foot Pursuit-Supv Other Debriefing Points Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025

The debriefing point for *Foot Pursuit-Supv Other* was manually subcategorized in preparation for this report. There were **42** occasions, TRED used this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routed the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant or TRED for their review. When there is a use of force or an arrest associated with a foot pursuit, it is the responsibility of the reviewing supervisor to route the reports to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for review. For foot pursuits that do not involve a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor is required to route the report to TRED for review.

There were also **17** instances that TRED used this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor incorrectly approved Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report which had an incorrect initial suspected charge associated to the foot pursuit.

The remainder of these debriefing points were for miscellaneous documentation and/or review deficiencies during the review process of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports.

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ Notification Deficiency-E.T. Debriefing Points Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025

TRED issues this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of persons and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured, allege injury, or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a person is injured during a use of force incident.

Through September 30, 2025, TRED issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **75** IDR reviews.

IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor¹ No Response to Scene Debriefing Points Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025

To ensure that frontline supervisors respond to the scene of use of force incidents, the Department revised its directives to require supervisors to respond to scenes of any Level 2 or Level 3 use of force incident. Through September 30, 2025, TRED issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **10** IDR reviews. TRED issues this debriefing point when a reviewing supervisor does not respond to a Level 2 or Level 3 use of force or does not fully articulate the reasonable circumstances when they could not respond to the scene as required by Department policy.


The Department has made this issue a learning objective during in-service supervisor training. TRED personnel also continues to emphasize this topic in the pre-service supervisor training.



INVESTIGATING SUPERVISOR¹ RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 226,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,238,239

IDRs with Investigating Supervisor Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the investigating supervisor (Lieutenant or above) complete responsibilities outlined in General Order *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if investigating supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or an incident involving a foot pursuit.

The most common debriefing point for investigating supervisors is *Inv Sup-Approval Deficiency (67)*. This debriefing is issued by TRED when there is a minor error in policy and procedure which may have occurred during the Watch Operations Lieutenant review process. The total of this debriefing point is lower than previous report. This is because in the second half of 2025, the debriefing point *Foot Pursuit-Approval Needed by WOL in Dist of Occurrence* was created. TRED personnel identified this was a common debriefing point which was previously being captured with the *Inv Sup-Approval Deficiency* debriefing point. There were **(42)** occasions were *Inv Sup-Approval Deficiency* was reclassified in order to accurately capture the data point *Foot Pursuit-Approval Needed by WOL in Dist of Occurrence* during this reporting period.

The second most common debriefing point is for *Investigating Supervisor-BWC Issue Not Addressed (63)*. This issue is typically debriefed when TRED issues a recommendation to an involved member for *BWC-Late Activation* and the investigating supervisor reviewed the incident but did not identify and address this issue with the member during the course of their TRR investigation or Watch Operations Lieutenant incident review of a foot pursuit.

The third most common debriefing point is for *Foot Pursuit-Over 48 Hrs (58)*. This is issued by TRED when the investigating supervisor has not completed the Watch Operations Lieutenant Review within 48 hours of the incident and there is no indication that an extension request has been approved by the appropriate exempt-level supervisor.

Through the first three quarters of 2025, there were **2,585** IDRs created for investigating supervisors. There were **2,209** investigating supervisor IDRs had no debriefing points issued from TRED reviews **(85%)**.


Note: Percentages in this report now represent the percentage of TRED reviews in which TRED identified a particular debriefing point. In past reports, percentages were calculated instead as a percentage of all debriefing points. The updated method provides TRED and the public with a more accurate understanding of how frequently certain issues arise during reviews, independent of other debriefing points. Percentages in previous reports may appear higher because they were based on the older calculation method. Going forward, this revised approach will allow TRED to more effectively track patterns, trends, and emerging concerns.



OC DISCHARGE INCIDENTS

¶ 162,173,207,208,209,210,211,235

TRRs with Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Discharge Jan 1- Sep 30, 2025



There were **17** total OC discharge incidents through September 30, 2025.

There were **10** TRRs that indicated multiple applications of OC discharge had occurred during the incident.

(OC) Discharge Summary

There were **17** total TRRs where the Department member indicated an OC discharge. This represents **0.3%** of all the TRRs generated. TRED reviews all instances where an OC device is discharged.

16 of the TRRs that indicated an OC spray discharge were determined by the investigating supervisor that the member's use of force response appeared to be in compliance with Department policy and directives.

The investigating supervisor determined the member's use of force appeared to be not in compliance with Department policy and directives and a notification to COPA was made for **one** OC discharge incident.

There were **eight** debriefing points as a result of the **17** OC discharge incidents.

There was **one** debriefing issued for *OC-Verbal Command and Warnings*. In accordance with Department policy, when it is safe and feasible, a member who is discharging a Personal OC device or other chemical agent will give verbal commands and warnings prior to, during, and after discharge, including informing other Department members on the scene of the discharge.

The debriefing points were as follows:

- (2) De-escalation/Force mitigation-Communication
- (1) De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Tactical Positioning
- (1) BWC-Late Activation
- (1) Equipment-Fail to Carry
- (1) Firearm Pointing Incident-No OEMC Notification
- (1) Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Event Log-Not Created
- (1) Other-Policy and Procedure



TASER DISCHARGE INCIDENTS


¶ 162,173,198,200,201,202,203,204,205,204,235

TRRs with Taser CEW Discharge

Through September 30, 2025, Department members submitted **95** TRRs indicating a Taser Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW) discharge. This represents **2%** of all the TRRs submitted. TRED reviews all incidents of a Taser discharge.

There were **four** TRRs where a member indicated that a Taser was deployed but TRED’s review determined that there were no actual Taser probes deployed. The Taser was un-holstered and displayed, although the Taser was never discharged in these **four** incidents. There were **two** incidents of a warning spark used.


There were **two** TRRs that indicated a Taser was deployed in an attempt to deter a vicious animal.



Taser Discharge-Related Debriefing Points


The involved member role had **122** debriefing points from Taser discharge-related IDRs. The most common debriefing point issued by TRED was for *Taser-Accidental Discharge* (**22**). The majority of these accidental Taser discharges within the first hour of the tour of duty while the member is conducting a weapon function test. When TRED reviews a TRR indicating an accidental Taser discharge, the involved member is referred to the Training and Support Group for additional Taser refresher training with the Tactical Training Unit.

Weapon Transition Issue (**12**) is the second most debriefed issue. TRED will use this debriefing point on the occasion an involved member may not maintain proper control of the Taser instead of re-holstering. This creates a tactical concern should the involved person not be fully restrained and have access to the Taser.





Multiple Taser Energy Cycles Discharged



The discharge of a Taser was indicated on **95** TRRs in the first three quarters of 2025. There were **38 (40%)** TRRs which had multiple energy cycles deployed. These multiple energy cycles can indicate a deployment of one or two cartridges and/or a combination of using the Arc button to re-energize an already-deployed cartridge.

Taser Discharge and Medical Aid

After a Taser discharge, once the Department member(s) gain control and restrain the person, the discharging member is required to request the appropriate medical aid, including contacting emergency medical services from the Chicago Fire Department, if the person was exposed to electricity, probes penetrated the person’s skin, or the person appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury. Typically when medical aid is requested, it is performed by CFD on scene and also at a hospital.


Through September 30, 2025, in the **95** TRRs where the involved member indicated a Taser discharge, no medical aid was indicated on **6** TRRs.

Two TRRs indicated an accidental discharge of the Taser. No person was struck.

Two TRRs indicated the involved person fled the scene and made good their escape.

One TRR occurred during a Level 3 incident.

One TRR indicated a Taser discharge in order to deter a vicious animal.





Taser Applied More Than Once

Through September 30, 2025, there were **38** TRRs which indicated the Taser was applied more than once. In **30** TRRs, the Taser probes from the first cartridge discharge did not make contact or the probe contact was ineffective. There was no neuromuscular incapacitation observed to gain compliance after the first cartridge, therefore a second cartridge discharge and/or pressing of the Taser ARC switch may have been necessary.

Seven TRRs indicated that they were part of a Level 3 incident.

One TRR indicated that the second cartridge discharged was unintentional. No person was struck.

Taser Use Incidents referred to COPA

In the first three quarters of 2025, there were **98** TRRs indicating a Taser discharge throughout the first three quarters of 2025. There were **six** of these TRRs that were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation and were not subject to review by TRED. In addition, **three** of these TRRs were a result of the complaint log number being obtained at the district level during the course of supervisory review and investigation.

Taser Use in Schools


Through September 30, 2025, there were no reported Taser discharges that occurred inside of a school.



BATON USE INCIDENTS

¶ 213,214,216

TRRs Indicating Baton Use Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025



Through September 30, 2025, Department members submitted **39** TRRs indicating a Baton use. This represents **.7%** of all TRRs submitted. TRED reviews all TRRs indicating a Baton use.

Baton Use Summary Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025

In the first three quarters of 2025, there were a total of **39** TRRs submitted by Department member that indicated a Baton use. TRED personnel reviews all TRRs indicating the use of Baton/Impact weapon.

There were **16** TRRs where the involved member described using the Baton as an impact weapon on a person.

There were **17** TRRs indicating a Baton use and the involved member described using the Baton as a control instrument. Control instruments are tools (e.g., baton) applied to joints and pressure sensitive areas of the body with non-impact pressure. In these TRRs the Baton was not used as an impact weapon on a person.

There were **four** TRRs indicating a Baton use where the involved member describe using a Baton during a crowd control situation. The Baton was described as being held at “port arms” and used as a “port arms push” in order to control a large crowd. The Baton was not used as an impact weapon on a person.


There were **two** TRRs indicating a Baton use submitted by involved members where the Baton was used to break a window/strike of a vehicle. The Baton was not used as an impact weapon on a person.

Two TRRs indicating a Baton use by the submitting member were determined by the WOL that the member’s use of force response appeared to not be in compliance with Department policy and directives.



INCIDENTS WITH FORCE AGAINST A HANDCUFFED SUBJECT

Reviewed TRRs with Force Used Against a Subject Who Was Handcuffed or Otherwise Physically Restrained




TRED reviews all TRRs that indicate a reportable use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. Reportable force against a person who is fully restrained and controlled (e.g. both hands secured together) with handcuffs or other restraining devices (e.g., flexible restraining devices) is considered a Level 2 use of force.

Through September 30, 2025, there were **615** TRRs where the involved member indicated that there was a use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. This represents **11.4%** of the TRRs submitted.

CPD policy states that officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained, absent circumstances such as when the person’s actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.

Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject IDR Recommendations



Through the first three quarters of 2025, there were **211** debriefing points issued by TRED that resulted in a training advisement or recommendation for a reportable use of force against a handcuffed person.

Training advisements were made in **105** IDRs. Recommendations were made in **41** of these IDRs.


There were **47** instances when individual training was completed on the date of the incident.

There were **365** IDRs in which TRED issued no recommendations or debriefing points.

There were **35** IDRs generated from **18** total incidents involving force used against a handcuffed subject in which there was a current COPA complaint investigation. Consequently, TRED did not review these incidents.



Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject Debriefing Points



TRED issued a total of **211** debriefing points related to these IDRs indicating force used against a person who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints through September 30, 2025.

The most debriefed issue was for *De-escalation Force Mitigation -Communication* (**36**). TRED will use this debriefing point to address either the reporting or application of communication as a de-escalation tactic. In many cases, TRED uses this debriefing point to address and improve the effectiveness of Department members' communication and professionalism during critical incidents.


TRR Entry-Handcuffed Subject is the second most common debriefing points (**29**) issued by TRED in these IDRs. TRED debriefs this in instances when the involved member incorrectly made a data entry error and marked “No” instead of “Yes” when documenting “Was any reportable force used against the subject while handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints?”

BWC-Late Activation (**27**) was the third most common debriefing point. TRED will use this debriefing point when the involved members BWC is not activated to event mode at the beginning of a law-enforcement-related activity.




TRRs AND PURSUITS

TRRs with Pursuits (First 3 QTRS)



Throughout the first three quarters of 2025, **688** of submitted TRRs indicate a pursuit (Foot, Foot and Vehicle, Other, and Vehicle.) This amounts to **13%** of all submitted TRRs. This appears consistent with past reporting.

TRRs with Pursuits Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025



There were **5,383** TRRs that were submitted in the through September 30, 2025, **87.2% (4,695)** did not indicate any type of pursuit. There are **622** TRRs where the involved member indicated a foot pursuit, **39** vehicle pursuit, **15** other pursuit, and **12** foot and vehicle pursuits.


Incidents that involve a foot pursuit have always consisted of the vast majority of all pursuit incidents. When combined, foot pursuits and foot and vehicle pursuits (**634**) are **12%** of all the TRRs submitted.



FPIRs AND PURSUITS


↑ 168,192,196

FPIRs and Pursuits Jan 1-Sep 30, 2025




Through September 30, 2025, there were **2,950 (75%)** FPIRs reviewed that were not associated with any form of pursuit. TRED reviewers identified **967 (24%)** FPIRs that involve a foot pursuit or a foot and vehicle pursuit.

FPIRs and Pursuits (First 3 QTRS)




Through September 30, 2025, there was a **6%** increase in FPIRs that did not involve a pursuit.

