



# CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

## TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION



# 2024 MIDYEAR REPORT

PUBLISHED DATE December 27, 2024






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# MISSION

TO SERVE OUR  
AND PROTECT  
RIGHTS, AND  
OF ALL PEOPLE





# STATEMENT

COMMUNITIES  
THE LIVES,  
PROPERTY  
IN CHICAGO.



G01-01, Vision, Mission Statement, and Core Values



## OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT

The Department is led by the Superintendent of Police, who is appointed by the Mayor.

In addition to overall Department management, the Office of the Superintendent is responsible for critical functions such as planning and implementing the Community Policing Strategy, facilitating and coordinating law enforcement services, planning police coverage at public gatherings, addressing legal and legislative matters, administering labor agreements, and providing a liaison to the news media.



**Superintendent of Police**

**Larry Snelling**

## OFFICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICING AND REFORM

The Office of Constitutional Policing & Reform is commanded by a Bureau Chief who reports directly to the Superintendent of Police. The office consists of the following division and groups: Administrative Support, Reform Management, and Training & Support.

The office is responsible for administrative operations, including the management of records, compliance, reform, and training.



**Chief**

**Angel L. Novalez**



**Deputy Chief**

**Sean G. Joyce**

## TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is overseen by a Lieutenant who reports directly to a Bureau Deputy Chief.

The mission of the Chicago Police Department's Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is to review and analyze information that arises from Use of Force incidents in order to enhance Department Members' skills and ultimately make the City of Chicago safer for its Officers and citizens. The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is non-disciplinary in nature.



**Lieutenant**

**Richard B. DeFelice**





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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## **BACKGROUND**

The Chicago Police Department established the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division (formerly the Force Review Division), in 2017 with the mission of reviewing and analyzing information that arises from use of force incidents. After establishing review procedures and an electronic use of force reporting application, the Force Review Division began conducting use of force reviews on May 29, 2018.

On November 1, 2019, the Department issued its first-ever Firearm Pointing Incident (FPI) policy which requires a Department member to make a notification any time that a member points a firearm at a person while performing their duties. In conjunction with this policy, TRED created a new team to review and analyze FPIs.

Beginning January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all reported Foot Pursuits involving Department members. Additionally, as of this same date, TRED commenced utilizing the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) for reviews of Use of Force, Foot Pursuit, and Firearm Pointing Incidents.

TRED's review process involves examining Department reports and any associated video, including body-worn camera and in-car camera video. The reviews compare the facts of each incident with protocols which have been established by Department policy and training standards in order to identify opportunities for improvement. These reviews are designed to be non-disciplinary in nature. TRED utilizes these reviews to make both individual and Department-wide recommendations related to training, policy, and equipment.

In 2023, the 4th Amendment Stop Review Unit expanded its operations as part of TRED. These two units comprise the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

## **PURPOSE**

The purpose of the TRED 2024 Midyear Report is to provide an overview of findings and recommendations related to Use of Force, Firearm Pointing Incidents, and Foot Pursuits.

*Note on information reported:*

The information and data contained in this document is indicative of IDRs generated from January 1 through June 30, 2024. The primary source of data for this report was drawn from Department tables as of November 22, 2024. Notably, data and

information in this report is subject to change based upon any subsequent reporting or processing of the relevant information. TRED produces its Year-End and Midyear reports based on the date of occurrence rather than date of TRED review. Accordingly, TRED reports should closely align with published data dashboards as well as other reports produced by other Department bureaus.

There are references to Consent Decree paragraphs throughout this report. The text of specific paragraphs is included in the appendix at the end of this report.

## **IDR OBSERVATIONS - PATTERNS AND TRENDS**

After reviewing a use of force incident, firearm pointing incident, or foot pursuit, TRED may issue a recommendation or an advisement. A recommendation is more formal in nature and requires that either the member's immediate supervisor or the Department's Training and Support Group conduct a debriefing and/or training session.

In comparison to a recommendation, an advisement is more informal in nature. Advisements are written debriefing points that provide involved members and supervisors with information that could potentially benefit them when engaged in or documenting a future use of force, firearm pointing, or foot pursuit incident. Unlike recommendations, advisements do not require a formally documented debriefing or training session.

TRED issues recommendations and advisements for involved members, reviewing supervisors (generally the rank of sergeant), and investigating/approving supervisors (generally the rank of lieutenant).

TRED conducted **12,653** IDR reviews January 1-June 30, 2024. There were **1,507 (10.9%)** IDR reviews completed at the mid-year point of 2024 that led to advisements for involved members. There were a total of **2,297** training recommendations made representing **18%** of all IDR reviews. **9,546 (69.3%)** of the reviews resulted in no recommendations.

Although body-worn camera debriefing points are trending downward in 2024, the most common debriefed issue for Department members is body-worn camera compliance. The four most common body-worn camera compliance issues comprised a total of **1,213** debriefing points, which accounted for **14%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed.





The four most common body-worn camera compliance issues include late camera activation, no activation, early deactivation, and no buffering.

Incidents requiring TRED review continued to increase throughout the first half of 2024. TRED reviewed **2,249** TRRs through June 30, 2024. This is a **53%** increase over the **1,476** TRRs reviewed in the first half of 2023. Overall, TRRs at the midyear point of 2024 increased by approximately **47%** over that same time period in 2023. Similarly, TRED reviewed **2,455** FPIRs at the midyear point of 2024. Through January 1-June 30, 2023, TRED reviewed **2,184** FPIRs. This results in a **12%** increase in FPIRs reviewed through the first half of 2024. Overall, total FPIRs **2,494** in the first half of 2024 increased by approximately **13%** compared to the first half of 2023 total (**2,201** FPIRs). TRED reviewed **2,944** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports at the mid-year point of 2024. Department members submitted a total of **3,021** Foot Pursuit reports. Overall, TRED reviewed **97%** of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports. The remaining percentage consists of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports for which TRED has completed a review and the report is now pending recommended actions at the district level in order to enter final status for the report to finalize.

In April of 2024 TRED began presenting IDR information at the weekly CompStat meeting. TRED presents two separate categories of information as it relates to the respective district that is featured for that week. The first category highlights the different statuses of IDR's in an "open" status, meaning these IDR's require certain recommended actions be completed for those IDRs. These statuses include:


- **PENDING RECOMMENDED ACTION**-TRED has made a recommended training debrief which needs to be assigned to the appropriate district/unit supervisory personnel and/or the appropriate Training and Support Group personnel that will conduct the recommended training with the involved member;
- **PENDING DEBRIEF**-the IDR has been assigned to the appropriate district/unit or Training and Support Group supervisory personnel that now has the responsibility to complete the recommended debrief or training;

- **PENDING DEBRIEF APPROVAL**-the appropriate recommended debrief or training has been completed and entered into the IDR which now awaits approval from the appropriate supervisory personnel the rank of lieutenant or above.

This information is presented to inform the command staff of the featured district of IDRs that require their attention in order to facilitate the appropriate training or approval process for these "open" IDRs.

The second category TRED addresses is the "Top 5" training debriefing points for the featured district. The intention is for TRED to highlight areas of training and mentoring the supervisory staff of the featured district may need to address with their personnel. The information in this category allows for the supervisory staff in not only the featured district, but all the district and units present at CompStat, to see debriefing point trends. With this knowledge, the Department's supervisory staff as a whole may be able to take the initiative to give Department members the front-line supervision they need to succeed. Moving forward, TRED will continue to produce this information at CompStat with the overall goal of improving the Department.

TRED continues to see a trend of Body Worn Camera debriefings as a department wide issue. BWC issues remain an area of focus, however the Chicago Police Department continues to make improvements in this area. TRED looked at the total percentages of Body Worn camera debriefings on a quarterly basis beginning with the first quarter of 2023, which is when TRED implemented the Incident Debriefing Report.





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When stated as a percentage of total IDRs reviewed each quarter, there is a clear, positive downward trend in the prevalence of BWC-Late Activation debriefing points issued. TRED will continue to utilize a BWC debriefing matrix to ensure accountability and consistency, as it is proving to be successful. When addressing BWC issues (No Activation, Late Activation, Early Deactivation, etc.), TRED utilizes the following debriefing progression: 1st Debriefing – review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" with a supervisor; 2nd Debriefing - review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" and BWC Training Bulletin ETB 17-03 "Body Worn Camera" with a supervisor and view Streaming Video V423 "Officer Worn Body Camera Act 2022"; 3rd Debriefing - review S03-14 "Body Worn Cameras" and BWC Training Bulletin ETB 17-03 "Body Worn Camera" with a supervisor and view Streaming Video V423 "Officer Worn Body Camera Act 2022 Updates." Additionally, the member will be re-enrolled in BWC E-Learning; 4th Debriefing - the member will be required to attend BWC training with the Training and Support Group; and 5th Debriefing - the following information will be forwarded to the unit's Commander and Captain: "The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division has progressively increased recommended training options for each incident requiring a debrief. TRED has exhausted all available training options at this time. This incident requires further corrective action to be determined by the affected member's unit/district, which should be documented in the Incident Debriefing Report upon completion." It is expected that this BWC matrix, along with increased training and district-level supervisory accountability will reduce the number of BWC issues moving forward. In addition, TRED sees a need to provide more training to officers who have multiple debriefings for BWC violations. Accordingly, TRED continues to work with the Training Support Group to create and conduct classes on the use and requirements of the BWC system. Further, TRED began presenting at CompStat in April of 2024, an Incident Debriefing Dashboard presentation instructing Command Staff members on the "how-to" of the IDR Debriefing Point Dashboard. This information allows supervisors the ability to see how their officers are performing. Specific information can be drawn from the dashboard including a date range, member name, report status, report type, debriefing point, unit, and watch. This will equip unit level supervisors with the information needed to better address training concerns, including BWC activation issues, at the unit level.

## **FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP REVIEW UNIT (4ASRU)**

### **BACKGROUND AND EARLY REFORMS**

In March 2015, the City of Chicago, the Chicago Police Department (CPD), and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) committed aligning CPD's investigatory stop policies with the Fourth Amendment. Former U.S. Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys was appointed to oversee CPD's practices. The April 2015 Darnell Smith et al. v. City of Chicago class-action lawsuit highlighted unconstitutional stops and initiated reforms.

In October 2015, CPD formed the Integrity Section (later renamed the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit or 4ASRU) to review Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) and train officers on new ISR policies. By 2016, reforms such as Public Act 99-0352 mandated pat-down receipts and expanded data collection for pedestrian stops, enhancing transparency and accountability.

### **SETTLEMENT, PRE-AND POST-STIPULATION DEPARTMENT-LEVEL REVIEWS**

The May 2023 settlement of the Darnell Smith et al. v. City of Chicago lawsuit spurred significant enhancements in policy, training, supervision, accountability, and community engagement. Following the June 27, 2023 stipulation, 4ASRU conducted department-level ISR reviews, covering:

- **Pre-Stipulation (Jan 2021–Jun 27, 2023):** 5% of all ISRs, totaling 1,396 reviews from a sample of **15%** of 26,506 unit-approved ISRs.
- **Post-Stipulation (Jun 28-Dec 2023):** 15% of all unit-approved ISRs (6,033 out of 39,634).
- **Post-Stipulation (Jan –Jun 2024):** 15% of all unit-approved ISRs (6,584 out of 43,330).

Compliance outcomes improved significantly following the stipulation. During the pre-stipulation period, **69.2%** of ISRs were fully compliant (966 ISRs), with **17.8%** showing administrative deficiencies (249 ISRs) and **13.0%** categorized as other deficiencies (181 ISRs).



In the post-stipulation period, fully compliant ISRs increased to **75.8%** (4,578 ISRs) from June to December 2023, while administrative deficiencies dropped to **12.3%** (743 ISRs), and other deficiencies to **11.8%** (712 ISRs). These trends remained consistent from January to June 2024, with **75.7%** of ISRs fully compliant (4,986 ISRs), **12.3%** showing administrative deficiencies (808 ISRs), and **12.0%** categorized as other deficiencies (790 ISRs). These improvements highlight the impact of enhanced review processes and policy adherence.

#### **4ASRU 2024 STAFFING**

The Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) is staffed to manage Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) reviews and essential administrative duties as mandated by the Consent Decree. The team includes six officers conducting approximately 410 ISR reviews weekly, along with roles supporting administrative and compliance functions:

- **Subpoena Response Officer:** Manages ISR subpoena requests to ensure legal compliance.
- **Administrative Support Officer:** Handles administrative tasks and assists ISR reviews.
- **Training and Subject Matter Expert (SME) Officer:** Conducts training and supports operations with Fourth Amendment expertise.
- **Data Management Officer:** Oversees data processes, review finalization, and data accuracy.

Two sergeants lead the unit, ensuring Consent Decree compliance, managing operations, and collaborating with divisions. One focuses on workflows, reporting, and cross-departmental coordination, while the other specializes in data management and compliance reporting. This structure supports effective operations and accountability.

#### **4ASRU 2024 ACHIEVEMENTS**

In 2024, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) continued its work with 10 officers reviewing investigatory stops. A major achievement was its role in developing the Stop Application, aligning with forthcoming Fourth Amendment policies. Collaborating with the Information Services and Strategic Initiatives Divisions, 4ASRU improved data accuracy, streamlined processes, and enhanced review capabilities with updated Tableau dashboards and ISR-A application programming.

The unit refined its methodology by categorizing reviews into Concurs, Administrative Deficiencies, and Fourth Amendment Deficiencies, providing actionable insights and strengthening compliance oversight. It completed two post-stipulation review periods, ensuring adherence to the Consent Decree. A significant procedural change in 2024 reduced the ISR sampling rate from **15%** to **3%**, while expanding reviews of gang- and narcotics-related ISRs to **100%**, maintaining robust oversight. These accomplishments highlight 4ASRU's commitment to data integrity, operational efficiency, and constitutional policing standards.

#### **4ASRU TRENDS**

Time Frame: 28 Jun - 31 Dec 2023 vs 01 Jan - 30 Jun 2024

- Total approved ISRs increased by **9%** from (2023) **39,634** to (2024) **43,330**. See details on pages 80 and 81.
- Total reviewed (**15%** of all unit-approved) ISRs increased by **9%** from (2023) **6,033** to (2024) **6,584**. See details on pages 80 and 81.
- The Concur status ISRs (no administrative or procedural errors were identified during 4ASRU's review of the ISR) have increased in the count; however, it is proportional to the increased ISRs written. The Concurs are at **76%** for 2023 (**4,578**) and 2024 (**4,986**). See details on pages 80 and 81.
- The Administrative Deficiency status ISRs (identifies typographical errors, incomplete fields, or a failure to issue an ISR receipt following a pat-down or search, as Department policy requires) have increased in the count; however, it is proportional to the increased ISRs written. The Administrative Deficiencies are at **12%** for 2023 (**743**) and 2024 (**808**). See details on pages 80 and 81.





- The Deficiency status ISRs (critical elements supporting reasonable articulable suspicion are omitted, there is improper justification for an investigatory stop or search, discrepancies exist between the hard copy and electronic copy of the ISR, or when an ISR is submitted in error for a stop that did not require one) have increased in the count; however, it is proportional to the increased ISRs written. The Deficiencies are at **12%** for 2023 (**712**) and 2024 (**790**). See details on pages 77, 80 and 81.
- Jane and John Doe ISRs have increased in the count; however, it is proportional to the increased ISRs written. The (J Does) are at **3%** for 2023 (**186**) and 2024 (**202**). See details on page 76.
- The number of ISR authors recommended to review BWC footage with a supervisor (remedy for five or more deficiencies in rolling 90 days) increased from (2023) **7** to (2024) **11**. See details on page 76.
- Total ISRs written were heavily dominated by males, with (2023) **87.2%** and (2024) **84.5%**.
- Among the race demographic groups, Black individuals represent the majority of the population at (2023) **64.48%** v (2024) **63.06%**. See details on pages 74 and 75.
- In the age distribution, the 21-30 age group represents the largest portion of the population at (2023) **35.8%** and (2024) **36.45%**. See details on pages 74 and 75.



# TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION

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## *Staff Requirements*

TRED staff is selected through a Notice of Job Opportunity (NOJO) process. Department members are encouraged to apply to the unit using a process delineated by the Human Resources Division.

TRED members are required to have a minimum of five years of experience. Officers must demonstrate a thorough working knowledge of Department policy and directives related to foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, search warrants, and use of force incidents.

Additionally, members must have an established working knowledge of Department computer applications and informational databases. Applicants must also have an acceptable disciplinary record, no outstanding debt to the City of Chicago, and an acceptable history of medical roll use and attendance.

Once applicants are detailed to the TRED, they are trained by TRED staff to perform the functions of a TRED review officer. This training includes Department policy refresher sessions regarding how policy and Department training materials relate and apply to the TRED review process.

Reviewers are then trained on using Department resources to gather and review all the information that is associated with an incident. This includes systems used to view body-worn camera and in-car camera video, and Clearnet.

New TRED reviewers shadow veteran TRED reviewers to gain familiarity with the review process and complete their training.

## *Tactical Review and Evaluation Division Staff*

On January 1, 2024, TRED was staffed with one Commander, one Lieutenant, nine Sergeants, and **45** Review Officers and four Tactical Review Specialists.

On June 30, 2024, the staffing levels were at one Commander, one Lieutenant, nine Sergeants, **42** Review Officers, and two Tactical Review Specialists.



**11 193,574,575**

## ***TRED Training***

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January 1-June 30, 2024, TRED personnel have attended: **8** hours of LEMART/Officer Wellness and Resilience and RQI.

TRED personnel also attended the 3-Day Field Force Operations training. This training was in preparation for the 2024 Democratic National Convention which was hosted in Chicago.

In addition, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) "Use of Force Training Program" **80** hour course was attended by Lieutenant Defelice.

## ***Continuous Training***

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TRED conducts weekly staff meetings on Wednesdays where Department-required training is presented. TRED also uses this as an opportunity to analyze and discuss policy changes that may impact the TRED review process and any recent trends observed while conducting reviews. Incidents that have training value are also presented. These incidents allow TRED staff to ensure that there is consistency in both the review process and training recommendations that are being made to Department members.






## GUIDING PRINCIPLES

To serve members of this organization and the community through objective and consistent review and analysis of use of force incidents, foot pursuit incidents and firearm pointing incidents.

To remain proactive and forward thinking and to continuously develop the use of force review process and communicate changes to all Department members.

To identify patterns that suggest a need for policy or enhanced training.

To ensure individual and Department-wide professional development through debriefing, training, and fostering a genuine culture of learning and improvement.







# DEPARTMENT POLICY

## ***SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE***

The Department's highest priority is the sanctity of human life. The concept of the sanctity of human life is the belief that all human beings are to be perceived and treated as persons of inherent worth and dignity, regardless of race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military status, immigration status, homeless status, source of income, credit history, criminal record, criminal history, or incarceration status. Department members will act with the foremost regard for the preservation of human life

## ***DE-ESCALATION***

Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time.

## ***WHEN FORCE IS AUTHORIZED***

Department members may only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, under the totality of the circumstances, in order to provide for the safety of any person or Department member, stop an attack, make an arrest, bring a person or situation safely under control, or prevent escape.