FPIs, Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery



TRED determined that **866 (27%)** of the **3,255** incidents in which a FPI (or multiple FPIs) is reported involve some type of pursuit. Out of the **866** incidents involving a pursuit, **393 (45%)** of these resulted in the recovery of a weapon. A total of **343** of the **386** recovered weapons from pursuits were semi-automatic handguns.

FPIs, Foot Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery




FPIs that involve a foot pursuit and weapon recovery have been on the decline through the first three quarters of 2025. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.



FPIRs AND TRRs


↑ 192,196

FPIRs and Tactical Response Reports




Approximately **10%** of the FPIRs that were reviewed by TRED through September 30, 2025 involved a use of force incident. This remains consistent with past reporting.

FPIRs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery




In the first three quarters of 2025, there were **3,979** FPIRs reviewed where a firearm pointing incident (or more than one FPI) occurred, **10%** involved a use of force. When a FPIR and a TRR were reported together, **40%** involved the recovery of a weapon.

FPIRs and TRRs (First 3 QTRS)



The percentage of FPIRs which involve a TRR has remained consistent over the same time period in comparison to previous years.

FPIs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery



Through September 30, 2025, **51%** of FPI incidents which involved a use of force also indicated a weapon recovered.




FPIs AND WEAPON RECOVERIES


FPIs and Weapon Recoveries

Through September 30, 2025, there are **4,059** Firearm Pointing Incident reports generated from **3,255** firearm pointing incidents. Data reflecting weapon recoveries is based on each individual firearm pointing incident, rather than the total number of officers who reported a FPI.

Through September 30, 2025, there is a **3%** increase in total firearm pointing incidents from the first half of 2024.



FPIs and Weapon Recoveries by Month



There have been **2,300** firearm pointing incidents in which at least one weapon was recovered since the beginning of 2024.



SEARCH WARRANT REVIEW

Search Warrant Review

Department policy requires the Department to conduct a critical incident after-action review for search warrants identified as wrong raids or in other circumstances identified by the Superintendent.

Department policy defines a wrong raid as a search warrant that is served at a location that is different than the location listed or an incident in which a Department member serving a search warrant encounters, identifies, or should reasonably have become aware of circumstances or facts that are inconsistent with the factual basis for the probable cause used to obtain the search warrant.

The Search Warrant Review Board (SWRB) is tasked with conducting this review of wrong raids and other search warrants identified by the Superintendent.

Throughout the entire year of 2025, Department members serviced approximately **234** residential search warrants. Of those search warrants, **none** were identified as being a wrong raid and no other search warrants were referred to the SWRB.



FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP REVIEW UNIT

‡800-802,805-806,812-819,834,841,852,857,858,859,860

CPD Launches Public-Facing ISR Website

During the reporting period, the Chicago Police Department continued expanding its public-facing investigatory stop website to enhance transparency, accessibility, and community engagement related to investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. The website serves as a centralized public portal for ISR-related resources, including Department directives, ISR datasets, data dictionaries, Frequently Asked Questions, Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (TRED) Reports, “Know Your Rights” materials, FOIA resources, and information concerning CPD’s investigatory stop review and oversight processes.

The website is designed to present investigatory stop information in accessible language and provide the public with a clearer insight into CPD’s investigatory stop practices, reporting requirements, documentation standards, and Department-level review processes. The Frequently Asked Questions section explains investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, reasonable articulable suspicion, receipt requirements, body-worn camera (BWC) obligations, and related constitutional policing standards. This aligns with Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 800 through 802, 805 through 806, and 812 through 819**, which address constitutional policing principles, investigatory stop requirements, documentation standards, BWC-related documentation, and stop receipt requirements.

Accordingly, CPD’s public-facing investigatory stop website supports the Department’s broader responsibilities under the Amended Stipulation by increasing public access to stop-related information and improving transparency around investigatory stop reporting and review processes. The website also supports the Department’s public reporting and electronic data accessibility obligations under Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 834 through 841**. **Paragraph 834** specifically requires CPD to continue posting de-identified investigatory stop data and the ISR data dictionary, while **Paragraphs 837 through 841** address electronic reporting systems, preservation of ISR records, electronic data accessibility, and data collection requirements.

Functions, Duties, and Staffing

Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit Functions, Staffing, and Training Support

Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) serves as CPD’s Department-level review body for investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and related loitering enforcement documentation. This role is consistent with Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraph 852**, which designates 4ASRU, or an equivalent internal CPD unit, as the Department-level review unit for a representative sample of ISRs, including reports completed for enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. Under this review function, 4ASRU reviews ISRs for completeness, accuracy, policy compliance, reasonable articulable suspicion, supervisory review quality, and recurring trends. **Paragraph 857** requires Department-level reviews sufficient to assess whether officers completely and thoroughly reported the factors supporting RAS for investigatory stops and protective pat-downs, whether reports were completed in compliance with CPD policy, and whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy. **Paragraph 858** further requires CPD to demonstrate that the subset of investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago.

Under the current review structure, 4ASRU reviews 100% of gang and narcotics loitering ISRs and a representative sample of the remaining approved ISRs. This review structure supports the Department-level review, trend identification, reporting, and oversight requirements set forth in Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraphs 852, 857, 858, 859, and 860**. **Paragraph 860** requires 4ASRU to report semi-annually on the ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed, including those completed for enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and to identify trends or patterns related to investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, as well as equipment, training, or policy concerns and any necessary recommendations.

In 2025, 4ASRU’s operational focus expanded to include trend analysis, structured feedback loops, and preparation for CPD’s revised Fourth Amendment reporting framework, including the design, testing, validation, and implementation planning for the STOP Application. These efforts supported CPD’s preparation for



compliance with the reporting and documentation requirements in **Paragraphs 812 through 819**, including the requirement that officers report investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and Loitering Ordinance enforcement; document reasonable suspicion using specific and clear language; justify the stop, pat-down, or enforcement action under law and policy; document any BWC footage viewed before report completion; submit only one revised version of an ISR, Stop Report, or LDR following supervisory rejection; and provide or document the absence of a required Stop Receipt. These efforts also supported CPD's preparation for the reporting system and data-plan requirements in **Paragraphs 835 through 837**, including assessing its reporting and data collection systems and developing an electronic system that allows officers to complete required stop-related documentation electronically with required fields completed before submission and the electronic reporting and data collection requirements contained in **Paragraphs 835 through 837**.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU continued to perform its Department-level review responsibilities while preparing for the Department's anticipated transition to the revised Fourth Amendment reporting and review environment scheduled for February 3, 2026. At the close of the reporting period, the Unit was staffed with two sergeants and eight sworn positions supporting Department-level ISR reviews, instructor and subject matter expert responsibilities, subpoena and administrative functions, and data management activities necessary to fulfill the Unit's review and reporting responsibilities.

In July 2025, 4ASRU completed the Notice of Job Opportunity process to support anticipated operational responsibilities associated with the Department's updated Fourth Amendment reporting and review environment. The Unit also identified the need for additional workspace to accommodate anticipated personnel growth and future operational requirements. These planning efforts were intended to ensure that 4ASRU maintained sufficient personnel, technology, and operational resources to perform its Department-level review responsibilities effectively and support implementation activities associated with the Department's transition to the updated Fourth Amendment reporting and review environment. Consistent with Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraph 853**, CPD is required to ensure that 4ASRU has sufficient personnel, technology, and other resources to perform its review responsibilities promptly, efficiently, and effec-

tively.

Recognizing the specialized subject matter expertise required to conduct Department-level Fourth Amendment reviews, 4ASRU also expanded its role beyond review operations by developing a comprehensive pre-service Sergeant curriculum addressing the Department's updated Police Encounters and Fourth Amendment policy suite, investigatory stop documentation, supervisory review responsibilities, constitutional policing principles, and Department-level review procedures. Curriculum development began during this reporting period and continued in preparation for the Department's February 3, 2026 implementation of the updated Fourth Amendment reporting and review environment. These efforts support the training requirements contained in **Paragraphs 822 through 827**, which require CPD to train officers and supervisors on investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, enforcement of the Loitering Ordinance, Stop Reports, Stop Receipts, electronic reporting applications, supervisory review responsibilities, and the documentation of specific and articulable facts supporting investigatory stops and protective pat-downs.



4ASRU 2024-2026 Achievements

Organizational Role, Training, STOP Application Development, and Department-Level Review Infrastructure

Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 800, 805-806, 812-819, 822-837, 853-860

During the reporting period, 4ASRU continued serving as CPD's Department-level review unit for investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and related loitering enforcement documentation. Consistent with Amended Stipulation Paragraph 800, the Unit supported CPD's responsibilities to monitor, review, train, and promote accountability for investigatory stops and related Fourth Amendment activities. Through Department-level reviews, supervisory oversight analysis, deficiency identification, and trend monitoring, 4ASRU identified recurring issues involving reasonable articulable suspicion, report articulation, supervisory review, and stop-related documentation, supporting CPD's obligations under **Paragraphs 805 and 806**.

Throughout 2025, 4ASRU expanded its operational responsibilities to support CPD's preparation for the revised Fourth Amendment reporting and review framework and the February 3, 2026 transition to the reporting STOP Application and Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) review application. Working with the Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform, the Education and Training Division, the Strategic Initiatives Division, the Research and Development Division, and Department technology partners, the Unit participated in the planning, design, testing, validation, and refinement of both applications. 4ASRU also provided operational subject matter expertise on electronic reporting workflows, supervisory review processes, Department-level review workflows, deficiency tracking, reporting capabilities, and audit features to support the reporting and review infrastructure and ensure alignment with Department directives, operational requirements, and the reporting, supervisory review, electronic reporting, and data collection requirements contained in Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 812 through 819 and 835 through 841**.

To support consistent reporting practices, 4ASRU developed a grammar and police report-writing guide emphasizing narrative clarity, organization, and the articulation of reasonable articulable suspicion. The Unit also participated in application testing, workflow validation, operational feedback, and issue resolution

to help prepare the reporting application and review application for future Department-level review operations, quality assurance, trend analysis, and compliance oversight.

While supporting these preparatory efforts, 4ASRU continued conducting Department-level reviews of randomly selected representative samples of Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) and all gang- and narcotics-loitering enforcement ISRs. Through these reviews, the Unit assessed report quality, supervisory review, policy compliance, and documentation standards; identified recurring deficiencies and emerging trends; and provided recommendations regarding training, policy, supervisory practices, equipment, and reporting procedures consistent with Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 857 through 860**.

Collectively, these accomplishments strengthened CPD's readiness for the revised Fourth Amendment reporting and review framework while maintaining 4ASRU's Department-level review responsibilities throughout the 2025 reporting period.



Distribution of ISR Types in Department-Level Reviews

Across both review periods, 4ASRU’s Department-level review activity continued to focus primarily on investigatory stops, while gang- and narcotics-related enforcement remained a significant secondary category, and prostitution-related ISRs remained minimal.


From January 1 - June 30, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 2,033 ISRs. This population consisted of 1,587 investigatory stop ISRs (78.07%) and 446 gang and narcotics enforcement ISRs (21.93%). No prostitution-related ISRs were reviewed during this reporting period.

From July 1 - December 31, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 1,706 ISRs. This population included 1,403 investigatory stop ISRs (82.24%), 301 gang and narcotics enforcement ISRs (17.64%), and 2 prostitution-related ISRs (0.12%). Separately, 4ASRU also reviewed 98 deferred ISRs that originated from the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period and had been held because of active court proceedings or administrative investigations. Those deferred ISRs are not included in the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review-period denominator. Of the 98 deferred ISRs, 95 involved investigatory stop ISRs (96.94%) and 3 involved gang and narcotics enforcement ISRs (3.06%).

Overall, the distribution of ISR review types remained generally consistent across the two reporting periods. Investigatory stops continued to comprise the substantial majority of Department-level reviews, while gang and narcotics enforcement ISRs represented the second-largest review category. Prostitution-related ISRs remained rare during both reporting periods.

These findings demonstrate that the overall distribution of Department-level reviews remained stable between reporting periods despite a reduction in total review volume. The consistency of the review population supports meaningful comparison of review outcomes and documentation trends presented throughout this report.


These review activities supported CPD’s responsibilities under the Amended Stipulation to monitor, report, review, train, and implement accountability measures related to investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. The Department-level review process also supported requirements governing investigatory stop documentation, supervisory review, representative sampling, after-action support, and semiannual reporting of trends, patterns, and recommendations. See Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 800, 803-805, 812-814, 828-833, 852, and 857-860.





Comparison of Department-Level ISR Review Outcomes

January 1-June 30, 2025 vs. July 1-December 31, 2025



During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU completed 2,033 Department-level Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) reviews. During the subsequent July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU completed 1,706 ISR reviews. This reflected a decrease of 327 reviews, or approximately (16.08%), between the two reporting periods.

4ASRU's Department-level review function is tied to the Amended ISR Stipulation's requirements for staffing and expertise, Department-level review, review of stop documentation, and representative sampling. **Paragraph 852** identifies 4ASRU as the Department-level review unit, **Paragraph 853** addresses staffing and expertise, **Paragraph 857** establishes the Department-level ISR review requirements, and **Paragraph 858** requires the reviewed subset to be demographically and geographically representative.