Source: *G03-02 De-Escalation, Response to Resistance, and Use of Force*  
Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*



# PRINCIPLES OF FORCE MITIGATION

## CONTINUAL COMMUNICATION

When it is safe and feasible, members will use continual communication, including exercising **PERSUASION**, **ADVICE**, and **INSTRUCTION** prior to the use of physical force.

- When practical, establish and maintain one-on-one communication where only one member speaks at a time.

## TACTICAL POSITIONING

When it is safe and reasonable to do so, members should make advantageous use of **POSITIONING**, **DISTANCE**, and **COVER** by isolating and containing a person, creating distance between the member and a potential threat, or utilizing barriers or cover.

- Members should attempt to establish a *zone of safety* for the security of the responding members and the public.

## TIME AS A TACTIC

When it is safe and reasonable to do so, members should use time as a tactic by **SLOWING DOWN THE PACE OF THE INCIDENT**.

Using time as a tactic may:

- Permit the de-escalation of the person's emotions and allow the person an opportunity to comply with the lawful verbal direction;
- Allow for continued communication with the person and the adjustment of verbal techniques employed by the members; and
- Allow for the arrival of additional members, special units and equipment, and other tactical resources.

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*

Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*





# LEVELS OF RESISTANCE

## COOPERATIVE SUBJECT

A person who is **COMPLIANT** without the need for physical force.

## RESISTER

A person who is **UNCOOPERATIVE**. Resisters are further divided into two categories:

1. **PASSIVE RESISTER** - A person who fails to comply (non-movement) with verbal or other direction.
2. **ACTIVE RESISTER** - A person who attempts to create distance between himself or herself and the member's reach with the intent to avoid physical control and/or defeat the arrest.

## ASSAILANT

A person who is **USING OR THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE** against another person or himself/ herself which is likely to cause physical injury. Assailants are further subdivided into two categories:

1. The person's actions are **AGGRESIVELY OFFENSIVE WITH OR WITHOUT WEAPONS**. This category may include an assailant who is armed with a deadly weapon but whose actions do not constitute an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm.
2. The person's actions constitute an **IMMINENT THREAT OF DEATH OR GREAT BODILY HARM** to a Department member or to another person.

Source: G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options

Effective Date: June 28, 2023




# FORCE OPTIONS MODEL

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## Force Options Model CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT



CPD-11.960 (11/17)



# CONTROL DEVICES & INSTRUMENTS

## O.C. SPRAY

The prescribed personal OC device is a hand-held, canister type device containing a non-lethal, active ingredient of oleoresin capsicum solution. The personal OC device will use a nonflammable propellant and contain a ten percent solution of oleoresin capsicum (pepper agent) only. The rating will not exceed 500,000 Scoville Heat Units.

A Personal OC device is an authorized force option against passive resisters only under the following conditions:

- A. Occupant(s) of a motor vehicle who is passively resisting arrest only by the approving on-scene supervisor, consistent with G03-02-05.
- B. Noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd and only after obtaining authorization from the Superintendent or his or her designee.

A Personal OC device is an authorized force option against active resisters. If an active resister is part of a group or crowd, a Personal OC device is authorized only after obtaining approval from the Superintendent or his or her designee.



Source: U04-02-02 Control Devices and Instruments

Effective Date: February 29, 2020

Source: G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options

Effective Date: June 28, 2023

## BATONS

Batons are authorized force options against passive and active resisters only as a control instrument placed mainly on the sensors of the skin covering bone or applied to joints and pressure sensitive areas of the body with non-impact pressure.

Batons are authorized force options against an assailant as an impact weapon.



Source: G03-02-07 Baton Use Incidents

Effective Date: June 28-2023





## TASER X2

The Taser is a device used to control and subdue an active resister through the application of electrical impulses that override the central nervous system and cause uncontrollable muscle contractions.

Two probes attached by thin wires are fired from a cartridge attached to the handheld device. When both probes attach to the subject, a timed energy cycle is applied to the subject at the control of the operator. The Taser contains a computerized function which retains data of all discharges of the device.

Department members are authorized to use a Taser only for the purpose of gaining control of and restraining the following subjects:\*

### ACTIVE RESISTERS

The use of a Taser is an authorized force response option against an active resister, when:

- There is objectively reasonable belief at the time that the person is armed, the person presents a risk of serious injury to the Department member or others, and other reasonable force options are not readily available or would otherwise be ineffective under the circumstances at the time, or
- The person is exhibiting violent and aggressive behavior and there is objectively reasonable belief at the time that the person has committed a felony offense or any other offense against a person (e.g. battery, aggravated assault) or that disregards or endangers the bodily safety of other (e.g. reckless discharge of a firearm).

### ASSAILANTS

- The use of a Taser is an authorized force option against an assailant, when the person is using or threatening to use force which is likely to cause physical injury.

Source: *G03-02-01 Response to Resistance and Force Options*  
*G03-02-04 Taser Use Incidents*

Effective Date: *June 28, 2023*





# DEPARTMENT TECHNOLOGY

1 236.237.238.239

## ***Body Worn Cameras***

When activated to event mode, the camera begins a permanent recording of digital data (audio and video media).

When the camera is powered on, the BWC is continually capturing video without audio. The camera is activated to event mode by a double press of the large button on the front of the camera. Activating the BWC also retains a buffering period (120 seconds prior to activation without audio and video recording). It is deactivated by pressing and holding the same button.

Recordings made on BWCs must be retained for a period of 90 days unless any incident captured on the recording has been flagged for extended retention.




Source: *S03-14 Body Worn Cameras*

Effective Date: *December 29, 2023*

## ***In-Car Video Systems***

The COBAN in-car video system records high definition video through a windshield mounted camera as well as a rear-camera lens directed at the prisoner compartment of the police vehicle.

The in-car video system will automatically engage audio and video recording when the vehicle's emergency-roof lights are activated. However, Department members may manually activate the in-car video system without the activation of the emergency equipment. At the conclusion of the incident, Department members must manually deactivate all recording processes, regardless of what method activated an in-car video system, and select the appropriate event type on the post-event pop-up menu.



Source: *S03-05 In-Car Video Systems*

Effective Date: *November 27, 2018*



## Body Worn Camera Video Access

Once the AXON Body Worn Camera is docked in its cradle, video stored on the camera is automatically uploaded and stored in a cloud based server.

This video is then immediately available for viewing. The server can be searched using a variety of criteria including: date, time, and officer involved. If multiple videos of an incident exist, they are automatically linked together.

TRED reviewers are able to view multiple videos simultaneously that are synchronized. This provides TRED with multiple viewing angles and better clarity when analyzing most incidents.

The screenshot displays the AXON Evidence web application. The top navigation bar includes links for EVIDENCE, CASES, INVENTORY, REPORTS, ADMIN, and HELP. Below this, a secondary bar shows filters: ALL EVIDENCE, MY EVIDENCE, SHARED EVIDENCE, EVIDENCE MAP, and CITIZEN EVIDENCE. The main content area shows details for a specific video titled "AXON Body 2 Video 2019-09-21 1628". The video player is active, showing a street scene with a fire truck and a building. The player controls at the bottom indicate a duration of 01:18 / 05:28. To the right of the video player, a metadata panel provides details such as "ASSIGNED TO:", "RECORDED ON:", "UPLOADED ON:", "UPLOADED BY:", "DELETION SCHEDULED FOR:", "FILE FORMAT:", "FILE SIZE:", and "EVIDENCE GROUP:". The "FILE SIZE" is listed as 114.7 MB. At the bottom of the interface, there are buttons for "ADD MARKER" and "ADD CLIP".



# INCIDENT DEBRIEFING REPORT

1 574.575

## *The Incident Debriefing Report Origin*

The Tactical Review and Evaluation Division is tasked with reviewing use-of-force incidents, firearm pointing incidents, and foot pursuits. These incidents are documented in the Tactical Response Report (TRR), Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR), and the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report (FP). The TRR and the FP reports are completed by the Department member involved in the incident. A FPIR is automatically created after the Department member makes the required notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communication (OEMC). Prior to 2023, TRED reviewed TRRs and documented their findings in the Tactical Response Report Review (TRR-R) located in the TRR application within Clearnet. TRED also reviewed FPIRs and documented their findings in the FPIR review section within the Firearm Pointing application within Clearnet. With the additional task of reviewing foot pursuits, TRED would be required to document their reviews in a Foot Pursuit Review report within the Foot Pursuit application located in Clearnet. Under this method, it was conceivable that if a Department member was involved in a foot pursuit that involved a firearm pointing and also involved a use-of-force, TRED would review and document its findings in three separate reports located in three separate applications in Clearnet. The involved Department member could then potentially be debriefed on three separate occasions for what was essentially one incident. TRED also debriefed reviewing and investigating supervisors within these same documents. This made it difficult for Department members to understand and separate the individual training which may be required.

Prior to 2023, in anticipation of reviewing foot pursuits, the decision was made to create the Incident Debriefing Report (IDR). The IDR facilitates a comprehensive review of an incident. Each member that is involved in the incident—the involved member, reviewing and

investigating supervisors—receive their own report. One TRED reviewer analyzes the entire incident and any combination of TRRs, FPIRs, and FPs that it may involve. This allows the reviewer to understand the totality of the circumstances around the incident and make an informed debriefing when it comes to recommending training.

This method also allows TRED to target training specific to each Department member as well as recommend training that corresponds with a particular debriefing point. Frontline supervisors are required to document the specific training that members receive. Frontline supervisors also have the ability to document instances when they do not concur with TRED's assessment. This provides valuable feedback when a supervisor's firsthand knowledge of the member's performance is needed to add context that TRED did not have during its review.

The IDR also creates efficiency in TRED's process. The total number of IDRs is significantly higher than the total number of TRRs and FPIRs reviewed in previous reporting periods. This is because the system automatically generates an IDR not only for the involved member(s), but also for the reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In practice, it does not take a TRED reviewer any longer to process three IDRs than a TRR-R from the same involved member, reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. The efficiency surfaces when there are multiple involved members with the same reviewing supervisor and investigating supervisor. In these cases, TRED reviewers do not need to repeat the information in every report for the same two supervisors.

The IDR also eliminates the separate data silos that contained TRED debriefing data. Instead of having separate TRR debriefing data and FPIR debriefing data, all the data is now contained in one IDR data set. As a result, this report will present some data differently than



previous reports. For example, previously, if an involved member did not activate their body-worn camera in accordance with policy during an incident in which a foot pursuit, firearm pointing, and use-of-force all occurred, TRED would report on this data point in both the TRR and FPIR review sections. Now, using the IDR data, TRED can report this as one body-worn camera debriefing, for one member, in one incident. In addition, TRED has received feedback from field personnel and its own reviewers that the IDR is easier to understand and use.





# IDR CREATION

¶ 228, 229, 234

## TRR #1

Involved Member A  
Reviewing Supervisor  
Investigating Supervisor

## TRR #2

Involved Member B  
Reviewing Supervisor  
Investigating Supervisor

## FP #1

Involved Member A  
Reviewing Supervisor  
Investigating Supervisor

## FP #1

Involved Member C  
Reviewing Supervisor  
Investigating Supervisor

## FPIR #1

Involved Beat Member  
Involved Beat Member

Each member in an incident, whether they are an involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor, only receives one IDR for an incident.

In the diagram below, three separate involved members, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor were involved in these five reports. Previously, each member or supervisor would have required documentation in every report that they authored, reviewed, or approved.

The IDR generates only one report for each member.

When the IDR has been reviewed, debriefed, and approved, it is attached electronically to every associated TRR, FPIR, or FP.

## ROOT IDR

IDR Involved Member A

IDR Involved Member B

IDR Involved Member C

IDR Reviewing Supervisor

IDR Investigating Supervisor



# TRED REVIEW

## Reports Reviewed by TRED

The Incident Debriefing Report (IDR) is used by TRED to document reviews of foot pursuits, firearm pointing incidents, and use-of-force incidents.

TRED reviewed **2,944** foot pursuit reports that occurred in the first half of 2024.

TRED also reviews Firearm Pointing Incident reports. TRED reviewed **2,455** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports that occurred through June 30, 2024.

TRED reviews use-of-force incidents documented in Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) based on the TRR level.


The level of a TRR is determined by a combination of different factors including the force options used by the Department member and injuries to a person.

TRED reviews a randomly selected **5%** of all Level 1 TRRs. TRED also reviews all Level 1 TRRs associated with a foot pursuit or firearm pointing incident. In addition, TRED reviews any Level 1 TRR that is associated with another TRR that TRED is required to review. TRED reviewed **1,267** Level 1 TRRs that occurred in the first half of 2024.

TRED reviews all Level 2 TRRs. TRED reviewed **958** Level 2 TRRs that occurred through June 30, 2024.

TRED does not review Level 3 TRRs. These are reviewed by the Force Review Board.


**12,653** individual Incident Debriefing Reports were created and used by TRED to document these reviews.





# REPORTS REVIEWED BY TRED

*TRRs, FPIRs, and FPs Reviewed January 1, 2023– June 30, 2024*



On January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports (FP). This was in addition to the Tactical Response reports (TRR) and Firearm Pointing Incident reports (FPIR) that TRED had already been conducting reviews on. Since the beginning of 2023, the total number of all reports reviewed by TRED has shown a general upward trend. Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports consistently lead in total amount of reports reviewed by TRED and peaked in July of 2023 with **609** reports. The first half of the year also ended with high totals in May 2024 (**574**) and June 2024 (**585**). Tactical Response reports reviews began with **207** in January 2023 and gradually increased to **513** in May 2024. There was also a notable increase of TRRs reviewed in the early months of 2024 in comparison to the early months of 2023. TRED reviews of Firearm Pointing Incident reports remained relatively consistent since the beginning of 2023 and peaked in June 2024 with **450**.






# IDR TOTALS


Every TRR generates an IDR for one involved member, one reviewing supervisor, and one investigating supervisor. Multiple TRRs from the same incident are reviewed by the same reviewing supervisor and investigated by the same investigating supervisor and will not result in duplicate IDRs for those same supervisors.

***TRRs and IDRs January 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024***




Every FPIR generates an IDR for the involved beat which may have one involved member or, in many cases, two involved members. In some cases, the FPIR generates IDRs for more than two members involved in the same incident (e.g., when two units each staffed with two officers are involved in an incident and at least one officer from each unit points their firearm).

***FPIRs and IDRs January 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024***



***FPs and IDRs January 1, 2024 – June 30, 2024***






## ***IDRs Generated and Reviewed by TRED***

In the first half of 2024, TRED reviewed **2,249** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs), **2,455** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **2,944** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports, which in turn generated **12,653** Incident Debriefing Reports (IDRs) for TRED to review in 2024.

The below chart displays the amount of IDRs generated by month of incident. Consequently, TRED reviewed these **12,653** IDRs generated for individual members in their role as either the involved member, reviewing supervisor, or investigating supervisor within an incident. These incidents include a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination thereof.

***Total IDRs Generated for Review Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024***





# TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORT TOTALS

¶ 153,156,157, 161,162,163,164,220

## *Tactical Response Report Totals*

**3,129**

TOTAL TRRs  
JAN 1, 2024 -  
JUN 30, 2024

**2,249**

TRRs  
REVIEWED  
BY TRED

**72%**

% OF TOTAL  
TRRs  
REVIEWED

**+49%**

(6 MONTH)  
CHANGE IN  
NUMBER OF  
TOTAL TRRs

**+53%**

(6 MONTH)  
CHANGE IN  
% OF TRRs  
REVIEWED

**2,102**

TOTAL TRRs  
JAN 1, 2023 -  
JUN 30, 2023

**1,476**

TRRs  
REVIEWED  
BY TRED

**70%**

% OF TOTAL  
TRRs  
REVIEWED

In the first six months of 2024 , there were **3,129** Tactical Response Reports (TRRs) submitted due to use of force incidents. TRED reviewed **2,249** or **72%** of all TRRs because they were either a random sample, flagged for review based on level classification, or associated with an incident that was flagged for review. In comparison, during the same six month time period of January 1-June 30, 2023, there were **2,102** TRRs submitted. TRED reviewed **1,476 (69%)** of those submitted TRRs.


This first six months of 2024 saw a **49%** increase in the number of TRRs submitted compared to January 1-June 30, 2023. As a result of this increase in TRRs submitted, TRED reviewed **53%** more TRRs overall than the first half of 2023. On average, TRED reviewed **72%** of all TRRs submitted in the first half of 2024. In the first half of 2023, TRED reviewed **70%** of all TRRs submitted.





¶ 153,156,157, 161, 162, 220

### ***Tactical Response Reports Generated January 1, 2023– June 30, 2024***



During January 1-June 30, 2024, an average of **522** TRRs were submitted each month. In the first half of 2023, the average monthly number of TRRs submitted was **350**. The previous six month time period of July 1-December 31, 2023 had an average of **475** TRRs submitted each month.

There were a total of **1,487** use of force incidents in the first half of 2024 compared to **1,131** use of force incidents in the first half of 2023. Through June 30, 2024, there were **5,037** IDRs created involving a use of force incident. This resulted in an average of **840** IDRs created each month involving a use of force. Overall, use of force incidents and the total number of TRRs documenting use of force by Department members is trending upward since the beginning of 2023. This upward trend has also contributed to the increase of total IDRs generated.




# TACTICAL RESPONSE REPORTS

## % of TRRs Reviewed Sorted by District

Unit	Total TRRs	TRRs Reviewed	% of TRRs Reviewed
001	126	83	66%
002	125	83	66%
003	190	136	72%
004	102	84	82%
005	121	93	77%
006	215	165	77%
007	172	128	74%
008	100	68	68%
009	88	57	65%
010	169	123	73%
011	413	323	78%
012	68	52	76%
014	31	21	68%
015	238	182	76%
016	27	19	70%
017	82	52	63%
018	106	56	53%
019	76	51	67%
020	43	27	63%
022	93	66	71%
024	68	43	63%
025	120	75	63%

January 1-June 30, 2024, TRED reviewed on average **72%** of all TRRs that were submitted by members of each district in patrol.

## TRR Reviews by Force Level



The total number of reviews increased significantly since the beginning of 2023. July 1-December 31, 2023 had a **31%** increase over January 1-June 30, 2023. There was also an **18%** increase in January 1-June 30, 2024 over July 1-December 31, 2023.

Overall, Level 1 use of force reviews have increased since the beginning of 2023.