For the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, review outcomes consisted of approximately (69.45%) Concur findings, (15.49%) Administrative Deficiency findings, and (15.05%) Deficiency findings. During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, Concur findings remained consistent (69.11%), Administrative Deficiency findings decreased to (11.43%), and Deficiency findings increased to (19.46%). Although the overall Concur rate remained relatively stable between reporting periods, the distribution of non-concur findings shifted, with a greater proportion of review outcomes resulting in Deficiency findings rather than Administrative Deficiency findings. This shift underscores the continued importance of clearly articulating reasonable articulable suspicion, preparing complete and accurate report narratives, documenting required stop receipt actions, and conducting thorough supervisory reviews. These review areas are consistent with the documentation and supervisory review requirements reflected in Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraphs 813 through 819** and **Paragraphs 828 through 833**. Department-level reviews conducted by 4ASRU also support the objectives of **Paragraphs 857 and 860** by identifying recurring deficiencies, monitoring trends, and informing recommendations related to training, policy, supervisory practices, equipment, and reporting procedures.



The July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period also occurred during a Department transition involving revised Fourth Amendment policies, updated review procedures, implementation planning, application testing, preparatory training, and review workflow adjustments related to the Department's investigatory stop, protective pat-down, and loitering enforcement framework. To avoid overstating the transition's effect on outcome trends, the percentages should be interpreted as Department-level review outcomes during a transitional period, not as a direct measure of post-implementation performance.

In addition to the 1,706 ISRs reviewed during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, CPD separately tracked 98 deferred ISRs originating from the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period. These ISRs were associated with active court proceedings, external administrative investigations, or internal administrative investigations and were temporarily withheld from the standard Department-level review queue pending coordination with the IMT, the OAG, and legal stakeholders regarding review procedures, discovery obligations, and evidentiary considerations. Consistent with their originating reporting period, these deferred ISRs were excluded from the July 1–December 31, 2025 review population and reported separately. Of the 98 deferred ISRs, 49 (50.00%) resulted in Concur findings, 27 (27.55%) resulted in Administrative Deficiency findings, and 22 (22.45%) resulted in Deficiency findings. Reporting these ISRs separately preserves the integrity of the two review-period comparison, and maintains transparency regarding ISRs that were reviews completed after the close of the originating reporting period. This approach also remains consistent with Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraphs 857 through 860**, which address Department-level review, representative review practices, corrective follow-up, and reporting of review outcomes.



Deficiency Trends January 1 - June 30, 2025 vs. July 1 - December 31, 2025

This section compares documentation-based deficiency findings identified during Department-level reviews conducted by 4ASRU during two reporting periods: January 1 - June 30, 2025, and July 1 - December 31, 2025. These findings evaluate whether the report documentation contained sufficient, specific, and clear facts to support the documented stop, protective pat-down, search, or reporting requirement. These are 4ASRU review classifications based on report documentation and are not formal legal determinations regarding the constitutionality of the underlying police action.

The Amended ISR Stipulation requires CPD to ensure that officers document reasonable suspicion for investigatory stops and protective pat-downs using specific and clear language. It also requires reports to demonstrate that the stop, pat-down, or enforcement action complies with law and CPD policy.

Review Population and Deferred ISR Treatment

During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU completed 2,033 ISR reviews used for deficiency analysis. An additional 98 ISRs from that same reporting period were deferred because they were associated with active court proceedings or administrative investigations. Although those 98 deferred ISRs were reviewed during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 period, they are separately denoted and attributed to the January - June 2025 reporting period.

Review Period	Completed Reviews Used for Deficiency Analysis	Deferred ISRs Attributable to Period	Total Attributable ISRs
January 1 - June 30, 2025	2,033	98	2,131
July 1 - December 31, 2025	1,706	0	1,706

The 98 deferred ISRs are separately denoted because they originated during the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period but were reviewed later. The percentages shown for January 1 - June 30, 2025, are based only on the 2,033 completed reviews used in the deficiency analysis.

Deficiency Findings by Review Period

Deficiency Category	Jan - Jun 2025	Jul - Dec 2025
Stop - Insufficient RAS	104 (5.12%)	151 (8.85%)
Pat Down - Insufficient RAS	132 (6.49%)	124 (7.27%)
Search - Insufficient RAS	35 (1.72%)	49(2.87%)
“No Facts Articulated”	7 (0.34%)	Eliminated / Replaced
ISR Not Required	48 (2.36%)	44 (2.58%)
Total Deficiency Findings	326 (16.03%)	332 (19.46%)



During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period, 4ASRU identified 326 total deficiency findings, representing (16.03%) of the 2,033 ISRs reviewed. These findings included 271 insufficient-RAS findings where some facts were articulated, 7 findings where no facts were articulated, and 48 ISR Not Required findings.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period, 4ASRU identified 332 total deficiency findings, representing (19.46%) of the 1706 ISRs reviewed. These findings included 324 insufficient-RAS findings involving stops, protective pat-downs, and searches, along with 44 ISR Not Required findings.

“No Facts Articulated” Category Transition

During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period, 4ASRU identified 7 deficiency findings (0.34%) in which no facts were articulated to support the documented stop, protective pat-down, or search. This category was used under the legacy ISR review structure to identify reports where the narrative failed to provide specific factual support for the documented Fourth Amendment action.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period, the “No Facts Articulated” category was eliminated and replaced with more specific, Department-approved reviewer language. This adjustment was made in preparation for the Department’s new Stop Report infrastructure, revised Fourth Amendment policy suite, updated review framework, and standardized reviewer-language model. As a result, the “No Facts Articulated” category is shown for the January 1 - June 30, 2025 period only and is not directly compared to the July 1 - December 31, 2025 period.

This change should be understood as a review-structure transition rather than a finding that no similar documentation concerns existed during the later period. Under the updated framework, articulation-related concerns were addressed through more specific deficiency language tied to the documented action, applicable policy requirements, and approved debrief points.

Comparative Analysis

Overall, total deficiency findings increased 3.43% from 326 findings (16.03%) during the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period to 332 findings (19.46%) during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, an increase of 6 findings (1.84% increase).

The increase was driven primarily by stop-related findings involving insufficient articulation of reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS), which increased from 104 findings (5.12%) to 151 findings (8.85%), an increase of 47 findings and 3.73 percentage points. Search-related insufficient-RAS findings also increased from 35 findings (1.72%) to 49 findings (2.87%), an increase of 14 findings and 1.15 percentage points. Although pat-down insufficient-RAS findings decreased in raw number from 132 findings to 124 findings, the deficiency rate increased from (6.49%) to (7.27%) because fewer ISRs were reviewed during the latter reporting period. Similarly, ISR Not Required findings decreased from 48 findings to 44 findings, while the rate increased slightly from (2.36%) to (2.58%) due to the smaller review population.

Overall, the data indicate that the increase in deficiency findings was primarily attributable to insufficient articulation of reasonable articulable suspicion supporting investigatory stops, with a secondary increase in search-related deficiencies. The findings do not indicate a comparable increase in ISRs that should not have been completed, but rather reflect continued challenges in adequately articulating the legal justification supporting documented Fourth Amendment actions during the July 1 – December 31, 2025 reporting period.



Training and Curriculum Response

In response to recurring articulation-related findings identified through Department-level ISR reviews, 4ASRU made articulation a central component of the foundational planning, policy assessment, curriculum development, and instructional design completed throughout 2025 and into early 2026 to support implementation of the Department's revised Police Encounters and Fourth Amendment policy suite, STOP Application, and Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) Application. Working collaboratively with Department stakeholders, the Unit developed the instructional framework, learning objectives, scenario-based exercises, report-writing standards, and supervisory review expectations that established the foundation for the Department's February 3, 2026 implementation and subsequent instructional delivery.

The instructional framework reinforced that the responsibility for articulating the legal basis supporting a Fourth Amendment action rests with the authoring member. The field training officers, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains are responsible for reviewing reports, identifying articulation deficiencies, providing coaching and corrective guidance, and ensuring compliance with Department policy. Instruction was tailored to each rank's role within the reporting and review process. For authoring members and field training officers, instruction focused on documenting specific and articulable facts supporting each distinct Fourth Amendment action, including the investigatory stop, protective pat-down, and search. For sergeants, instruction focused on supervisory review, identifying incomplete or insufficient articulation, returning reports when appropriate, documenting clear rejection language, and ensuring corrective actions were consistent with Department policy and legal standards. For lieutenants and captains, instruction emphasized command-level oversight, trend identification, accountability, and addressing recurring articulation deficiencies through training, debriefing, and supervisory follow-up.

This foundational, rank-based instructional framework established consistent expectations for report writing, supervisory review, and command oversight while reinforcing the documentation and evaluation of reasonable articulable suspicion supporting each distinct Fourth Amendment action in accordance with Department policy and the Amended ISR Stipulation.




Gang and Narcotics Loitering ISR Outcomes

January 1-June 30, 2025 and July 1, 2025-December 31, 2025

Gang and Narcotics Loitering ISR Outcomes

Department-Level Review Comparison | Excludes 2024 Data



During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period, 4ASRU reviewed 446 gang and narcotics loitering ISRs out of 2,033 total ISRs, representing (21.94%) of the Department-level review population. Of those 446 gang and narcotics loitering ISRs, 229 resulted in Concur findings, 131 resulted in Administrative Deficiency findings, and 86 resulted in Deficiency findings. Stated as a percentage of the gang and narcotics loitering ISR population, these outcomes represented (51.35%) Concur, (29.37%) Administrative Deficiency, and (19.28%) Deficiency.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period, 4ASRU reviewed 301 gang and narcotics loitering ISRs out of 1706 total reviewed ISRs, representing (17.64%) of the Department-level review population. Within this population, 150 ISRs resulted in Concur findings, 32 resulted in Administrative Deficiency findings, and 119 resulted in Deficiency findings. Stated as a percentage of the gang and narcotics loitering ISR population, these outcomes represented (49.83%) Concur, (10.63%) Administrative Deficiency, and (39.54%) Deficiency.

Compared with the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, the Jul 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period reflected a decrease in the proportion of gang and narcotics loitering ISRs within the overall Department-level review population, from 446 reviews (21.94%) to 301 reviews (17.64%). Concur outcomes remained relatively stable, decreasing slightly from 229 (51.35%) to 150 (49.83%), and Administrative Deficiency outcomes decreased from 131 (29.37%) to 32 (10.63%). Deficiency outcomes increased from 86 (19.28%) to 119 (39.54%). Overall, the results indicate that although gang and narcotics loitering ISRs represented a smaller share of the Department-level review population during the latter reporting period, a substantially greater proportion of those reviews resulted in substantive deficiency findings rather than administrative deficiencies.

These reviews support CPD’s obligations under Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraph 800** to monitor, report, review, train, and implement accountability measures for investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. They also



support the documentation requirements in Paragraphs 812 through 816, including the requirement that officers report investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, and Loitering Ordinance enforcement and document the specific facts supporting RAS and policy compliance.


The outcome analysis is also consistent with 4ASRU’s Department-level review responsibilities under Amended ISR Stipulation Paragraph 857(a)-(d), including assessing whether officers completely and thoroughly documented the factors supporting reasonable articulable suspicion, whether reports were complete and policy-compliant, and whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy. Paragraph 858 further requires CPD to demonstrate that the reviewed subset of investigatory stops and protective pat-downs is demographically and geographically representative, while Paragraph 860 requires semiannual reporting on the total number of ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed, trends or patterns identified through 4ASRU reviews, and any equipment, training, or policy concerns requiring recommendations.

The 98 deferred ISRs associated with the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review population were tracked separately from the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review population to avoid overstating the later period’s results. Of the 98 deferred ISRs, 2 resulted in Deficiency findings, and 1 resulted in an Administrative Deficiency finding. These deferred outcomes should be reported as a separate subset tied to the January 1 - June 30, 2025 population, rather than included in the July 1 - December 31, 2025 denominator. This treatment preserves the integrity of the comparative analysis and avoids duplicating or commingling review populations.

Because gang and narcotics loitering enforcement remains a complex enforcement category subject to 100% Department-level review, continued analysis of these outcomes supported insight into documentation practices, policy compliance, articulation standards, and supervisory review quality. This review process supports Amended ISR Stipulation Paragraphs 857 through 860 by allowing 4ASRU to identify trends, assess recurring issues, provide after-action support where appropriate, and report findings that may inform future training, policy, supervision, and system improvements.

Supervisory Approval Timeliness

January 1, 2025 - June 30, 2025 and July 1, 2025 - December 31, 2025 Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 828-832





Supervisory review remains a required component of CPD's accountability framework for investigatory stops, protective pat-downs, Stop Reports, LDRs, and related documentation. Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 828 through 832** require CPD supervisors to review submitted ISRs, Stop Reports, and LDRs; approve or reject submitted reports by the end of their tours of duty; ensure reports are properly completed and conform to CPD policy; document the reason for any rejection; and take appropriate after-action support or corrective action when rejected reports or policy deviations are identified.