# FRB INCIDENTS

¶ 165,166,173,178,184,185,186,187,213,216,575,577,578,589

## FORCE REVIEW BOARD INCIDENTS 2024

LEVEL 3 INCIDENT TYPE										TRR-I SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION													
TRR	DATE OF INCIDENT	Deadly Force, Firearms Discharge	Deadly Force, Chokehold	Deadly Force, Impact Weapon Strike to Head or Neck	Deadly Force, Other	Hospital Admission	Force Caused Death to a Person	Chokehold Used	Carotid Artery Restraint Used	Intentional Baton Strike to Head or Neck	Member Discharged Firearm	Warning Shot Fired	Firearm Discharge at a Person Who Was a Threat Only to Self	Firearm Dishcharge Solely in Defense or Protection of Property	Firearm Disharged Into a Crowd	Firearm Discharged at or Into a Building	Firearm Discharged at or Into a Moving Motor Vehicle	Firearm Discharged From a Moving Motor Vehicle	Member Was On-Duty	Involved a Mental Health Component	Medical Aid Provided	Subject Fled Scene	
2024-00150	1/8/24	✓				✓					✓								✓		✓		
2024-00151	1/8/24	✓				✓					✓								✓		✓		
2024-00170	1/9/24	✓									✓											✓	
2024-00258	1/17/24	✓									✓								✓				
2024-00259	1/17/24	✓									✓								✓				
2024-00382	1/25/24	✓			✓						✓								✓	UNK		✓	
2024-00387	1/25/24				✓														✓			✓	
2024-00584	2/6/24	✓									✓										✓	✓	
2024-00792	2/17/24																		✓	✓	✓		
2024-00793	2/17/24			✓															✓	✓	✓		
2024-00840	2/22/24	✓			✓						✓											✓	
2024-00871	2/24/24																		✓			✓	
2024-00872	2/24/24	✓									✓								✓		✓	✓	
2024-00873	2/24/24	✓									✓								✓		✓	✓	
2024-00874	2/24/24																		✓			✓	
2024-00875	2/24/24																		✓			✓	
2024-01019	3/3/24	✓									✓								✓				
2024-01020	3/3/24																		✓				
2024-01134	3/9/24	✓				✓					✓								✓		✓		
2024-01359	3/22/24	✓				✓	✓				✓								✓		✓		
2024-01360	3/22/24	✓				✓					✓								✓		✓		
2024-01361	3/22/24																		✓		✓		
2024-01362	3/22/24	✓			✓	✓	✓				✓								✓		✓		
2024-01363	3/22/24	✓			✓		✓												✓		✓		
2024-02339	5/18/24		✓					✓											✓		✓	✓	
2024-02350	5/18/24		✓					✓											✓				
2024-02467	5/22/24		✓																✓		✓		
2024-02471	5/22/24																		✓		✓		
2024-02472	5/22/24																		✓		✓		
2024-02638	5/27/24	✓					✓												✓		✓		
2024-02639	5/27/24	✓					✓												✓		✓		
2024-03055	6/18/24																		✓				
2024-03130	6/22/24		✓					✓											✓		✓		
2024-03127	6/22/24																		✓		✓		
2024-03168	6/23/24					✓													✓		✓		
2024-03243	6/27/24				✓	✓		✓											✓	✓	✓		





# FRB INCIDENTS

¶ 166,185,213,216,575,577

## ***Force Review Board Incidents***

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The Force Review Board is responsible for reviewing incidents when a Department member uses deadly force, also referred to as a Level 3 reportable use of force . These include discharging a firearm, (FRB will not be responsible for reviewing unintentional firearm discharges or discharges solely to destroy/deter an animal that did not involve a firearm discharged at a person and did not result in an injury to any person) using an impact weapon to intentionally strike a person's head or neck, the application of a chokehold, the application of a carotid artery restraint, and the application of other restraints above the shoulders with risk of positional asphyxiation.

The Force Review Board is also responsible for reviewing any force by a Department member that causes injury to any person resulting in admission to a hospital, any force that causes the death of any person, all use of force incidents by an exempt member that results in the completion of a TRR, and other incidents as determined by the Superintendent.

There were **18** Force Review Board incidents in the first half of 2024. Page 33 displays these **18** incidents and their associated TRRs.

## ***Level 3 Baton / Impact Weapon Use***

---

Department members will not use batons to intentionally strike a person in the head or neck except when deadly force is justified.

There were **18** total Force Review Board incidents in the first half of 2024. From these **18**, there was **one** Level 3 incident in which a Department member used an impact weapon on the head or neck area of a person.

In this incident, the involved member used his Department radio as an improvised impact weapon to strike a person in the head or neck area.

## ***Warning Shots***

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In the first half of 2024, there were no incidents in which a Department member used their firearm to fire warning shots.

## ***Deadly Force Against Fleeing Persons***

---

Department members are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing persons who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.

In the first half of 2024, there were no incidents in which a Department member used deadly force against a fleeing person who did not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.



# FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188,189,190, 191,192,193,195,196

1

## FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT OCCURS

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while in the performance of his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

2

## OEMC IS NOTIFIED

OEMC takes the notification of the involved member's beat. OEMC generates an event for Firearm Pointing (PNT) which is tied to the original incident that the member responded to.

3

## OEMC NOTIFIES THE BEAT'S SUPERVISOR

The member's supervisor is notified of the beat number that was involved in a Firearm Pointing Incident. The supervisor will document the incident on their Supervisor's Management Log and ensure that appropriate documentation of the incident is completed. They will also ensure that ICC and BWC video is appropriately retained.

4

## TACTICAL REVIEW AND EVALUATION DIVISION REVIEWS THE FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

A Firearm Pointing Incident Report (FPIR) is automatically generated in Clearnet. TRED gathers documentation related to the incident. If no Arrest Report or Investigatory Stop Report was completed for the incident, TRED does not continue reviewing the incident. TRED then reviews available video of the incident in conjunction with written documentation. TRED identifies any tactical, equipment, or training concerns. TRED also identifies whether the pointing of a firearm at a person allegedly violated department policy. TRED will ensure that appropriate complaint and disciplinary procedures are followed involving obvious policy violations. FPIRs that do not result in a training recommendation are closed.

5

## TRED SENDS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNIT OF ASSIGNMENT

TRED issues written notifications of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to address any tactical, equipment, or training concerns to the notifying beat's executive officer and unit commanding officer.

6

## FOLLOW-UP ACTION

The notifying beat's unit commanding officer ensures that the written communication (FPIR) has been received by the notifying beat's immediate supervisor and informs the notifying beat's chain of command of the written notification of recommendations. They ensure that recommendations are appropriately implemented and documented in the debriefing section of the FPIR. Debriefings are approved by the notifying beat's chain of command and the FPIR is closed.



# FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT

¶ 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 196







# FIREARM POINTING INCIDENT TOTALS

¶ 190, 191, 192, 193

## *Firearm Pointing Incident Report Totals*

**2,494**

TOTAL FPIRs  
JAN 1, 2024 -  
JUN 30, 2024

**98%**

FPIRs  
REVIEWED  
JAN-JUN 2024

**2,047**

TOTAL FPI  
INCIDENTS  
JAN-JUN 2024

**+13%**

(6 MONTH)  
CHANGE IN  
NUMBER OF  
TOTAL FPIRs

**2,201**

TOTAL FPIRs  
JAN 1, 2023 -  
JUN 30, 2023

**99%**

FPIRs  
REVIEWED  
JAN-JUN 2023

**1,810**

TOTAL FPI  
INCIDENTS  
JAN-JUN 2023

**+14%**

(6 MONTH)  
CHANGE IN  
% OF TOTAL  
INCIDENTS


Between January 1 and June 30, 2024, **2,047** firearm pointing incidents occurred. The number of firearm pointing occurrences in 2024 was **237** higher than in the first half of 2023.

There were **2,494** total FPIRs generated for review by TRED in the first half of 2024. This is an increase of **293** total FPIRs when compared to the first six months of 2023. Please note that differences in the FPI and FPIR totals are attributable to occurrences of officers assigned to different beats engaging in a firearm pointing during the course of the same incident.

Both FPIRs and FPIs saw double-digit growth in 2024. The amount of FPIRs which TRED personnel reviews is also increasing due to this. In the first half of 2023, TRED reviewed **2,184** FPIRs. The amount of FPIRs that TRED reviewed has increased to **2,455** FPIRs in the first half of 2024.



### *Firearm Pointing Incident Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024*



There were a total of **2,047** firearm pointing incidents throughout January 1-June 30, 2024. There were also a total of **2,494** total FPIRs generated, of which TRED reviewed **2,455** FPIRs during that time period. The average number of FPIRs generated per month at the midyear point of 2024 was **415** FPIRs. There were a total of **6,993** IDRs generated which involved a FPIR for an average of **1,166** IDRs created monthly throughout the first half of 2024.

Through the midyear point of 2024, January has been the only month of 2023 where the FPIR total has not reached the **400** mark. The FPIR totals have also increased with each month concluding with June 2024 (**465 FPIRs**), the highest total over the last 18 month period.

***FPIRs Generated by Unit Involved***

001	95	3.8%
002	162	6.5%
003	207	8.3%
004	97	3.9%
005	74	3.0%
006	180	7.2%
007	186	7.5%
008	110	4.4%
009	158	6.3%
010	110	4.4%
011	179	7.2%
012	72	2.9%
014	66	2.6%
015	117	4.7%
016	28	1.1%
017	26	1.0%
018	122	4.9%
019	38	1.5%
020	8	0.3%
022	78	3.1%
024	33	1.3%
025	127	5.1%
079	1	0.0%
145	3	0.1%
180	4	0.2%
189	10	0.4%
193	8	0.3%
211	35	1.4%
212	17	0.7%
213	8	0.3%
214	26	1.0%
215	3	0.1%
216	4	0.2%
341	1	0.0%
606	20	0.8%
610	11	0.4%
620	3	0.1%
630	5	0.2%
640	10	0.4%
650	1	0.0%
701	11	0.4%
704	3	0.1%
715	4	0.2%

January 1, 2024-June 30, 2024, District units within the Bureau of Patrol accounted for the large majority of FPIRs generated. Generally, these units are responding to calls for service and actively patrolling Chicago streets and neighborhoods.

001-1st District	079-Special Investigations Unit
002-2nd District	145-Traffic Section
003-3rd District	180-Bureau of Detectives
003-3rd District	189-Narcotics Division
004-4th District	193-Gang Investigations Division
005-5th District	211-Bureau of Patrol, Area 1
006-6th District	212- Bureau of Patrol, Area 2
007-7th District	213- Bureau of Patrol, Area 3
008-8th District	214- Bureau of Patrol, Area 4
009-9th District	215- Bureau of Patrol, Area 5
010-10th District	216-Central Control Group
011-11th District	341-Canine Unit
012-12th District	606-Investigative Field Group
014-14th District	610-Detectives, Area 1
015-15th District	620- Detectives, Area 2
016-16th District	630- Detectives, Area 3
017-17th District	640- Detectives, Area 4
018-18th District	650- Detectives, Area 5
019-19th District	701-Public Transportation Section
020-20th District	704-Transit Security Unit
022-22nd District	715-Critical Incident Response Team
024-24th District	
025-25th District	





# FPI REPORTING

¶ 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195

## ***FPIs Reported in Error***

Whenever a Department member points a firearm at a person while performing his or her duties, the member is required to make the appropriate notification to the Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC).

The exceptions to this notification requirement includes:

Department members assigned as a Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team members, who point a firearm at a person during the course of a designated SWAT incident.

Department members assigned to a federal task force, who point a firearm at a person during the execution of the federal task force duties.

Department members un-holstering or displaying their firearm or having the firearm in a “ready” position (e.g. low ready, position “SUL”) or any other position during the course of an incident, unless the firearm is pointed at a person.

January 1, 2024-June 30, 2024, there were **zero** debriefings issued by TRED for a firearm pointing incident reported in error.

## ***OEMC Dispatcher Notifications***

A firearm pointing occurs when a Department member points his firearm at a person while in the performance of his or her duties. The Department member is then required to notify OEMC promptly after the incident has concluded.

The notified OEMC dispatcher is then required to acknowledge the notification from the Department member who pointed a firearm at a person. Then the OEMC dispatcher must create a Police Computer-Aided Dispatch (PCAD) event recording the firearm pointing incident and the Beat Number of the notifying Department member. After the PCAD event number is created, the OEMC dispatcher is required to notify the firearm pointing beat’s immediate supervisor of the event and record the notification in the appropriate PCAD event.

TRED staff created the debriefing point OEMC Notification Deficiency in the fourth quarter of 2023. This debriefing point will allow TRED personnel to capture instances of when an OEMC dispatcher fails to notify an immediate supervisor of a firearm pointing incident.

This issue generated **11** debriefings January 1-June 30, 2024.

When TRED issues a debriefing point for this issue, an OEMC supervisor is notified of the incident. The OEMC supervisor then conducts a debriefing with the OEMC dispatcher that handled the firearm pointing incident and did not make the appropriate notification.



# FOOT PURSUIT REPORTS

¶ 168,169,172

## *Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report Totals*

**3,021**

TOTAL FP  
REPORTS  
JAN 1, 2024 -  
JUN 30, 2024

**2,407**

TOTAL FP  
REPORTS  
JAN 1, 2023 -  
DEC 31, 2023

**+26%**

(6 MONTH)  
CHANGE IN  
NUMBER OF  
TOTAL FPs

**1,413**

TOTAL FP  
INCIDENTS  
JAN 1, 2024 -  
JUN 30, 2024

**1,171**

TOTAL FP  
INCIDENTS  
JAN 1, 2023 -  
JUN 30, 2023

**+21%**

(6 MONTH)  
CHANGE IN %  
OF FP  
INCIDENTS


The Department policy on Foot Pursuits was implemented on August 29, 2022. As of January 1, 2023, TRED began reviewing all Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports created by Department members. After a foot pursuit incident occurs, the involved member is required to create a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. A unit-level reviewing supervisor then routes the reviewed Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report to the district of occurrence Watch Operations Lieutenant if the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is associated with a reportable use of force or an arrest. In an instance where a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is not associated with a reportable use or force or an arrest, the unit-level reviewing supervisor is required to correctly route the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report directly to TRED after their supervisory review.

TRED reviewed **2,944 (98%)** of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports in the first half of 2024. The remaining percentage consists of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports for which TRED has completed a review and the report is now pending recommended actions at the district level in order to enter final status for the report to finalize.



168,169,172

### Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports Generated Jan 1, 2023– Jun 30, 2024



January 1-June 30, 2024 there were a total of **1,413** foot pursuit incidents. As a result of this, there were **3,021** total Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports that were submitted through June 30, 2024. On average, there were **504** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports submitted every month throughout the first half of 2024. Each month of the first half of 2024 had more total Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports than the corresponding month of 2023.

There were **6,574** IDRs generated that involve a foot pursuit. In the first half of 2024, there were an average of **1,096** IDRs generated each month that involved a foot pursuit.






168,169,172

## After-Action Support Recommendations

Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024



After a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report is submitted, it is reviewed by a reviewing supervisor. When a foot pursuit report is associated with a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor should correctly route the report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for their review.


The majority of reports forwarded to the WOL for review resulted in no further need for corrective actions or further guidance (**70%**).

**13%** involve a recommendation for review of department directives. This ensures an immediate emphasis on Department policy and procedure from front line supervisors.

**12%** involve a recommendation for an individual debriefing with a supervisor. This ensures direct feedback from front line supervisor in a timely manner.

## Foot Pursuits and Injuries

Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024



When completing the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report, Department members will indicate if there is a known injury or a claim of injury that has resulted from the pursuit.

In first half of 2024, **83%** of foot pursuit reports indicate no injury, showing evidence that the majority of foot pursuits did not lead to physical harm for any involved person.

**11%** of foot pursuit reports indicate that the Pursued Person was injured.

**5%** of foot pursuit reports indicate an injury to the pursuing Department member.

There was only **one** reported instance that a Department member indicate a third party community member was injured or claimed injury.



168,169,172

## Foot Pursuit and In Compliance

Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024

BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH DEPARTMENT POLICY AND DIRECTIVES	1982
REQUIRE A NOTIFICATION TO COPA	13
BE ASSOCIATED WITH A DEADLY FORCE INCIDENT	2

In the instances when the reviewing supervisor forwarded the report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant, there were **1,982** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports in which the WOL determined that the foot pursuit appeared to be in compliance with Department policy and directives.

There were **13** reports where the WOL determined the foot pursuit appeared to require a notification to COPA.

The WOL indicated that a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report was associated with a deadly force incident on **2** reports.


Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024



# IDRs FOOT PURSUIT RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 168, 169, 172

## *Foot /Bicycle Pursuit Debriefing Points*



January 1-June 30, 2024 TRED reviewed **12,653** total IDRs. There were **6,574** IDRs created that involved a foot pursuit and **3,313** total incidents reviewed by TRED in the first half of 2024.

At the midyear point, the most common debriefing point from IDRs which involve a foot pursuit is *Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Event Log-Report Not Completed*. TRED recommends this debriefing point when an involved member is involved in a foot pursuit and there is no Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report submitted by an involved member that engaged in a foot pursuit.

The second most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Other*. This is used by TRED to debrief involved members on minor reporting errors when submitting their Foot/Bicycle pursuit report.


The third most common debriefing point is *Foot Pursuit-Radio Communications*. TRED typically will use this debriefing point when an involved member does not give a location of their foot pursuit, or if the involved member is unable to make a reasonable effort to provide OEMC with an accurate location of their foot pursuit.



# IDR RECOMMENDATION TOTALS

153,162,168,169,170,177,178,192,196,199,183,202,203,205,207,208,210,220,233,234,235,236,238,239

## IDR Recommendations Jan 1– Jun 30, 2024



In the first half of 2024, Department members submitted a total of **3,129** Tactical Response Reports, **2,494** Firearm Pointing Incident Reports, and **3,061** Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Reports. The sum of these submitted reports created **12,653** Incident Debriefing Reports that were flagged for review for TRED. Overall, TRED reviewed a total of **3,313** incidents in the first half of 2024. These **3,313** incidents included a use of force, firearm pointing, foot pursuit, or any combination of the three incidents. Of the **12,653** IDR reports reviewed by TRED, **9,546 (69.3%)** had no debriefing points. This means that TRED did not recommend any additional training.

When TRED reviews a TRR and a training opportunity presents itself, an “Advisement” or a “Recommendation” is made to the involved member(s), reviewing supervisor, and investigating supervisor. An Advisement is recommended training that is detailed in the TRED review and issued directly to the involved Department member. These are issued for minor policy and procedure infractions. A Recommendation is recommended training that is conducted by the involved member’s immediate supervisor or the Training and Support Group (training academy). Also, on occasion, TRED can make a recommendation to re-enroll involved members in e-learning modules for refresher training. A recommendation typically is made for involved members that have repeated debriefings for the same policy issue or debriefings that have officer safety implications. In **1,507** reviews, TRED made an Advisement for training. This represents **10.9%** of all IDRs reviewed. Overall, a Recommendation for training was made on **2,297** instances, which represents **18%** of all total IDRs reviewed.





# INVOLVED MEMBER RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 153,162,168,169,170, 177, 178, 192,196,199,183, 202,203,205,207,208,210,214,219,220, 236, 238,

## *IDRs with Debriefing Points and Percentages for Involved Members*


TRED members review submitted reports to ensure the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident are thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with Department policy. When applicable, TRED recommends additional training or policy review for the involved members, reviewing supervisors, and/or investigating supervisors via the IDR Clearnet application.

Through June 30, 2024, there were **8,721** IDRs generated for involved members. There were **3,319** total debriefing points for involved members. The most common debriefing point for involved members is for *BWC-Late Activation* (**10.6%**). Although most incidents are captured on BWC video, Department policy requires the BWC to be activated at the beginning of an incident. TRED stresses this issue because of the importance of memorializing words and actions of both Department members and citizens that occur prior to, during, and after the incident.

The second most debriefed issue was for *Tactics-Vehicle Stops* (**207**). TRED will debrief this issue when an involved member conducts a traffic stop that may place them in a tactical disadvantage while the traffic stop is being performed.