During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU reviewed 2,033 ISRs. Of those reviewed ISRs, 1,408 (69.26%) received same-day supervisory approval and 386 (18.99%) were approved within one day. Combined, 1,794 ISRs (88.25%) received supervisory approval on the same day or within one day of submission. An additional 214 ISRs (10.43%) were approved within two to seven days. The remaining 25 ISRs (1.23%) required more than seven days for supervisory approval, including 13 ISRs (0.64%) approved within 8 to 14 days, 11 ISRs (0.54%) approved between 15 and 364 days, and 1 ISR (0.05%) approved after 365 days.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, 4ASRU reviewed 1,706 ISRs. Of those reviewed ISRs, 1,157 (67.82%) received same-day supervisory approval and 345 (20.22%) were approved within one day. Combined, 1,502 ISRs (88.04%) received supervisory approval on the same day or within one day of submission. An additional 179 ISRs (10.49%) were approved within two to seven days. The remaining 25 ISRs (1.47%) required more than seven days for supervisory approval, including 15 ISRs (0.88%) approved within 8 to 14 days, 9 ISRs (0.53%) approved between 15 and 364 days, and 1 ISR (0.06%) approved after 365 days.

The two reporting periods reflect consistent supervisory approval practices. Same-day approvals decreased slightly from (69.26%) to (67.82%), while approvals within one day increased from (18.99%) to (20.22%). Approvals within two to seven days were consistent at (10.53%) to (10.43%), and approvals requiring more than seven days remained nearly unchanged at approximately (1.00%) of reviewed ISRs in both periods. Overall, approximately (88.00%) of reviewed ISRs in each period received supervisory approval on the same day or within one day of submission.

These stable approval timeframes are notable because the second reporting period occurred while CPD was preparing for implementation of the revised Police Encounters and Fourth Amendment policy suite, the STOP Application, the IDR Application, and revised supervisory review workflows. Throughout the Jul 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, supervisory approvals continued to be completed under the existing ISR reporting and review framework. The data indicate that district-level supervisory review timelines remained stable during the preparatory transition and continued to support timely oversight of investigatory stop documentation.

The 98 deferred ISRs are reported as a separate review population. Within this subset, 62 ISRs (63.27%) received same-day supervisory approval, 20 ISRs (20.41%) were approved within one day, and 16 ISRs (16.33%) were approved within two to seven days. No deferred ISR required more than seven days for supervisory approval. Overall, supervisory approval timeframes for the deferred ISRs remained timely and were generally consistent with those observed during the standard Department-level review populations.


Overall, the data indicates that district-level supervisory review processes remained consistent across both primary reporting periods and that the separately reported deferred ISR subset did not reflect extended supervisory approval delays. These findings are consistent with the Department's supervisory review framework established under Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 828 through 832**, which governs timely supervisory review, report approval or rejection, documentation requirements, and supervisory follow-up for identified deficiencies.



Race Demographics of Reviewed ISRs

January 1, 2025 - June 30, 2025 and July 1, 2025 - December 31, 2025 Amended ISR Stipulation Paragraphs 856-858


The Amended ISR Stipulation requires 4ASRU to report the demographic and geographic distribution of individuals subject to reviewed investigatory stops and protective pat-downs. **Paragraph 857** establishes 4ASRU’s Department-level review function for a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including those completed for enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. **Paragraph 858** requires CPD to demonstrate that the reviewed subset is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago.



From January 1 - June 30, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 2,033 ISRs. Black subjects represented the largest portion of the reviewed population, accounting for 1,384 reviewed ISRs, or (68.08%). White Hispanic subjects accounted for 456 reviewed ISRs, or (22.43%), followed by White subjects with 149 reviewed ISRs, or (7.33%). Asian/Pacific Islander subjects accounted for 39 reviewed ISRs, or (1.92%), and American Indian/Alaskan Native subjects accounted for 5 reviewed ISRs, or (0.25%). No reviewed ISRs were coded as Black Hispanic during this period.



RACE DEMOGRAPHICS OF REVIEWED ISRs
 01.JUL.25 - 31.DEC.25



RACE / ETHNICITY DISTRIBUTION		
● BLACK	1,161	(68.05%)
● WHITE HISPANIC	405	(23.74%)
● WHITE	108	(6.33%)
● ASIAN/PACIFIC ISLANDER	21	(1.23%)
● AMER IND/ALASKAN NATIVE	10	(0.59%)

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

From July 1 - December 31, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 1,706 ISRs. Black subjects represented the largest portion of the reviewed population, accounting for 1,161 reviewed ISRs, or (68.05%). White Hispanic subjects accounted for 405 reviewed ISRs, or (23.74%), followed by White subjects with 108 reviewed ISRs, or (6.33%). Asian/Pacific Islander subjects accounted for 21 reviewed ISRs, or (1.23%), and American Indian/Alaskan Native subjects accounted for 10 reviewed ISRs, or (0.59%). No reviewed ISRs were coded as Black Hispanic during this period.

Overall, the racial and ethnic distribution of reviewed ISRs remained consistent across the two reporting periods. Black subjects remained the largest reviewed group, accounting for (68.08%) to (68.05%) of reviewed ISRs during the two reporting periods. White Hispanic subjects remained the second-largest group, increasing slightly from (22.43%) to (23.74%). White subjects decreased from (7.33%) to (6.33%), and Asian/Pacific Islander subjects decreased from (1.92%) to (1.23%). Meanwhile, American Indian/Alaskan Native subjects increased from (0.25%) to (0.59%). These modest changes reflect limited variation in the reviewed ISR population across the two reporting periods.


The 98 deferred ISRs are reported separately and are not included in the January 1–June 30, 2025 race-demographic analysis. Accordingly, the demographic figures presented above are limited to the 2,033 ISRs comprising the primary Department-level review population for that reporting period.



Age Demographics of Reviewed ISRs

January 1, 2025-June 30, 2025 and July 1, 2025-December 31, 2025 Amended ISR Stipulation Paragraphs 856-858 and 860

The Amended ISR Stipulation requires 4ASRU to report the demographic and geographic distribution of individuals subject to reviewed investigatory stops and protective pat-downs. Paragraph 857 requires 4ASRU to conduct regular Department-level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including reports completed for enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances. Those reviews assess whether officers completely and thoroughly documented the basis for investigatory stops and protective pat-downs, whether reports were completed in compliance with CPD policy, and whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy. Paragraph 858 requires CPD to demonstrate that the reviewed subset is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago. Paragraph 860 requires 4ASRU to report semiannually on reviewed ISRs and Stop Reports, including identified patterns and trends.



From January 1 - June 30, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 2,033 ISRs. The largest age group was 21-30, accounting for 720 reviewed ISRs, or (35.42%) of the reviewed population. The next largest group was 31-40, with 453 reviewed ISRs, or (22.28%). Together, subjects between 21 and 40 years old accounted for 1,173 reviewed ISRs, or (57.70%) of the reviewed population.


From July 1 - December 31, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 1,706 ISRs. The 21-30 age group remained the largest age group, with 543 reviewed ISRs, or (31.83%). The 31-40 age group increased proportionally to 444 reviewed ISRs, or (26.03%). Together, subjects between 21 and 40 years old accounted for 987 reviewed ISRs, or (57.85%) of the reviewed population.

Across both primary review periods, the reviewed ISR population remained concentrated among subjects between 21 and 40 years old. Although the total number of reviewed ISRs decreased from 2,033 to 1,706, the combined 21-40 age range remained nearly unchanged as a share of the reviewed population, increasing slightly from (57.70%) to (57.85%).



Within the reviewed age groups, the 21–30 age group decreased from 720 reviewed ISRs (35.42%) to 543 (31.84%). The 31–40 age group also decreased slightly in number, from 453 reviewed ISRs (22.28%) to 444 (26.04%), although its proportion of the overall reviewed population increased. The 11–20 age group also declined from 352 reviewed ISRs (17.31%) to 328 (19.23%), although its proportion of the overall reviewed population increased.

Subjects age 51 and older accounted for 246 reviewed ISRs, or (12.10%), during January 1 - June 30, 2025 and 188 reviewed ISRs, or (11.02%), during July 1 - December 31, 2025. The youngest and oldest age categories remained limited in both primary review periods.



Within the deferred ISR population, the largest age group was 21-30, with 25 ISRs, or (25.51%). The 11-20 age group accounted for 22 ISRs, or (22.45%), followed by the 31-40 age group with 19 ISRs, or (19.39%), the 41-50 age group with 16 ISRs, or (16.33%), and the 51-60 age group with 12 ISRs, or (12.24%). The 61-70 age group accounted for 3 ISRs, or (3.06%), and the 81+ age group accounted for 1 ISR, or (1.02%). No deferred ISRs were reported in the 0-10 or 71-80 age groups.


When reviewed separately, the deferred ISR population generally follows the broader age-demographic pattern, with the highest concentration among young adult and adult subjects. Subjects between 21 and 40 accounted for 44 of the 98 deferred ISRs, or (44.90%). Although this share is lower than the 21-40 share in the two primary review periods, the deferred subset still reflects limited representation in the youngest and oldest age categories.

Overall, the age-demographic data remained consistent across the two primary review periods. The 21-30 age group remained the largest reviewed group, and the combined 21-40 age range accounted for more than half of the reviewed ISR population in both periods. The deferred ISR population is presented separately for analytical purposes and is incorporated into 4ASRU's semiannual demographic reporting in accordance with **Paragraph 860** and the Department-level review requirements of **Paragraphs 856 through 858**.



Gender Distribution of Reviewed ISRs

(January 1, 2025–June 30, 2025 vs. July 1, 2025–December 31, 2025)
(Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 842, 848, 857–858)



Across both review periods, the gender distribution of reviewed ISRs remained highly stable and overwhelmingly male, consistent with the Amended Stipulation’s requirements that CPD and 4ASRU analyze investigatory stop activity by demographic characteristics and ensure reviewed samples remain demographically representative of the broader stop population.

January 1 – June 30, 2025 (2,033 ISRs Reviewed):

- Male: 1,763 (86.72%)
- Female: 269 (13.23%)
- X/Unknown: 1 (0.05%)

July 1 – December 31, 2025 (1,706 ISRs Reviewed):

- Male: 1,471 (86.22%)
- Female: 235 (13.78%)
- X/Unknown: 0 (0.00%)

Between the two reporting periods, the share of reviewed ISRs involving male subjects decreased slightly from (86.72%) to (86.22%), (-.50%), while the share involving female subjects increased from (13.23%) to (13.78%), (.54%). The X/Unknown category remained negligible across both periods.

Overall, despite changes in review volume and operational transition activities, the gender composition of reviewed ISRs remained substantially unchanged. Across both periods, approximately seven out of every eight reviewed ISRs involved male subjects, while



approximately one in eight involved female subjects, supporting ongoing demographic monitoring and representative review requirements under the Amended Stipulation.

In addition, 98 ISRs associated with active court proceedings or administrative investigations were deferred from the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period and subsequently reviewed during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 timeframe under separate procedures. Consistent with 4ASRU reporting methodology, these deferred reviews remain attributed to the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period.

Deferred ISR Population (98 ISRs):

- Male: 84 (85.71%)
- Female: 14 (14.29%)

The deferred ISR population closely mirrored the overall gender distribution of the January–June 2025 review population and remained consistent with the demographic trends observed across both primary reporting periods.

Geographic Distribution of Reviewed ISRs by Area and District


January 1 - June 30, 2025 vs. July 1 - December 31, 2025 | Including 98 Deferred ISRs

Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 857, 858, and 860

For this geographic analysis, the reviewed ISR population includes 3,837 ISRs: 2,033 ISRs reviewed during the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, 1,706 ISRs reviewed during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 reporting period, and 98 deferred ISRs associated with January 1 - June 2025 reporting period but reviewed during the later period.




Geographic Distribution by Area and Review Population



At the Area level, the combined reviewed population was concentrated in Areas 1, 3, and 4. Area 1 accounted for the largest share, with 979 reviewed ISRs (25.51%) of the combined population. Area 3 followed with 956 reviewed ISRs (24.92%). Area 4 accounted for 794 reviewed ISRs (20.69%), while Area 2 accounted for 640 reviewed ISRs (16.68%). Area 5 accounted for 458 reviewed ISRs (11.94%). District 31, categorized separately as Other, accounted for 10 reviewed ISRs (0.26%).

Area-Level Combined Ranking






Across the two primary review periods, reviewed ISR volume declined in four of the five Areas. Area 1 decreased from 511 to 435, Area 3 from 506 to 432, Area 4 from 470 to 300, and Area 5 from 233 to 216. Area 2 was the only Area to increase, rising from 310 to 318 reviewed ISRs. The 98 deferred ISRs were distributed across all Areas, with the highest counts in Area 1 (33) and Area 4 (24). The table below provides the supporting Area-level counts for each review population and the combined total.

Area-Level Distribution Table

Area	Jan - Jun 2025	Jul - Dec 2025	Deferred ISRs	Combined Total	% of 3,837
Area 1	511	435	33	979	25.51%
Area 2	310	318	12	640	16.68%
Area 3	506	432	18	956	24.92%
Area 4	470	300	24	794	20.69%
Area 5	233	216	9	458	11.94%
Other / District 31	3	5	2	10	0.26%
Total	2033	1706	98	3837	100.00%

District-Level Combined Ranking

At the district level, District 011 had the highest combined total, with 357 reviewed ISRs (9.30%) of the total reviewed population. District 011 was followed by District 007 with 293 reviewed ISRs (7.64%), District 005 with 290 (7.56%). District 010 with 275 (7.17%), and District 001 with 245 (6.39%). Collectively, these five districts accounted for 1,460 reviewed ISRs (38.05%) of the combined reviewed population.