*TRR Not Completed* is also a debriefing point that TRED continues to monitor. In the first half of 2024, it represented **1.4%** of all involved member debriefing points. In these debriefings, the involved member was identified as using a low-level reportable use of force (i.e. control holds, firm grip, or push/physical redirection) in order to overcome the active resistance of a person. TRED personnel was unable to locate a TRR submitted by the involved member in these incidents.

**70%** of IDRs for involved members had no debriefing point (**6,143 IDRs**).





# IDRs WITH BWC RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 236, 237, 238, 239

## *IDRs with Involved Member Body-Worn Camera Recommendations*




BWC - LATE  
ACTIVATION



BWC - NO  
ACTIVATION



BWC—EARLY  
DEACTIVATION



BWC—NO  
BUFFERING

Through June 30, 2024, TRED reviewed **8,721** IDRs generated for involved members. There were **928** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-Late Activation* and this represents **10.6%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed. There were **121** debriefing points addressed by TRED for *BWC-No Activation*, which represents **1.2%** of all involved member IDRs reviewed.

*BWC- Late Activation* is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the Department member is late in activating the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident to record all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

*BWC-No Activation* is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when there is no BWC activation found for the involved member. As required by policy, the Department member will activate the BWC to event mode at the beginning of an incident and record the entire incident for all law enforcement-related activities. If circumstances prevent activating the BWC at the beginning of an incident, the member will activate the BWC as soon as practical.

*BWC-Early Deactivation* is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when the involved member deactivates their BWC prior to the conclusion of the incident in its entirety. The Department member will not deactivate event mode unless the entire incident has been recorded and the member is no longer engaged in a law

enforcement-related activity.

*BWC-No Buffering* is recommended by TRED as a debriefing point when a TRED reviewer observes that there is less than the appropriate amount of buffering time when the BWC is activated. According to policy, Department members will at the beginning of the tour of duty ensure the BWC is on buffering mode prior to leaving the station.



### ***IDRs with Involved Member BWC Late Activation and BWC No Activation Debriefing Points by Unit***

Unit	IDRs With 'BWC Late Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC Late Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed	IDRs With BWC No Activation as % of Unit's IDRs Reviewed	IDRs Reviewed With BWC No Activation DPs	IDRs Reviewed
001	9.0%	45	501	2.6%	13	501
002	5.9%	38	644	0.3%	2	644
003	7.6%	74	970	0.9%	9	970
004	16.5%	18	442	1.8%	8	442
005	4.2%	19	456	0.9%	4	456
006	5.7%	49	865	1.0%	9	865
007	6.5%	53	813	1.0%	8	813
008	6.5%	33	509	0.8%	4	509
009	7.0%	38	545	0.7%	4	545
010	4.9%	35	718	0.4%	3	718
011	10.5%	140	1338	0.7%	10	1338
012	6.3%	22	348	0.3%	1	348
014	6.7%	15	224	0.4%	1	224
015	3.8%	30	782	0.6%	5	782
016	18.2%	20	110	0.0%	0	110
017	10.3%	18	175	0.0%	0	175
018	11.2%	53	473	1.1%	5	473
019	9.3%	19	204	0.5%	1	204
020	1.1%	1	91	1.1%	1	91
022	10.1%	43	426	0.7%	3	426
024	5.8%	11	190	2.1%	4	190
025	5.0%	24	478	0.0%	0	478
044	5.0%	1	20	0.0%	0	20
050	5.3%	1	19	0.0%	0	19
051	14.3%	1	7	14.3%	1	7
057	20.0%	1	5	0.0%	0	5
079	0.0%	0	1	100.0%	1	1
121	0.0%	0	1	100.0%	1	1
132	0.0%	0	2	100.0%	2	2
171	0.0%	0	2	50.0%	1	2
145	33.3%	1	3	0.0%	0	3
180	8.0%	2	25	0.0%	0	25
189	7.7%	4	52	1.9%	1	52
191	20.0%	1	5	0.0%	0	5
193	6.7%	1	15	0.0%	0	15
211	11.6%	33	284	0.4%	1	284
212	5.3%	5	95	1.1%	1	95
213	15.8%	6	38	0.0%	0	38
214	12.4%	31	250	0.4%	1	250
215	11.5%	3	26	0.0%	0	26
216	0.9%	2	217	0.9%	2	217
606	7.0%	6	86	5.8%	5	86
610	7.1%	3	42	7.1%	3	42
620	12.0%	3	25	0.0%	0	25
630	7.1%	1	14	14.3%	2	14
640	12.8%	5	39	5.1%	2	39
650	4.8%	1	21	0.0%	0	21
701	9.2%	9	98	1.0%	1	98
704	26.1%	6	23	4.3%	1	23
715	2.3%	1	44	0.0%	0	44
716	15.4%	2	13	0.0%	0	13

The most common debriefing points for TRED regarding Body Worn Cameras are *BWC-No Activation* and *BWC-Late Activation*. BWC video is crucial for the review of a use of force incident. It is also vital for the involved member and the Department to memorialize the events leading up to and including the use of force incident.

In some cases of *BWC-Late Activation*, the words and actions of both the involved member and the citizen leading up to the use of force incident are not recorded on audio, video, or both.

The corresponding chart displays the total number of IDRs which TRED reviewed for each district and the total number of IDRs with debriefing points for *BWC-Late Activation* and *BWC-No Activation*.



# DE-ESCALATION AND FORCE MITIGATION

¶ 153, 156, 157, 161, 162, 183, 220

## *IDRs with Involved Member De-Escalation Force Mitigation Articulation Debriefing Points*

2,249

TRRs  
REVIEWED  
BY TRED

43

IDR  
RECOMMENDATIONS

2%

% OF IDRs WITH  
RECOMMENDATIONS

The debriefing point for *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* is used within the IDR by TRED personnel whenever TRED identifies the common issue in which a member checks force mitigation boxes on the TRR but neglects to describe these efforts with specificity in the narrative of their report. Department members are required to use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need to use force, unless doing so would place a person or a Department member in immediate risk of harm, or de-escalation techniques would be clearly ineffective under the circumstances at the time. The details that the involved member describes serves to articulate the totality of the circumstances, including why force was necessary despite the involved member's de-escalation and force mitigation efforts.

TRED reviewers recommend this debriefing point when involved members fail to fully articulate with specificity their force mitigation effort(s). Department policy requires members to describe force mitigation efforts in detail, not simply provide a list of force mitigation efforts when writing a report narrative. January 1- June 30, 2024, **2%** of TRRs reviewed received a debriefing point for *De-escalation/Force Mitigation-Not Articulated*. This is a **1%** decrease from 2023 when **3%** of the TRRs reviewed received this debriefing point.

Overall, there has been a downward trend in the number of *De-escalation/ Force Mitigation-Not Articulated* debriefing points issued by TRED since 2022 when **12%** of TRRs received this debriefing.

The overall downward trend of this debriefing point has continued throughout the first half of 2024. This trend may be a result of TRED debriefing efforts in conjunction with Department training, which has emphasized the need to describe any force mitigation efforts used during a use of force incident with specificity. TRED will continue to monitor this positive trend.






# SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY

¶ 155,156,192,217,232

## *IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers*




When misconduct is observed or an allegation of misconduct is made, a Complaint Log (CL) number is obtained from the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA). This initiates the investigatory process.

As a matter of Department policy, TRED does not review incidents that are associated with a CL investigation. Thus, when notified of an incident becoming subject to a complaint investigation, TRED does not complete a review of the associated incident. Furthermore, during the course of an incident review or investigation, reviewing and investigating supervisors are required to enter a complaint log number into the TRR-I or the Watch Operations Lieutenants Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report whenever they obtain a complaint log number for an allegation of misconduct.

Through June 30, 2024, **548 (4%)** of IDRs were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation and not subject to review by TRED. These **548** IDRs derived from **111** total incidents.

## *IDRs with Complaint Log Numbers Jan 1– June 30, 2024*



**548** IDRs that were flagged for review had an associated complaint log number due to an allegation of misconduct. On average, there were **91** IDRs generated each month that were associated with a complaint log number.

## *Complaint Log Numbers continued*

TRED reviewed **3,313** total incidents from in the first half of 2024. TRED obtained complaint log numbers in **4** of those incidents. **One** incidents involved an allegation of an escaped prisoner.

**One** complaint log number was obtained due to alleged misconduct involving an improper search of a person.


**One** complaint involved the allegation of disrespectful treatment of an arrestee.

**One** complaint log number was obtained due to improper notification procedures by investigating supervisors in connection with a Level 3 use of force incident.

There were **two** complaint log numbers obtained involving a firearm pointing incident.



### ***Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred at Time of Incident***




*Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred* is the data point TRED uses to capture how often an involved member's unit supervisor identifies, addresses, and documents corrective action at the time (or briefly after) an incident occurs.

In the first half of 2024, unit supervisors documented corrective action on **300** IDRs. This means that during the course of the supervisory investigation, the investigating supervisor identified and addressed a potential training opportunity for the involved member. The investigatory supervisor then documented their corrective actions taken within the TRR-I or Watch Operations Lieutenant Review section of the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report. As a reminder, supervisors are not required to review Firearm Pointing Incidents and their investigatory review of Foot Pursuits is limited to when a use of force or an arrest is associated with the pursuit.

During pre-service promotional classes for Sergeants and Lieutenants, TRED instructors emphasize to front-line supervisors when and how to identify training opportunities. Supervisors are trained on when and how to recognize and document these instances to ensure effective front-line supervision.

### ***Appropriate District/Unit Action Occurred at Time of Incident Jan 1 - Jun 30 as % of Reviewed IDRs***




Data to track information on the amount of instances of when a reviewing supervisor or investigating supervisor documents unit corrective action taking place at the time of the incident is now kept in the IDR application within the IDR data tables. TRED will continue to collect and monitor this data.



# REVIEWING SUPERVISOR<sup>1</sup> RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 232, 233

## IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor<sup>1</sup> Debriefing Points



CPD policy requires that the reviewing supervisor (Sergeant or above) complete the responsibilities outlined in General Orders *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if reviewing supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or a foot pursuit.

In the first half of 2024, there were **2,178** IDRs generated for reviewing supervisors. TRED issued **256** debriefing points for reviewing supervisors from those IDRs. The most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Notification Deficiency-E.T.* (**65 - 25.4%**). TRED will debrief this issue when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of people and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured, allege injury, or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a person or Department member who have been involved in a use of force incident are injured or allege injury.

The second most common debriefing point for reviewing supervisors is *Foot Pursuit-Supervisor Other* (**46 - 18%**). TRED typically makes a recommendation for this debriefing point if a reviewing supervisor did not submit his supervisory review of a Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant in a timely manner or the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routes the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to TRED or the Watch Operations Lieutenant.

Debriefing point *Review Deficiency-Rev Sup* was also issued on **43 (16.8%)** occasions. TRED commonly debriefs this issue when a reviewing supervisor does not address minor errors within the review process.

**1,957** reviewing supervisor IDRs had no debriefing points issued from TRED reviews.

<sup>1</sup>Language in the consent decree refers to “Responding Supervisor” whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as “Reviewing Supervisor.” The data included on these pages is for the “Responding Supervisor” as defined in the consent decree.



### ***Foot Pursuit-Supv Other Debriefing Points Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2024***

The debriefing point for *Foot Pursuit-Supv Other* was manually subcategorized in preparation for this report. On **21** occasions, TRED used this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor incorrectly routed the Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report to the Watch Operations Lieutenant or TRED for their review. When there is a use of force or an arrest associated with a foot pursuit, it is the responsibility of the reviewing supervisor to route the reports to the Watch Operations Lieutenant for review. For foot pursuits that do not involve a use of force or an arrest, the reviewing supervisor is required to route the report to TRED for review.

There were also **9** instances that TRED used this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor incorrectly approved Foot/Bicycle Pursuit report which had an incorrect initial suspected charge associated to the foot pursuit.

This debriefing point was also used by TRED **7** times when the reviewing supervisor did not submit their review of a foot pursuit to the Watch Operations Lieutenant in a timely manner. When the report is not correctly reviewed in a timely manner, it can hinder the Watch Operations Lieutenant's review of the foot pursuit incident and prolong the incident review beyond the 48 hour review period.

The remainder of these debriefing points were for miscellaneous documentation and/or review deficiencies during the review process of Foot/Bicycle Pursuit reports.

### ***IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor<sup>1</sup> Notification Deficiency-E.T. Debriefing Points Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2024***

TRED issues this debriefing point when the reviewing supervisor does not request the assignment of an evidence technician to take photographs of persons and Department members who have been involved in a use of force incident and are injured, allege injury, or when photographs are otherwise deemed necessary. Notifying an evidence technician is a requirement any time a person is injured during a use of force incident.

In the first half of 2024, TRED issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **65** IDR reviews.

### ***IDRs with Reviewing Supervisor<sup>1</sup> Response to Scene Debriefing Points Jan 1- Jun 30, 2024***

To ensure that front line supervisors respond to the scene of use of force incidents, the Department revised its directives to require supervisors to respond to scenes of any Level 2 or Level 3 use of force incident. During the first half of 2024, TRED issued this debriefing point to reviewing supervisors in **5** IDR reviews. TRED issues this debriefing point when a reviewing supervisor does not respond to a Level 2 or Level 3 use of force or does not fully articulate the circumstances when they could not respond to the scene as required by Department policy.

The Department has made this issue a learning objective during in-service supervisor training. TRED personnel also emphasize this topic in the pre-service supervisor training.






# INVESTIGATING SUPERVISOR<sup>1</sup> RECOMMENDATIONS

¶ 225,226,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,238,239

## *IDRs with Investigating Supervisor<sup>2</sup> Debriefing Points*



CPD policy requires that the investigating supervisor (Lieutenant or above) complete responsibilities outlined in General Order *G03-02-02 Incidents Requiring the Completion of a Tactical Response Report* and *G03-07 Foot Pursuits*. TRED reviews reports and Department video to determine if investigating supervisors completed the required responsibilities following a use of force incident or an incident involving a foot pursuit.

The most common debriefing point for investigating supervisors is *Investigating Supervisor-BWC Issue Not Addressed (77)*. This issue is typically debriefed when TRED issues a recommendation to an involved member for *BWC-Late Activation* and the investigating supervisor reviewed the incident but did not identify and address this issue with the member during the course of their TRR investigation or Watch Operations Lieutenant incident review of a foot pursuit.

The second most common debriefing point is for *Inv Sup-Approval Deficiency (71)*. This debriefing is issued by TRED when there is a minor error in policy and procedure which may have occurred during the Watch Operations Lieutenant review process.

The third most common debriefing point is for *TRR Approval-Over 48 hours*. This is issued by TRED when the TRR-I section is not completed within 48 hours of the use of force incident and there is no indication that an extension request has been approved.


<sup>2</sup>Language in the consent decree refers to "Reviewing Supervisor" whereas CPD policy and forms including the TRR name this role as "Investigating Supervisor." The data included on these pages is for the "Reviewing Supervisor" as defined in the consent decree.



# OC DISCHARGE INCIDENTS

¶ 162, 173, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 235

## *TRRs with Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Discharge Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024*



At the midyear point of 2024, there was only **one** OC discharge incident where the involved member indicated multiple applications of an OC device. This incident also happened to involve a member of SWAT as the discharging member.

All **seven** of the TRRs that indicated an OC spray discharge were determined that the member's use of force response appeared to be in compliance with Department policy and directives by the investigating supervisor.

Medical attention was given to each involved person that was sprayed with an OC device. The person was either given medical aid by CFD EMS and/or taken to the hospital for decontamination.

## *IDRs (OC) Discharge Summary*

There were **seven** total TRRs where the Department member indicated an OC discharge. In total, there were **six** OC spray discharge incidents in the first half of 2024. This represents **0.2%** of all the TRRs generated. TRED reviews all instances where an OC device is discharged.

There was **one** SWAT incident which accounted for **two** of the TRRs that indicate an OC discharge.

**Five** TRRs indicating an OC discharge were submitted by members of the Bureau of Patrol further continuing the downward trend of low OC spray usage by Department members.

The **seven** OC discharge TRRs produced **three** IDR debriefing points. **One** debriefing point each for *BWC-No Activation*, *De-escalation/Force mitigation-Other*, and *TRR Inconsistency-Internal*.




# TASER DISCHARGE INCIDENTS

¶ 162.173.198.200.202.203.205.235

## TRRs with Taser CEW Discharge

In the first half of 2024, Department members submitted **55** TRRs indicating a Taser Conducted Electrical Weapon (CEW) discharge. This represents **1.8%** of all the TRRs submitted. TRED reviews all incidents of a Taser discharge.


There were **four** TRRs where a member indicated that a Taser was deployed but TRED's review determined that there was no actual Taser deployment. In these **four** instances, the Taser was un-holstered and displayed, although the Taser was never discharged. Furthermore, there were an additional **four** TRRs that indicated a Taser was deployed in an attempt to deter a vicious animal.



## Taser Discharge-Related Debriefing Points


The involved member role had **61** debriefing points from Taser discharge-related IDRs. The most common debriefing point issued by TRED was for *Weapon Transition Issue* (**10**). TRED will typically use this debriefing point when it is observed that the involved member does not properly re-holster their Taser. When TRED reviews a TRR indicating a *Weapon Transition Issue*, the involved member is referred to the Training and Support Group for additional Taser refresher training with the Tactical Training Unit.

The second most debriefed issue by TRED is for *Taser-Verbal Commands and Warnings* (**7**). This debriefing point was added in December of 2023. This was added to accurately capture data pertaining to Department members use of verbal commands and warnings issued when safe and feasible to do prior to, during, and after the deployment of a Taser.






### ***Taser Energy Cycles Discharged***



There were **55** Taser discharge incidents in the first half of 2024. **17 (28%)** of those Taser incidents had multiple energy cycles deployed. These multiple energy cycles can indicate a deployment of one or two cartridges and/or a combination of using the Arc button to re-energize an already-deployed cartridge.

### ***Taser Discharge and Medical Aid***



After a Taser discharge, once the Department member(s) gain control and restrain the person, the discharging member is required to request the appropriate medical aid, including contacting emergency medical services from the Chicago Fire Department, if the person was exposed to electricity, probes penetrated the person's skin, or the person appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury. Of the **55** TRRs where the involved member indicated a Taser discharge, no medical aid was indicated on **six** TRRs.

In **four** of those incidents where medical aid was not requested, the Taser was deployed in an attempt to deter a vicious animal.

**One** incident, the Taser was un-holstered and displayed but was never actually discharged. Another incident was an accidental discharge which occurred at the start of the tour of duty.

Typically when medical aid is requested, it is performed by CFD on scene and also at a hospital.





### ***Taser Applied More Than Once***

There are **17** Taser incidents in which the Taser was applied more than once. In **14** of those incidents, the Taser probes from the first cartridge discharge did not make contact or the probe contact was ineffective. There was no neuromuscular incapacitation observed to gain compliance after the first cartridge therefore a second cartridge discharged and/or pressing of the Taser ARC switch. There were **2** incidents of multiple Taser application that resulted in a CL number alleging misconduct. As a result, the incident was not subject to review by TRED.