District-Level Distribution Table

The table below provides the district-level support for the ranking chart. The deferred ISR column is maintained separately so the 98 reviews can be attributed to the January-June 2025 reporting period while still being visible in the combined geographic total.


Area	District	Jan - Jun 2025	Jul - Dec 2025	Deferred ISRs	Combined Total	% of 3837
Area 1	002	71	59	6	136	3.54%
Area 1	003	119	93	9	221	5.76%
Area 1	007	138	146	9	293	7.64%
Area 1	008	107	65	5	177	4.61%
Area 1	009	76	72	4	152	3.96%
Area 2	004	27	44	5	76	1.98%
Area 2	005	149	136	5	290	7.56%
Area 2	006	84	87	1	172	4.48%
Area 2	022	50	51	1	102	2.66%
Area 3	001	133	108	4	245	6.39%
Area 3	012	61	64	7	132	3.44%
Area 3	018	87	102	2	191	4.98%
Area 3	019	44	60	1	105	2.74%
Area 3	020	29	26	1	56	1.46%
Area 3	024	152	72	3	227	5.92%
Area 4	010	151	120	4	275	7.17%
Area 4	011	211	129	17	357	9.30%
Area 4	015	108	51	3	162	4.22%
Area 5	014	35	43	2	80	2.08%
Area 5	016	65	63	3	131	3.41%
Area 5	017	48	44	1	93	2.42%
Area 5	025	85	66	3	154	4.01%
Other	031	3	5	2	10	.26%
Total		2033	1706	98	3837	100.00%



Deferred ISR Geographic Distribution

The 98 deferred ISRs should be reported as a separate subset because they originated from the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period but were completed during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 period. Including them in the combined geographic distribution provides a complete picture of all reviewed ISRs, while separately identifying them preserves period-based reporting accuracy and avoids overstating the July 1 -December 2025 review population.

Geographic Distribution of 98 Deferred ISRs



Overall, the geographic distribution shows that the combined reviewed ISR population was broadly distributed across CPD Areas and districts, with the largest concentrations in Areas 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the highest district-level totals in Districts 011, 007, 005, 010 and 001. This analysis supports 4ASRU’s Department-level review and semiannual reporting responsibilities under Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 857, 858, and 860** by documenting the geographic distribution of reviewed ISRs, identifying district-level concentrations, and preserving a separate accounting for deferred reviews associated with the January 1 - June 30 2025 reporting period.




Comparison of 4ASRU-Reviewed Vehicle and Non-Vehicle Stop Outcomes

January 1–June 30, 2025 and July 1, 2025–December 31, 2025 (Amended Stipulation Paragraphs 842, 848, 857–858)

4ASRU- Reviewed Vehicle and Non-Vehicle Stop Outcomes

Data compares Period 1 (Jan 1–Jun 30, 2025) vs. Period 2 (Jul 1, 2025–Dec 31, 2025)



SUMMARY OF KEY TOTALS			
METRIC	Jan 1–Jun 30, 2025 (Period 1)	Jul 1–Dec 31, 2025 (Period 2)	CHANGE (Period 2 – Period 1)
Total Reviewed Stops	2,033	1,706	-327 (-16.08%)
Total Vehicle Stops	860	734	-126 (-14.65%)
Vehicle Stops with Enforcement Actions	155	149	-6 (-3.87%)

- #### OPERATIONAL OBSERVATIONS
- Total reviewed stops decreased by 16.08%.
 - Non-vehicle stops remained the majority, but their share decreased from 57.70% to 57.01%.
 - Vehicle stops decreased by 14.65%.
 - The rate of enforcement actions from vehicle stops increased slightly from 18.02% to 20.27%.
 - Arrests accounted for a larger share of enforcement actions, increasing from 47.74% to 58.39%.

Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

This section compares vehicle and non-vehicle stop outcomes reviewed by the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) across two reporting periods and reflects the removal of the prior citywide comparison methodology. The analysis is limited to Department-level reviews conducted by 4ASRU and evaluates reviewed stop composition and vehicle stop outcomes over time.

Consistent with the Amended Stipulation, this comparison supports ongoing evaluation of investigatory stop activity, Department-level review practices, operational trend analysis, and representative review sampling associated with demographic and geographic review requirements under Paragraphs 842, 848, 857, and 858.



Overall Stop Distribution

From January 1 - June 30, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 2,033 total stops, consisting of:

- 1,173 Non-Vehicle Stops (57.70%)
- 860 Vehicle Stops (42.30%)

During the subsequent reporting period of July 1 - December 31, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 1,706 total stops, consisting of:

- 972 Non-Vehicle Stops (56.98%)
- 734 Vehicle Stops (43.02%)

Overall reviewed stop volume decreased by 327 stops (16.08%) but percentages stayed consistent between reporting periods (42.30% compared to 43.02%). Despite the lower overall review volume, the distribution of reviewed stop activity remained generally consistent, with a modest shift toward vehicle-related encounters.

Compared with January 1 – June 30, 2025:

- Non-vehicle stops decreased by 201 reviews (-17.13%)
- Vehicle stops decreased by 126 reviews (-14.65%)
- Vehicle stops represented a slightly larger share of reviewed stop activity, increasing from (42.30%) to (43.02%), while the share of non-vehicle stops decreased from (57.70%) to (56.98%).

Across both reporting periods, non-vehicle stops remained the majority of reviewed encounters and continued to represent more than one-half of all 4ASRU-reviewed stop activity.

Vehicle Stop Outcomes

Vehicle stop outcomes remained generally stable across both reporting periods, with verbal warnings continuing to represent the most common reviewed disposition.

During January 1 - June 30, 2025, of the 860 reviewed vehicle stops:

- 705 resulted in a Verbal Warning (81.98%)
- 155 resulted in an Enforcement Action (18.02%)

During July 1 - December 31, 2025, of the 734 reviewed vehicle stops:

- 585 resulted in a Verbal Warning (79.70%)
- 149 resulted in an Enforcement Action (20.30%)

Compared with the prior reporting period:

- Verbal warnings remained the predominant reviewed outcome, decreasing by 120 outcomes (17.02%).
- Although enforcement actions decreased by six outcomes (3.87%), they represented a modestly larger proportion of reviewed vehicle stops than during the previous reporting period.



Although verbal warnings remained the predominant reviewed outcome, enforcement actions represented a modestly larger share of reviewed vehicle stop outcomes during the later reporting period despite a slight decrease in the total number of enforcement actions.

Detailed comparison of vehicle enforcement outcome categories is depicted in the accompanying infographic and is not repeated within this narrative section to avoid duplication.

Overall, comparison of the two reporting periods identified no substantial change in the overall composition of Department-level reviewed stop activity. Although modest shifts occurred in the proportional distribution of reviewed stop types and vehicle stop outcomes, the overall distribution of 4ASRU-reviewed stop activity remained generally consistent across both reporting periods. These findings provide additional context for Department-level monitoring of reviewed stop patterns and supervisory review practices under Amended Stipulation **Paragraphs 842, 848, 857, and 858.**

Deferred Vehicle-Related Encounters

★ Enforcement Outcomes Overview ★



Total Deferred Vehicle-Related Encounters: **43**

1. PRIMARY OUTCOME (ALL 43 ENCOUNTERS)

11 encounters (25.58%) resulted in verbal warnings



Verbal Warnings

11 (25.58%)

32 encounters (74.42%) involved vehicle enforcement actions



Vehicle Enforcement Actions

32 (74.42%)



2. OF THE 32 ENFORCEMENT-RELATED VEHICLE ENCOUNTERS:



1

resulted in a traffic citation



31

resulted in an arrest



Most deferred vehicle-related encounters involved enforcement action, and nearly all enforcement actions resulted in arrest.



Percentages for verbal warnings and vehicle enforcement actions are based on all 43 deferred vehicle-related encounters. The traffic citation and arrest figures reflect the breakdown of the 32 enforcement-related vehicle encounters.

Analysis of the deferred ISR population showed that non-vehicle investigatory stops represented the largest category, accounting for 55 of the 98 deferred ISRs (56.12%). Vehicle-related enforcement activity accounted for the remaining 43 deferred ISRs (43.88%).

Among the deferred vehicle-related encounters, enforcement outcomes varied. Eleven encounters (25.58%) of vehicle stops resulted in verbal warnings, while 32 encounters (74.42%) involved vehicle enforcement actions. Of the enforcement-related vehicle encounters, one resulted in a traffic citation and 31 resulted in an arrest.

Overall, the deferred ISR population reflects a higher concentration of enforcement-related outcomes than typically observed in the broader Department-level review population. This distribution is consistent with the operational reality that ISRs associated with active judicial proceedings, arrests, or administrative review are more likely to require temporary review deferral while preserving evidentiary integrity and coordinating with ongoing legal processes.



Jane/John Doe ISRs

Comparison of Department-Level Review Outcomes January 1–June 30, 2025 vs. July 1, 2025–December 31, 2025 (Amended ISR Stipulation Paragraph 857(a)–(c))

COMPARISON OF JANE/JOHN DOE ISR REVIEW OUTCOMES

(DEPARTMENT-LEVEL REVIEWS)

January 1–June 30, 2025
(Jan–Jun 2025)
vs.
July 1 -
December 31, 2025
(Jul–Dec 2025)

Jane/John Doe ISRs remain a stable proportion of Department-level reviewed activity across both reporting periods.

Jan–Jun 2025: 4ASRU reviewed 107 Jane/John Doe ISRs out of 2,033 total reviewed ISRs, representing 5.26% of reviewed activity.

Jul - Dec 2025: 4ASRU reviewed 86 Jane/John Doe ISRs out of 1,706 total reviewed ISRs, representing 5.04% of reviewed activity.

Although the total reviewed Doe population decreased slightly (107 to 86; -19.6%), the proportional share of Doe ISRs remained stable across both periods.

JANE/JOHN DOE ISR REVIEW OUTCOME DISTRIBUTIONS

Outcome	Jan–Jun 2025	Jul–Dec 2025	Change
Concur	31 (28.97%)	26 (30.23%)	Stable
Administrative Deficiency	47 (43.93%)	14 (16.28%)	Decrease (-27.65%)
Deficiency	29 (27.10%)	46 (53.49%)	Increase (+26.39%)
Total Doe ISRs	107	86	-19.63%

METHODOLOGY & STIPULATION CITATION

Jane/John Doe ISRs represent encounters in which the subject could not be identified at the time of documentation. Across both review periods, this population remained relatively stable as a proportion of Department-level reviewed ISRs and generally accounted for approximately five percent of the overall review population.

Amended ISR Stipulation Paragraphs 842, 848, 857(a)-(c), and 858

KEY TAKEAWAY

Overall, Jane/John Doe ISRs remained a stable proportion of Department-level reviewed activity across both reporting periods, while review outcomes reflected fewer Administrative Deficiency findings and a higher proportion of Deficiency findings.

Jane/John Doe ISRs represent encounters in which the subject could not be identified at the time of documentation. Across both review periods, this population remained relatively stable as a proportion of Department-level reviewed ISRs and generally accounted for approximately five percent of the overall review population.

From January 1 - June 30, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 107 Jane/John Doe ISRs out of 2,033 total reviewed ISRs, representing (5.26%) of reviewed activity.

From July 1 - December 31, 2025, 4ASRU reviewed 86 Jane/John Doe ISRs out of 1,706 total reviewed ISRs, representing (5.04%) of reviewed activity.

Although the total reviewed Doe population decreased slightly from 107 to 86 ISRs (19.63%), the proportional share of Doe ISRs within the reviewed population decreased only slightly, from (5.26%) to (5.04%) (0.22 percentage points), and remained generally stable across both reporting periods.

Importantly, unlike the broader ISR review population which included deferred reviews associated with active court proceedings and administrative investigations, the Jane/John Doe ISR population was not materially affected by the deferrals. Of the 98 deferred ISRs originating from the January 1 - June 30, 2025 reporting period, only four involved Jane/John Doe ISRs, consisting of:

- 2 Administrative Deficiency findings
- 2 Deficiency findings

No deferred Jane/John Doe ISRs resulted in a Concur outcome. Given the limited number of deferred Doe ISRs, these deferred reviews cases did not materially affect overall trend interpretation for the Jane/John Doe population or alter the observed distribution of review outcomes.



Overall, the findings indicate that while Jane/John Doe encounters continued at a consistent rate, review outcomes shifted away from Administrative Deficiency findings and toward Deficiency findings across the two reporting periods. These findings support continued Department-level emphasis on complete documentation, compliance with reporting requirements, and reviewer feedback to promote consistency in investigatory stop reporting and documentation practices.

Consistent with Amended ISR Stipulation **Paragraph 857(a)-(c)**, Department-level reviews continue to evaluate whether officers completely documented the factors supporting reasonable articulable suspicion, thoroughly completed required reporting elements, and complied with CPD policy and documentation standards.