There was **one** incident of multiple applications which involved the Taser accidentally discharged due to an inadvertent double tap. This can occur on occasion, due to the infrequent Taser use and highly stressful nature of use of force incidents involving a Taser discharge, the involved member may inadvertently double tap the Taser trigger causing two Taser cartridges to discharge.

### ***Taser Use Incidents referred to COPA***

There were **55** TRRs indicating a Taser discharge in the first half of 2024. **Two** of these TRRs were subject to a current COPA complaint investigation and were not subject to review by TRED. These **two** were a result of the complaint log number being obtained at the district level during the course of supervisory review and investigation.

### ***Taser Use in Schools***


In the first half of 2024, there was no reported Taser discharges that occurred inside of a school. This was also the case in 2023, when there were no reported Taser discharges that occurred inside of a school.



# BATON USE INCIDENTS

¶ 213.214.216

## *TRRs Indicating Baton Use Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024*



At the midyear point of 2024, Department members submitted **17** TRRs indicating a Baton Use. This represents **.5%** of all TRRs submitted. TRED reviews all TRRs indicating a Baton use.

## *Baton Use Summary Jan 1-Jun 30, 2024*

In the first half of 2024, there were a total of **17** TRRs submitted by Department member that indicated a Baton use. TRED personnel reviews all TRRs indicating the use of Baton/Impact weapon.

There were **six** TRRs indicating a Baton use and the involved member described using the Baton as a control instrument. Control instruments are tools (e.g., baton) applied to joints and pressure sensitive areas of the body with non-impact pressure. In these **six** TRRs the Baton was not used as an impact weapon on a person.

There were **four** TRRs indicating a Baton use where the involved member describe using a Baton during a crowd control situation. The Baton was described as being held at “port arms” and used as a “port arms push” in order to control a large crowd. The Baton was not used as an impact weapon on a person.

There were **two** TRRs indicating a Baton use submitted by involved members where the Baton was used to break a window of a vehicle. The Baton was not used as an impact weapon on a person.

**One** TRR submitted by an involved member indicated a Baton use, although during TRED review, it was discovered that the Baton was displayed and not used as an impact weapon on a person.

During the course of TRED’s review of TRRs indicating a Baton use, there were **four** TRRs where the involved member described using the Baton as an impact weapon on a person.


There was **one** TRR indicating Baton use on a person and during the Watch Operations Lieutenant’s investigation, it was determined that the member’s use of force was response appeared to not be in compliance with department policy and directives. A complaint log number was obtained at the district level.



# INCIDENTS WITH FORCE AGAINST A HANDCUFFED SUBJECT

1177

## *Reviewed TRRs with Force Used Against a Subject Who Was Handcuffed or Otherwise Physically Restrained*




TRED reviews all TRRs that indicate a reportable use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. In most instances, the involved member indicates more than one force option being used on a subject. The involved member is responsible for justifying each use of force in the narrative portion of the TRR.

At the midyear point of 2024, there were **271** TRRs where the involved member indicated that there was a use of force against a subject who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints. This represents **8.7%** of the TRRs submitted.

CPD policy states that officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained, absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.

## *Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject IDR Recommendations*



At the midyear point of 2024, there were **91** debriefing points issued by TRED that resulted in a training advisement or recommendation for a reportable use of force against a handcuffed person.

Training advisements were made in **49** IDRs and recommendations were made in **23** of these IDRs.

There were **8** instances when individual training was completed on the date of the incident.


**One** debriefing point was referred for additional training with the Training and Support Group.

There were **120** IDRs in which TRED issued no recommendations or debriefing points.

There were **26** IDRs generated from **15** total incidents in which there was a current COPA complaint investigation. Consequently, TRED did not review these incidents.



## Reviewed IDRs with Force Used Against Handcuffed Subject Debriefing Points



TRED issued a total of **91** debriefing points related to these IDRs indicating force used against a person who was handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints.

*TRR Entry-Handcuffed Subject* is one of most common debriefing points (**22**) issued by TRED in these IDRs. TRED debriefs this in instances when the involved member incorrectly made a data entry error and marked “No” instead of “Yes” when documenting “Was any reportable force used against the subject while handcuffed or otherwise in physical restraints?”

*TRR Not Completed* (**9**) was the second most common debriefing point. In these debriefings, the involved member used a low-level reportable use of force (i.e. control holds, firm grip, or push/physical redirection) against a handcuffed person that was actively resisting the involved members’ attempts to place the person into a police vehicle or facility. TRED personnel was unable to locate a TRR submitted by the involved member in these incidents.

This debriefing point may be attributable to a training issue in which the involved member is unaware that a TRR should be completed. This is likely due to the relatively low amount of force that requires reporting in such instances, general infrequencies of use of force incidents, and/or a lack of familiarity with use of force incidents.






# TRRs AND PURSUITS


168,169

## TRRs with Pursuits by Six-Month Periods



At the midyear point of 2024, **440** of submitted TRRs indicate a pursuit (Foot, Foot and Vehicle, Other, and Vehicle.) This amounts to **14%** of all submitted TRRs.


## TRRs with Pursuits Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2024



Of the **3,129** TRRs that were submitted in the first half of 2024, **85.9% (2,689)** did not indicate any type of pursuit. There are **394** TRRs where the involved member indicated a foot pursuit, **14** vehicle pursuit, **21** other pursuit, and **11** foot and vehicle pursuits.

Incidents that involve a foot pursuit comprise the majority of pursuit incidents. Combined foot pursuit and foot and vehicle pursuits (**405**) are **13%** of all the TRRs submitted.

## TRR with Foot Pursuits and Force Levels



When completing a TRR, the involved member will indicate if there was a foot pursuit involved.

Looking at the previous three six-month periods, it appears that there is an upward trend in total use of force incidents that indicate a foot pursuit overall. TRED will continue monitoring this trend.

In the first half of 2024, there was a total of **175** more TRRs documenting a foot pursuit than the January 1—June 30, 2023.


Foot pursuits associated with a Level 1 use of force, also have an upward trend over the last three six-month periods.



# FPIRs AND PURSUITS


168,169,192,196

## FPIRs and Pursuits Jan 1 - Jun 30, 2024




At the midyear point of 2024, there were **1,717 (70%)** FPIRs reviewed that were not associated with any form of pursuit. TRED reviewers identified **705 (28%)** FPIRs that involve a foot pursuit or a foot and vehicle pursuit.

## FPIRs and Pursuits over 6 month periods




FPIRs that involved a pursuit has remained consistent over the past three six-month periods.

## FPIs, Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery



TRED determined that **619 (30%)** of the **2,047** incidents in which a FPI (or multiple FPIs) are reported involve some type of pursuit. Out of the **619** incidents involving a pursuit, **326 (53%)** of these resulted in the recovery of a weapon. **302** of the **326** recovered weapons from pursuits were semi-automatic handguns.

## FPIs, Foot Pursuits, and Weapon Recovery




In the first half of 2024, a weapon was recovered in **53%** of the firearm pointing incidents that also involved a foot pursuit.



# FPIRs AND TRRs


192,196

## FPIRs and Tactical Response Reports




Of the FPIRs that were reviewed by TRED at the midyear point, **9%** involve a use of force incident. **91%** of FPIRs have no association to a TRR and did not involve a use of force.

## FPIRs and TRRs Over 6 Month Periods




While the total number of FPIRs has increased over the first half of 2024, the number of FPIRs which involve a TRR has remained consistent over the last three six-month periods.

## FPIRs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery in 2024



In the first half of 2024, there were **2,455** FPIRs reviewed where a firearm pointing incident (or more than one FPI) occurred, **9%** involved a use of force. When a FPIR and a TRR were reported together, **41%** involved the recovery of a weapon.

## FPIs, TRRs, and Weapon Recovery



Over the past three six-month periods, **50%** of FPI incidents which involved a use of force also indicated a weapon recovered.




# FPIRs AND WEAPON RECOVERIES


## FPIs and Weapon Recoveries

At the midyear point in 2024, there are **2,455** Firearm Pointing Incident reports generated from **2,047** firearm pointing incidents. Data reflecting weapon recoveries is based on each individual firearm pointing incident, rather than the total number of officers who reported a FPI.

In comparison with the first six months of 2023, there is a **13%** increase in total firearm pointing incidents. Due to this increase of total firearm pointing incidents, there was also a **10%** increase in occurrences when at least one weapon was recovered from these incidents. TRED will continue to monitor this trend.



## FPIs and Weapon Recoveries by Month



There have been **1,915** firearm pointing incidents in which at least one weapon was recovered since the beginning of 2023.





# SEARCH WARRANT REVIEW

## *Search Warrant Review*

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Department policy requires the Department to conduct a critical incident after-action review for search warrants identified as wrong raids or in other circumstances identified by the Superintendent.

Department policy defines a wrong raid as a search warrant that is served at a location that is different than the location listed or an incident in which a Department member serving a search warrant encounters, identifies, or should reasonably have become aware of circumstances or facts that are inconsistent with the factual basis for the probable cause used to obtain the search warrant.

The Search Warrant Review Board (SWRB) is tasked with conducting this review of wrong raids and other search warrants identified by the Superintendent.

In the first half of 2024, Department members serviced approximately **112** residential search warrants. Of those search warrants, **none** were identified as being a wrong raid and no other search warrants were referred to the SWRB.



# 4ASRU

## 4ASRU 2024 ACHIEVEMENTS

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In 2024, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) continued its mission with a dedicated team of 10 officers conducting thorough reviews of investigatory stops. A key milestone was 4ASRU's active participation in developing the Stop Application, designed to align with forthcoming Fourth Amendment policies.

Collaborating with the Information Services Division (ISD) and Strategic Initiatives Division (SID), 4ASRU addressed data entry inaccuracies, streamlined review processes, and implemented a Tableau-driven data-tracking system. These efforts culminated in enhanced Tableau dashboards and updates to the ISR-A application, significantly improving data visualization and enabling centralized reviews for efficient decision-making and compliance monitoring.

4ASRU also advanced its ISR review methodology by introducing clear categories, such as Concurs, Administrative Deficiencies, and Fourth Amendment Deficiencies. Supported by trend visualizations, these enhancements provided actionable feedback and strengthened compliance oversight. With updated ISR-A programming, 4ASRU completed two post-stipulation review periods (June 28, 2023–December 31, 2023, and January 1, 2024–June 30, 2024), refining processes to ensure continued adherence to the Consent Decree.

Additionally, a significant adjustment to the review process was implemented in 2024. The sampling rate for Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) was reduced from **15%** of all department reviews to **3%**. In contrast, the review of gang- and narcotics-related ISRs was increased to **100%**, ensuring continued compliance with Consent Decree requirements. These achievements underscore 4ASRU's commitment to enhancing data accuracy, improving reporting systems, and upholding constitutional standards in CPD's investigatory stop practices.

## ISR Historical Background

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The Chicago Police Department's (CPD) approach to investigatory stops has undergone significant reforms since 2015, beginning with the City-ACLU agreement and evolving through litigation and oversight. These reforms aim to enhance transparency, accountability, and compliance with constitutional standards while addressing community concerns.

### ***The Role of the ACLU and Initial Agreement***

In March 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) published a report titled *'Stop and Frisk in Chicago,'* highlighting widespread issues with CPD's investigatory stops and pat-downs. The report criticized the department's practices as unconstitutional and disproportionately targeting minority communities. Following this, in August 2015, the City of Chicago, CPD, and the ACLU agreed to implement "best practices" for investigatory stops. Overseen by Judge Arlander Keys, the agreement marked a pivotal step toward reforming CPD's stop-and-frisk practices.

### ***Smith v. City of Chicago Lawsuit***

In April 2015, the class-action lawsuit *Smith v. City of Chicago* was filed, alleging unconstitutional stops and pat-downs by CPD officers. The lawsuit relied heavily on the ACLU's findings and focused on abuses related to the enforcement of gang and narcotics loitering ordinances. This legal challenge amplified the call for systemic changes within CPD, particularly concerning investigatory practices and their broader implications for civil rights.



# 4ASRU

1854.855

## ***ISR Historical Background continued***

### **Public Act 99-352 and the Creation of Unit 131**

In October 2015, CPD established the Integrity Section, later renamed Unit 115 and Unit 131, to oversee the implementation of investigatory stop reforms. The unit was tasked with managing Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs), training officers on new policies, and conducting audits to ensure compliance with the City-ACLU agreement. In 2016, Illinois enacted Public Act 99-352, which expanded the Illinois Traffic Stop Statistical Study Act to include pedestrian stops. The legislation required officers to issue receipts for pat-downs and searches, increasing transparency and accountability in police interactions. Unit 131 played a critical role during this period, implementing corrective actions and comprehensive training programs to align CPD's practices with the new standards.

### ***Consent Decree and Expansion***

On January 31, 2019, the Consent Decree between CPD and the Illinois Attorney General was entered. Initially, investigatory stop reforms were excluded due to the existing City-ACLU agreement. However, in June 2023, the Consent Decree was expanded to include CPD's investigatory stops, pat-downs, and enforcement of gang and narcotics loitering ordinances. This expansion was driven by the settlement of the *Smith* lawsuit and agreements with the Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) and the Illinois Attorney General. Including these practices ensures that CPD's procedures are subject to constitutional oversight, fostering trust and accountability within the community.

### **Updated 4ASRU Review Process**

#### **Background and Transition to a 3% Sampling Rate**

The Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform provided updates on September 6, 2024, regarding the sampling process for Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) reviewed by the Fourth Amendment Street Stop Review Unit (4ASRU). These updates emphasize CPD's commitment to balancing efficient resource allocation with the oversight responsibilities outlined in the Consent Decree.

Between June 27, 2023, and June 30, 2024, 4ASRU conducted daily reviews of 15% of ISRs to ensure representativeness. While effective, this method was resource-intensive and required adjustments to streamline the process. In 2024, the Strategic Initiatives Division (SID) analyzed ISR review practices, using advanced statistical models to forecast ISR volume and identify optimal sampling rates.




# 4ASRU

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
The Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) staffing was designed to manage both ISR reviews and essential cross-functional and administrative duties, as required under Paragraph 853 of the Consent Decree. The team includes six dedicated police officers, primarily focused on ISR reviews, each handling an average of 82 ISRs weekly, totaling approximately 410 reviews across the unit weekly. Additionally, the unit has specific roles for administrative and compliance support:

- **Subpoena Response Officer (Paragraph 840):** Handles ISR subpoena requests, ensuring transparency and legal compliance.
- **Administrative Support Officer:** Manages administrative tasks and assists with ISR reviews as needed.
- **Training and Subject Matter Expert (SME) Officer (Paragraphs 825, 824):** Conducts training, represents the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), and supports unit operations with Fourth Amendment expertise.
- **Data Management Officer (Paragraphs 837, 839):** Designs and manages data processes, assists with finalizing reviews, and maintains data accuracy.



Two sergeants lead 4ASRU, ensuring compliance with Consent Decree requirements, managing daily operations, and spearheading inter-departmental collaborations. One sergeant oversees workflows, coordinates with divisions such as Strategic Initiatives, Constitutional Policing and Reform, and Field Technology and Innovation, prepares submissions, and writes reports for the Independent Monitor. The other sergeant focuses on data management, creating dashboards, and ensuring accurate compliance reporting in collaboration with the Strategic Initiatives Division. This structure enables 4ASRU to fulfill its responsibilities effectively while upholding CPD's standards of transparency and accountability.

## POST-STIPULATION BACKLOG ISR REVIEWS, Jan 1, 2024 – Jun 30, 2024



On **June 27, 2023**, the 4th Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) began its mandated Department-level reviews, as outlined in the stipulations resulting from the **Darnell Smith et al. v. City of Chicago** class-action lawsuit filed in April 2015. The unit initiated these reviews in **August 2023**.

During the **second post-stipulation review period (January 1 to June 30, 2024)**, the 4ASRU reviewed **15% of the 43,330 approved Investigative Stop Reports (ISRs)**, totaling **6,584 ISRs**. The findings were as follows:

### Compliance:

- **Fully Compliant ISRs: 75.7% (4,986 ISRs).**

This reflects an improvement in compliance rates compared to prior review periods.

### Deficiencies:

- **Administrative Deficiencies: 12.3% (808 ISRs).**
- **Other Deficiencies: 12.0% (790 ISRs)**, broken down as follows:

- ⇒ **Improper Justifications for Stops: 0.7% (44 ISRs).**
- ⇒ **Improper Justifications for Pat-Downs: 0.7% (44 ISRs).**
- ⇒ **Improper Justifications for Searches: 0.3% (18 ISRs).**
- ⇒ **Insufficient Reasonable Articulate Suspicion (RAS): 7.5% (494 ISRs).**

- **Non-Required ISRs:**

- ⇒ **ISRs Determined to Be Not Required: 3.1% (207 ISRs).**

**ISRs Determined to Be Not Required: 3.1% (207 ISRs).**

To address these findings, 4ASRU will issue 1,058 notifications to members, including 510 deficiency notifications and 548 administrative notifications. The trend toward improved compliance and a slight reduction in deficiencies demonstrated progress, although insufficient RAS remained a notable issue.




## Unit-Level Approvals Times Jun (28-Dec 31 2023) Compared to (Jan-Jun 2024)

The Chicago Police Department's Investigatory Stop System policy outlines specific supervisory responsibilities to ensure compliance and accuracy in documentation. To ensure that reports are properly completed and consistent with Department policy, reviewing supervisors must review ISRs submitted by officers and either approve or reject them by the end of their tour of duty.

During the review periods from June 28 to December 31, 2023, and January 1 to June 30, 2024, the approval times for Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) showed clear improvements. In the first period, **54.7% (3,302)** of ISRs received same-day approval, which increased to **58% (3,820)** in the second period. Approvals completed within one day also rose slightly from **22.7% (1,370)** to **23.8% (1,568)**. Meanwhile, approvals taking 2 to 7 days decreased from **19% (1,147)** to **15.9% (1,049)**, highlighting greater efficiency in processing times.


Approvals requiring 8 to 14 days remained nearly unchanged, with **2.1% (124)** in the first period and **1.4% (90)** in the second. Delays of 15 to 364 days dropped from **1.5% (90)** to **0.9% (56)** and only one ISR exceeded 365 days for approval, compared to none in the first period. Additionally, the total number of ISRs reviewed increased from **6,033** in the first period to **6,584** in the second, reflecting ongoing efforts to streamline the review process and enhance overall approval times in compliance with policy.



## 2024 ISR Categories

Within the ISR application, officers can classify an ISR into one of three categories via a drop-down menu. The most frequently selected category is "Investigatory Stops," with additional options for "Gang and Narcotics Enforcement-Related" and "Prostitution-Related," depending on the nature of the stop.

During the Post-Stipulation period (January-June 2024), approximately **6,584** ISRs, accounting for **15%** of all unit-approved ISRs, were reviewed. Of these, **98.8% (6,502)** were classified as Investigatory Stops, **1.2% (79)** as Gang and Narcotics Enforcement-Related, and less than **0.1% (3)** as Prostitution-Related.









# 4ASRU

## 2024 Geographic Break Down of Reviewed ISRs





# 4ASRU

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## ***2024 Geographic Break Down of Reviewed ISRs***

These bar charts provide a detailed overview of the reviewed Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) statuses across all Chicago Police Department districts and units, offering insight into compliance trends and performance challenges. The x-axis represents the districts or units, while the y-axis measures the total number of ISRs reviewed. Each category includes three color-coded bars: green bars correspond to ISRs that are identified a "concur," indicating they are compliant and approved; red bars represent deficiencies, highlighting significant issues with investigatory practices; and yellow bars denote administrative deficiencies, such as incomplete or improperly filled-out ISRs. This visual summary helps pinpoint areas of substantial compliance while identifying districts and units requiring focused improvements.

The prevalence of concurs across most districts and units reflects adherence to legal and procedural standards. However, certain areas stand out for having a higher proportion of deficiencies and administrative deficiencies, underscoring recurring challenges. For example, districts 5, 6, 7, and 25 show elevated deficiencies, pointing to procedural issues such as inadequate legal justification for stops or pat-downs. Similarly, units 214, 211, and 701 report notable deficiencies, with Unit 214 having the most significant number, highlighting the need for closer scrutiny and intervention.

While less severe, administrative deficiencies indicate common documentation errors or oversights that require attention to ensure accurate and thorough reporting.

Another observation is the variation in the number of ISRs conducted across districts and units. Districts 1, 7, and 25 and units 214, 211, and 701 report significantly higher ISR, reflecting a higher number of stops conducted. In contrast, districts such as 3, 14, and 22 and units like 44, 57, and 145 display much lower ISR volumes due to fewer stops.


The presence of deficiencies and administrative deficiencies across both districts and units underscores the need for interventions to address specific challenges. Administrative deficiencies highlight the importance of improved training and clearer procedural guidance to reduce common documentation errors. Deficiencies, being more critical, require greater supervisory oversight, enhanced training on legal standards, and systematic checks to ensure investigatory stops are conducted lawfully. Districts and units with higher deficiencies, such as District 5 and 25 and Unit 214, would benefit from targeted support, including roll call training and more detailed supervisory reviews at the unit level, to address systemic issues and prevent recurring problems. These efforts will help bolster compliance, accountability, and effectiveness in investigatory practices.



## DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF POST-STIPULATION REVIEWS


### DEMOGRAPHICS June 28, 2023-Dec 31, 2023 31,2023

Gender Population of Reviewed ISRs Between 28.JUN.23 - 31.DEC.23




The gender demographic data reveals a comprehensive view of the population segmented by age, sex, and race/ethnicity, with **6,033** ISRs Reviewed. The data is heavily dominated by males, who comprise **87.2%** of the total, while females constitute **12.6%**. A small number (three individuals) are categorized as "X" or unknown.

Reviewed ISRs Between 28.JUN.23 - 31.DEC.23 of Age Demographics




Age distribution highlights that the 21-30 age group is the largest, comprising **35.8%** of the population. The next largest group is 11-20 years old, making up **19.5%**, followed by 31-40 at **21.8%**. Representation decreases steadily in older age categories, with individuals aged 51 and above accounting for only **11.7%**. The smallest groups are those aged 71-80 (**0.3%**) and 0-10 (**0.05%**). This decline in older age groups is consistent across all racial and ethnic categories.

Reviewed ISRs Between 28.JUN.23 - 31.DEC.23 Race Demographics



Within the race demographic data, Black individuals represent the majority, accounting for **64.48%** of the total population. They are followed by White Hispanic individuals, who make up **26.54%**. Other groups have smaller representations, including White individuals at **7.44%**, Asian/Pacific Islanders at **1.39%**,

Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity 28.JUN.23 - 31.DEC.23




Black males are the most prominent demographic, representing **59.5%** of the total population and peaking in the 21-30 age group with **1,197** individuals. White Hispanic males are the second-largest group, also concentrated in the 21-30 age bracket. Females, regardless of racial or ethnic identity, show lower representation across all age groups, with the highest number of Black females (**192**) in the 21-30 range. The data indicates that younger individuals, particularly males aged 11-30, make up the majority of the population, with Black and White Hispanic individuals being the most represented racial groups within this age range.

Older age groups (51+) show a significant decline in representation, with Black males still dominating but in much smaller numbers. Asian/Pacific Islander individuals, though small in number, are most represented in the 21-30 age group, reflecting a similar pattern to other racial and ethnic groups. American Indian/Alaskan Native and Black Hispanic individuals are minimal subgroups, appearing only sporadically in the data.

## DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF POST-STIPULATION REVIEWS


### DEMOGRAPHICS January 1, 2024-June 30, 2024

Gender Population of Reviewed ISRs Between 01.JAN.24 - 30.JUN.24




From January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024, demographic data for reviewed ISRs reveals a comprehensive view of the population segmented by age, sex, and race/ethnicity, with 6,584 ISRs reviewed. The data is heavily dominated by males, 84.5% of the total, while females constitute 15.3%. A small number (three individuals) are categorized as "X" or unknown.

Reviewed ISRs Between 01.JAN.24 - 30.JUN.24 of Age Demographics




Age distribution highlights that the 21-30 age group is the largest, comprising 36.45% of the population. The next largest group is 11-20 years old, making up 17.88%, followed by 31-40 at 23.15%. Representation decreases steadily in older age categories, with individuals aged 51 and above accounting for only 7.67%. The smallest groups are those aged 71-80 (0.41%) and 0-10 (0.06%). This decline in older age groups is consistent across all racial and ethnic categories.

Reviewed ISRs Between 01.JAN.24 - 30.JUN.24 of Race Demographics



Among the race demographic groups, Black individuals constitute the largest portion of the population, making up **63.06%** of the total. This is followed by White Hispanic individuals, who represent **28.11%**. Other groups, including White individuals (**7.53%**), Asian/Pacific Islanders (**1.18%**), and American Indian/Alaskan Native and Black Hispanic individuals (each less than **0.09%**), have significantly smaller representation in the data.

Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity 01.JAN.24 - 30.JUN.24



Black males are the most prominent demographic, representing **59.3%** of the total population and peaking in the 21-30 age group with 1,269 individuals. White Hispanic males are the second-largest group, also concentrated in the 21-30 age bracket. Females, regardless of racial or ethnic identity, show lower representation across all age groups, with the highest number of Black females (**202**) in the 21-30 range. The data indicates that younger individuals, particularly males aged 11-30, make up the majority of the population, with Black and White Hispanic individuals being the most represented racial groups within this age range.

Older age groups (51+) show a significant decline in representation, with Black males still dominating but in much smaller numbers. Asian/Pacific Islander individuals, though small in number, are most represented in the 21-30 age group, reflecting a similar pattern to other racial and ethnic groups. American Indian/Alaskan Native and Black Hispanic individuals are minimal subgroups, appearing only sporadically in the data.



# 4ASRU

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## TRENDS OR PATTERNS

### Jane and John Doe ISRs Trends

During post-stipulation reviews, 4ASRU analysts observed that Jane and John Doe Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) comprised 3.08% of all reviewed statuses. It is a fundamental principle of investigatory stops that a person's failure to provide identification without more does not constitute sufficient grounds for arrest or further detention. Officers encountering such situations must enter "John Doe" or "Jane Doe" into the ISR name field. Additionally, officers must provide as much detailed information as possible about the stop, document the refusal in the narrative section, and thoroughly describe the stop's circumstances, including any notable clothing, mannerisms, or behavior.

Reviewed "DOE" ISRs Between 28.JUN.23 - 31.DEC.23				
Deficiency Type	Total Jane or John Doe	Total Statuses	% Over Statuses	% Over Total Reviewed
Concur	112	4577	2.45%	1.86%
Admin	34	744	4.57%	0.56%
Deficiency	40	712	5.62%	0.66%
Grand Total	186	6033		3.08%

Between June 28, 2023, and December 31, 2023, **186** "Doe" ISRs were reviewed, representing **3.08%** of the **6,033** total statuses recorded. Of these ISRs, **112 (60.2%)** were concurred, accounting for **2.45%** of total statuses and **1.86%** of reviewed ISRs. Administrative deficiencies were identified in **34** reports (**18.3%**), comprising **4.57%** of total statuses and **0.56%** of reviewed ISRs. Other deficiencies, such as incomplete or incorrect entries, were found in **40** reports (**21.5%**), making up **5.62%** of total statuses and **0.66%** of reviewed ISRs. These data points highlight that while most reports adhered to established protocols, a significant number exhibited administrative or procedural shortcomings.

Reviewed "DOE" ISRs Between 01.JAN.24 - 30.JUN.24				
Deficiency Type	Total Jane or John Doe	Total Statuses	% Over Statuses	% Over Total Reviewed
Concur	97	4986	1.95%	1.47%
Admin	68	808	8.42%	1.03%
Deficiency	37	790	4.68%	0.56%
Grand Total	202	6584		3.07%

In January 2024, **202** "Doe" ISRs were reviewed, equating to **3.07%** of the **6,584** statuses recorded that month. The findings from this period reflect similar trends. Of the reviewed ISRs, **97 (48%)** concurred, accounting for **1.95%** of total statuses and **1.47%** of reviewed ISRs. Administrative deficiencies were identified in **68** reports (**33.7%**), comprising **8.42%** of total statuses and **1.03%** of reviewed ISRs, while other deficiencies were present in **37** reports (**18.3%**), representing **4.68%** of total statuses and **0.56%** of reviewed ISRs. Notably, administrative deficiencies rose compared to the previous period, indicating the need to focus on reducing administrative errors.






# 4ASRU

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## Jane and John Doe ISRs Trends

These reviews underscore the importance of addressing procedural and compliance-related challenges in handling ISRs. While most reports are concurred, the persistence of administrative and other deficiencies indicates areas for improvement. Targeted training programs and enhanced review processes could help address these issues, ensuring that officers accurately document investigatory stops and adhere to legal and departmental standards. Moving forward, the data suggests a need to reinforce administrative compliance measures to reduce error rates.

## Jane Deficiency Trends



The analysis of deficiency trends over time highlights patterns and areas requiring improvement in investigatory stop practices. The total number of deficiencies shifted between the two periods, with notable increases in categories such as "Pat Down - Insufficient RAS" and "Improper Justification." Conversely, categories like "ISR Not Required" showed a slight decline, indicating progress in decision-making and reporting accuracy. These trends reflect an ongoing effort to identify and address deficiencies in investigatory practices.

Additionally, there was an increase in both the number of reviews conducted and the ISRs written between the two periods, reflecting a broader scope of oversight. This increase provides 4ASRU with more comprehensive data to identify patterns and address recurring issues. For example, the higher volume of reviews conducted in the second period allowed for greater scrutiny of investigatory stops, uncovering deficiencies that may have previously gone unnoticed.

Significant increases in specific categories help 4ASRU pinpoint areas for targeted training. For instance, "Pat Down - Insufficient RAS" rose from 365 cases in 2023 to 419 cases in 2024, an increase of 54 cases (14.8%), suggesting continued challenges with adequately justifying pat-downs. Similarly, "Improper Justification" deficiencies saw sharp increases across all subcategories: stops increased by 19 cases (25 to 44; a 76% rise), pat-downs by 32 cases (12 to 44; a 266% rise), and searches by 14 cases (5 to 19; a 280% rise). These trends reveal gaps in training or inconsistent adherence to procedural standards for documenting legal justifications.



# 4ASRU

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## TRENDS and PATTERNS

### Deficiency Trends

Some categories, however, demonstrated improvement or remained stable. For instance, "Stop - Insufficient RAS" decreased slightly from **72** cases in 2023 to **68** in 2024, a **5.6%** reduction, indicating modest progress in articulating reasonable suspicion for stops. Similarly, "ISR Not Required" dropped from **222** instances in 2023 to **207** in 2024, a **6.8%** improvement, reflecting better decision-making regarding when ISRs are necessary. "Duplicate ISR" cases remained constant at two across both periods, confirming that this issue is rare. These changes suggest that focused reviews are driving improvements in some areas while exposing persistent gaps in others.

Despite these gains, significant concerns remain. The increases in "Pat Down - Insufficient RAS" and "Improper Justification" deficiencies underscore ongoing challenges in training and procedural compliance. These deficiencies indicate inconsistent application or limited understanding of the legal standards governing investigatory stops, pat-downs, and searches.

Targeted training should focus on legal standards for stops, pat-downs, and searches to address recurring deficiencies. Supervisory oversight must be enhanced to provide timely feedback on deficient reports. 4ASRU will continue reviewing ISRs, particularly in categories with high deficiency rates, to monitor compliance trends. Additionally, upcoming policy revisions and along with a new Stop application will further clarify guidelines for pat-downs and searches, ensuring alignment with best practices and improving procedural adherence.

It bears mentioning that, as a result of the soon-to-be-published policy and the collaborative efforts of the Department, alongside feedback from its members, a new Stop application has been created and, at the time of this report, is being beta-tested. This application, among other compliance features, will enable **unit-level supervisors** to document why reports are rejected and specify the reasons for rejection on a **Deficiency Response Report**. All automated or paper **Deficiency Response Reports** will subsequently be forwarded to the **Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU)** for final review.

### BWC Trends

Between June 28, 2023, and June 30, 2024, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) of the Chicago Police Department conducted thorough reviews of investigatory stop reports (ISRs) to ensure compliance with constitutional standards and departmental policies. As part of its mandate under Paragraph 859 of the consent decree, 4ASRU identified a small but critical subset of ISRs requiring additional corrective actions involving Body-Worn Camera (BWC) footage reviews. These advisories reflect an ongoing effort to enhance transparency, accountability, and adherence to investigatory stop procedures.

In the first review period, spanning from June 28, 2023, to December 31, 2023, 4ASRU conducted **6,033** ISR reviews, during which seven department members were advised to review their BWC footage with supervisors. These notifications were issued to address identified deficiencies in ISRs. The prevalence of such advisories was minimal, at only 0.12% of the total reviews conducted. As part of the corrective process, officers flagged for multiple deficiencies were enrolled in Learning Management System (LMS) courses, including "Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) FAQ" and "Investigatory Stop Refresher." Supervisors were required to oversee the BWC reviews and document the actions taken in the Investigatory Stop Audit Report.

In the second review period, from January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024, the total number of ISR reviews increased to **6,584**. During this period, 11 department members were advised to conduct BWC reviews, representing a prevalence of **0.17%**. While the overall percentage of deficient ISRs remained low, the increase in notifications suggests either a heightened scrutiny of deficiencies or a slight rise in instances of noncompliance. The same corrective measures applied in the earlier period were continued, reinforcing the department's focus on addressing deficiencies through training and direct supervisory intervention.

Across both periods, a total of **12,617** ISR reviews were conducted, with 18 department members advised to conduct BWC reviews. This represents an overall prevalence of **0.14%**, demonstrating that such deficiencies are rare but carefully monitored. The rise in BWC advisories between the two periods indicates a proactive effort by 4ASRU to identify and address issues promptly, ensuring that officers adhere to required standards.



# 4ASRU


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## BWC Trends

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Total Number of  
ISRs Reviewed



Department  
members advised  
to conduct BWC  
reviews

## Updated 4ASRU Review Process

### Background and Transition to a 3% Sampling Rate

The Office of Constitutional Policing and Reform provided updates on September 6, 2024, regarding the sampling process for Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) reviewed by the Fourth Amendment Street Stop Review Unit (4ASRU). These updates emphasize CPD's commitment to balancing efficient resource allocation with the oversight responsibilities outlined in the Consent Decree.

Between June 27, 2023, and June 30, 2024, 4ASRU conducted daily reviews of **15%** of ISRs to ensure representativeness. While effective, this method was resource-intensive and required adjustments to streamline the process. In 2024, the Strategic Initiatives Division (SID) analyzed ISR review practices, using advanced statistical models to forecast ISR volume and identify optimal sampling rates.

### Statistical Analysis and Sample Validation

SID projected approximately **87,807** ISRs for 2024 using a Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (SARIMA) model. Multiple sample sizes were evaluated against confidence levels (**99%, 95%, 90%**) and margins of error (**1%-3%**). A **3%** sample with a **95%** confidence level and a **2%** margin of error was identified as statistically sound and demographically representative. Clarity Technology Partners validated the representativeness of the **3%** sample using ISR data from January to June 2024. The analysis confirmed alignment with the overall ISR population, ensuring geographic and demographic proportionality. The Independent Monitoring Team (IMT) and Illinois Attorney General approved this approach.

### Implementation and Monitoring

As of July 1, 2024, 4ASRU adopted the new **3%** sampling rate for general ISR reviews while continuing to review **100%** of ISRs related to loitering ordinances. Monthly forecasts and demographic analyses will ensure ongoing compliance, with results presented to the IMT and OAG during regular meetings. The first quarterly review of the process, ending September 20, 2024, will assess its effectiveness and identify any necessary adjustments.



# 4ASRU

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## 4ASRU Review Outcomes

Investigative Stop Report (ISR) review findings are categorized into **Concurs**, **Administrative Deficiency**, and **Deficiency**. The **Concurs** status indicates that no administrative or procedural errors were identified during 4ASRU's review of the ISR. An ISR is classified as an **Administrative Deficiency** when the review identifies typographical errors, incomplete fields, or a failure to issue an ISR receipt following a pat-down or search, as Department policy requires. The **Deficiency** status applies when critical elements supporting reasonable articulable suspicion are omitted, there is improper justification for an investigatory stop or search, discrepancies exist between the hard copy and electronic copy of the ISR, or when an ISR is submitted in error for a stop that did not require one.

Completed Reviews - Total: 6,033

Concurs (finalized by reviewer) 3,972 (65.8%)	Concurs 606 (10.0%)	Admin deficiency 743 (12.3%)	Deficiency 712 (11.8%)
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Between June 28, 2023, and December 31, 2023, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) reviewed **6,033** Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs), representing **15%** of the **39,634** ISRs written by Department members. An additional **1.5%** of ISRs were included in the review due to system logic rounding up fractional reviews. Of the ISRs reviewed, **3,972 (65.8%)** were finalized by the original reviewer and found compliant with Department policy, while **606 (10.0%)** were finalized by a 4ASRU sergeant and also deemed compliant. Administrative deficiencies were noted in **743 ISRs (12.3%)**, and **712 ISRs (11.8%)** were identified as lacking adequate articulation of reasonable suspicion.

Completed Reviews - Total: 6,584

Concurs (finalized by reviewer) 4,913 (74.6%)	Admin deficiency 808 (12.3%)	Deficiency 790 (12.0%)
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From January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024, 4ASRU reviewed **6,584** ISRs, representing **15%** of the **43,330** ISRs written by Department members, with an additional **1.3%** included due to rounding up fractional reviews. This marked an increase of **551** ISRs reviewed compared to the previous period. Of the reviewed ISRs, **4,913 (74.6%)** were finalized by the original reviewer and found compliant with Department policy, while **73 (0.01%)** were finalized by a 4ASRU sergeant and also found compliant. Administrative deficiencies were identified in **808 ISRs (12.3%)**, and **790 ISRs (12.0%)** were found deficient in articulating reasonable suspicion.

The increase in ISRs reviewed by the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) between the two periods did not significantly impact deficiency percentages, highlighting consistent systemic patterns. Administrative deficiencies remained steady at **12.3%**, with **743** ISRs identified in June–December 2023 and **808** ISRs in January–June 2024, despite an additional **551** ISRs being reviewed. Similarly, deficiencies in articulating reasonable suspicion showed only a slight increase, from **11.8% (712 ISRs)** to **12.0% (790 ISRs)**. The concur rate for ISRs written by Department members remained consistent, shifting marginally from **75.8% (4,578 ISRs)** between June 28, 2023, and December 31, 2023, to **75.7% (4,986 ISRs)** between January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024, reflecting continued adherence to Department policy among ISR authors.