Deficiency and Administrative Notification Analysis

During this review period, 4ASRU evaluated the officer's ability to accurately complete ISRs and properly document the observations supporting RAS for the reported stop, protective pat-down, or search. Consistent with **Paragraph 857** of the Consent Decree, reviewer findings focused on the completeness, clarity, and sufficiency of the written documentation contained within the ISR.

Articulation-related deficiencies were categorized as follows:

1. Insufficient Reasonable Articulable Suspicion — Some Facts to Support RAS:

The ISR documented articulable facts related to the reported enforcement action; however, the narrative lacked sufficient specificity, detail, clarity, or completeness to adequately explain the basis for the action.

2. Insufficient Articulation to Support RAS — “No Facts Articulated”:

The ISR failed to document specific facts supporting the officer's stated basis for the reported enforcement action.

Administrative deficiencies consisted of procedural, technical, or clerical errors within the ISR, including incomplete data fields, inaccurate classifications, coding errors, or unclear narrative language.

During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period, 4ASRU identified 7 deficiency findings (0.34%) categorized as “No Facts Articulated.” This review category was used to identify reports in which the narrative failed to provide specific factual support for the documented stop, protective pat-down, or search.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period, the “No Facts Articulated” reviewer category was eliminated and replaced with more specific, standardized reviewer language tied to the documented enforcement action, applicable reporting requirements, and documentation guidance. This change supported the Department's ongoing preparation for the revised Stop Report and IDR infrastructure and standardized reviewer language model scheduled for implementation after the reporting period. As a result, the “No Facts Articulated” category applies only to the January 1 – June 30, 2025 review period and is not directly compared to the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period.

Accordingly, the absence of “No Facts Articulated” findings during the later review period reflects a transition in reviewer-language structure rather than the absence of articulation-related documentation concerns.



Deficiencies (RAS related) Deficiency-Officers by Number of Deficiencies

The distribution of RAS-related deficiencies among officers demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of identified deficiencies during both review periods involved officers receiving only a single articulation-related deficiency. During the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period, 162 officers (75.35%) received one RAS-related deficiency, while 180 officers (77.59%) received one RAS-related deficiency during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period.

This consistency indicates that most deficiencies identified by 4ASRU involved individual documentation concerns rather than repeated patterns of articulation-related deficiencies.

Officers with multiple deficiencies represented a significantly smaller portion of the review population. During the later review period, officers receiving three or more RAS-related deficiencies increased modestly when compared to the earlier review period. Specifically, officers receiving three deficiencies increased from 6 to 11, four deficiencies increased from 4 to 5, and five deficiencies increased from 3 to 5. Additionally, three officers received six deficiencies during the later review period, while during the earlier review period, one officer reached eight deficiencies and one officer reached eleven deficiencies.

The deferred ISR population associated with the January 1 - June 30, 2025 review period reflected a substantially different distribution pattern. Of the 21 officers associated with deferred RAS-related deficiencies, 20 officers (95.24%) received only one deficiency and one officer (4.75%) received two deficiencies. No officers within the deferred ISR population received more than two RAS-related deficiencies.

Overall, the data indicate that articulation-related deficiencies were generally distributed across a broad officer population rather than concentrated among a small number of officers with repeated deficiencies. While the later review period reflected a modest increase in officers receiving three or more RAS-related deficiencies, the overwhelming majority of officers in both review periods received only a single articulation-related deficiency.

The absence of the "No Facts Articulated" reviewer category during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period should not be interpreted as indicating an absence of articulation-related documentation concerns. As previously noted, the reviewer category associated with the "No Facts Articulated" finding was eliminated during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period. During that period, articulation-related concerns were addressed through more specific, standardized reviewer-language categories associated with the documented stop, protective pat-down, or search. Accordingly, the absence of "No Facts Articulated" findings during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 period reflects a transition in reviewer-language structure rather than the absence of articulation-related documentation concerns.



DEFICIENCIES (RAS-RELATED) – OFFICERS BY NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES

NUMBER OF RAS-RELATED DEFICIENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	TOTAL OFFICERS
01 JAN 2025 – 30 JUN 2025	162 75.35%	38 17.67%	6 2.79%	4 1.86%	3 1.40%	-	-	1 0.47%	-	-	1 0.47%	215
DEFERRED 98 – 01 JAN TO 30 JUN 2025	20 95.24%	1 4.76%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21
01 JUL 2025 – 31 DEC 2025	180 77.59%	28 12.07%	11 4.74%	5 2.16%	5 2.16%	3 1.29%	-	-	-	-	-	232
TOTAL	362 77.51%	67 14.31%	17 3.64%	9 1.93%	8 1.71%	3 0.64%	-	1 0.21%	-	-	1 0.21%	468



Administrative Deficiencies (Receipt/ Clerical issues)

Administrative Deficiency – Officers by Number of Administrative Deficiencies

The distribution of Administrative Deficiencies among officers demonstrates that the majority of identified deficiencies during all review populations involved officers receiving only a single Administrative Deficiency. During the January 1 - June 30 2025 review period, 162 officers (78.26%) received one Administrative Deficiency, while 150 officers (87.72%) also received one Administrative Deficiency during the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period. This consistency indicates that most Administrative Deficiencies identified by 4ASRU involved individual documentation or procedural concerns rather than recurring administrative reporting deficiencies.



ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCY – OFFICERS BY NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES

NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEFICIENCIES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9	10	TOTAL OFFICERS
01 JAN 2025 – 30 JUN 2025	162 78.26%	25 12.08%	7 3.38%	4 1.93%	2 0.97%	2 0.97%	1 0.48%	2 0.97%	1 0.48%	207
DEFERRED 98 – 01 JAN TO 30 JUN 2025	25 96.15%	1 3.85%	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	26
01 JUL 2025 – 31 DEC 2025	150 87.72%	18 10.53%	3 1.75%	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	171
TOTAL	337 83.42%	44 10.89%	10 2.48%	4 0.99%	2 0.49%	2 0.49%	1 0.25%	2 0.49%	1 0.25%	404

Officers with multiple Administrative Deficiencies represented a substantially smaller portion of the review population. During the January - June 2025 review period, 25 officers received two Administrative Deficiencies, while smaller numbers of officers received three or more Administrative Deficiencies. The highest Administrative Deficiency totals identified during that review period involved one officer receiving ten Administrative Deficiencies and one officer receiving nine Administrative Deficiencies.

The deferred ISR population associated with the January 1 - June 2025 review period reflected a distribution heavily concentrated among officers receiving only one Administrative Deficiency. Of the 26 officers associated with deferred Administrative Deficiencies, 25 officers (96.15%) received only one Administrative Deficiency and one officer (3.85%) received two Administrative Deficiencies. No officers within the deferred ISR population received more than two Administrative Deficiencies.

During the July 1 - December 31, 2025 review period, the Administrative Deficiency distribution was concentrated among officers receiving only one or two deficiencies. Specifically, 150 officers (87.72%) received one Administrative Deficiency and 18 officers (10.53%) received two Administrative Deficiencies. No officers during the review period received more than three Administrative Deficiencies.

Overall, the data indicate that Administrative Deficiencies were broadly distributed across the reviewed officer population and were generally limited in frequency per officer. Across all review populations, the overwhelming majority of officers associated with Administrative Deficiencies received either one or two deficiencies, while officers receiving higher Administrative Deficiency totals remained comparatively rare.



Email Notifications to Department Members by Outcome and Review Period

For ISRs identified as containing documentation deficiencies, 4ASRU did not notify the report author or approving supervisor via email during these reporting periods. During 2025, the Department was preparing for implementation of the revised Fourth Amendment policy suite, the Stop Application, and the IDR Application. Accordingly, no retrospective recommendations were issued regarding individual documentation deficiencies identified under the review framework in effect during these reporting periods.

An exception to this practice applied when an officer submitted five or more ISRs receiving deficiency findings within a rolling 90-day period. Pursuant to **Paragraph 859** of the Consent Decree, 4ASRU was required to recommend that the officer and their supervisor review the associated BWC footage to address insufficient documentation of reasonable articulable suspicion.

During the reviewed populations, two department members accumulated five deficiencies within a rolling 90-day period, while two department members accumulated six or more deficiencies within a rolling 90-day period.

The deferred ISR population associated with the January 1–June 30, 2025 review period did not identify any officers who accumulated five or more Administrative Deficiencies. Accordingly, the deferred reviews did not affect the population of officers meeting the five-deficiency notification threshold.

Conclusion

This report compares Department-level ISR review activity during the January 1 – June 30, 2025 and July 1 – December 31, 2025 reporting periods. Throughout these periods, 4ASRU continued to evaluate review outcomes, identify recurring documentation concerns, and assess trends related to investigatory stops, gang and narcotics loitering enforcement, vehicle and non-vehicle stops, supervisory approval timeliness, demographic patterns, and review deficiencies. These efforts remained aligned with the Amended ISR Stipulation's requirements for Department-level review, supervisory accountability, data analysis, and ongoing monitoring of investigatory stop practices.

Comparison of the two reporting periods demonstrated that review outcomes remained generally consistent while reflecting operational changes, including a smaller review population, the temporary deferral of certain court-related or administrative-investigation ISRs, and the Department's preparation for future policy and reporting changes. Although modest variations were identified across several review categories, the overall distribution of reviewed activity remained generally stable throughout 2025.

The 98 deferred ISRs associated with the January 1 – June 30, 2025 reporting period were reviewed separately and are reported independently within this report. This approach preserves the integrity of the original reporting period while recognizing that review of those ISRs was delayed because of court-related or administrative-review considerations. Reporting the deferred ISRs separately also prevents the July 1 –December 31, 2025 review population from being overstated while ensuring that all completed Department-level reviews are fully documented.

The report's findings continue to demonstrate the importance of clear, specific, and complete documentation. Recurring concerns involving reasonable articulable suspicion, report narratives, supervisory review, enforcement outcomes, and gang and narcotics loitering documentation reinforce the need for continued training, supervisory engagement, and reviewer feedback. The findings also support continued use of process-oriented guidance, report-writing resources, and targeted training to improve articulation, reduce recurring documentation errors, and strengthen consistency among Department members and supervisory personnel. Consistent with the Amended ISR Stipulation, Department-level reviews continue to assess whether officers thoroughly documented the factors supporting reasonable articulable suspicion, completed required reporting elements, and whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy.



Overall, this report documents 4ASRU's continued role in supporting constitutional policing, transparency, supervisory accountability, and data-informed reform. The analyses presented provide Department leadership with a comprehensive assessment of review activity, recurring documentation trends, and supervisory review practices throughout the 2025 reporting periods, supporting CPD's ongoing obligations under the Amended ISR Stipulation and its commitment to constitutional policing and police legitimacy.



RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

Relevant Consent Decree Paragraphs

The following consent decree paragraphs are referenced at the top of some pages by the symbol ¶.

- ¶153 CPD’s use of force policies, as well as its training, supervision, and accountability systems, must ensure that: CPD officers use force in accordance with federal law, state law, and the requirements of this Agreement; CPD officers apply de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible; when using force, CPD officers only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances; and any use of unreasonable or unnecessary force is promptly identified and responded to appropriately.
- ¶154 CPD adopted revised use of force policies on October 16, 2017 (“October 2017 Policies”). The October 2017 Policies incorporated multiple best practices that were not reflected in CPD’s prior use of force policies. Building on these improvements, CPD will maintain the best practices reflected in the October 2017 Policies and make additional improvements to its policies consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
- ¶155 CPD officers have the authority to use force, but that authority is limited by the law and Department policy. The provisions of this Agreement seek to facilitate compliance with the law and Department policy regarding the use of force to reduce the circumstances in which using force is necessary, and to ensure accountability when CPD officers use force that is not objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶156 CPD’s use of force policies and training, supervision, and accountability systems will be designed, implemented, and maintained so that CPD members:
- a. act at all times in a manner consistent with the sanctity of human life;
 - b. act at all times with a high degree of ethics, professionalism, and respect for the public;
 - c. use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible;
 - d. use sound tactics to eliminate the need to use force or reduce the amount of force that is needed;
 - e. only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances;
 - f. only use force for a lawful purpose and not to punish or retaliate;
 - g. continually assess the situation and modify the use of force as circumstances change and in ways that are consistent with officer safety, including stopping the use of force when it is no longer necessary;
 - h. truthfully and completely report all reportable instances of force used;
 - i. promptly report any use of force that is excessive or otherwise in violation of policy;
 - j. are held accountable, consistent with complaint and disciplinary policies, for use of force that is not objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, or that otherwise violates law or policy; and
 - k. act in a manner that promotes trust between CPD and the communities it serves.
- ¶157 CPD will collect and analyze information on the use of force by CPD members, including whether and to what extent CPD members use de-escalation techniques in connection with use of force incidents. CPD will use this information to assess whether its policies, training, tactics, and practices meet the goals of this Agreement, reflect best practices, and prevent or reduce the need to use force.
- ¶161 CPD recently adopted de-escalation as a core principle. CPD officers must use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible. CPD officers are required to de-escalate potential and ongoing use of force incidents whenever safe and feasible through the use of techniques that may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- a. using time as a tactic by slowing down the pace of an incident;
 - b. employing tactical positioning and re-positioning to isolate and contain a subject, to create distance between an officer



and a potential threat, or to utilize barriers or cover;

c. continual communication, including exercising persuasion and advice, and providing a warning prior to the use of force;

d. requesting assistance from other officers, mental health personnel, or specialized units, as necessary and appropriate; and

e. where appropriate, use trauma-informed communication techniques, including acknowledging confusion or mistrust, or using a respectful tone.