This progress underscores the importance of incorporating end-user feedback into developing tools and processes that directly support compliance. A forthcoming application tied to updated stop policies is being designed to address key areas of improvement, particularly in reducing administrative deficiencies. This application will integrate user-friendly features like real-time prompts and automated validations to ensure accurate ISR documentation. By providing officers with intuitive tools that align with updated policies, the new system aims to simplify compliance, minimize administrative errors, and improve the overall quality of ISRs.




# 4ASRU

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## Review Periods Results: Pre-Stipulation Backlog and Post-Stipulation Periods 1 and 2 (January 1, 2021 – June 30, 2024)

### Reviewed ISRs by Statuses



The review results across three periods—pre-stipulation backlog (January 1, 2021, to June 27, 2023), post-stipulation period 1 (June 28, 2023, to December 31, 2023), and post-stipulation period 2 (January 1, 2024, to June 30, 2024)—highlight trends in concurrence rates, administrative deficiencies, and reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) deficiencies.

The number of ISRs reviewed increased significantly, rising from **1,396** during the pre-stipulation backlog to **6,033** and **6,584** in the subsequent periods. Despite this growth, administrative deficiencies remained consistent at **12.3%**, indicating ongoing challenges with application and data entry processes. Deficiencies in articulating RAS saw a slight increase, moving from **11.8%** in post-stipulation period 1 to **12%** in post-stipulation period 2, suggesting room for improvement despite broader compliance advancements.


Concurrence rates demonstrated notable progress, increasing from **69.2%** in post-stipulation period 1 to **75.7%** in post-stipulation period 2, reflecting improved adherence to policy.

These findings demonstrate the need for systemic improvements, including targeted training, updated policies, and the development of tools to address application and data entry challenges and enhance RAS articulation.






## Deficiency Feedback to Department Members



The analysis tracks the number of administrative deficiency emails sent to department members across two labeled periods: Period 1 (June 28, 2023, to December 31, 2023) and Period 2 (January 1, 2024, to June 20, 2024). It delineates the relationship between the number of deficiencies per officer and the total number of officers who received these emails.

In both periods, the majority of officers received only one deficiency email, with 372 officers in Period 1 and 391 officers in Period 2, reflecting a slight increase over time. The number of officers decreases progressively as the number of deficiencies increases. For example, in Period 1, 103 officers received two deficiencies compared to 98 officers in Period 2, while only one officer received six deficiencies in Period 1, and none in Period 2.

While Period 2 shows more officers with one deficiency, it has fewer officers with 2-5 deficiencies, suggesting some improvement in compliance among officers with repeated deficiencies. Both periods show minimal instances of officers receiving as many as eight or nine deficiencies, highlighting outliers.



This **analysis** tracks the number of deficiencies assigned to department members across two periods: June 28, 2023, to December 31, 2023 (Period 1), and January 1, 2024, to June 20, 2024 (Period 2). It highlights the relationship between the number of deficiencies per officer and the number of officers receiving them.

In both periods, most officers received only one deficiency, with 348 officers in Period 1 and 382 officers in Period 2, reflecting a slight increase in single-deficiency assignments over time. As the number of deficiencies increases, the number of officers consistently decreases. For instance, 77 officers received two deficiencies in Period 1, compared to 75 in Period 2. Similarly, 29 officers in Period 1 received three deficiencies, while 21 received the same in Period 2. This trend points to a gradual reduction in repeated deficiencies among department members, indicating improving compliance.




# 4ASRU

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## Deficiency Feedback to Department Members

Higher levels of deficiencies remain rare in both periods. In Period 1, **3 officers** received six deficiencies, increasing to **4** in Period 2. Additionally, Period 2 includes notable outliers, with **two officers** receiving 11 deficiencies and **one** receiving 20. These extreme cases of repeated noncompliance deviate significantly from the overall trend and underscore the need for targeted intervention to address such exceptional instances and prevent recurrence.

Mid-range deficiencies (three to five) show mixed trends. For example, **12 officers** received four deficiencies in Period 1, increasing slightly to **15 officers** in Period 2. Meanwhile, the number of officers receiving five deficiencies remained consistent at **three officers** in both periods.



The bar chart depicts the total number of emails sent to department members, categorized as either administrative or deficiency-related, across two periods. During the earlier period, **519** administrative emails and **477** deficiency emails were sent. In the later period, these numbers increased to **548** administrative emails and **510** deficiency emails, reflecting a rise in both categories. This increase underscores the department's enhanced efforts to address administrative and deficiency concerns through targeted communication.

The data highlights progress in reducing deficiencies, particularly among officers with multiple deficiencies. However, extreme outliers in Period 2 emphasize the need for focused oversight and individualized corrective measures. Addressing these exceptional cases, alongside continued efforts to improve compliance at all levels, will be vital to reducing deficiencies department-wide and ensuring adherence to policy.



# 4ASRU

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit (4ASRU) demonstrated notable progress in ensuring compliance with constitutional standards and departmental policies through its review and oversight of Investigatory Stop Reports (ISRs) between June 28, 2023, and June 30, 2024. With a total of **12,617** ISRs reviewed across two periods, the unit identified and addressed deficiencies through targeted Body-Worn Camera (BWC) footage reviews, Learning Management System (LMS) training, and direct supervisory interventions.

The prevalence of BWC reviews remained low, at **0.14%** overall, reflecting that most ISRs were compliant. However, the slight increase in advisories from 7 in the first period to 11 in the second highlights ongoing efforts to improve scrutiny and compliance. Despite the increase in reviewed ISRs, the consistency in administrative deficiencies at **12.3%** suggests a systemic challenge in ensuring procedural accuracy. Similarly, deficiencies related to reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) rose marginally, emphasizing the need for continued focus on legal standards in investigatory stops, pat-downs, and searches.

Improvements in concurrence rates, rising from **69.2%** in the first period to **75.7%** in the second, indicate progress in adherence to policy. Additionally, the development and beta-testing of a new Stop Application demonstrate the department's commitment to reducing administrative errors and improving data accuracy. This tool is expected to enhance compliance further by providing real-time prompts and validation features.



# RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

## *Relevant Consent Decree Paragraphs*

The following consent decree paragraphs are referenced at the top of some pages by the symbol ¶.

- ¶153 CPD's use of force policies, as well as its training, supervision, and accountability systems, must ensure that: CPD officers use force in accordance with federal law, state law, and the requirements of this Agreement; CPD officers apply de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible; when using force, CPD officers only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances; and any use of unreasonable or unnecessary force is promptly identified and responded to appropriately.
- ¶154 CPD adopted revised use of force policies on October 16, 2017 ("October 2017 Policies"). The October 2017 Policies incorporated multiple best practices that were not reflected in CPD's prior use of force policies. Building on these improvements, CPD will maintain the best practices reflected in the October 2017 Policies and make additional improvements to its policies consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
- ¶156 CPD's use of force policies and training, supervision, and accountability systems will be designed, implemented, and maintained so that CPD members:
- a. act at all times in a manner consistent with the sanctity of human life;
  - b. act at all times with a high degree of ethics, professionalism, and respect for the public;
  - c. use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible;
  - d. use sound tactics to eliminate the need to use force or reduce the amount of force that is needed;
  - e. only use force that is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances;
  - f. only use force for a lawful purpose and not to punish or retaliate;
  - g. continually assess the situation and modify the use of force as circumstances change and in ways that are consistent with officer safety, including stopping the use of force when it is no longer necessary;
  - h. truthfully and completely report all reportable instances of force used;
  - i. promptly report any use of force that is excessive or otherwise in violation of policy;
  - j. are held accountable, consistent with complaint and disciplinary policies, for use of force that is not objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, or that otherwise violates law or policy; and
  - k. act in a manner that promotes trust between CPD and the communities it serves.
- ¶157 CPD will collect and analyze information on the use of force by CPD members, including whether and to what extent CPD members use de-escalation techniques in connection with use of force incidents. CPD will use this information to assess whether its policies, training, tactics, and practices meet the goals of this Agreement, reflect best practices, and prevent or reduce the need to use force.
- ¶161 CPD recently adopted de-escalation as a core principle. CPD officers must use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force whenever safe and feasible. CPD officers are required to de-escalate potential and ongoing use of force incidents whenever safe and feasible through the use of techniques that may include, but are not limited to, the following:
- a. using time as a tactic by slowing down the pace of an incident;
  - b. employing tactical positioning and re-positioning to isolate and contain a subject, to create distance between an officer and a potential threat, or to utilize barriers or cover;
  - c. continual communication, including exercising persuasion and advice, and providing a warning prior to the use of force;
  - d. requesting assistance from other officers, mental health personnel, or specialized units, as necessary and appropriate; and
  - e. where appropriate, use trauma-informed communication techniques, including acknowledging confusion or mistrust, or using a respectful tone.
- ¶162 Consistent with CPD's commitment to preventing and reducing the need for force, CPD officers will allow individuals to voluntarily comply with lawful orders whenever safe and feasible (e.g., allowing individuals the opportunity to submit to arrest before force is used).



- ¶163 CPD officers may only use force for a lawful purpose. CPD officers are prohibited from using force as punishment or retaliation, such as using force to punish or retaliate against a person for fleeing, resisting arrest, insulting an officer, or engaging in protected First Amendment activity (e.g., lawful demonstrations, protected speech, observing or filming police activity, or criticizing an officer or the officer's conduct).
- ¶164 CPD officers must only use force when it is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶165 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force except in circumstances where there is an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person. CPD officers are not permitted to use deadly force against a person who is a threat only to himself or herself or to property. CPD officers may only use deadly force as a last resort.
- ¶166 CPD officers are prohibited from using deadly force against fleeing subjects who do not pose an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to an officer or another person.
- ¶168 Starting no later than January 1, 2019, CPD will track and analyze the frequency with which CPD officers engage in foot pursuits of persons attempting to evade arrest or detention by fleeing on foot, regardless of whether the foot pursuit is associated with a reportable use of force incident. CPD will track foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents through TRRs or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement.
- ¶169 For foot pursuits associated with reportable use of force incidents, by January 1, 2020, CPD will review all associated foot pursuits at the headquarters level to identify any tactical, equipment, or training concerns.
- ¶170 CPD recently issued a foot pursuit training bulletin. By July 1, 2019, CPD will develop and issue a supplemental foot pursuit training bulletin that reflects best practices from foot pursuit policies in other jurisdictions. The supplemental training bulletin will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and OAG. The supplemental training bulletin will:
- identify risks and tactical factors officers should consider prior to initiating and during the course of a foot pursuit;
  - provide guidance to officers regarding radio communications during a foot pursuit;
  - instruct officers to avoid, to the extent practical, separating from other officers in the course of a foot pursuit;
  - provide guidance on circumstances when alternatives to a foot pursuit may be appropriate; and
  - inform officers that they must follow supervisors' instructions in the course of a foot pursuit, including instructions to alter tactics or discontinue the pursuit.
- ¶172 By no later than January 1, 2021, the Monitor will complete an assessment of CPD data and information to determine whether CPD should adopt a foot pursuit policy. If the Monitor recommends that CPD should adopt a foot pursuit policy, CPD will adopt a foot pursuit policy no later than July 1, 2021. Any foot pursuit policy adopted by CPD will be subject to review and approval by the Monitor and OAG.
- ¶173 Following a use of force, once the scene is safe and as soon as practicable, CPD officers must immediately request appropriate medical aid for injured persons or persons who claim they are injured.
- ¶176 CPD officers must recognize and act upon the duty to intervene on the subject's behalf when another officer is using excessive force.
- ¶177 Consistent with CPD policy that force must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional, CPD officers must generally not use force against a person who is handcuffed or otherwise restrained absent circumstances such as when the person's actions must be immediately stopped to prevent injury or escape or when compelled by other law enforcement objectives.
- ¶178 CPD officers are prohibited from using carotid artery restraints or chokeholds (or other maneuvers for applying direct pressure on a windpipe or airway, i.e., the front of the neck, with the intention of reducing the intake of air) unless deadly force is authorized. CPD officers must not use chokeholds or other maneuvers for intentionally putting pressure on a person's airway or carotid artery restraints as take-down techniques.
- ¶183 CPD will require officers to issue a verbal warning prior to the use of any reportable force, including the use of firearms, when it is safe and feasible to do so.
- ¶184 When CPD officers discharge firearms, they must continually assess the circumstances that necessitated the discharge and modify their use of force accordingly, including ceasing to use their firearm when the circumstances no longer require it





# RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

- (e.g., when a subject is no longer a threat).
- ¶185 CPD will continue to prohibit officers from firing warning shots.
- ¶186 CPD officers must not fire at moving vehicles when the vehicle is the only force used against the officer or another person, except in extreme circumstances when it is a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily harm to a person, such as when a vehicle is intentionally being used to attack a person or group of people. CPD will continue to instruct officers to avoid positioning themselves or remaining in the path of a moving vehicle, and will provide officers with adequate training to ensure compliance with this instruction.
- ¶187 CPD will prohibit officers from firing from a moving vehicle unless such force is necessary to protect against an imminent threat to life or to prevent great bodily harm to the officer or another person.
- ¶188 By January 1, 2019, CPD will develop a training bulletin that provides guidance on weapons discipline, including circumstances in which officers should and should not point a firearm at a person. CPD will incorporate training regarding pointing of a firearm in the annual use of force training required by this Agreement in 2019.
- ¶189 CPD will clarify in policy that when a CPD officer points a firearm at a person to detain the person, an investigatory stop or an arrest has occurred, which must be documented. CPD will also clarify in policy that officers will only point a firearm at a person when objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
- ¶190 Beginning July 1, 2019, CPD officers will, at a minimum, promptly after the incident is concluded, notify OEMC of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer points a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The notification will identify which CPD beat(s) pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting the seizure. The City will ensure that OEMC data recording each such notification is electronically linked with CPD reports and body-worn camera recordings associated with the incident, and all are retained and readily accessible to the supervisor of each CPD beat(s) identified in the notification.
- ¶191 OEMC will notify an immediate supervisor of the identified beat(s) each time the pointing of a firearm is reported. Notified CPD supervisors will ensure that the investigatory stop or arrest documentation and the OEMC recordation of the pointing of a firearm are promptly reviewed in accordance with CPD policy. CPD supervisors will effectively supervise the CPD members under their command consistent with their obligations set forth in the Supervision section of this Agreement.
- ¶192 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected from all investigatory stop and arrest occurrences in which a CPD officer pointed a firearm at a person in the course of effecting a seizure. The review and audit will be completed within 30 days of each such occurrence. This review and audit will:
- a. identify whether the pointing of the firearm at a person allegedly violated CPD policy;
  - b. identify any patterns in such occurrences and, to the extent necessary, ensure that any concerns are addressed; and
  - c. identify any tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns and, to the extent necessary, ensure that the concerns are addressed.
- The designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will, where applicable, make appropriate referrals for misconduct investigations or other corrective actions for alleged violations of CPD policy. At the completion of each review and audit, the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will issue a written notification of its findings and, if applicable, any other appropriate actions taken or required to an immediate supervisor as described above.
- ¶193 CPD will ensure that the designated unit at the CPD headquarters level responsible for performing the duties required by this Part has sufficient resources to perform them, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶194 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of the pointing of a firearm at a person when the CPD officer is a SWAT Team Officer responding to a designated SWAT incident, as defined in CPD Special Order S05-05, or an officer assigned to a federal task force during the execution of federal task force duties.
- ¶195 CPD officers will not be required to notify OEMC of any un-holstering or display of a firearm or having a firearm in a “low ready” position during the course of an investigation, unless the firearm is pointed at a person
- ¶196 The City will ensure that all documentation and recordation of investigatory stop or arrest occurrences in which a CPD member points a firearm at a person, including OEMC data, is maintained in a manner that allows the Monitor, CPD, and OAG to review and analyze such occurrences. Beginning January 1, 2020, the Monitor will analyze these occurrences on an annual basis to assess whether changes to CPD policy, training, practice, or supervision are necessary, and to recommend



any changes to the process of documenting, reviewing, and analyzing these occurrences. CPD will either adopt the Monitor's recommendations or respond in writing within 30 days. Any dispute regarding the whether the Monitor's recommendations should be implemented will be resolved by the Court.

- ¶198 CPD will instruct officers that Tasers can cause serious injury or death and, as a result, officers should use Tasers only after balancing relevant factors including the threat presented by the subject, the risk of injury if a Taser is used, and the seriousness of the suspected offense. Consistent with this standard, CPD officers should not use Tasers against persons who are reasonably perceived to be non-violent, unarmed, and suspected of low-level offenses, such as property-related misdemeanors, quality of life offenses, moving or traffic violations, or municipal code violations.
- ¶199 CPD will clarify in policy that flight alone, without any other basis for reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause, does not justify use of a Taser against a subject.
- ¶200 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must give verbal commands and warnings prior to, during, and after deployment of a Taser. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers will allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use a Taser, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶201 CPD will strongly discourage the use of Tasers in schools and on students. CPD will require officers to consider the totality of the circumstances, including a subject's apparent age, size, and the threat presented, in assessing the reasonableness and necessity of using a Taser in a school.
- ¶202 CPD officers will treat each application or standard cycle (five seconds) of a Taser as a separate use of force that officers must separately justify as objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional. CPD will continue to require officers to, when possible, use only one five-second energy cycle and reassess the situation before any additional cycles are given or cartridges are discharged. In determining whether any additional application is necessary, CPD officers will consider whether the individual has the ability and has been given a reasonable opportunity to comply prior to applying another cycle.
- ¶203 CPD will require that if the subject has been exposed to three, five-second energy cycles (or has been exposed to a cumulative 15 total seconds of energy) and the officer has not gained control, officers switch to other force options unless the officer can reasonably justify that continued Taser use was necessary to ensure the safety of the officer or another person, recognizing that prolonged Taser exposure may increase the risk of death or serious injury.
- ¶205 CPD officers must request medical aid for a person subjected to a Taser application. CPD officers must place any person subjected to a Taser application in a position that does not impair respiration, as soon as it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must render life-saving aid to injured persons consistent with their training until medical professionals arrive on scene. Only trained medical personnel may remove Taser probes from a subject.
- ¶207 CPD officers may use OC devices only when such force is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.
- ¶208 CPD officers may only use OC devices for crowd dispersal when such force is necessary, objectively reasonable, and proportional to the threat presented to public safety. CPD will continue to require that the Superintendent or his or her designee provides authorization before OC devices are used for noncompliant groups, crowds, or an individual taking part in a group or crowd.
- ¶209 When safe and feasible to do so, CPD officers must issue verbal commands and warnings to the subject prior to, during, and after the discharge of an OC device. When safe and feasible to do so, CPD will require officers to allow a subject a reasonable amount of time to comply with a warning prior to using or continuing to use an OC device, unless doing so would compromise the safety of an officer or another person.
- ¶210 Each individual application of an OC device (e.g., each spray of an officer's personal OC device) by a CPD officer must be objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional under the totality of the circumstances, and consistent with the objectives above.