- ¶162 Consistent with CPD's commitment to preventing and reducing the need for force, CPD officers will allow individuals to voluntarily comply with lawful orders whenever safe and feasible (e.g., allowing individuals the opportunity to submit to arrest before force is used).
- ¶163 CPD officers may only use force for a lawful purpose. CPD officers are prohibited from using force as punishment or retaliation, such as using force to punish or retaliate against a person for fleeing, resisting arrest, insulting an officer, or engaging in protected First Amendment activity (e.g., lawful demonstrations, protected speech, observing or filming police activity, or criticizing an officer or the officer's conduct).
- ¶164 CPD officers must only use force when it is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶165 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force except in circumstances where there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person. CPD officers are not permitted to use deadly force against a person who is a threat only to himself or herself or to property. CPD officers may only use deadly force as a last resort.
- ¶166 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing subjects who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.
- ¶168 Starting no later than January 1, 2019, CPD will track and analyze the frequency with which CPD officers engage in foot pursuits of persons attempting to evade arrest or detention by fleeing on foot, regardless of whether the foot pursuit is associated with a reportable use of force incident. CPD will track foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents through TRRs or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement.
- ¶169 For foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents, by January 1, 2020, CPD will review all associated foot pursuits at the headquarters level to identify any tactical, equipment, or training concerns.
- ¶170 CPD recently issued a foot pursuit training bulletin. By July 1, 2019, CPD will develop and issue a supplemental foot pursuit training bulletin that reflects best practices from foot pursuit policies in other jurisdictions. The supplemental training bulletin will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and OAG. The supplemental training bulletin will:
- a. identify risks and tactical factors officers should consider prior to initiating and during the course of a foot pursuit;
 - b. provide guidance to officers regarding radio communications during a foot pursuit;
 - c. instruct officers to avoid, to the extent practical, separating from other officers in the course of a foot pursuit;
 - d. provide guidance on circumstances when alternatives to a foot pursuit may be appropriate; and
 - e. inform officers that they must follow supervisors' instructions in the course of a foot pursuit, including instructions to alter tactics or discontinue the pursuit.
- ¶172 By no later than January 1, 2021, the Monitor will complete an assessment of CPD data and information to determine whether CPD should adopt a foot pursuit policy. If the Monitor recommends that CPD should adopt a foot pursuit policy, CPD will adopt a foot pursuit policy no later than July 1, 2021. Any foot pursuit policy adopted by CPD will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and OAG.
- ¶173 Following a use of force, once the scene is safe and as soon as practicable, CPD officers must immediately request



appropriate medical aid for injured persons or persons who claim they are injured.

- ¶176 CPD officers must recognize and act upon the duty to intervene on the subject's behalf when another officer is using excessive force.
- ¶177 Consistent with CPD policy that force must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, CPD officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.
- ¶178 CPD officers are prohibited from using carotid artery restraints or chokeholds (or other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway, i.e., the front of the neck, with the intention of reducing the intake of air) unless deadly force is authorized. CPD officers must not use chokeholds or other maneuvers for intentionally putting pressure on a person's airway or carotid artery restraints as take-down techniques.
- ¶179 CPD's use of force policies must guide officers on all force techniques, technologies, and weapons that CPD officers are authorized to use. CPD's use of force policies must clearly define and describe each force option and the circumstances under which use of such force is appropriate to address potential types of resistance.
- ¶183 CPD will require officers to issue a verbal warning prior to the use of any reportable force, including the use of firearms, when it is safe and feasible to do so.
- ¶184 When CPD officers discharge firearms, they must continually assess the circumstances that necessitated the discharge and modify their use of force accordingly, including ceasing to use their firearm when the circumstances no longer require it (e.g., when a subject is no longer a threat).
- ¶185 CPD will continue to prohibit officers from firing warning shots.
- ¶186 CPD officers must not fire at moving vehicles when the vehicle is the only force used against the officer or another person, except in extreme circumstances when it is a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily harm to a person, such as when a vehicle is intentionally being used to attack a person or group of people. CPD will continue to instruct officers to avoid positioning themselves or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, and will provide officers with adequate training to ensure compliance with this instruction.
- ¶187 CPD will prohibit officers from firing from a moving vehicle unless such force is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life or to prevent great bodily harm to the officer or another person.
- ¶188 By January 1, 2019, CPD will develop a training bulletin that provides guidance on weapons discipline, including circumstances in which officers should and should not point a firearm at a person. CPD will incorporate training regarding pointing of a firearm in the annual use of force training required by this Agreement in 2019.
- ¶189 CPD will clarify in policy that when a CPD officer points a firearm at a person to detain the person, an investigatory stop or an arrest has occurred, which must be documented. CPD will also clarify in policy that officers will only point a firearm at a person when objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶190 Beginning July 1, 2019, CPD officers will, at a minimum, promptly after the incident is concluded, notify OEMC of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer points a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The notification will identify which CPD beat(s) pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The City will ensure that OEMC data recording each such notification is electronically linked with CPD reports and body-worn camera recordings associated with the incident, and all are retained and readily accessible to the supervisor of each CPD beat(s) identified in the notification.
- ¶191 OEMC will notify an immediate supervisor of the identified beat(s) each time the pointing of a firearm is reported. Notified CPD supervisors will ensure that the investigatory stop or arrest documentation and the OEMC recordation of the pointing of a firearm are promptly reviewed in accordance with CPD policy. CPD supervisors will effectively supervise the CPD



- members under their command consistent with their obligations set forth in the Supervision section of this Agreement.
- ¶192 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected from all investigatory stop and arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting a seizure. The review and audit will be completed within 30 days of each such occurrence. This review and audit will:
- identify whether the pointing of the firearm at a person allegedly violated CPD policy;
 - identify any patterns in such occurrences and, to the extent necessary, ensure that any concerns are addressed; and
 - identify any tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns and, to the extent necessary, ensure that the concerns are addressed.
- The designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will, where applicable, make appropriate referrals for misconduct investigations or other corrective actions for alleged violations of CPD policy. At the completion of each review and audit, the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will issue a written notification of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to an immediate supervisor as described above.
- ¶193 CPD will ensure that the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level responsible for performing the duties required by this Part has sufficient resources to perform them, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶194 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of the pointing of a firearm at a person when the CPD officer is a SWAT Team Officer responding to a designated SWAT incident, as defined in CPD Special Order S05-05, or an officer assigned to a federal task force during the execution of federal task force duties.
- ¶195 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of any unholstering or display of a firearm or having a firearm in a “low ready” position during the course of an investigation, unless the firearm is pointed at a person.
- ¶196 The City will ensure that all documentation and recordation of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD member points a firearm at a person, including OEMC data, is maintained in a manner that allows the Monitor, CPD, and OAG to review and analyze such occurrences. Beginning January 1, 2020, the Monitor will analyze these occurrences on an annual basis to assess whether changes to CPD policy, training, practice, or supervision are necessary, and to recommend any changes to the process of documenting, reviewing, and analyzing these occurrences. CPD will either adopt the Monitor’s recommendations or respond in writing within 30 days. Any dispute regarding the whether the Monitor’s recommendations should be implemented will be resolved by the Court.
- ¶198 CPD will instruct officers that Tasers can cause serious injury or death and, as a result, officers should use Tasers only after balancing relevant factors including the threat presented by the subject, the risk of injury if a Taser is used, and the seriousness of the suspected offense. Consistent with this standard, CPD officers should not use Tasers against persons who are reasonably perceived to be non-violent, unarmed, and suspected of low-level offenses, such as property-related misdemeanors, quality of life offenses, moving or traffic violations, or municipal code violations.
- ¶200 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must give verbal commands and warnings prior to, during, and after deployment of a Taser. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers will allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use a Taser, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶204 CPD officers must:
- determine the necessity, objective reasonableness, and proportionality of Taser use based on the totality of the circumstances, including the subject’s apparent age, size, physical and mental condition, disability, and impairment;
 - not use Tasers in drive-stun mode unless the subject is an assailant and other force options are not readily available or would otherwise be ineffective;



- c. when practicable, avoid the use of Tasers when it is reasonably evident that a deployment may cause serious physical injury, including if the subject is elevated above the ground, if the subject is operating or riding any mode of transportation, or if the subject may be less able to catch or protect themselves in a fall;
- d. not use Tasers in any environment that contains potentially flammable, volatile, or explosive material;
- e. not use Tasers on a subject who is at a greater risk of serious injury or death from Taser use, including, but not limited to, children, pregnant individuals, and the elderly, unless the subject is an assailant and other force options are not readily available or would otherwise be ineffective;
- f. target the Taser in probe mode at the lower center mass and avoid the head, neck, and genitalia;
- g. not activate more than one Taser at a time against a subject, unless an officer already attempted to use a Taser against the subject but the probes did not make contact with the subject; and
- h. keep Tasers in a weak-side holster.

- ¶207 CPD officers may use OC devices only when such force is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.
- ¶209 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must issue verbal commands and warnings to the subject prior to, during, and after the discharge of an OC device. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD will require officers to allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use an OC device, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶213 CPD officers must not use impact weapons (e.g., baton, asp, improvised impact weapons) to intentionally strike a subject in the head or neck, except when deadly force is justified.
- ¶214 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must give verbal commands and warnings prior to, during, and after using an impact weapon.
- ¶216 CPD officers must request appropriate medical aid for a subject who experiences an impact weapon strike when the subject appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury, or when the subject sustained a strike to the head from an impact weapon or a hard, fixed object. CPD officers must render life-saving aid to the subject consistent with the officers' training until medical professionals arrive on scene.
- ¶217 To be effective, the foundation of CPD's accountability system must be CPD members. When CPD members use force, they must be able to demonstrate that the force used complies with the law and CPD policy. When a member's use of force does not comply with the law and CPD policy, the member's supervisors must be able to identify the non-compliance and take appropriate action to address it. To facilitate evaluation of how CPD members use force, CPD will ensure that members report incidents when they use force and that supervisors collect and review available information about the incidents.
- ¶219 Whenever a CPD member engages in a reportable use of force, the member must complete a TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. In addition to completing the TRR, officers must also document the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action per CPD policy. CPD may allow members requiring medical attention a reasonable amount of additional time to complete the required documentation. CPD may allow supervisors to complete the TRR for members who are unable to complete the report due to injury or in other extraordinary circumstances.
- ¶220 In completing the TRR, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, CPD members must include a narrative that describes with specificity the use of force incident, the subject's actions, or other circumstances necessitating the level of force used; and the involved member's response, including de-escalation efforts attempted and the specific types and amounts of force used. The narrative requirement does not apply to CPD members who discharged a firearm in the performance of duty or participated in an officer-involved death in the performance of duty. Any CPD member who



- observes or is present when another CPD member discharges a firearm or uses other deadly force must complete a written witness statement prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. CPD members will note in their TRRs the existence of any body-worn camera or in-car camera audio or video footage, and whether any such footage was viewed in advance of completing the TRR or any other incident reports. CPD members must complete TRRs, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, and other reports related to the incident, truthfully and thoroughly.
- ¶221 Any CPD member who engages in a reportable use of force must immediately report the incident to OEMC. OEMC is required to notify the involved member's immediate supervisor and the Watch Operations Lieutenant of the district of occurrence.
- ¶222 A CPD supervisor will immediately respond to the scene when a level 2 or level 3 reportable use of force occurs ("responding supervisor"). CPD supervisors may, at their discretion, respond to the scene when a level 1 reportable use of force occurs, but they are not required to do so.
- ¶223 For level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, the duties of the responding supervisor will include, at a minimum:
- identifying known available witnesses to the use of force to the extent reasonably possible and documenting their identities and statements in a written report, except in incidents for which the Civilian Office of Police Accountability ("COPA") receives administrative notifications and responds to the scene;
 - coordinating with COPA, as appropriate;
 - gathering and preserving evidence related to the use of force;
 - requesting the assignment of an evidence technician to photograph persons involved in the incident, including any injuries sustained;
 - ensuring that members and subjects receive appropriate medical care;
 - making notifications as required by CPD policy;
 - and g. reviewing reports regarding the incident for legibility and completeness.
- ¶224 In addition, for level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents involving an injury or complaint of injury for which COPA does not have jurisdiction, the responding supervisor will undertake reasonable efforts to identify and interview additional witnesses beyond those that are known and available.
- ¶225 A supervisor who used force or ordered force to be used during a reportable use of force incident will not perform the duties assigned to the responding supervisor for that incident.
- ¶226 CPD will continue to require the responding supervisor to document information collected and actions taken in performing his or her investigatory duties in the supervisor's portion of the TRR, or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement.
- ¶227 Any CPD member who becomes aware of information indicating that a reportable use of force occurred but was not reported must immediately notify his or her supervisor.
- ¶228 Supervisors play a critical role in ensuring that force is used legally, consistent with CPD policy, and in a manner that will promote community confidence in the Department. Supervisor reviews and investigations of uses of force are essential to identify necessary individual and departmental corrective action.
- ¶229 All reportable uses of force by CPD members must be reviewed by CPD supervisors.
- ¶230 After a reportable use of force has occurred, required TRRs have been completed, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 incidents, a responding supervisor has documented any investigatory information collected, the incident will be reviewed and evaluated by a CPD supervisor at least the rank of Lieutenant, and in all instances at least one rank level above that of the highest-ranking member who engaged in the reportable use of force, or by a command staff member, when designated ("reviewing supervisor").
- ¶231 The reviewing supervisor will conduct an investigation into the reportable use of force incident by reviewing all information reasonably available regarding the incident, including written reports, video or audio recordings, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, witness statements, photographs (if available), and other evidence or information collected by the responding supervisor. After advising the subject of his or her right not to answer



questions and other applicable rights, and only if the subject voluntarily consents to an interview, the reviewing supervisor will interview the subject solely about the reportable use of force. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will visually inspect the subject and document any injuries observed.