# RELEVANT CONSENT DECREE PARAGRAPHS

- ¶211 CPD officers must assist subjects exposed to application of an OC device with decontamination and flushing when it is safe and feasible to do so. CPD officers must request the appropriate medical aid for a subject after the discharge of an OC device if the subject appears to be in any physical distress, or complains of injury or aggravation of a pre-existing medical condition (e.g., asthma, emphysema, bronchitis, or a heart ailment).
- ¶213 CPD officers must not use impact weapons (e.g., baton, asp, improvised impact weapons) to intentionally strike a subject in the head or neck, except when deadly force is justified
- ¶216 CPD officers must request appropriate medical aid for a subject who experiences an impact weapon strike when the subject appears to be in any physical distress or complains of injury, or when the subject sustained a strike to the head from an impact weapon or a hard, fixed object. CPD officers must render life-saving aid to the subject consistent with the officers' training until medical professionals arrive on scene.
- ¶217 To be effective, the foundation of CPD's accountability system must be CPD members. When CPD members use force, they must be able to demonstrate that the force used complies with the law and CPD policy. When a member's use of force does not comply with the law and CPD policy, the member's supervisors must be able to identify the non-compliance and take appropriate action to address it. To facilitate evaluation of how CPD members use force, CPD will ensure that members report incidents when they use force and that supervisors collect and review available information about the incidents.
- ¶220 In completing the TRR, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, CPD members must include a narrative that describes with specificity the use of force incident, the subject's actions, or other circumstances necessitating the level of force used; and the involved member's response, including de-escalation efforts attempted and the specific types and amounts of force used. The narrative requirement does not apply to CPD members who discharged a firearm in the performance of duty or participated in an officer-involved death in the performance of duty. Any CPD member who observes or is present when another CPD member discharges a firearm or uses other deadly force must complete a written witness statement prior to the end of his or her tour of duty. CPD members will note in their TRRs the existence of any body-worn camera or in-car camera audio or video footage, and whether any such footage was viewed in advance of completing the TRR or any other incident reports. CPD members must complete TRRs, or whatever similar documentation CPD may implement, and other reports related to the incident, truthfully and thoroughly.
- ¶222 A CPD supervisor will immediately respond to the scene when a level 2 or level 3 reportable use of force occurs ("responding supervisor"). CPD supervisors may, at their discretion, respond to the scene when a level 1 reportable use of force occurs, but they are not required to do so.
- ¶223 For level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, the duties of the responding supervisor will include, at a minimum:
- a. identifying known available witnesses to the use of force to the extent reasonably possible and documenting their identities and statements in a written report, except in incidents for which the Civilian Office of Police Accountability ("COPA") receives administrative notifications and responds to the scene;
  - b. coordinating with COPA, as appropriate;
  - c. gathering and preserving evidence related to the use of force;
  - d. requesting the assignment of an evidence technician to photograph persons involved in the incident, including any injuries sustained;
  - e. ensuring that members and subjects receive appropriate medical care;
  - f. making notifications as required by CPD policy;
  - and g. reviewing reports regarding the incident for legibility and completeness.
- ¶224 In addition, for level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents involving an injury or complaint of injury for which COPA does not have jurisdiction, the responding supervisor will undertake reasonable efforts to identify and interview additional witnesses beyond those that are known and available.
- ¶225 A supervisor who used force or ordered force to be used during a reportable use of force incident will not perform the duties assigned to the responding supervisor for that incident
- ¶226 CPD will continue to require the responding supervisor to document information collected and actions taken in performing his or her investigatory duties in the supervisor's portion of the TRR, or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement.



- ¶227 Any CPD member who becomes aware of information indicating that a reportable use of force occurred but was not reported must immediately notify his or her supervisor.
- ¶228 Supervisors play a critical role in ensuring that force is used legally, consistent with CPD policy, and in a manner that will promote community confidence in the Department. Supervisor reviews and investigations of uses of force are essential to identify necessary individual and departmental corrective action.
- ¶229 All reportable uses of force by CPD members must be reviewed by CPD supervisors.
- ¶230 After a reportable use of force has occurred, required TRRs have been completed, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 incidents, a responding supervisor has documented any investigatory information collected, the incident will be reviewed and evaluated by a CPD supervisor at least the rank of Lieutenant, and in all instances at least one rank level above that of the highest-ranking member who engaged in the reportable use of force, or by a command staff member, when designated (“reviewing supervisor”).
- ¶231 The reviewing supervisor will conduct an investigation into the reportable use of force incident by reviewing all information reasonably available regarding the incident, including written reports, video or audio recordings, and, in the case of level 2 and level 3 reportable use of force incidents, witness statements, photographs (if available), and other evidence or information collected by the responding supervisor. After advising the subject of his or her right not to answer questions and other applicable rights, and only if the subject voluntarily consents to an interview, the reviewing supervisor will interview the subject solely about the reportable use of force. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will visually inspect the subject and document any injuries observed.
- ¶232 For all reportable uses of force, the reviewing supervisor will determine, based on the information reviewed, if the use of force requires a notification to COPA and will assess whether the use of force was in compliance with CPD policy (except for incidents involving deadly force or an officer-involved death). The reviewing supervisor will also review the TRR, or any similar form of documentation CPD may implement, for sufficiency and completeness.
- ¶233 For all reportable use of force incidents, the reviewing supervisor will: provide timely, constructive feedback, where appropriate, to the officer who engaged in the reportable use of force, the officer’s supervisor, or both; recommend additional training and/or support as necessary based on the incident; take appropriate action, including referring uses of force that may violate law or CPD policy to COPA.
- ¶234 CPD will continue to require the reviewing supervisor to document in a Tactical Response Report – Investigation (“TRR-I”), or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, his or her detailed assessment of compliance with CPD policy, any constructive feedback, and any required or recommended action. In addition, the reviewing supervisor will include in the TRR-I or in any other similar form of documentation CPD may implement, the identities of CPD members on scene during the incident who are reasonably believed to have relevant knowledge or information regarding the reportable use of force
- ¶235 All district-level supervisory review documentation regarding a reportable use of force incident must be completed within 48 hours of the incident, unless an extension is approved by a command staff member.
- ¶236 CPD will continue to develop, implement, and maintain a system of video recording officers’ encounters with the public with body-worn cameras. The use of body-worn cameras will be designed to increase officer accountability, improve trust and CPD legitimacy in the community, and augment CPD’s records of law enforcement-related activities.
- ¶237 CPD will continue to require all officers assigned to patrol field duties to wear body-worn cameras and microphones with which to record law-enforcement related activities as outlined in the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-1 et seq.), with limited exceptions, including, but not limited to, when requested by a victim or witness of a crime, or interacting with a confidential informant. CPD will develop and implement a written policy delineating the circumstances when officers will not be equipped with body worn cameras.



- ¶238 CPD will continue to maintain a policy regarding body-worn camera video and audio recording that will require officers to record their law-enforcement related activities, and that will ensure the recordings are retained in compliance with the Department's Forms Retention Schedule (CPD-11.717) and the Illinois Law Enforcement Officer-Worn Body Camera Act. At a minimum, CPD's body-worn camera policy will:
- a. clearly state which officers are required to use body-worn cameras and under which circumstances;
  - b. require officers, subject to limited exceptions specified in writing, to activate their cameras when responding to calls for service and during all law enforcement-related activities that occur while on duty, and to continue recording until the conclusion of the incident(s);
  - c. require officers to articulate in writing or on camera their reason(s) for failing to record an activity that CPD policy otherwise requires to be recorded;
  - d. require officers to inform subjects that they are being recorded unless doing so would be unsafe, impractical, or impossible;
  - e. address relevant privacy considerations, including restrictions on recording inside a home, and the need to protect witnesses, victims, and children;
  - f. establish a download and retention protocol;
  - g. require periodic random review of officers' videos for compliance with CPD policy and training purposes;
  - h. require that the reviewing supervisor review videos of incidents involving reportable uses of force by a subordinate; and
  - i. specify that officers who knowingly fail to comply with the policy may be subject to progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action.
- ¶239 CPD officers must comply with the body-worn camera policy. CPD will impose progressive discipline, training, or other remedial action on officers who do not comply with the body-worn camera policy, as permitted by applicable law.
- ¶574 A designated unit at the CPD headquarters level will routinely review and audit documentation and information collected regarding each level 2 reportable use of force incident, a representative sample of level 1 reportable use of force, and incidents involving accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries to ensure:
- a. CPD members completely and thoroughly reported the reason for the initial stop, arrest, or other enforcement action, the type and amount of force used, the subject's actions or other circumstances necessitating the level of force, and all efforts to de-escalate the situation;
  - b. the district-level supervisory review, investigation, and policy compliance determinations regarding the incident were thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policy;
  - c. any tactical, equipment, or policy concerns are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed; and
  - d. any patterns related to use of force incidents are identified and, to the extent necessary, addressed.
- ¶575 CPD recently established a Force Review Unit ("FRU") and tasked the FRU with certain responsibilities described in the preceding paragraph. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities has sufficient resources to perform them. CPD will ensure that the FRU or any other unit tasked with these responsibilities is staffed with CPD members, whether sworn or civilian, with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise to: effectively analyze and assess CPD's use of force practices and related reporting and review procedures; conduct trend analysis based on use of force data; identify tactical, equipment, training, or policy concerns based on analysis of use of force incidents and data; and develop recommendations regarding modifications to tactics, equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address identified practices or trends relating to the use of force.
- ¶577 CPD will create a Force Review Board ("FRB") to review, from a Department improvement perspective:
- (a) any level 3 reportable use of force incident, except for accidental firearms discharges and animal destructions with no human injuries, and
  - (b) any reportable uses of force by a CPD command staff member.





- ¶578 For any reportable use of force incident subject to an ongoing investigation by COPA, COPA will be exclusively responsible for recommending disciplinary action relating to the incident. The purpose of FRB's review will be to:
- evaluate if actions by CPD members during the incident were tactically sound and consistent with CPD training; and
  - if applicable, identify specific modifications to existing policy, training, tactics, or equipment that could minimize the risk of deadly force incidents occurring and the risk of harm to officers and the public.
- ¶579 The FRB will be chaired by the Superintendent, or his or her designee, and will include, at a minimum, the Chief of the Bureau of Patrol, or his or her designee, and CPD members at the rank of Deputy Chief, or above, who are responsible for overseeing policy development, policy implementation, training, and misconduct investigations. CPD's General Counsel, or his or her designee, will also serve on the FRB.
- ¶833 When directed by a 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit after-action support recommendation, CPD supervisors will review the BWC footage from the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down with the involved officer(s). CPD supervisors will document the viewing of the BWC footage and the results of the after-action support in the appropriate supervisory reports. E. Data Collection
- ¶848 As part of CPD's annual report on investigatory stops and Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders, CPD will conduct an assessment of: (1) the relative frequency of all investigatory stops made by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity, gender, age, or perceived or known disability status for the prior calendar year, (2) the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers, and (3) an analysis of the relative frequency of requests for consent to search and searches conducted based on consent. For informational purposes only, CPD will identify the relative frequency of all Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders issued by CPD officers of persons in specific demographic categories, including race/ethnicity and gender. The report will clearly indicate that the assessment of Loitering Ordinance dispersal orders based on demographic categories is for informational purposes only because the demographic classifications are based on the subjective observations of the CPD officer(s) who (1) pursuant to CPD policy, will not have stopped the individual to conduct the dispersal and (2) lacks the means to validate or confirm the demographic classifications.
- ¶853 CPD will ensure that the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit has sufficient resources to perform these review duties promptly, efficiently, and effectively, including staff with sufficient experience, rank, knowledge, and expertise.
- ¶854 Beginning at the entry of this Stipulation, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform the Department-level reviews, consistent with the requirements of Paragraph 857(a) through (d) of this Stipulation, of 5% of the backlog of ISR reviews maintained in the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit for January 1, 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation.
- ¶855 The backlog of ISR reviews consists of 15% of all ISRs completed during 2021 through the entry of this Stipulation that have been randomly selected.
- ¶856 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will create and submit to the Monitor and OAG a summary to report the demographic and geographic distribution of the individuals subject to the investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed as prescribed in Paragraph 854 of this Stipulation.
- ¶857 The 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will perform regular Department level reviews of a representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports, including a representative sample of those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, submitted by CPD officers after the entry of this Stipulation, sufficient to reach relevant and reliable observations on:
- Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop;
  - Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly reported all factors that established the reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the protective pat down;
  - Whether CPD officers completely and thoroughly completed the report and complied with CPD policy; and



- d. Whether supervisory review was timely, thorough, complete, objective, and consistent with CPD policies.
- ¶858 For the representative sample of ISRs and Stop Reports described in Paragraph 857 of this Stipulation, CPD must demonstrate that the subset of investigatory stops and protective pat-downs reviewed is demographically and geographically representative of community members stopped by CPD officers throughout Chicago.
- ¶859 CPD will recommend an involved officer(s) and their supervisor review the BWC footage for the identified investigatory stop or protective pat down conducted by the involved officer(s), after the involved officer has submitted five ISRs or Stop Reports within a 90-day period that have resulted in a recommendation for after-action support to resolve a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion.
- ¶860 On a semi-annual basis, the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit will report on the ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed beginning with the time period ending with December 31, 2023, including those completed for the enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances, and identify:
- a. The total number of ISRs and Stop Reports reviewed by the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit;
  - b. Any trends or patterns relating to investigatory stops, protective pat downs, and enforcement of the Loitering Ordinances identified through the 4th Amendment Street Stop Review Unit reviews;
  - c. The number of reports rejected by supervisors and categories of reason for rejection;
  - d. The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected;
  - e. The number of officers who had multiple ISRs and Stop Reports rejected for a lack of sufficient description of reasonable articulable suspicion; and
  - f. Any equipment, training, or policy concerns, and to the extent necessary, recommendations regarding modifications to equipment, training, or policy as necessary to address those concerns.
- ¶861 CPD will develop a timeline for implementation of the recommendations provided for in Paragraph 860(f) of this Stipulation and consult at the earliest feasible time with the Monitor and OAG, with the goal of developing consensus on the substance and timetable for the implementation of recommendations, subject to the processes provided for in Paragraph 627 of the Consent Decree for policies and Paragraph 641 of the Consent Decree for training. H. Community Engagement operationally equivalent units).



# ACRONYMS AND TERMS

The following is a listing of acronyms and terms utilized by the Tactical Review and Evaluation Division.

<b>4ASRU</b>	Fourth Amendment Stop Review Unit
<b>Advisements and Recommendations</b>	TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a TRR review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training which, once complete, must be documented by a supervisor in the TRR.
<b>AXON</b>	Company that provides the Body Worn Camera system utilized by CPD officers.
<b>BWC</b>	Body-Worn Camera
<b>BWC Early Termination</b>	Indicates that the involved member deactivated his BWC before the conclusion of an incident.
<b>BWC Late Activation</b>	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at the beginning of an incident.
<b>BWC No Activation</b>	Indicates that the involved member did not activate his BWC at any point during an incident.
<b>BWC Other Issues</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue relating to BWC usage.
<b>Control Tactics Not Articulated</b>	The involved member indicated that they used control tactics by checking the action on their TRR but did not articulate how or when they were used.
<b>DP</b>	Debriefing Point
<b>ET</b>	Evidence Technician
<b>Foot Pursuit Issue</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous issue related to a foot pursuit.
<b>Foot Pursuit – Radio Communications</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified that the involved member did not follow the guidelines laid out in Training Bulletin 18-01.
<b>Force Mit – Communication</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of communication as a Force Mitigation tactic.
<b>Force Mit. – Not Articulated</b>	The involved member indicated that they used the principles of Force Mitigation by checking it on the TRR but failed to articulate the actions in the narrative portion of their TRR.
<b>Force Mit. – Positioning</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of positioning as a Force Mitigation tactic.
<b>Force Mit. – Time</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers observed an issue with either the reporting or application of time as a Force Mitigation tactic.



<b>Force Options</b>	Indicates that the involved member incorrectly identified subject's actions or member's response in relation to the CPD Force Options Model.
<b>FP</b>	Foot/Bicycle Pursuit Report
<b>FPI</b>	Firearm Pointing Incident
<b>FPIR</b>	Firearm Pointing Incident Report
<b>IDR</b>	Incident Debriefing Report
<b>ISR</b>	Investigatory Stop Report
<b>Narrative Deficiency</b>	Refers to various issues identified by TRED reviewers regarding an involved member's narrative or that of a reviewing or approving supervisor. Typically this involves the member failing to adequately articulate, in writing, a portion of the incident.
<b>OEMC</b>	Office of Emergency Management & Communications
<b>Other – Policy Procedure</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a miscellaneous policy or procedure issue.
<b>Other – Tactics</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified miscellaneous tactical issues.
<b>Performance Recognition System</b>	The Performance Recognition System is an assessment tool for assisting Department supervisors in recognizing exceptional or adverse behavior related to the job performance of members under their command.
<b>PERGUN</b>	Person with a gun call for service
<b>PERKNI</b>	Person with a knife call for service
<b>PERSTB</b>	Person stabbed call for service
<b>Pursuit Box Not Checked</b>	Foot or vehicle pursuit box on the Tactical Response Report was either omitted or incorrectly checked.
<b>PNT</b>	Pointing notification
<b>Radio Communications</b>	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue relating to the involved member's use of radio to communicate with dispatchers or other officers.
<b>Recommendations and Advisements</b>	TRED debriefings are classified as either Advisements or Recommendations. Advisements are informal training insights provided to the involved member or involved supervisor(s) from observations made during the course of a review. By comparison, recommendations are more formal in nature. Recommendations require specific follow-up training.
<b>Search Issue</b>	Indicates an issue was identified by TRED reviewers relating to the involved member's search of a subject.
<b>Taser – Accidental Discharge</b>	The involved member reported accidentally discharging a Taser device.
<b>Taser – Crossfire</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified a crossfire situation involving a Taser.



# ACRONYMS AND TERMS

<b>Taser – Other</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding Taser handling, use, or reporting.
<b>Taser – Over 5 Seconds</b>	Involved member utilized a Taser cycle that exceeds five seconds.
<b>TRR</b>	Tactical Response Report
<b>TRR-I</b>	Tactical Response Report Investigation
<b>TRED</b>	Tactical Review and Evaluation Division
<b>TRR Box Issue</b>	One or more boxes on the Tactical Response Report were either omitted or incorrectly checked.
<b>TRR Inconsistency – External</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency between the TRR or TRR-I and other reports (e.g. Arrest Report or Case Incident Report).
<b>TRR Inconsistency – Internal</b>	Indicates that TRED reviewers identified an inconsistency within the TRR or TRR-I.
<b>Vehicle Extraction</b>	Indicates TRED reviewers identified an issue regarding the involved member’s actions while extracting (removing) a subject from a motor vehicle.
<b>VIRTRA</b>	A 300-degree small arms judgmental use of force and decision-making simulator for law enforcement training. This intense, immersive training environment takes into account every detail from the smallest pre-attack indicators to the most cognitive overload stimuli situations imaginable.