- ¶232 For all reportable uses of force, the reviewing supervisor will determine, based on the information reviewed, if the use of force requires a notification to COPA and will assess whether the use of force was in compliance with CPD policy (except for incidents involving deadly force or an officer-involved death). The reviewing supervisor will also review the TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, for sufficiency and completeness.
- ¶233 For all reportable use of force incidents, the reviewing supervisor will: provide timely, constructive feedback, where appropriate, to the officer who engaged in the reportable use of force, the officer's supervisor, or both; recommend additional training and/or support as necessary based on the incident; take appropriate action, including referring uses of force that may violate law or CPD policy to COPA.
- ¶234 CPD will continue to require the reviewing supervisor to document in a Tactical Response Report – Investigation ("TRR-I"), or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, his or her detailed assessment of compliance with CPD policy, any constructive feedback, and any required or recommended action. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will include in the TRR-I or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, the identities of CPD members on scene during the incident who are reasonably believed to have relevant knowledge or information regarding the reportable use of force.
- ¶235 All district-level supervisory review documentation regarding a reportable use of force incident must be completed within 48 hours of the incident, unless an extension is approved by a command staff member.
- ¶236 CPD will continue to develop, implement, and maintain a system of video recording officers' encounters with the public with body-worn cameras. The use of body-worn cameras will be designed to increase officer accountability, improve trust and CPD legitimacy in the community, and augment CPD's records of law enforcement-related activities.
- ¶237 CPD will continue to require all officers assigned to patrol field duties to wear body-worn cameras and microphones with which to record law-enforcement related activities as outlined in the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq.), with limited exceptions, including, but not limited to, when requested by a victim or witness of a crime, or interacting with a confidential informant. CPD will develop and implement a written policy delineating the circumstances when officers will not be equipped with body-worn cameras.
- ¶238 CPD will continue to maintain a policy regarding body-worn camera video and audio recording that will require officers to record their law-enforcement related activities, and that will ensure the recordings are retained in compliance with the Department's Forms Retention Schedule (CPD-11.717) and the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act. At a minimum, CPD's body-worn camera policy will:
- a. clearly state which officers are required to use body-worn cameras and under which circumstances;
 - b. require officers, subject to limited exceptions specified in writing, to activate their cameras when responding to calls for service and during all law enforcement-related activities that occur while on duty, and to continue recording until the conclusion of the incident(s);
 - c. require officers to articulate in writing or on camera their reason(s) for failing to record an activity that CPD policy otherwise requires to be recorded;
 - d. require officers to inform subjects that they are being recorded unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible;
 - e. address relevant privacy considerations, including restrictions on recording inside a home, and the need to protect witnesses, victims, and children;
 - f. establish a download and retention protocol;



g. require periodic random review of officers' videos for compliance with CPD policy and training purposes;
h. require that the reviewing supervisor review videos of incidents involving reportable uses of force by a subordinate; and i. specify that officers who knowingly fail to comply with the policy may be subject to progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action.

¶239 CPD officers must comply with the body-worn camera policy. CPD will impose progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action on officers who do not comply with the body-worn camera policy, as permitted by applicable law.

¶569 CPD must collect, track, and maintain all available documents related to use of force incidents, including:

- a. TRRs, or any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement for initial reporting of reportable use of force incidents;
- b. TRR-Is, or any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement to document supervisory investigation of reportable use of force incidents;
- c. Tactical Response Reports – Review (“TRR-Rs”), or any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement to document review or auditing of reportable use of force incidents;
- d. arrest reports, original case incident reports, and investigatory stop reports associated with a reportable use of force incident;
- e. administrative investigative files, including investigative materials generated, collected, or received by BIA, or COPA, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement for misconduct allegations or civilian complaints; and
- f. all reasonably available documentation and materials relating to any reportable use of force, in-custody injury or death, or misconduct allegation, including body-worn, in-car, or known third-party camera recordings, and statements, notes, or recordings from witness and officer interviews.

¶574 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected regarding each level 2 reportable use of force incident, a representative sample of level 1 reportable use of force, and incidents involving accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries to ensure:

- a. CPD members completely and thoroughly reported the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action, the type and amount of force used, the subject's actions or other circumstances necessitating the level of force, and all efforts to de-escalate the situation;
- b. the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident were thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy;
- c. any tactical, equipment, or policy concerns are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed; and
- d. any patterns related to use of force incidents are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed.

¶575 CPD recently established a Force Review Unit (“FRU”) and tasked the FRU with certain responsibilities described in the preceding paragraph. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities has sufficient resources to perform them. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities is staffed with CPD members, whether sworn or civilian, with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise to: effectively analyze and assess CPD's use of force practices and related reporting and review procedures; conduct trend analysis based on use of force data; identify tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns based on analysis of use of force incidents and data; and develop recommendations regarding modifications to tactics, equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address identified practices or trends relating to the use of force.

¶578 For any reportable use of force incident subject to an ongoing investigation by COPA, COPA will be exclusively responsible for recommending disciplinary action relating to the incident. The purpose of FRB's review will be to:

- a. evaluate if actions by CPD members during the incident were tactically sound and consistent with CPD training; and



b. if applicable, identify specific modifications to existing policy, training, tactics, or equipment that could minimize the risk of deadly force incidents occurring and the risk of harm to officers and the public.

- ¶580 The FRB will review each incident within its purview promptly, which will in no event be more than 96 hours after the incident occurs. Within 30 days after its review of an incident, the FRB will issue recommendations, if appropriate, to the Superintendent regarding any need for additional training or modifications to policies, tactics, equipment, or Department practices. Upon review and approval by the Superintendent, or his or her designee, the FRB will assign each approved recommendation to a specific CPD command staff member for implementation. CPD will promptly implement each approved recommendation.
- ¶833 When directed by a 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit after-action support recommendation, CPD supervisors will review the BWC footage from the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down with the involved officer(s). CPD supervisors will document the viewing of the BWC footage and the results of the after-action support in the appropriate supervisory reports.
- ¶848 As part of CPD's annual report on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will conduct an assessment of: (1) the relative frequency of all investigatory stops made by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including, race/ethnicity, gender, age, or perceived or known disability status for the prior calendar year, (2) the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers, and (3) an analysis of the relative frequency of requests for consent to search and searches conducted based on consent. For informational purposes only, CPD will identify the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity and gender. The report will clearly indicate that the assessment of Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders based on demographic categories is for informational purposes only because the demographic classifications are based on the subjective observations of the CPD officer(s) who (1) pursuant to CPD policy, will not have stopped the individual to conduct the dispersal and (2) lacks the means to validate or confirm the demographic classifications.
- ¶853 CPD will ensure that the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit has sufficient resources to perform these review duties promptly, efficiently, and effectively, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶854 Beginning at the entry of this Stipulation, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform the Department-level reviews, consistent with the requirements of Paragraph 857(a) through (d) of this Stipulation, of 5% of the backlog of ISR reviews maintained in the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit for January 1, 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation.
- ¶855 The backlog of ISR reviews consists of 15% of all ISRs completed during 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation that have been randomly selected.
- ¶856 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will create and submit to the Monitor and OAG a summary to report the demographic and geographic distribution of the individuals subject to the investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed as prescribed in Paragraph 854 of this Stipulation.
- ¶857 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform regular Department level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including a representative sample of those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, submitted by CPD officers after the entry of this Stipulation, sufficient to reach relevant and reliable observations on:
- a. Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop;
 - b. Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable



suspicion to justify the protective pat down;

c. Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly completed the report and complied with CPD policy; and

d. Whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policies.

¶858 For the representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports described in Paragraph 857 of this Stipulation, CPD must demonstrate that the subset of investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago.

¶859 CPD will recommend an involved officer(s) and their supervisor review the BWC footage for the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down conducted by the involved officer(s), after the involved officer has submitted five ISRs or Stop Reports within a 90-day period that have resulted in a recommendation for after-action support to resolve a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion.

¶860 On a semi-annual basis, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will report on the ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed beginning with the time period ending with December 31, 2023, including those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and identify:

a. The total number of ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed by the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit;

b. Any trends or patterns relating to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances identified through the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit reviews;

c. The number of reports rejected by supervisors and categories of reason for rejection;

d. The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected;

e. The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected for a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion; and

f. Any equipment, training, or policy concerns, and to the extent necessary, recommendations regarding modifications to equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address those concerns.

¶861 CPD will develop a timeline for implementation of the recommendations provided for in Paragraph 860(f) of this Stipulation and consult at the earliest feasible time with the Monitor and OAG, with the goal of developing consensus on the substance and timetable for the implementation of recommendations, subject to the processes provided for in Paragraph 627 of the Consent Decree for policies and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree for training. H. Community Engagement operationally equivalent units).



ACRONYMS AND TERMS

The following is a listing of acronyms and terms utilized by the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

4ASRU	Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit
Advisements and Recommendations	TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a TRR review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training which, once complete, must be documented by a supervisor in the TRR.
AXON	Company that provides the Body-Worn Camera system utilized by CPD officers.
BWC	Body-Worn Camera
BWC Early Termination	Indicates that the involved member deactivated his BWC before the conclusion of an incident.
BWC Late Activation	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at the beginning of an incident.
BWC No Activation	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at any point during an incident.
BWC Other Issues	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue relating to BWC usage.
Control Tactics Not Articulated	The involved member indicated that they used control tactics by checking the action on their TRR but did not articulate how or when they were used.
DP	Debriefing Point
ET	Evidence Technician
Foot Pursuit Issue	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue related to a foot pursuit.
Foot Pursuit – Radio Communications	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified that the involved member did not follow the guidelines laid out in Training Bulletin 18-01.
Force Mit – Communication	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of communication as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Mit. – Not Articulated	The involved member indicated that they used the principles of Force Mitigation by checking it on the TRR but failed to articulate the actions in the narrative portion of their TRR.
Force Mit. – Positioning	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of positioning as a Force Mitigation tactic.
Force Mit. – Time	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of time as a Force Mitigation tactic.



ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Force Options	Indicates that the involved member incorrectly identified subject's actions or member's response in relation to the CPD Force Options Model.
FP	Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report
FPI	Firearm Pointing Incident
FPIR	Firearm Pointing Incident Report
IDR	Incident Debriefing Report
ISR	Investigatory Stop Report
Narrative Deficiency	Refers to various issues identified by TRED reviewers regarding an involved member's narrative or that of a reviewing or approving supervisor. Typically this involves the member failing to adequately articulate, in writing, a portion of the incident.
OEMC	Office of Emergency Management & Communications
Other – Policy Procedure	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous policy or procedure issue.
Other – Tactics	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified miscellaneous tactical issues.
Performance Recognition System	The Performance Recognition System is an assessment tool for assisting Department supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to the job performance of members under their command.
Pursuit Box Not Checked	Foot or vehicle pursuit box on the Tactical Response Report was either omitted or incorrectly checked.
PNT	Pointing notification
Radio Communications	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue relating to the involved member's use of radio to communicate with dispatchers or other officers.
Search Issue	Indicates an issue was identified by TRED reviewers relating to the involved member's search of a subject.
Taser – Accidental Discharge	The involved member reported accidentally discharging a Taser device.
Taser – Crossfire	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a crossfire situation involving a Taser.
Taser – Other	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding Taser handling, use, or reporting.
Taser – Over 5 Seconds	Involved member utilized a Taser cycle that exceeds five seconds.
TRR	Tactical Response Report
TRR-I	Tactical Response Report Investigation
TRED	Tactical Review and Evaluation Division



TRR Box Issue	One or more boxes on the Tactical Response Report were either omitted or incorrectly checked.
TRR Inconsistency – External	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency between the TRR or TRR-I and other reports (e.g. Arrest Report or Case Incident Report).
TRR Inconsistency – Internal	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency within the TRR or TRR-I.
Vehicle Extraction	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding the involved member’s actions while extracting (removing) a subject from a motor vehicle.